Judgment : 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with consent of the parties. 2. This writ petition is preferred against the order passed by the Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Nagpur, whereby he allowed the appeal preferred by respondent nos.5 to 16. 3. The facts giving rise to this petition are as follows – The petitioner is the member of the society known as Hindustahan Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha Ltd. Bhandara. Respondents nos.5 to 16 are the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Society. The said Society is registered. The petitioner, who is the member of the said Society noticed certain irregularities committed by respondents no.5 to 16. Therefore, he made complaint to the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Society, Bhandara. The Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies accordingly appointed Shri R.N.Vasu to submit enquiry report. Said Vasu conducted an enquiry and submitted report on 9/2/2007 in which he found many irregularities. The Enquiry Officer also found that the respondent nos.5 to 16 have not furnished a bond as contemplated by Section 73 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. In pursuance to the said report, respondent no.2 i.e. the Assistant Registrar issued a notice to respondents no.5 to 16 calling their explanation. They submitted their explanation. After considering the explanation as well as the complaint and after giving opportunities to the parties, respondent no.2 passed an order under Section 78(1) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act superseding the Committee of respondents no.5 to 16 and appointing an administrator. The said order was challenged before the Divisional Joint Registrar by respondents no.5 to 16 under Section 152 of the M.C.S. Act by way of appeal. 4. The Joint registrar disagreeing with the finding of the Assistant Registrar allowed the appeal and quashed the order and being aggrieved by that, this writ petition has been preferred. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. 6. The foremost contention that is raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the writ petition in the instant case is not maintainable since an efficacious remedy is available under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act by way of revision. Shri Tidke learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Assistant Registrar passed an order under Section 78 of the Act and the petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 152 of the Act before the Joint Registrar. Shri Tidke learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Assistant Registrar passed an order under Section 78 of the Act and the petitioner had preferred an appeal under Section 152 of the Act before the Joint Registrar. He submits that as against an order of the Joint Registrar, a revision lies under section 154 (2) of the Act. Section 154 reads as follows – “154(2) – Under this Section, the revision shall lie to the State Government if the decision or order is passed by the Registrar, the Additional Registrar or a Joint Registrar, and to the Registrar if passed by any other officer.” 7. It is clear from the Section that a revision could be filed before the Government against the order of the Joint Registrar. Shri Khapre, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even if a remedy by way of revision may be available that does not necessarily bar a writ petition. He contends that when order passed is patently illegal and without jurisdiction, a writ petition does lie. He contends that an appeal to the Joint Registrar could lie only as against the order under section 78 of the Act and the Assistant Registrar had also passed an order under Section 73(1AB) of the Act which is not an order under Section 78 and therefore, the Joint Registrar could not have entertained an appeal as against that part of the order. It is clear from Section 152 that an appeal against order under Section 73(1AB) is not provided under Section 152. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Joint Registrar therefore had no jurisdiction to set aside the order under section 73(1AB) while entertaining an appeal under section 152. I do not find substance in the contention. Section 73(1AB) reads as follows – “73(1AB) The members of the Committee shall be jointly and severally responsible for all the decisions taken by the committee during its term relating to the business of the society. The members of the committee shall be jointly and severally resp0onsible for all the acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the society. Every such member shall execute a bond to that effect within fifteen days of his assuming the office, in the form as specified by the State Government by general or special order. The members of the committee shall be jointly and severally resp0onsible for all the acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the society. Every such member shall execute a bond to that effect within fifteen days of his assuming the office, in the form as specified by the State Government by general or special order. The member who fails to execute such bond within the specified period shall be deemed to have vacated his office as a member of the Committee. 8. The section says that where the elected members fail to furnish bond within fifteen days of assuming the office, they shall be deemed to have vacated the office. It is by deeming fiction that the member looses his office and right to hold it. In fact, no order of such vacation as such would be necessary. By operation of law they cease to hold such office. The office of the member, therefore, falls vacant on 16th day upon failure to execute the bond. There is, however, no doubt that the Assistant Registrar will have to verify the position as to whether such bond was executed and furnished or not within stipulated time to take further necessary steps. Such verification would all the more be necessary to confirm that the office has fallen vacant. In the instant case, none of the members had furnished bond and as such office had fallen vacant. This fact that the respondent had failed to execute the bond came to the notice of the Registrar only after he took inspection. He could not have, therefore, taken any action under Section 78 unless it was confirmed that the bonds were not furnished within the stipulated time. After it comes to the knowledge of the Registrar that the said post of the member has fallen vacant and the member ceases to hold office, the Registrar can then alone proceed under Section 78 of the Act. Beside Section 78 of the Act, there is no other provision in the Act to take care of contingencies where all members of the Committee are deemed to have vacated the office. Section 78 says that when a member of the committee has ceased to discharge his function or when such member stands disqualified, the Registrar is to remove them and appoint another committee and administrator. Section 78 says that when a member of the committee has ceased to discharge his function or when such member stands disqualified, the Registrar is to remove them and appoint another committee and administrator. Thus, whenever a disqualification occurs under Section 73(1AB), the Registrar would no doubt be required to take steps under Section 78 of the Act. There is, therefore, to my mind only one order under Section 78 after the deemed vacation of the office. There is no separate order under Section 73(1AB) and no separate order under the said Section is contemplated. The Registrar had, therefore, necessarily passed an order under Section 78 only. Consequently an appeal under Section 152 was rightly entertained by the Registrar. I have already pointed out that the revision against an order of the Joint Registrar can be filed before the Government. 9. This takes me to the contention whether the writ petition should, therefore, be entertained or not. According to Shri Khapre, learned counsel for the petitioner, since part of the order of Joint Registrar is without jurisdiction, the writ petition is maintainable. The foregoing discussions would show that there is only one order under Section 78 and no order under Section 73(1AB) of the Act and I have also found that the appeal was rightly entertained by the Joint Registrar. The order passed by him is, therefore, not without jurisdiction. Mr. Khapre relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Supreme Court Service Rulings (Vo.2), 129 Dr.(Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta .vs.. MGT of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya) and AIR 1999 SC 22 (Whirlpool Corporation ..vs.. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai). These decisions have no bearing on the case at hand as the order is not one without jurisdiction. Similarly in a decision reported in 2003 (2) SCC 107 (Harbanslal Sahnia and anr. ..vs.. Indial Oil Corpn. Ltd. And ors.), the Supreme Courts holds that the High Court may entertain the writ petition in three contingencies. (i) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the where virus of an Act is challenged. None of the above contingencies exists in the case at hand. 10. (i) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the where virus of an Act is challenged. None of the above contingencies exists in the case at hand. 10. Shri Khapre, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends before me that the revision under Section 154 of the Act is not an adequate remedy. He contends that if Section 154 is read, it would be clear that the Government may or may not entertain a revision. I am unable to agree to the submission. Revisional power can be exercised by the State of its own motion or upon an application and it can decide the legality and propriety of the decision under challenge. Shri Khapre had relied upon a decision of this court reported in 1999 (3) Mh.L.J . 982 (Balasaheb Kondiram Pawar ..vs.. State of Mah.). The court observes as follows – 5. It is, therefore, clear that the party cannot claim as a matter of right to move the Government for revision of the impugned orders. If that is so, section 154 cannot be called as an alternative and efficacious remedy. The Supreme Court has indeed, a very succinctly described section 154 being potential but not compulsive. This power is reposed in Government to intervene to do justice when occasion demands it and of the occasion for its exercise, the Government is made the sole Judge. According to me, therefore, the present writ petition is maintainable.” The very same learned judge while dealing with the provisions of Section 152 and 154 of the act observes as follows in another decision reported in 1999(1) Mh.L.J . 619 (Prabhu Shriram Sahakari Dudh Vyawasaik Sanstha Maryadit, Ahmednagar ..vs.. State of Maharashtra). “4. ......... The orders passed by the Registrar under Section 9 of the Act to register or not to register a co-operative society are challengable under Section 152 of the Act by filing an appeal. Section 152 provides for appeals against the orders or decisions under Sections 4, 9 etc. (we are concerned with these two sections). Full-fledged appellate authorities are prescribed and they are armed with the regular powers of appellate forums. A complete hierarchy is also given under the said Section. Section 152 provides for appeals against the orders or decisions under Sections 4, 9 etc. (we are concerned with these two sections). Full-fledged appellate authorities are prescribed and they are armed with the regular powers of appellate forums. A complete hierarchy is also given under the said Section. The decisions or orders or awards passed are treated as final subject to the provisions for revision in the Act. Similarly, section 154 has vested the State Government with the revisionary powers. Even in this section, minute hierarchy is created with the powers.” 11. Upon going through the section itself, it is clear that an adequate remedy by way of revision is available. The authority i.e. The State can certainly go into the question of legality and propriety of the order under challenge. I do not find upon going through the scope of Section 154 that the remedy provided is in any way inadequate. The supreme Court in a recent decision reported in (2006)5 SCC 469 (A.P.Foods ..vs.. S.Samuel and ors.) observes as follows – 6. In a catena of decisions it has been held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 12. A bare reading of Section 22 of the Act makes the position clear that where the dispute arises between an employer and employees with respect to the bonus payable under the Act or with respect to the application of the Act in public sector then such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the ID Act. 13. As disputed questions of fact were involved, and alternative remedy is available under the ID Act, the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition, and should have directed the writ petitioners to avail the statutory remedy.” 12. Thus, the clear ratio is that the court should not entertain when statutory remedy is available We have seen that the revision does lie to the State Government against the order of Joint Registrar. The remedy is both adequate and efficacious. When a particular forum is provided that remedy must be availed. The restraint has to be observed or else the High Court would be flooded with litigation and the very purpose of creating alternate forum would be defeated. The remedy is both adequate and efficacious. When a particular forum is provided that remedy must be availed. The restraint has to be observed or else the High Court would be flooded with litigation and the very purpose of creating alternate forum would be defeated. That has to be avoided and the forum created under the Act must be left to deal with the disputes. Therefore, I do not find that the writ petition can be entertained. Same is dismissed.