H. L. GOKHALE, CJ. Heard Mr. Bhanot, in support of this appeal. Mr. Y. K. Agarwal with Lt. Cdr. G. D. Mukerji, appears for the respondent. 2. This appeal filed by the Union of India through the Chief of Army Staff and. its officers seeks to challenge the order passed by a learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent herein. The learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order dated 25. 9. 2003 has quashed and set aside the sentence awarded to the respondent in summary Court Martial on 6. 7. 1992 and subsequent order rejecting the annulment thereof vide order dated 10. 4. 1993. 3. The short facts leading to this appeal are this wise. The respondent herein joined the Indian Army on 18. 7. 1975 and at the relevant time in year 1992 was deployed with the 8th Bn. Brigade of the Guards in Assam in the counter insurgency operation as stated in paragraphs 6 and 10 of the counter to the writ petition affirmed by Capt. Pankaj Saxena. It so transpired that in the night of 4. 1. 1992 at about 10:00 p. m. , the respondent entered into the house of one Sri Dhaneshwar Das and tried to molest his wife (the name of lady is borne on the record of the writ petition, but it is purposely not mentioned in this judgment ). The wife of Sri Dhaneshwar Das had gone out of her house to fetch water and was returning with a bucket full of water in one hand and an oil lamp in the other. The respondent was sitting in front of her house. He put out the lamp in her hand. She woke up her husband immediately. The respondent was drunk. The lady offered him a stool to sit but instead he sat on the bed. She asked him if he would like to have Tamul, but he caught her wrist and pulled her towards him. She ran and caught her husband from behind. The respondent caught her blouse and tried to force his hand inside. The lady got scared and ran out to the house of one Sri Chandeshwar situated nearby and slept inside that house with his daughter. Much later, she came back to her house with Smt. Sona Devi wife of Sri Chandeshwar to get her clothes. The respondent caught her blouse and tried to force his hand inside. The lady got scared and ran out to the house of one Sri Chandeshwar situated nearby and slept inside that house with his daughter. Much later, she came back to her house with Smt. Sona Devi wife of Sri Chandeshwar to get her clothes. She spent her night in the house of Sri Chandeshwar. Houses of Dhaneshwar Das and Chandeshwar Singh were situated near Army Camp and they immediately contacted the persons over there and brought the incident to the notice of the Subedar Major and the members of the Armed Forces. Immediately, they arranged a test identification parade and the respondent was identified by Dhaneshwar Das. 4. The respondent was charged on three counts; (i) under Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950 for using criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty; (ii) under Section 39 (d) of the Army Act, 1950 for being absent from his place of duty and (iii) under Section 48 of the Army Act, 1950 for intoxication. A summary Court martial was held on 6. 7. 1992 by the third appellant-Commanding Officer of the 8th Bn. Brigade of Guards for the aforesaid three charges. The respondent was held guilty and by the order passed on the same day, the following punishments were awarded to the respondent: (a) to be reduced to the ranks; (b) to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment; and (c) to be dismissed from the service. 5. The respondent suffered the imprisonment where after on 1. 3. 1993 he filed a petition under Section 165 of the Army Act, 1950, addressed to the Commander, Headquarters 44 Mountain Brigade, who is appellant No. 2 herein for annulment of the proceedings of the summary Court martial. This petition was rejected by the order passed by the second appellant by his order dated 10. 4. 1993. 6. Being aggrieved by these two orders dated 6. 7. 1992 and 10. 4. 1993, the respondent herein filed a writ petition, bearing No. 5707 of 1994. The matter was heard by a learned Single Judge. This petition was rejected by the order passed by the second appellant by his order dated 10. 4. 1993. 6. Being aggrieved by these two orders dated 6. 7. 1992 and 10. 4. 1993, the respondent herein filed a writ petition, bearing No. 5707 of 1994. The matter was heard by a learned Single Judge. It was canvassed before the learned Single Judge that there was a breach of Army Rule 33 (7) and that the respondent was not provided with the summary of evidence 96 hours in advance contrary to the said rule, it was also submitted that he was not informed about the charges nor was he given an opportunity as required under Rule 34 of the said rules and that he was not provided with a friend of the accused as required under Rule 129 thereof. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the charge-sheet was served on 6. 7. 1992 and the summary Court martial was commenced and concluded on the same day. The learned Single Judge accepted those submissions and held that since the procedures as prescribed by the Army Act and Rules had not been followed, while conducting the trial, the summary Court martial proceedings were vitiated. He, therefore, set aside both those orders and allowed the writ petition by his judgment and order dated 25. 9. 2003. 7. Being aggrieved by this judgment and order, the appellants have filed this appeal. The appeal was admitted on 10. 7. 2007 and the operation of the judgment and order under appeal was stayed till the disposal of the appeal. 8. Mr. Ajay Bhanot, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, raised a preliminary objection and submitted that merely because the respondent is a resident of Allahabad, he had filed the writ petition in Allahabad High Court, although the entire cause of action had arisen in the North East India and this Honble Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the writ petition. He referred to and relied upon a judgment of Full Bench of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Misra v. Union of India, 2004 (4) ESC 2313 (FB) (Per: Justice Markandey Katju, A C. J. as His Lordship then was in this Court ). He referred to and relied upon a judgment of Full Bench of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Misra v. Union of India, 2004 (4) ESC 2313 (FB) (Per: Justice Markandey Katju, A C. J. as His Lordship then was in this Court ). After referring to a catena of judgments of the Apex Court, the Full Bench held that in a case where Court martial proceedings were conducted at Calcutta and the Chief of Army Staff was sought to be sued in Allahabad High Court, he can only be sued either at Delhi where he is located or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. 9. Mr. Bhanot submitted that merely because the respondent was residing in Allahabad, or he was sent some communication by the Army to his address in Allahabad, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Allahabad High Court. In his submission, the learned Single Judge had erred in exercising the jurisdiction and on this count alone his impugned judgment and order ought to be set aside. Similar has been the view of an earlier Division Bench of this Court that mere communication by the Armed Forces will not confer the jurisdiction on this High Court, where a sentence is imposed in a Court martial elsewhere or in Jammu & Kashmir, as in that case. This was in the case of Ex. No. 1387-5234-M Sepoy/d. B. /m. T. , Chabi Nath Rai v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 236 (Per: Justice D. P. Mohapatra and Justice Sudhir Narain, as their Lordships then were in this Court ). 10. Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Mukerji, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that this Court very much had jurisdiction. However, they submitted that in any case, the appellants had not raised any objection to the jurisdiction of this Court when the matter was heard before the learned Single Judge. They had not raised this objection even in their counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge and thus, acquiesced in the jurisdiction of this Court. However, they submitted that in any case, the appellants had not raised any objection to the jurisdiction of this Court when the matter was heard before the learned Single Judge. They had not raised this objection even in their counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge and thus, acquiesced in the jurisdiction of this Court. They relied upon the dicta of the Apex Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 , which is to the following effect: "it is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court to try a case. Competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. " 11. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court recently in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and another, JT 2005 (8) SC 561, which is to the following effect: "so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is nullity. " 12. We have noted the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Bhanot to the jurisdiction of this Court though at the same time, we cannot ignore the dicta of the Apex Court as quoted above, namely that the objection to the territorial jurisdiction has to be raised at the first instance. " 12. We have noted the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Bhanot to the jurisdiction of this Court though at the same time, we cannot ignore the dicta of the Apex Court as quoted above, namely that the objection to the territorial jurisdiction has to be raised at the first instance. However, for the reasons, which have been given hereinafter, it is not necessary to decide this objection. 13. Mr. Bhanot, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge had erred on facts in taking the view that the charge-sheet was dated 6. 7. 1992 and hence could not have been served on the respondent on 26. 6. 1992. Mr. Bhanot has taken us through the record of the writ petition and has drawn our attention to the papers, which have been filed before the learned Single Judge. There is a receipt of the respondent of having received the charge-sheet and summary of evidence on 26. 6. 1992. What the learned Single Judge has noted as charge-sheet dated 6. 7. 1992, is a document dated 6. 7. 1992 signed by the appellant No. 3, but it is a part of the proceedings of summary Court martial held on 6. 7. 1992. That is why the date of 6. 7. 1992 has been placed at the bottom of the papers wherein the charge-sheet is one of the documents. It is quite possible that a confusion may occur which is why the learned Single Judge has observed as to how a charge-sheet dated 6. 7. 1992 could have been served on the respondent on 26. 6. 1992. We have, however to rely upon the document on record. There is a receipt of the respondent dated 26. 6. 1992 receiving charge-sheet and summary of evidence before the trial and there are the proceedings of summary Court martial dated 6. 7. 1992 held subsequently. Amongst them, there is again a document with the title charge-sheet below which the date 6. 7. 1992 is typed since it is a part of the record of proceedings of 6. 7. 1992. In our view, the submission of Mr. Bhanot is well taken and when the documents are seen in totality as above, it is clear that the charge- sheet along with summary of evidence was served on 26. 6. 1992. In fact, in the counter affidavit filed by Capt. 7. 1992. In our view, the submission of Mr. Bhanot is well taken and when the documents are seen in totality as above, it is clear that the charge- sheet along with summary of evidence was served on 26. 6. 1992. In fact, in the counter affidavit filed by Capt. Saxena on behalf of the appellants before the learned Single Judge, it has been clearly stated in paragraph 3 (iv) that the charge sheet as required under the Act and the Rules was served upon the petitioner (respondent herein) well in advance much prior to 96 hours. This answers the objection based on Rule 33 (7), which is to the following effect: "33 (7) As soon as practicable after an accused has been remanded for trial by a general or district Court-martial, and in any case not less than ninety-six hours or on active service twenty-four hours before his trial, an officer shall give to him free of charge a copy of the summary of evidence, an abstract of the evidence, and explain to him his rights under these rules as to preparing his defence and being assisted or represented at the trial, and shall ask him to state in writing whether or not he wishes to have an officer assigned by the convening officer to represent him at the trial, if a suitable officer should be available. The convening officer shall be informed whether or not the accused so elects. " 14. The other objection is based on Rule 34 of the Army Rules, which is to the following effect: "34. Warning of accused for trial.- (1) The accused before he is arraigned shall be informed by an officer of every charge for which he is to be tried and also that, on his giving the names of witnesses or whom he desires to call in his defence, reasonable steps will be taken for procuring their attendance, and those steps shall be taken accordingly. The interval between his being so informed and his arraignment shall not be less than ninety-six hours or where the accused person is on active service less than twenty-four hours. (2) The officer at the time of so informing the accused shall give him a copy of the charge-sheet and shall if necessary, read and explain to him the charges brought against him. (2) The officer at the time of so informing the accused shall give him a copy of the charge-sheet and shall if necessary, read and explain to him the charges brought against him. If the accused desires to have it in a language which he understands, a translation thereof shall also be given to him. (3) The officer shall also deliver to the accused a list of the names, rank and corps (if any), of the officers who are to form the Court, and where officers in waiting are named, also of those officers in Courts- martial other than summary Courts-martial. (4) If it appears to the Court that the accused is liable to be prejudiced at his trial by any non-compliance with this rule, the Court shall take steps and, if necessary, adjourn to avoid the accused being so prejudiced. " 15. The idea behind these Rules is that a fair opportunity ought to be afforded to the delinquent. It is no doubt true that in the present case the Court martial was conducted and completed on one day, but as can be seen from the records of the Court martial, the respondent has fully participated therein and has cross-examined the witnesses. Prosecution Witness No. 1 was a lady, who was molested. The respondent has declined her cross-examination. The second witness was Sri Dhaneshwar Das, nusband of the lady concerned. He reiterated the incident and in examination-in-chief he stated that the respondent, apart from what is stated earlier, took out Rs. 50 from his pocket and asked Dhaneshwar Das to leave the house which he refused to do. Other events mentioned earlier were confirmed by him. Thereafter the following questions and answers are recorded in the cross-examination, which apart from showing the participation of the respondent in the trial also prove his participation in the crime: "cross examination by the accused as under: (a) Q1. What were you doing when I pulled your wife towards me? (b) Ans 1. (Witness ). I was inside the room. (c) Q2. Why did you not shout for help? (d) Ans 2. Both of us were shouting. (e) Q3. Did anybody come for help? (D Ans 3. Nobody came for help. (g) Q4. How far is the neighbours house? (h) Ans 4. Approx 15 meters. (i) Q5. How far are the army tents? (f) Ans 5. Approx 30 meters. (k) Q6. Why did you not shout for help? (d) Ans 2. Both of us were shouting. (e) Q3. Did anybody come for help? (D Ans 3. Nobody came for help. (g) Q4. How far is the neighbours house? (h) Ans 4. Approx 15 meters. (i) Q5. How far are the army tents? (f) Ans 5. Approx 30 meters. (k) Q6. You asked me for Rs. 200. 00 for the liquor I used to purchase from you? (I) Ans 6. 1 am a poor man please do not say incorrect things. Nothing of this nature happened instead you offered me Rs. 50. 00 to leave the house. " 16. The third witness examined by the prosecution was the neighbour, namely, Sri Chandeshwar Singh. He was also cross-examined by the respondent. The witness No. 4 was Guard Satish Chandra and witness No. 5 was Havildar-Pratap Bahadur Singh. Both of them were examined to prove the test identification of the accused by Dhaneshwar Das. They also testified to the fact that the accused was drunk in the night of 4. 1. 1992. Witness No. 6 was L. Nk. EBR Devi Ram, who testified to the fact that the accused-respondent was not on duty at the relevant time. Respondent declined cross-examination of these persons. 17. Mr. Agarwal and Mr. Mukerji, criticized the manner in which the entire evidence was recorded on one day and submitted that this was a farce and there was a denial of opportunity. As far as this aspect is concerned, it is to be noted that this was a summary Court martial. Even so all the witnesses were examined as if in a regular Court and opportunity was given to the respondent and in fact, he has cross- examined the husband of the lady concerned as well as her neighbour. It cannot be said that there is any denial of opportunity or fairness on this count. 18. The other submission, which impressed the learned Single Judge was that the respondent was not allowed to have a friend of accused as required under Rule 129 of the Army Act. This rule is to the following effect: "129. Friend of accused.-In any summary Court-martial, an accused person may have a person to assist him during the trial, whether a legal advisor or any other person. This rule is to the following effect: "129. Friend of accused.-In any summary Court-martial, an accused person may have a person to assist him during the trial, whether a legal advisor or any other person. A person so assisting him may advise him on all points and suggest the questions to be put to witnesses, but shall not examine or cross- examine witnesses or address the Court. " 19. On this submission, Mr. Bhanot pointed out that the record of the proceedings shows that Capt. Om Prakash of 8th Bn. Brigade was deputed as the friend of the accused. If the respondent did not want him as a friend or wanted somebody else, he should have put it in writing, which he did not. Besides, we must note that as the Rule provides, a friend of accused is provided to assist him by advising on all points and suggesting the questions to be put to the witnesses. However, the cross-examination of the witnesses or address before the Court is not permitted to him. Thus, the Rule concerning the friend of the accused, though relevant, provides a limited role to the friend. Besides, as stated above, in any case, if the respondent was not satisfied with the representative that he was afforded, he ought to have objected in writing or ought to have sought some other representative, which he had not. 20. One of the criticisms levelled by Mr. Agarwal was that the respondent got "the papers only when his Advocate wrote to the appellants to have annulment of the proceedings on 1. 3. 1993. Now as far as this aspect is concerned, inasmuch the respondent had not applied any time earlier and was undergoing the sentence, he could not be furnished with those papers. In reply to this request for annulment, the papers were supplied with a short order dated 10. 4. 1993 passed by the second appellant, which is to the following effect: "proceedings have been perused and found in order. Punishment awarded by the Commanding Officer 8m Battalion Brigade of the Guards are legal and confirms to Army Act. " 21. It was submitted that no detailed reasons were given in this order. We have to note that this is an order passed on the annulment application arising out of the summary Court martial. Punishment awarded by the Commanding Officer 8m Battalion Brigade of the Guards are legal and confirms to Army Act. " 21. It was submitted that no detailed reasons were given in this order. We have to note that this is an order passed on the annulment application arising out of the summary Court martial. The order states that the proceedings are found in order and the punishment awarded are also legal and in conformity with the Army Act. In our view, considering the nature of proceedings one cannot expect a detailed reasoned order, as in regular Court. The order is sufficient and adequate for the respondent to know as to what is the decision on the annulment application. 22. One of the submissions sought to be canvassed by Mr. Mukerji, learned counsel for the respondent was that Mr. Nautiyal-Commander, 8th Bn. Brigade was biased though this submission was not canvassed before the learned Single Judge. It is true that it is stated in paragraph 2 of the writ petition that in the year 1992, the petitioner (respondent herein) was falsely implicated for some criminal offence. It is then stated in the rejoinder affidavit for the first time that the respondent had worked under Lt. Col. Nautiyal in Jammu in 1991. Lt. Col. Nautiyal had asked for some furniture from the Unit for his official use, but the respondent could not manage it from his own resources and as a result of which, their relations were not cordial and, therefore, he had manipulated the whole case against him. Now, what is material to note is that all these allegations have come for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit. That apart, the facts of the case are so gross that it is difficult to say that Mr Nautiyal has falsely implicated the respondent. The lady who is molested has given her evidence and is supported by her husband and a neighbour. Two Armed Guards have testified to the facts that the respondent was drunk at the relevant time and also that the husband of the molested lady had identified the respondent in the test identification parade. Another member of the Armed Forces testified to the absence of the respondent from duty. Over and above this, the above quoted portion from the cross-examination of the husband of the molested lady by the respondent, in fact, proves that the incident had occurred. Another member of the Armed Forces testified to the absence of the respondent from duty. Over and above this, the above quoted portion from the cross-examination of the husband of the molested lady by the respondent, in fact, proves that the incident had occurred. The allegation of bias is, therefore, without any substance. We may as well note that as held in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the test of real likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely. In Major G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 , in spite of prior incident wherein Major Sodhi was put under arrest by Lt. Col. Maini, who had ordered summary Court martial, the Apex Court refused to accept the charge of bias in view of the factual material on record with respect to the incident leading to Court martial. In the present case, on the face of it, the allegation of bias made for the first time in the rejoinder affidavit, is nothing but afterthought and baseless. 0 23. The learned Single Judge relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Pravesh Rai v. Union of India, 1988 UPL8ec 783 to hold that Rule 34 contemplated an interval of not less than 96 hours where the accused person is not in active service, or otherwise 24 hours between the accused being informed of the charge and his arraignment. It is material to note that this was a case where the petitioner had been directed to be removed from service in a summary proceeding, which started because of his being found in improper dress and refused to take his meal brought before him with a view to get his punishment quashed. In paragraph 14 of this judgment, the Division Bench referred to a judgment of the Apex Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 (also in 1987 (4) SCC 611 ), wherein the Division Bench observed that the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the proportionality of punishment for almost identical offence, namely, refusal to eat food when ordered amounting to disobedience of lawful command. The punishment of rigorous imprisonment for one year and his dismissal from service was held to be strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. 24. The punishment of rigorous imprisonment for one year and his dismissal from service was held to be strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. 24. In this behalf, it is necessary to note that this judgment in Ranjit Thakur (supra) has been explained in paragraph 13 of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. R. K. Sharma, AIR 2001 SC 3053 . In R. K. Sharmas case, the Apex Court has noted that observations in Ranjit Thakurs case (supra) have been misunderstood. The facts in the case of Ranjit Thakur (supra) were such that they disclose a bias on the part of the Commanding Officer. All that the person concerned had done was to refuse to eat food which was treated as disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 13 in Union of India v. R. K. Sharma (supra) as follows: "on such a ridiculous charge rigorous imprisonment of one year was imposed. He was then dismissed from service, with the added disqualification of being declared unfit for any future civil employment. It was on such gross facts that this Court made the observations quoted above and held that the punishment was so strikingly disproportionate that it called for interference. The above observations are not to be taken to mean that a Court can, while exercising powers under Article 226 or 227 and/or under Article 32, interfere with the punishment because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme cases, which on their face show perversity or irrationality that there can be judicial review. Merely on compassionate grounds a Court should not interfere. " (underlining supplied) The judgment in R. K. Sharmas case (supra) was cited before the learned Single Judge though the import thereof, appears to have been missed. 1 25. The other judgment cited and found favour with the learned Single Judge is that of another Single Judge in the case-of No. 138836-K-EX. SEP DVR (MT) MZH Khan v. Chief of the Army Staff, Army Headquarters, New Delhi and others, (2001) 3 UPLBEC 2202 . In this matter, the petitioner had made a specific request that he should be permitted to be defended by assistance of civil lawyer, which was not permitted to him. SEP DVR (MT) MZH Khan v. Chief of the Army Staff, Army Headquarters, New Delhi and others, (2001) 3 UPLBEC 2202 . In this matter, the petitioner had made a specific request that he should be permitted to be defended by assistance of civil lawyer, which was not permitted to him. On facts, it is seen that the allegation that the charge sheet was not given well in time was not specifically denied in the counter affidavit. The learned Single Judge followed the law laid down in Ram Pravesh Rai (supra) and held that non-compliance of Rules 33 (7) and 34 vitiates the trial of the summary Court martial. As can be seen, the decision is on the facts of this case and it had followed Ram Pravesh Rai (supra), which in turn had followed in Ranjit Thakur (supra), which has now been explained by the Apex Court, as pointed out above, and has specifically emphasized that the Courts are not expected to interfere in punishments imposed by the Court martial merely because they consider the punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme cases, which on their face show perversity or irrationality that there can be a judicial review. The Courts should not interfere merely on compassionate ground. 26. Another Division Bench judgment, which was cited before us by Mr. Agarwal was in the case of Chief of Army Staff v. No. 133883630-K. Ex. Sep. Dvr (MT), M. Z. H. Khan, 2006 (4) ESC 2611 . In the facts of that case, the respondent was charged for making false allegations against the superior and a summary Court martial was allegedly held in breach of Rules 33 (7) and-34 (1) of the Army Act. Since adequate opportunity was not given to the respondent, the said judgment of the Division Bench can be understood in the facts of that case. The Division Bench has commented in paragraph 22 that Rule 149 of the Army Rules is applicable to certain cases only where there is some irregularity in procedure. This comment is however, contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Major A. Hussain, AIR 1998 SC 577 . In that matter, the respondent was charged for loss by negligence of some confidential papers and on his request the matter was adjourned from time to time and was offered representative of his choice. This comment is however, contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Major A. Hussain, AIR 1998 SC 577 . In that matter, the respondent was charged for loss by negligence of some confidential papers and on his request the matter was adjourned from time to time and was offered representative of his choice. The Apex Court upheld the Court martial. The Court specifically referred to rule 149 of the Army Rules in paragraph 20 of the judgment. This rule reads as follows: "irregular procedure when no injustice is done 149. . Validity of irregular procedure in certain cases.-Whenever, it appears that a Court-martial had jurisdiction to try any person and make a finding and that there is Legal evidence or a plea of guilty to justify such finding and any sentence which the Court-martial had jurisdiction to pass thereon may be confirmed, and shall, if so confirmed and in the case of a summary Court-martial where confirmation is not necessary, be valid, notwithstanding any deviation from these rules or notwithstanding that the charge-sheet has not been signed by the commanding officer or the convening officer, provided that the charges have, in fact, before trial been approved by the commanding officer and the convening officer or notwithstanding any defect or objection, technical or other, unless it appears that any injustice has 2 been done to the offender, and where any finding and sentence are otherwise valid, they shall not be invalid by reason only of a failure to administer an oath or affirmation to the interpreter or shorthand writer; but nothing in this rule shall relieve an officer from any responsibility for any wilful or negligent disregard of any of i these rules. " 27. The Apex Court then observed in paragraph 22 of the judgment as follows: "22. Though Court-martial proceedings are subject to judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court-martial is not subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If a Court-martial has been properly convened and there is no challenge to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands. If a Court-martial has been properly convened and there is no challenge to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands. Proceedings of a Court-martial are not to be compared with the proceedings in a criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure where adjournments have become a matter of routine though that is also against the provisions of law. It has been rightly said that Court-martial remains to a significant degree, a specialized part of overall mechanism by which the military discipline is preserved. It is for the special need for the armed forces that a person subject to Army Act is tried by Court-martial for an act which is an offence under the Act. Court-martial discharges judicial function and to a great extent is a Court where provisions of Evidence Act are applicable. A Court-martial has also the same responsibility as any Court to protect the rights of the accused charged before it and to follow the procedural safeguards. If one looks at the provisions of law relating to Court- martial in the Army Act, the Army Rules, Defence Service Regulations and other Administrative Instructions of the Army, it is manifestly clear that the procedure prescribed is perhaps equally fair if not more than a criminal trial provides to the accused. When there is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction, it is unnecessary to examine if pre-trial investigation was adequate or not. Requirement of proper and adequate investigation is not jurisdictional and any violation thereof does not invalidate the Court-martial unless it is shown that accused has been prejudiced or a mandatory provision has been violated. One may usefully refer to Rule 149 quoted above. The High Court should not allow the challenge to the validity of conviction and sentence of the accused when evidence is sufficient, Court- martial has jurisdiction over the subject-matter and has followed the prescribed procedure and is within its powers to award punishment. " (underlining supplied) 28. Same is the dicta of the Apex Court in the case of Major G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 , which is to the effect that the procedural defects unless vital and substantial will not affect the Court martial. " (underlining supplied) 28. Same is the dicta of the Apex Court in the case of Major G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 , which is to the effect that the procedural defects unless vital and substantial will not affect the Court martial. What the Court observed in paragraph 35 of the judgment is relevant for our purpose, which is as follows: 3 "35. In the present case there is no violation of these rules and at any rate no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in his defence. Most of the main submissions were only about certain alleged lapses in constituting Court of inquiry, recording of summary of evidence, issuance of the charge-sheets, convening order and that all these orders were not signed by a duly authorized officer and about confirmation and promulgation of the Court-martial findings and sentence and discrimination in awarding of sentence. Even if it is assumed that there is some substance in these submissions, they would not affect the trial as such in which both the petitioners duly participate. " 29. Rule 149 of the Army Rules quoted above does not relieve an officer holding the Court martial from any responsibility for any wilful or negligent disregard of any of these rules. At the same time, it lays down that where a Court martial has a jurisdiction to try and give a finding and when there is legal evidence to justify the finding and the sentence, which the Court martial has jurisdiction to pass, it will be valid notwithstanding any deviation from the Rules. This will be so unless it appears that any injustice has been done to the offender. In the instant case, the respondent was charged with a serious offence. He has fully participated in the enquiry. He has nowhere said either in the application for annulment or in the writ petition that such an incident did not take place. In fact, his cross-examination of the husband of the molested lady goes to confirm that such an incident had occurred. Two members of the armed forces have confirmed that he was drunk. He was identified by the husband of the lady when test identification parade was conducted. There was no reason for them to do so unless this was noted by them. Two members of the armed forces have confirmed that he was drunk. He was identified by the husband of the lady when test identification parade was conducted. There was no reason for them to do so unless this was noted by them. The third member of the armed forces had reported that the respondent was not on duty at the relevant time. Once this evidence was there before the officer holding Court martial, he was justified in coming to the conclusion that the three charges levelled against the delinquent/respondent had been established. He had used criminal force with a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. This offence was traced to Section 69 of the Army Act. His absence from duty was traced to Section 39 (d) of the Act and intoxication was traced to Section 48 of the Army Act. The punishments are permissible under the law and, therefore, the findings as well as punishment were fully justified. We may in this behalf profitably refer to the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Himmat Singh Chahar, AIR 1999 SC1980, where the dismissal of a petty officer from Navy was upheld in a case of molestation and the judgment of the High Court re-appreciating the evidence and substituting the finding of guilt was criticized. 30. In the matters of a Court martial, the High Court cannot ignore that the Parliament has been authorized under Article 33 of the Constitution of India to modify the rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution containing the fundamental rights to an appropriate extent in their application to the armed forces. The Army Act has-been held to be protected by Article 33 even if found to affect one or more of the Fundamental Rights in Ram Swarup v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 247 . The Army Rules have also been held to be valid in R. Viswan v. Union of India, (1983) 3 SCC 401 . In fact, the Apex Court has held the application of these Rules even to General Reserve Engineering Force to be valid in that judgment. The Army Rules have also been held to be valid in R. Viswan v. Union of India, (1983) 3 SCC 401 . In fact, the Apex Court has held the application of these Rules even to General Reserve Engineering Force to be valid in that judgment. The Court held in R. Viswan (supra) that having regard to the varying requirements of army discipline and the need for flexibility in this sensitive area, it would be inexpedient to insist that 4 Parliament itself should determine what particular restrictions should be imposed and on which fundamental rights in the interest of proper discharge of duties by the members of Armed Forces and the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order and maintenance of discipline among them. The extent of restrictions necessary to be imposed on any of the fundamental rights in their application to members of the Armed Forces and the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order for the purpose of ensuring proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline among them, would necessarily depend upon the prevailing situation at a given point of time and it would be inadvisable to encash it in a rigid statutory formula. 31. For the reasons stated above, in our view, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is wholly unsustainable. It amounts to interference into the decision and order of the Court martial for the alleged infraction of the Army Rules, which in fact, is not there. It would amount to re- appreciating the evidence and interfering with the punishment, which will be contrary to the provisions of the Army Act and Rules, which are protected under Article 33 of the Constitution to ensure proper discharge of duties by the members of the Armed Forces and to maintain their discipline. 32. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. Judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal Allowed. .