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2009 DIGILAW 615 (JHR)

Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand

2009-04-27

R.R.PRASAD

body2009
JUDGMENT : Both the applications arise out of the same complaint case and hence, it were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. Both these applications have been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding of complaint case bearing no.C-1527 of 2008, pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi including the order dated 10.10.2008 whereby cognizance of the offence has been taken under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. The facts giving rise these applications are that the complainant-opposite party no.2 lodged a complaint stating therein that she married one Kamal Kumar Poddar, who is the son of petitioners no.1 and 2 of Cr.M.P No.413 of 2009 on 10.12.2006. When she came to her in-law’s place, accused persons (petitioners of both the cases) started subjecting her to torture in order to get the demand of dowry fulfilled. In course of time, they also put forth demand of a luxury car and when her father refused to oblige them, she was put to harassment in many ways and even went on saying that if the demand is not fulfilled, they will get the marriage dissolved and the other day, she was also subjected to assault and that on the occasion of Holi festival, she came to her parents’ house to offer worship to goddess ‘Gangaur’. Upon filing of the complaint, statement of the complainant was recorded on solemn affirmation and the matter was taken up for enquiry. In course of time, witnesses were examined and thereupon cognizance of the offence was taken against all the accused persons. Being aggrieved with that, these applications have been filed. Upon filing of the complaint, statement of the complainant was recorded on solemn affirmation and the matter was taken up for enquiry. In course of time, witnesses were examined and thereupon cognizance of the offence was taken against all the accused persons. Being aggrieved with that, these applications have been filed. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that from the allegations made in the complaint, it would appear that all the acts constituting offence under section 498A, according to complainant, occurred at Mumbai where complainant was living in her matrimonial home and no part of alleged act was committed at Ranchi within the local jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate, who took cognizance of the offence and as such, order taking cognizance, in view of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Manish Ratan and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another [ (2006) 8 Supreme 372 ], Ramesh and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 2005 SC 1989 ) and Y. Abraham Ajith and others vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another [ (2004) 8 SCC 100 ] is also bad. It was further submitted that though the complaint petition does not disclose about any act being committed at Ranchi but the complainant in her statement made under solemn affirmation has stated that when she came to her parents’ house at Ranchi, accused persons came and passed certain sarcastic remarks (taunting) which allegation is not only palpably false but seems to have been added for the purpose of creating jurisdiction at Ranchi but even if that allegation is taken to be true, that word ‘taunting’ in absence of actual wordings cannot be taken to be an act relating to demand of dowry or subjection to cruelty and thereby it would not be helpful in any manner to the complainant to show or to establish that the cause of action does arise within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate who took cognizance. Learned counsel in this respect has referred to a decision rendered in a case of Ajay Kr. Jain @ Ajay Kr. Kala vs. State of Jharkhand and another [ 2007(2) JLJR 182] and also in a case of Prem Pal Singh and others vs. Mohan Lal [1981 Cr.L.J 1208 (H.P)]. Thus, it was submitted that entire case including the order taking cognizance is fit to be set aside. Jain @ Ajay Kr. Kala vs. State of Jharkhand and another [ 2007(2) JLJR 182] and also in a case of Prem Pal Singh and others vs. Mohan Lal [1981 Cr.L.J 1208 (H.P)]. Thus, it was submitted that entire case including the order taking cognizance is fit to be set aside. As against this, leaned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.2 submits that there have been averments in the complaint petition that the talk of the marriage and even formal ceremony of engagement was performed at Ranchi and that demand of dowry both in kinds and cash was settled at Ranchi and that apart, it has been alleged by the complainant that she was subjected to torture/harassment in order to have demand of dowry fulfilled and that as per the statement made by the complainant in her solemn affirmation when she came to her parents’ house, accused persons came over there and passed sarcastic remarks (taunting) which, though is not in specific word but in the context of entire allegations it would always relate to torture and, therefore, learned Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence never lack territorial jurisdiction. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to a decision rendered in a case of Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal ( AIR 1999 SCW 3492 ) and also a case of Ranu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar and others [Supreme Court of India (2008) ACR 584] Coming straightway to the point raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Magistrate, who took cognizance does not have jurisdiction as, according to the petitioners, no cause of action has arisen within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate, I may refer to section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which lays down that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, this general rule does have exceptions and one of the exceptions has been enshrined in section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: “ 178 – Place of inquiry or trial – (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or .(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or .(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or .(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas”. Thus, the question does arise as to whether any part of the acts constituting offence under section 498A has been done within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the offence ? In this context, I may again reiterate that the acts relating to demand or subjection to cruelty, as per the complaint petition, have been committed at the place where the complainant was living with her husband. However, the complainant in her statement made under solemn affirmation has stated that when she came to Ranchi on the occasion of Holi, all the accused persons came and passed sarcastic remarks which in absence of actual wordings, according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, could never be presumed to be an act constituting offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. I am afraid this Court in exercise of inherent power would go into that question to adjudicate as to whether remark which appears to be vague would one of the acts constituting offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code or not as it can only be adjudicated at the time of trial. I am afraid this Court in exercise of inherent power would go into that question to adjudicate as to whether remark which appears to be vague would one of the acts constituting offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code or not as it can only be adjudicated at the time of trial. In this context, I would refer to a decision rendered in a case of Renu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar and others [(2008) ACR 584] wherein it has been held that the High Court being highest court of the State should normally refrain from giving prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. That being the situation the ratio laid down in a case of Y. Abraham Ajith and others vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another (supra) or in other cases referred to above would not be applicable in the instant case. Therefore, contention of the petitioners that the learned Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence lacked territorial jurisdiction is not acceptable at this stage. Thus, I do not find any merit in these applications. Hence, both the applications are dismissed.