JUDGMENT : (Per A.P. Lavande, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. By consent heard forthwith. 3. Briefly, the case of the petitioner is as under:­ The petitioner passed M. Sc. in Statistics in 1994. He passed M. Phil in Statistics from Amravati University with topic “Review of Stratified Random Sampling” in the year 1990 and he was awarded Ph. D. by Amravati University. In October 2005 the petitioner was elected to the Senate of Sant Gadge Baba Amravati University (hereinafter referred to as “the University”) from Teachers’ Constituency of Science faculty and was elected to Management Council from Senate in January 2006. In 2002 the petitioner was coopted as the member of the Board of Studies in Statistics and was elected to the Faculty of Science from the Board of Studies. In July 2006 one Professor Sayyad Arshad Nazir from Pune University asked for copy of dissertation of the petitioner from respondent no.1. Respondent no.2 supplied copy of the same to Prof. Nazir. On 15.7.2006 Prof. Nazir lodged complaint with respondent no.1 that M. Phil Dissertation of the petitioner is on the same topic submitted by him to Pune University under the same title in the year 1980. According to him, the dissertation submitted by the petitioner was exact copy of dissertation submitted by him. On 6.9.2006 respondent no.1 issued notice to the petitioner to appear before the Committee constituted under Section 32(6) (a) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (“the Act” for short) to answer the allegations made against him in the complaint. On 13.9.2006 his statement was recorded. The petitioner sought time to submit written statement and sought supply of certain documents. On 14.9.2006 the Committee supplied four documents to the petitioner. On 20.9.2006 the petitioner sought certain additional documents and also raised objection in respect of maintainability of proceedings under Section 32 (6)(a) of the Act. On that date also, the statement of the petitioner was not recorded. The petitioner again sought time. On 21.9.2006 some additional documents were supplied to the petitioner by the Committee. On 3.10.2006 the petitioner sought additional documents and sought further time to file written statement. On the ground that the documents were not supplied the statement of the petitioner was not recorded. Respondent no.1 refused to supply documents sought by him. The petitioner again sought time. On 21.9.2006 some additional documents were supplied to the petitioner by the Committee. On 3.10.2006 the petitioner sought additional documents and sought further time to file written statement. On the ground that the documents were not supplied the statement of the petitioner was not recorded. Respondent no.1 refused to supply documents sought by him. The petitioner sought time to submit his say on the ground of illhealth and sought exemption on the same ground. However, he submitted his interim statement. On 11.10.006 the petitioner filed written statement making grievance about nonsupply of document and making statement on merits. On the same date, Principal Hote, who was appointed as Chairman of the Committee, had given letter to respondent no.1 to allow him to participate in the proceedings of the Committee. However, he was not allowed to participate in the meeting. Principle Hote filed writ petition in this Court and sought an order to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter two members namely Principal A.S. Jagtap and Prof. R. Chittaranjan submitted their report against the petitioner to Board of Examinations. The other members namely Dr. P.B. Raghuvanshi and Prof. A.G. Somwanshi did not send report and they gave representation to respondent no.1 stating that the petitioner had not been given documents sought by him and that the petitioner was not given adequate opportunity. Thereafter the petitioner addressed letter to respondent no.2 praying for cancellation of the proceedings of the meetings of the Committee on 11.10.2006 in view of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.4669/2006 filed by the Principal Hote. The petitioner thereafter sought personal hearing in the matter, which was not granted. On 8.11.2006 respondent no.1 issued two notifications. Under first Notification, M. Phil Examination in Statistics of the petitioner conducted in the year 1990 was declared void and he was debarred from the said examination. He was further debarred for five years for examination from the University. In terms of the second Notification, the petitioner ceased to be member of the Senate and Board of Studies and also ceased from other authorities/bodies of the University. Both these notifications bearing No. 130/2006 and 131/2006 have been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. 4. Per contra, the case of the respondents is that on 15.7.2006 Prof. In terms of the second Notification, the petitioner ceased to be member of the Senate and Board of Studies and also ceased from other authorities/bodies of the University. Both these notifications bearing No. 130/2006 and 131/2006 have been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. 4. Per contra, the case of the respondents is that on 15.7.2006 Prof. Nazir made complaint of Plagiarism against the petitioner and informed respondent no.1 that statement of problem, methodology and the language are all verbatim copy of his M. Phil Dissertation. On 24.7.2006 respondent no.2 referred the matter of Plagiarism, which amounts to malpractice in the examination to the Committee constituted under Section 32 (6) (a) by the Board of Examinations. On 18.8.2006 the said Committee referred the matter to the Head of the Statistics Department being expert on the topic of dissertation of petitioner and of Prof. Nazir for report on verbatim copy. The Head of the Statistics Department submitted report that dissertation submitted by the petitioner was verbatim copy of the report submitted by Prof. Nazir. On 6.9.2006 the above referred Committee asked the petitioner to submit of the report present before the Committee to submit his views on the complaint against him. On 13.9.2006 the petitioner requested to supply four documents, which were supplied to him on 14.9.2006. On 20.9.2006 the say of the petitioner was recorded in question and answer form. The petitioner again sought four documents. On 3.10.2006 respondent no.1 informed the petitioner that documents sought by him were not relevant to take decision. On 11.10.2006 the petitioner showed his inability to put fourth his case. On 11.10.2006 the petitioner submitted his written submission before the Committee and also gave letter informing that he was unable to appear before the Committee because he was ill. On the same day, the Committee gave its decision and the report was submitted to the Vice Chancellor for her recommendation. On 7.11.2006 the Vice Chancellor in exercise of powers under Section 32(4) of the Act after recording the reasons in writing for emergency accepted the report and recommendations of the Committee. On the very next day, two notifications, which have been challenged in the present petition were issued by respondent no.2. 5. Mr. On 7.11.2006 the Vice Chancellor in exercise of powers under Section 32(4) of the Act after recording the reasons in writing for emergency accepted the report and recommendations of the Committee. On the very next day, two notifications, which have been challenged in the present petition were issued by respondent no.2. 5. Mr. Gordey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the action taken under Section 32 (6) of the Act read with Ordinance No.22/2001 is misconceived in law and on facts inasmuch as after conferment of M. Phil. degree upon the petitioner in the year 1990, no action under Section 32 (6) of the Act could have been taken but the only possible action that could have been taken was under Section 96 of the Act under which the Hon’ble Vice Chancellor of respondent no.1 upon recommendations of the Management Council and Academic Council with special majority, can take action for cancellation of degree. According to learned counsel, the Committee constituted under Section 32(6) of the Act has no jurisdiction to inquire into the matter of cancellation of degree conferred upon the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel further submitted that in terms of Section 96 (2) of the Act, it is only the Chancellor who can withdraw the degree conferred upon any candidate and the Committee constituted under Section 32(6)(a) of the Act has no jurisdiction to take such an action. Placing reliance upon Statute No.63 of the Amravati University, learned counsel submitted that powers to initiate action to withdraw degree vests in the Management Council by following procedure laid down in Section 96 of the Act. Learned counsel further urged that action by respondent no.1 against the petitioner for obtaining degree by fraudulent means can be taken in terms of Section 96 of the Act read with Statute 63 and once the degree has been conferred, there is no question of invoking Section 32 of the Act at the behest of the Board of Examinations. Learned counsel further urged that the power of Board of Examinations under Section 32 of the Act can be invoked only if the degree has not been conferred upon the concerned candidate, who is found have resorted to malpractice in the course of the examination. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the Notifications issued by respondent no.1 are patently illegal and, therefore, deserve to be quashed. Mr. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the Notifications issued by respondent no.1 are patently illegal and, therefore, deserve to be quashed. Mr. Gordey invited our attention to Sections 31 and 32 of the Act and submitted that action under Section 32(6) of the Act is patently unsustainable in law. 7. Mr. Gordey further submitted that the Committee constituted under Section 32(6) (a) of the Act was not properly constituted on 11.10.2006 and as such the report submitted only by two members with other members refusing to sign the said report and the Chairman of the Committee having been restrained from participating in the proceeding, report submitted by two members could not have been made foundation of action under Section 32(6) (b) of the Act. The learned counsel submitted that Principle Hote was not allowed to participate in the proceedings on 11.10.2006 and, therefore, report submitted by two members namely Principal A.S. Jagtap and Prof. R. Chittaranjan was not valid report on the basis of which action could be initiated under Section 32 (6) (b) of the Act by the Board of Examinations. Learned counsel further urged that since other two members had specifically disagreed with the findings given by other two members of the Committee and had stated that no adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner, the said report could not have been acted upon. 8. Learned counsel further urged that no adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself against the alleged action since several relevant documents sought by the petitioner were not supplied to him nor personal hearing was given to him though asked for. Therefore, the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the proposed action and on this ground also, the Notifications are liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel further urged that the report of the Committee was not placed before the Board of Examinations, as required under Section 32 (6) (b) of the Act and there was absolutely no warrant for respondent no.2 to invoke emergency power under Section 32 (4) of the Act while accepting the report. According to the petitioner, the action of respondent no.2 is malafide and in colourable exercise of power. According to learned counsel, respondent no.2 had personal grudge against the petitioner and therefore, she exercised emergency power under Section 32 (4) of the Act. 9. On merits, Mr. According to the petitioner, the action of respondent no.2 is malafide and in colourable exercise of power. According to learned counsel, respondent no.2 had personal grudge against the petitioner and therefore, she exercised emergency power under Section 32 (4) of the Act. 9. On merits, Mr. Gordey submitted that there is no bar for candidate for M. Phil examination to take the same subject of dissertation taken by some other candidate, in view of the provisions contained in Ordnance No.164 of respondent no.1 University and, therefore, even if the dissertation submitted by the petitioner tallies with that of Professor Nazir, the same does not amount to malpractice or fraud by the petitioner. In support of his submissions, Mr. Gordey relied upon the following authorities:­ (i) Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs. vs. State of U.P. and others : (2007) 5 SCC 85 ; (ii)State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and others : AIR 1964 SC 358 ; and (iii) Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and others : AIR 1976 SC 789 . 10. Per contra, Mr. Kilor, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that action taken by respondent no.1 under Section 32(6) of the Act read with Ordinance No.22/2001 is not illegal and the Committee constituted under Section 32(6) of the Act has jurisdiction to inquire into complaint regarding any malpractice on the part of candidates in examination even after conferment of degree. According to learned counsel Section 31(2) of the Act entitles Board of Examinations to deal with all the matters in relation to examination and to hear and decide the complaints regarding any matter arising out of conduct of Examinations. According to learned counsel, power under Section 32(6)(a) of the Act can be exercised not only at preexamination stage at the post examination stage but at any stage. Learned counsel further urged that in terms of Ordinance 22 of 2001, the Board of Examination shall have power at any time to institute inquiry and to punish such unfair means. Learned counsel further urged that the Board of Examinations is also entitled to cancel medal which is awarded with degree to the students for his outstanding performance in the examination. According to Mr. Learned counsel further urged that the Board of Examinations is also entitled to cancel medal which is awarded with degree to the students for his outstanding performance in the examination. According to Mr. Kilor, insofar cancellation of degree is concerned, the said power vests with Hon’ble Chancellor in terms of Section 96 of the Act and the same power has to be exercised only after the power is exercised under Section 32 of the Act. Learned counsel further urged that the Committee constituted under Section 32 (6)(a) of the Act has been properly constituted and the same was constituted on 23.1.2006 for a period of five years to deal with all the complaints during the said period relating to malpractices on the part of the candidates, paperssetters, examiners, moderators, referees, teachers or any other persons connected with the conduct of examination. 11. Learned counsel submitted that the members who have not signed the report have not shown disagreement to the recommendations made by the Committee and, therefore, the finding regarding plagiarism is not vitiated. Learned counsel further urged that Committee constituted under Section 32(6) of the Act is recommendatory body and ultimately the Board of Examination or Vice Chancellor has to take decision relating to acceptance of recommendations and therefore, the alleged disagreement shown by two members does not vitiate the report. Learned counsel further urged that Shri Hote, the Chairman of the said Committee has himself admitted in his letter that he was sitting in the chair of the Chairman throughout the proceedings and he has not stated as to who had restrained him in participating in the proceedings. According to learned counsel, letter by two members and the letter by the Chairman were issued with intention to help the petitioner. Placing reliance upon Section 111 of the Act, learned counsel submitted that the letters written by two members as well as Chairman would not vitiate the decision taken by respondent no.2. 12. Mr. Kilor further submitted that the petitioner was given fair opportunity to defend himself and it cannot be said that he was deprived of reasonable opportunity of defending himself. 12. Mr. Kilor further submitted that the petitioner was given fair opportunity to defend himself and it cannot be said that he was deprived of reasonable opportunity of defending himself. On the contrary, the conduct of the petitioner during inquiry before the Committee discloses that the petitioner was bent upon delaying the proceedings which are of summary nature and having regard to proceedings before the Committee, it cannot be said that fair opportunity was not given to the petitioner to defend his case. On the contrary, the petitioner himself refused to answer questions put by the Committee about submission of verbatim copy of dissertation which speaks volumes about the conduct of the petitioner. Learned counsel further urged that the action taken by the Vice Chancellor under Section 32(4) of the Act is not malafide since on 7.11.2006 the Vice Chancellor took action in 27 cases including the case of the petitioner relating to malpractices in examination. According to learned counsel, the Vice Chancellor has recorded reasons in each case for invoking Section 32 (4) of the Act and, therefore, action of the Vice Chancellor cannot be faulted. Mr. Kilor submitted that insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the Vice Chancellor has exercised powers under Section 32 (4) of the Act in view of the fact that the meeting of the Board of Examinations was not scheduled early in near future and the same was to be held on 19.12.2006 and since the petitioner was sitting member of Senate of the University and was empowered to visit examination centres for strict vigilance during the conduct of the examination to avoid use of unfair means by the students, teachers, invigilators and supervisors and also check malpractices, action under Section 32(4) of the Act was taken so as not to cause damage to the image and reputation to the University. 13. Mr. Kilor further urged that the case of the petitioner was referred to the Committee under Section 32 (6) of the Act not because the petitioner had taken same subject of dissertation which was taken by Dr. Nazir but because the petitioner had submitted verbatim copy of the dissertation submitted by Dr. Nazir. He submitted that no candidate can be permitted to copy dissertation submitted by some other candidate. Nazir but because the petitioner had submitted verbatim copy of the dissertation submitted by Dr. Nazir. He submitted that no candidate can be permitted to copy dissertation submitted by some other candidate. He further urged that the scope of interference in such matter is very limited and having regard to the conduct of the petitioner, the petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:­ (i) Controller of Examinations and Others Vs. G.S. Sunder and another : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 82; (ii)The Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha and others : AIR 1970 SC 1269 ; (iii)Chairman, J. & K. State Board of Education v. Feyaz Ahmed Malik and others : AIR 2000 SC 1039 ; (iv)Union Public Service Commission vs. Jagannath Mishra : (2003) 9 SCC 237 ; (v)State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 and (vi) Bansilal Narayandas Kankaria and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Pune and others : 2001(1) Mh. L.J. 638. 14. We have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and the judgments relied upon. 15. Mr. Gordey submitted that action taken under Section 32(6) of the Act read with Ordinance 22/2001 is patently illegal since such an action could not have been after conferment of the M. Phil. degree in the year 1990. We find no merit in the said submission. Section 32(6)(a) of the Act is a clear answer to the submission made by Mr. Gordey. Section 32 (6)(a):­“ 32(6)(a) In order to investigate and take disciplinary action for malpractices and lapses on the part of candidates, papersetters, examiners, moderators, referees, teachers or any other persons connected with the conduct of examinations (including the preexamination stage and the post examination stage or at any stage whatsoever) the Board of Examinations shall constitute a committee of not more than five persons of whom one shall be Chairman. 16. Thus, under Section 32(6)(a) of the Act investigation and disciplinary action for malpractices in examinations at the preexamination stage, the post examination stage or at any stage whatsoever is permissible. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. 16. Thus, under Section 32(6)(a) of the Act investigation and disciplinary action for malpractices in examinations at the preexamination stage, the post examination stage or at any stage whatsoever is permissible. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Gordey that the only possible action against the petitioner could have been taken under Section 96 of the Act by the Chancellor of the University on the recommendation of the Management Council and the Academic Council, supported by majority of by not less than 2/3rd member of each such authority for withdrawal of the degree. In our considered opinion, in the present case action under Section 96 of the Act can be taken only after taking action under Section 32 (6) (a) of the Act is taken. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Gordey do not advance the case of the petitioner. 17. In the case of Kunwar Pal Singh (supra) the Apex Court has held that the principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed in the Act. Similar observations are made by the Apex Court in the case of Singhara Singh (supra) after placing reliance upon the case of Nazir Ahmad Vs. King Emperor : AIR 1936 Privy Council 253. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the above two judgments. But this principle is not applicable having regard to the factual and legal position in the present case. 18. Insofar as the submissions of Mr. Gordey that the respondents could not have taken action for the alleged malpractice committed by the petitioner in the year 1990 is concerned, we find no merit. It was in the year 2006 that upon a complaint of Professor Nazir that respondents came to know about that the dissertation submitted by the petitioner was verbatim copy of the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir. Therefore, there is absolutely no delay on the part of the respondents in taking action against the petitioner. We, therefore, find absolutely no merit in the said submission. 19. The next submission made by Mr. Nazir. Therefore, there is absolutely no delay on the part of the respondents in taking action against the petitioner. We, therefore, find absolutely no merit in the said submission. 19. The next submission made by Mr. Gordey that two members, out of five members of the Committee had submitted the report and, therefore, it was not a valid report on which action could have been taken against the petitioner. We are not impressed with this submission since we are in agreement with Mr. Kilor that the report submitted by the Committee constituted under Section 32 of the Act is a recommendatory body and the action is to be on the basis of the report submitted by it by following the provisions of the Act. Moreover, we have perused the copy of the dissertation submitted by the petitioner as well as by Prof. Nazir. We find that the dissertation submitted by the petitioner is verbatim copy of the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir and there is absolutely no explanation offered by the petitioner not only before the Committee but also before this Court. In this factual background, we have to consider the case of the petitioner. It is well settled by catena of decisions of the Apex Court that fraud vitiates all actions. It would be appropriate to quote paragraph 1 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs., v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others : AIR 1994 SC 853 which reads thus: “Fraudavoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or degree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first Court or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.” 20. Although the judgment of the Apex Court is in relation to a decree obtained by fraud, we are of the considered opinion that the same principle has to be applied to a degree obtained by a candidate. 21. We have no doubt that the petitioner has submitted dissertation for M. Phil. after copying the same from the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir. 21. We have no doubt that the petitioner has submitted dissertation for M. Phil. after copying the same from the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir. Therefore, this is nothing but a flagrant case of “plagiarism”. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the action of the respondents upon report submitted by only two members namely Principal A.S. Jagtap and Prof. Chittaranjan cannot be faulted. Insofar as the submission of Mr. Gordey that there is no bar in taking the same subject taken by any other candidate for submitting dissertation for M. Phil. is concerned, we have no difficulty in accepting the same. But we are not inclined to accept that a candidate, who submits dissertation for M. Phil. can copy dissertation submitted by some other candidate earlier. A candidate submitting dissertation of M. Phil. is expected to do some original work. The petitioner has also made grievance that no adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself since relevant documents sought for by him not supplied to him nor personal hearing was not given to him though asked for. The affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents discloses that the petitioner was heard on 13.9.2006, 20.9.2006, 3.10.2006 and 11.10.2006. The petitioner also submitted written submissions explanation before the Committee although he did not appear before the Committee on 11.10.2006 on the ground that he was ill. Having regard to this factual situation, we are of the considered opinion that reasonable opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner. The petitioner was supplied a copy of the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir to respondent no.1 and also copy of his own dissertation. The scope of the Enquiry before the Committee was limited one i. e. whether the dissertation submitted by the petitioner was verbatim copy of the dissertation submitted by Prof. Nazir. Having regard to the scope of the enquiry, which was to be undertaken by the Committee, we are of the considered opinion that the grievance made by the petitioner that he was not given reasonable opportunity of defending himself is absolutely baseless. The whole attempt of the petitioner appears to be that he was interested in prolonging enquiry and creating all hurdles so as to avoid any action against him. The whole attempt of the petitioner appears to be that he was interested in prolonging enquiry and creating all hurdles so as to avoid any action against him. Insofar as personal hearing to the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner himself had appeared before the Committee on several dates and, therefore, the grievance made by him that he was not given personal hearing has absolutely no merit. 22. Insofar as the submission of Mr. Gordey that there was no occasion for respondent no.2 to invoke emergency power 32(4) of the Act is concerned, we find merit in the submission of Mr. Kilor. Respondent no.2 has recorded reasons in writing for exercise of power under Section 32 (4) of the Act and, therefore, there is absolutely no merit in the submission of Mr. Gordey about noncompliance of Section 32 (4) of the Act. Respondent no.2 was justified in invoking emergency powers in view of the fact that meeting of Board of Examinations was scheduled in December 2006 and the petitioner was not only an approved teacher but also a sitting member of the Management Council of the University and as such was empowered to visit the examination centres for strict vigilance during the conduct of the examination to avoid use of unfair means by the students, teachers, invigilators and supervisors and also check malpractices, if any. In this factual background, the petitioner who had indulged in plagiarism was allowed to visit the examinations centres, the same was bound to cause damage to the reputation of the University. It is also pertinent to note that in terms of Section 32 (4) of the Act, the Vice Chancellor has also reported the said action in the next meeting of Board on 27.12.2006. Thus, there was total compliance of Section 32 (4) of the Act. 23. The petitioner has not been able to establish the charge of malpractice alleged by him against respondent no.2 by placing cogent material before this Court. The charge of malafide can easily be made but difficult to be made out since a party is bound to produce cogent material to prove the charge of malafide. There is absolutely no material on record to substantiate the charge of malafide against respondent no.2. The charge of malafide can easily be made but difficult to be made out since a party is bound to produce cogent material to prove the charge of malafide. There is absolutely no material on record to substantiate the charge of malafide against respondent no.2. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the action of respondent no.2 is vitiated by malafides on her part and that the action taken by respondent no.2 is in colourable exercise of power. We hold that respondent no.2 was perfectly justified to invoke emergency power under Section 32(4) of the Act. 24. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Hukumchand Shyam Lal (supra) relied upon by Mr. Gordey is concerned, the same does not advance the case of the petitioner. In the said case, the Apex Court, while interpreting Section 5 of the Telegraph Act 1885 and Rule 422 of the Rules held that while exercising power under Section 5(1) of the Act to take action in the event of public emergency the authority exercising such power must record its satisfaction regarding existence of such an emergency. The ratio laid down in the said case is of no help to the petitioner in view of the finding given above by us in relation to exercise of power by respondent no.2 under Section 32(4) of the Act. 25. We shall now deal with the authorities relied upon by Mr. Kilor. In the case of G.S. Sunder (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with action taken against the student, who had committed malpractice in the examination. The Apex Court has observed thus in para 10 :­ “One thing must be put beyond doubt, in matters of enforcement of discipline this Court must be very slow in interference. After all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examinations fairly and properly, know best how to deal with situations of this character. one cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales. In the present system of education, the system of examinations is the best suited to assess the progress of the student so long as they are fairly conducted. Interference by court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce. For instance, we cannot but strongly condemn copying in the examination which has grown into canker of mass copying. Interference by court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce. For instance, we cannot but strongly condemn copying in the examination which has grown into canker of mass copying. Such unhealthy practices which are like poisonous weeds in the field of education must be rooted out in order that the innocent and the intelligent students are not affected”. 26. In the case of Bihar School Examination Board (supra) while dealing with the action of the Board cancellation of the examination for adopting unfair means observed that if there was sufficient material on which it could be demonstrated that the University was right in its conclusion that the examinations ought to be cancelled then academic standards require that the University’s appreciation of the problem must be respected. It would not be for the Court to say that you should have examined all the candidates or even their representatives with a view to ascertain whether they had received assistance or not. The Apex Court further observed that the universities are responsible for their standards and the conduct of examinations. The essence of the examinations is that the worth of every person is appraised without any assistance from an outside source. If at a centre the whole body of students receive assistance and manage to secure success in the neighbourhood of 100% when others at other centres are successful only at an average of 50%, it is obvious that the university or the Board must do something in the matter. It cannot hold a detailed quasi judicial inquiry with a right to its alumni to plead and lead evidence etc. before the results are withheld or the examinations cancelled. If there is sufficient material on which it can be demonstrated that the university was right in in its conclusion that the examinations ought to be cancelled then academic standards require that the university’s appreciation of the problem must be respected. It would not be for the Court to say that you should have examined all the candidates or even their representatives with a view to ascertaining whether they had received assistance or not. To do this would encourage indiscipline if not also perjury. 27. It would not be for the Court to say that you should have examined all the candidates or even their representatives with a view to ascertaining whether they had received assistance or not. To do this would encourage indiscipline if not also perjury. 27. In the case of Feyaz Ahmed Malik and others (supra) the Apex Court held that the Board of Examinations was entrusted with the duty of maintaining higher standards of education and proper conduct of examinations. It was an expert body consisting of persons coming from different walks of life who are engaged in or interested in the field of education and have wide experience. The decision of such an expert body should be given due weightage by Courts. Reliance was also placed upon by the Apex Court in its earlier decision in the case of Bihar School examination Board v. Subhas Chandra (supra). The Apex Court further observed that in matters concerning campus discipline of educational institutions and conduct of examinations the duty is primarily vested in the authorities incharge of the institutions. In such matters Court should not try to substitute its own views in place of the concerned authorities nor thrust its view on them. The Apex Court further observed that it is not to say that the Court cannot at all interfere with the decisions of the authorities in such mattes. 28. In the case of Union Public Service Commission (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with the case in which respondent was debarred from any competitive examination for a period of 10 years on the allegation he had resorted to copying in competitive examination. The Apex Court called upon UPSC to produce the answer papers of both the candidates and on a careful scrutiny of the same held that there was no doubt that but for assistance and/or connivance of the respondent it would not have been possible for the other candidate to answer in the manner in which he had answered. The Apex Court upheld the action of U.P.S.C. and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. 29. In the case of Prabhu (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with removal of member of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and High Secondary Education. Removal of the respondent as a member was on the ground that his activities were detrimental functioning of the Board. 29. In the case of Prabhu (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with removal of member of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and High Secondary Education. Removal of the respondent as a member was on the ground that his activities were detrimental functioning of the Board. The respondent was appointed as a supervisor at an examination centre for the engineering examination. On account of mass copying having taken place and cancellation of results of the candidates who appeared from the Centre and the respondent was debarred from membership of the Board. The said action was challenged which was allowed by the High Court. Setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Apex Court held that the High Courts exercises control over Government functioning and ensure obedience of rules and law by enforcing proper, fair and just performance of duty. Where the government or any authority passes an order which is contrary to rules or law it becomes amenable to correction by the Courts in exercise of writ jurisdiction. But one of the principles inherent in it is that the exercise of power should be for the sake of justice and one of the yardstick is if the quashing of the order results in greater harm to the society then the Court may restrain from exercising the power. The Apex Court further held that even if the order of the government is vitiated either by technical breach, the High Court should have refused to interfere in exercise of its equity jurisdiction as the facts did not warrant interference. 30. In the case of Bansilal Narayandas Kankaria and another (supra) the Division Bench of this Court quoted the following paragraph from the judgment of the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta vs. union of India and others : A.I.R. 1999 SCW 2754 :­“ It is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 of Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law. The Court can under Article 32 of Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice.” 31. Having regard to the judgments of the Apex Court referred to herein above, we are of the considered opinion that since the petitioner has resorted to Plagiarism, this is not a fit case in which we should exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner. On the basis of the material placed on record the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the petitioner submitted verbatim copy of the dissertation earlier submitted by Prof. Nazir and secured M. Phil degree. Therefore, even if there is violation of natural justice as contended by the petitioner, we are not inclined to exercise writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 32. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in the present petition. Rule is accordingly discharged with costs in favour of respondent no.1, which we quantify at Rs. 10,000/­. Needless to mention that the interim order stands vacated. 33. At this stage, Mr. Gordey, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks extension of interim order granted by this Court for a period of four weeks. Mr. Kilor, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the prayer for continuation of interim order. 34. We have recorded a finding that the petitioner has obtained M. Phil degree by resorting to plagiarism and there is absolutely no explanation coming from the petitioner either before the Committee or before this Court. In view of this position and considering the facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to continue interim order for a period of four weeks as sought for by the petitioner although interim order has been in operation for more than two years.