Judgment :- The present appeal is by the accused in SC No.6/2003 on the file of the learned Session Judge, Kodagu, Madikeri (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’ for short). He has challenged in this appeal the judgment and order of conviction dated 1.6.2006 passed in the said case convicting him for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and sentencing him to undergo R1 for 7 years and also to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-with default sentence of R1 for a further period of six months. 2. On 5.8.2009, the learned counsel for the appellant – accused submitted that the presence of the accused before this Court may be secured by issuing body warrant against him as he requires his presence for seeking instructions from him on the question of sentence. Accordingly, body warrant was issued against the appellant – accused. In response thereto, the superintendent of Central prison, Mysore, submitted his report that the accused, who was convicted for the offence under Section 307 IPC by the Trial Court in the said case came to be released from the prison on 9.7.2009 on his completion of the term of imprisonment and payment of fine of Rs.2,000/- as imposed by the Trial court. 3. Learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that since the appellant – accused has already been released from the prison on his completion of term of imprisonment, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed as having become infructuous. 4. Per contra, Sri D Basavarajappa, the learned counsel for the appellant – accused submitted that if the judgment and order of conviction and sentence is allowed to remain on record, it will adversely affect the future of the accused and therefore this appeal may be disposed of in accordance with law on hearing both the sides on merits. Accepting his said submission, I have heard the arguments of both the sides on merits. Perused the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and the entire material found in the original records obtained from the Trial Court. 5. The case of the prosecution is: “On 20.9.2002 at about 2 PM, while the accused was putting some size stones in the open space in front of the house of the complainant, the husband of the complainant namely PW5 Lokesh objected to the same and therefore, there started exchange of words between the accused and PW5. 5. The case of the prosecution is: “On 20.9.2002 at about 2 PM, while the accused was putting some size stones in the open space in front of the house of the complainant, the husband of the complainant namely PW5 Lokesh objected to the same and therefore, there started exchange of words between the accused and PW5. On hearing the said galata PW4 Naveen, the son of PWs.3 & 5 came there and intervened. The accused, being enraged, suddenly took out a knife and assaulted PW4 Naveen and thereby inflicted severe injuries on his left upper arm and left side of abdomen and thereby committed the said offence.” 6. PW1, the Lady Medical Officer, has stated in her evidence that on 20.9.2002 at about 2.50 PM i.e., within one hour of the occurrence of the incident, the injured was examined by her and she found on his person (1) a deep lacerated wound on the lateral aspect of left upper arm measuring 4 x 2 ½ x 2 inches and (2) another deep incised wound on the left side of the abdomen and both the said injuries were severe and there was bleeding. She has further deposed that she issued Ex.P1 wound certificate for having examined the said injured. 7. PW2 Dr. Ajith Kumar is another Medical Officer of the District Hospital, Madikeri. He has deposed that on the very date of the said incident, he examined the said injured. PW10 Dr. P. Saroja is yet another Medical Officer at Wenlock Hospital, Mangalore. She has deposed that on 20.9.2002 at about 9.15 pm, she examined the injured Naveen and found on his person one sutured wound on his left arm and one incised wound on abdomen penetrating into the cavity and that she has issued Ex.P12 would certificate. 8. The above evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 10 Medical Officers who examined the injured Naveen (PW4) on the very date of incident goes to show that the injuries sustained by him were severe in nature. Further, the evidence of PW3 Janaki, the mother of PW4 injured Naveen and that of his father PW5 Lokesh, as to the occurrence of the incident is consistent with each other. Further, the evidence of PW3 Janaki, the mother of PW4 injured Naveen and that of his father PW5 Lokesh, as to the occurrence of the incident is consistent with each other. They have consistently deposed that on the said date, time and place when the accused was putting size stones in front of the house of PW5 Lokesh, the latter objected to the same, the accused picked up quarrel with him and, on hearing galata, PW4 injured Naveen came from inside the house and intervened and then, the accused became enraged and suddenly took the knife and assaulted the injured and thereby inflicted the said injuries. This evidence falls in line with the allegation in the complaint Ex.P4. 9. The above evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 10, the Medical Officers, and that of PW4 injured Naveen, PWs.3 & 5 his parents clearly establishes that on the said date and time, the accused quarreled with PW5 Lokesh and when his son PW4 Naveen intervened, the accused became enraged and assaulted him (PW4) with knife and thereby inflicted on his person the said severe injuries. 10. Referring to the evidence of PWs.3 & 5, the parents of the injured Naveen and that of the said Naveen and the nature of injuries sustained by the injured, Sri D. Basavarajappa, the learned counsel for the appellant – accused, strongly contended that the accused is shown to have assaulted the injured in the heat of passion during the quarrel, without any pre-meditation, with intent to cause some injuries on the injured and therefore, it could not be said that the accused caused the said injuries on the person of the injured with such intention and under such circumstances as, had he caused the death of the injured by doing so, he would have been guilty of committing murder of the injured. While submitting so, he further submitted that neither of the injuries inflicted by the accused on the person of the injured falls within the definition of ‘grievous injury’ as defined u/s. 320 IPC. It could be seen the though the injury on the abdomen was severe, the prosecution has not proved further that the same was grievous in nature as defined u/s. 320 IPC. It could be seen the though the injury on the abdomen was severe, the prosecution has not proved further that the same was grievous in nature as defined u/s. 320 IPC. He further submitted that though the accused inflicted the said injuries by assaulting with knife, a ‘dangerous weapon’ none of the said injuries was grievous in nature as defined under Section 320 IPC, the act of assault committed by the accused resulting in the said injuries to the injured, at the most, constitutes an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and not the one u/s. 307 IPC. 11. It is pertinent to note that the accused committed the said act of assault on the injured and thereby inflicted on his person the said injuries on the spur of the moment, in the heat of passion, without any premeditation, being enraged against the injured, as the injured intervened in the quarrel between himself (accused) and the father of the injured. Having regard to the circumstances under which the accused assaulted the injured, resulting in the said injuries, it could not be held that while so assaulting, he intended to cause the death of the injured or to cause him such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the injured. Therefore, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be held that while so assaulting the injured, the accused intended to cause some injuries to his person as he had intervened in the said quarrel. Besides this, none of the injuries is proved to have been ‘grievous’ in nature as defined under Section 320 IPC. 12. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the above submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant – accused deserve acceptance and conviction of the accused deserves to be altered to the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and consequently sentence of R1 for 7 years deserves to be reduced. Maximum period of imprisonment prescribed for the offence under Section 324 IPC is 3 years. Therefore, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case, I feel that the ends of justice would be met with if the appellant – accused is sentenced to undergo R1 for a period of two years only. 13. Before concluding my judgment, I feel it necessary to place on record some facts constituting delay in disposal of this appeal. 13. Before concluding my judgment, I feel it necessary to place on record some facts constituting delay in disposal of this appeal. (a) This unfortunate poor appellant – accused had no means to engage a counsel of his choice for preferring this appeal. Therefore, Sri D Basavarajappa, the learned Advocate came to be authorized by the High Court Legal Services Committee, by its order dated 27.12.2006 to present this appeal on behalf of the appellant – accused. Accordingly, this appeal came to be presented on 31.1.2007 alongwith I.A.I/07, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of about 183 days caused in filing the present appeal. (b) This appeal came to be listed for the first time on 13.3.2007. Unfortunately, the learned counsel representing the appellant – accused remained absent on that date of hearing and also on 17.4.2007. On 4.6.2007, he was heard and the appeal came to be admitted. (c) Thereafter, the appeal did not see the light of the day for more than one year and seven months till 23.01.2009 despite the appellant – accused being in prison on 23.01.2009 it did not reach. Therefore, it came to be listed for final hearing on 31.1.2009. Unfortunately, the learned counsel for the appellant was absent on that date of hearing and therefore the appeal was ordered to be listed next week i.e. by the end of first week of February, 2009. Though the appeal came to be listed on 25.2.2009, it could not reach and therefore it came to be re-listed on 27.2.2009 on which date also the learned counsel for the appellant remained absent and hence the appeal was ordered to be listed next week. (d) When this appeal was listed on 17.4.2009, on that date also the learned counsel for the appellant was not present. Therefore, it was ordered to be listed during next week. But it was listed on 9.6.2009 on which date it could not reach and therefore it was re-listed on 10.6.2009. (e) Order sheet dated 10.6.2009 discloses that the learned counsel for the appellant declined to argue the appeal and therefore the Court ordered that Bailable Warrant for Rs.10,000/- be issued against the accused directing him to appear on 18.6.2009. On 18.6.2009, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted to the Court that the appellant – accused had been in judicial custody. On 18.6.2009, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted to the Court that the appellant – accused had been in judicial custody. But the bailable warrant that was issued against the appellant – accused as per order dated 10.6.2009 was not returned. (f) On 5.8.2009, the learned counsel for the appellant – accused submitted that since the accused has been in judicial custody, his presence may be secured by issuing body warrant against him as he (learned counsel for the appellant) wanted to seek instructions from the appellant – accused. Therefore, body warrant came to be issued against the appellant – accused. In response thereto, one Sri Boraiah, the Assistant Superintendent of Central Prison, Mysore, submitted his report stating that the appellant – accused had already been set at liberty on his completion of the period of imprisonment imposed on him by the Trial Court. (g) On 10.8.2009, though the learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that in view of completion of the period of imprisonment that was imposed on the appellant – accused by the Trial Court, the appeal may be dismissed as having become infructuous, arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant – accused and the learned HCGP were heard on merits by accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant – accused that if the judgment and order of conviction and sentence is allowed to remain on record, it would adversely affect the future of the appellant – accused. 14. The above facts constituting delay in disposal of the instant appeal clearly go to show that for no fault on his part, the appellant – accused has suffered R1 for more than three times the period for which he is ultimately held liable to be imprisoned. This has resulted in great injustice to this poor appellant – accused inasmuch as, his Fundamental Rights viz: Right to personal liberty and Right to speedy disposal of his appeal have been violated. The injury which the accused – appellant has suffered by reason of violation of these valuable rights cannot be compensated either in terms of money or in any other manner. Every one, concerned with dispensation of justice in such matters, shall have to feel one’s responsibility and do the right things at the right time and thereby avoid repetition of such injustice as her been caused to the appellant – accused in this appeal. Every one, concerned with dispensation of justice in such matters, shall have to feel one’s responsibility and do the right things at the right time and thereby avoid repetition of such injustice as her been caused to the appellant – accused in this appeal. Therefore, I feel that the High Court needs to issue suitable ‘guidelines’ in respect of ‘speedy disposal of Criminal Appeals/Revisions, etc,’ wherein the accused – appellants/respondents/petitioners are in prison. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, I pass the following; ORDER The present appeal is allowed in part. The impugned judgment and order convicting and sentencing the appellant – accused for the offence under Section 307 IPC is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said offence. However, he is convicted for the offence under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to undergo R1 for a period of two years only. As on this date, the appellant – accused has already completed the term of imprisonment imposed on him by the Trial Court for the offence under Section 307 IPC and he has been released from prison. Therefore, no sentence of fine is imposed on him for the offence under Section 324 IPC. The fine of Rs.2,000/- which he has paid in compliance of the impugned judgment and order shall be refunded to him. The Registrar Judicial shall bring this judgment to the notice of Hon’ble Chief Justice and take suitable steps, including issuing of suitable ‘guidelines’ in respect of ‘speedy disposal of Criminal Appeals/Revisions, etc.’ wherein the accused – appellants/respondents/petitioners have been in prison.