JUDGMENT 1. - These appeals have been filed by the General Manager, North Eastern Railway & Another and Union of India through the General Manager, North Eastern Railway against the award passed by the learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur whereby the claim preferred by the respondents on account of loss in transit and shortfall in the consignment at the destination point. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the present one is a case where the goods were loaded in the open box wagons at the siding of the respondents and the RRs were prepared on the basis of said to contain" certain quantity of goods. It was submitted that the consignment was loaded under the supervision of the respondent and, therefore, the Railways cannot be saddled with the liability for the shortfall, as alleged. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents pointed out that in both these cases there is a distinction and the law relating to the avoidance of the liability by the Railways in the event of shortfall at the point of destination in cases of RRs issued on the basis of the - said to contain" where the loading has been done at the siding of the consignor under supervision of the consignor would be applied. It was pointed out and which is not disputed by the appellants and also as held by the learned Tribunal that enroute from the point of dispatch to the point of destination, the consignment was handled in the presence of the appellant-Railways and transshipment was carried out. The claim of the respondent which has been allowed by the learned Tribunal is in respect of the shortfall in the quantity between the quantity which was found at the time of transshipment which was done in the presence of the appellants and difference between the quantity which reached the destination. 4.
The claim of the respondent which has been allowed by the learned Tribunal is in respect of the shortfall in the quantity between the quantity which was found at the time of transshipment which was done in the presence of the appellants and difference between the quantity which reached the destination. 4. I am of the view that the approach of the learned Tribunal, in the facts and circumstances, does not call for any interference as so far as the original quantity which was loaded in the wagons at the point in the Railway siding of the respondent itself is concerned, that cannot be accepted as the loading was carried out not in the presence of the appellants but under the supervision of the respondents and the Railways only issued the RR on the basis of "said to contain" and with the said remark. It is not this quantity which is mentioned in the RR prepared at the station of dispatch with the remark "said to contain" which has been taken into account by the learned Tribunal but the quantity which the wagon was found to be carrying and measured jointly at the station of transshipment. Once at the point of transshipment, the consignment was handled enroute in the presence of the appellants, the quantity which was found in the consignment at the point of transshipment would be considered to be the quantity of the goods entrusted to the appellants and, therefore, any shortfall in the said quantity could have been taken into account. This is precisely what has been done in the present case as damages have been awarded for the loss taking into account the quantity at point of joint inspection at transshipment station and the shortfall at destination station and not the dispatch station. 5. Since the learned Tribunal has in the impugned judgments only awarded the compensation on account of this shortfall between the consignment which was accounted for at the point for transshipment and at the point of destination, the judgment of the learned Tribunal awarding compensation for the same does not call for any interference. 6. Hence, I find no reason to interfere with the award of compensation determined by the learned Tribunal as the basis of the findings arrived at. 7.
6. Hence, I find no reason to interfere with the award of compensation determined by the learned Tribunal as the basis of the findings arrived at. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that that looking to the present rates of interest which are prevailing the award of interest @ 12% per annum with effect from the date of the filing of the claim petition in the year 1994 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1996 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) would be a very high and an exorbitant amount would be required to be paid as a period of more than 14 years (in Appeal No.507/97) and 12 years (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) has elapsed since the date of the submission of the claim petition in 1994 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1996 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98). 8. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the respondents-claimants has been deprived of the fruits of the award for a long time and the appellants on the other hand sought the stay of the award before the Court. Hence the appellant cannot, therefore, be permitted to contend that the amount of interest should not be @ 12% per annum as has been awarded by the learned Tribunal in its judgments dated 13.09.1996 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 19.11.1997 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98). 9. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and I find that there is substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant as award of interest @ 12% per annum in the facts and circumstances of the present case with effect from the date of the application in the year 1994 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1996 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) would result in virtually multiplying the amount and making it more than two times the principle amount awarded. While the idea behind awarding interest is to compensate for the delay the same has to be reasonably awarded. Even the award of interest, assuming that the rate of interest in the year 1994 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1996 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) was much higher than the present prevailing rates the rate of interest of 12% appears to be on the higher side.
Even the award of interest, assuming that the rate of interest in the year 1994 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1996 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) was much higher than the present prevailing rates the rate of interest of 12% appears to be on the higher side. There also appears to be some justification in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that looking to the present rate of interest which have been fixed by the Reserve Bank, which if taken as a guiding factor the interest rate 12% as awarded appears to be on the higher side. 10. Since the matter has remained pending before this Court for a considerable period of time from 1997 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 1998 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) till date and the respondent has been deprived the fruits of the award on account of the stay by this Court, I deem it just and proper to direct that on the amount awarded the appellant shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the filing of the claim till the date of the award passed by the Tribunal i.e. 13.09.1996 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 19.11.1997 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98). However, so far as the rate of interest after 13.09.1996 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 19.11.1997 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) till the date of realisation is concerned looking to the fact that the present rate of interest have been slashed substantially and the period spent in the pendency of this appeal is also a substantially long period of 10 years the rate of interest to which the respondent claimant would be entitled w.e.f. 13.09.1996 (in Appeal No.507/97) and 19.11.1997 (in Appeals No.242/98 & 235/98) would be 6% per annum till the date of realization. 11. It is further made clear that in case the appellant fails to make the payment to the respondent-claimant on the basis of the above rate of interest within period of three months of the submission and the certified copy of this order to the appellant the respondent would be entitled to receive interest @ 9% per annum throughout. 12. Subject to the above all these appeals stand disposed of and partly allowed as indicated. There shall be no order as to costs. *******