B. K. Sharma, J.:- This revision application is directed against the order dated 31.3.2009, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shillong, in case No. FTC(S)7/2009, registered under Sec­tion 448/376/511 IPC. By the said order, the plea of the accused petitioner for transfer­ring the case to the District Council Court has been rejected. In view of such rejection, the case shall now proceed in the Court of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court). 2. Shortly stated the facts involved are that on 24.3.2008, the accused petitioner was arrested by the police on the basis of the FIR lodged by the mother of the victim. As per 5 the FIR the accused petitioner abused her daughter with filthy language and attempted to rape her in the afternoon of 23.3.2008 i.e. the date on which the FIR was lodged. The police carried out investigation etc. and there­after charge sheet was submitted against the accused petitioner. In the meantime, the ac­cused was released on bail by the learned Deputy Commissioner (East Khasi Hills Dis­trict, Shillong), who also transferred the case to the Fast Track Court Shillong for trial. The case was registered 'afresh as Fast Track Court Case (S) No. 7/2008. 3. The accused on receipt of the summons duly appeared before the court and he vide his petition dated 25.7.2008, which was reg­istered and numbered as Petition No. 61/2008, prayed foftransferxof the case to the learned Judge, District Council Court at Shillong. The prayer so made was in view of the provisions of 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India. It was the contention of the accused petitioner that both the accused and the victim being tribals, the matter is exclusively triable by the District Council Court. In this connection, the petitioner also referred to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 2007 (4) GLT938 : Longsan Khongngain Vs. State of Meghalaya. 4. The learned Judge of the Fast Track Court having rejected the prayer of the petitioner for transferring the case to the District Council court, the petitioner has filed this ap­plication challenging the legality and validity of the order so passed by the said Court. 5. I have heard Mr. G.S. Massar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. P. Mahanta, learned counsel representing the State. I have also consid­ered the materials on records. 5. I have heard Mr. G.S. Massar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. P. Mahanta, learned counsel representing the State. I have also consid­ered the materials on records. 6. The issue is no longer res integra and has been decided by this Court in the afore­said judgment and order dated 1.10.2007, reported in 2007 (4) GIT938 (here-in-after referred to as the said decision). The peti­tioner has also filed an additional affidavit bringing certain documents on records. On the strength of the said documents including the said decision, it was the emphatic argu­ment of Mr. Massar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 31.3.2009, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) is misconceived and thus liable to be set aside and quashed. In this connection, he has also referred to the provisions of The Assam Autonomous Dis­tricts Administration of Justice (Miscellane­ous Provisions) Act, 1957; The Assam Autonomous Districts Administration of Justice Act, 1960; The Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 and The United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953. Mr. Massar has also placed reliance on the decision of this court reported in (1984) 2 GLR 159 State of Meghalaya Vs. U. Bakingster Syiemiong & Ors. 7. Countering the above argument, Mr. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General, appearing for the State, strenuously argued that having regard to the facts and circumstances involved, more particularly, the em­phasis on early disposal of criminal cases by the Fast Track Court, there is no question of transferring the matter to the District Council Court. According to him, the plea for trans­ferring the case to the District Council Court is anti-thesis to the whole emphasis for early disposal of the Criminal Cases by the Fast Track Court. According to him, the plea on the part of the accused petitioner is a ploy to delay the matter. Mr. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General, has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2002) 5 SCC 1 Brij Mohan lal Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8. As observed above, the issue raised is no longer resintegra and is covered by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this court. Mr. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General, has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2002) 5 SCC 1 Brij Mohan lal Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8. As observed above, the issue raised is no longer resintegra and is covered by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this court. The judgment was rendered on the basis of the reference made by the learned Single Judge, who was taking up the criminal Revision Petition. The issue raised in the said Criminal Revision Petition was the same as in the instant case. In that case also, the peti­tioner was involved in an offence under Sec­tion 376 IPC and the trial was pending be­fore the Fast Track Court cum Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong. As in the in­stant case, both the parties were tribals be­longing to Scheduled Tribe Community (Khasi). Initially, the charge sheet was filed before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate and subsequently, the case was transferred to the Court of Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, who in turn transferred the case to the Fast Track Court at Shillong. As in the instant case, in that case also, the accused petitioner filed an applica­tion praying for transfer of the case to the court of the learned Judge, District Council Court at Shillong, on the same very ground of provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Con­stitution, making the case exclusively triable by the District Council Court. 9. While deciding the issue so raised, the Division Bench noticed the indisputable fact that the Fast Track Court is a Court estab­lished and functioning under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was also noticed that except three chapters re­ferred to in the judgment, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. are not applicable to the tribal areas in the State of Meghalaya, more spe­cifically, the Khasi Hills District where the petitioner and the alleged victim admittedly residing at the point of time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. Be it stated here that as in the said case, in the instant case also, the parties are residents of Khasi Hills District and at the time of com­mitting the alleged offence also, they were the residents of the said District. 10. Be it stated here that as in the said case, in the instant case also, the parties are residents of Khasi Hills District and at the time of com­mitting the alleged offence also, they were the residents of the said District. 10. Elaborately dealing with the various provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Consti­tution and so also the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and also referring to the role of the Fast Track Court, it was observed that the authority of the Governor to confer the powers of trial either in accordance with the CPC or the Cr.P.C. is limited to the trial of suits or cases arising out of any law in force in any Autonomous District or Region. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, it has been observed thus: "...............in order to meet such a situation, in our view, the Governor is authorised under paragraph 5 of the 6th Schedule to invest such powers as he deems fit, available either in Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Proce­dure, either on the District Council or Regional Council or a court constituted by the District Council (village Court). Paragraph 5 also authorises the Governor to invest an officer with such powers available under the CrPC or CPC, as the Governor may deem fit, having regard to the situation that is required to be dealt. Obviously such a power is entrusted by the Governor to meet a situation where the Governor comes to the conclusion that the Village Courts may not be able to meet the requirement of a given situation. 14. Another class of cases recognised un­der paragraph 5 for which a special treatment by the Governor of conferring powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure is the trial of offences punishable with death, transportation for life imprisonment for a term not less than 5 years punishable either under the Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being appli­cable to such an Autonomous District or Re­gion, as the case may be. Obviously, the pun­ishment such as the one mentioned above are such that would constitute a serious curtail­ment of the personal liberty guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore, are required to be imposed in ac­cordance with law both substantive or proce­dural which should accord with the profound standards of due process, which is guaranteed under the Constitution." 11. The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment also dealt with the question as to whether issues with such serious conse­quences are triable exclusively by the Village Courts and in accordance with the procedures evolved by the District Council -having re­gard to the scheme and language of the paragraph 4 and 5 of the 6th Schedule. Paragraph 4 of the 6th Schedule deals with ad­ministration of justice in Autonomous Dis­tricts and Autonomous Regions. Clause 5 of the 6th Schedule relates to conferment of powers under the CPC and Cr.P.C. on the Regional and District Council and on certain courts and officers for the trial of certain suits, cases and offences. For a ready reference, Clause-5 is quoted below: "5. Conferment of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Code of Crimi­nal Procedure, 1898, on the Regional and dis­trict Councils and on certain courts and officers for the trial of certain suits, cases and offences- (1) The Governor may, for the trial of suits or cases arising out of any law in force in any autonomous district or region being a law specified in that behalf by the Governor,. or for the trial of offences punishable with death, transportation for life, or imprisonment for a term of not less than five years under the Indian Pe­nal Code or under any other law for the time being applicable to such district or region, confer on the District council or the Regional Council having authority over such district or regional or on courts constituted by such Dis­trict Council or on any officer appointed in that behalf by the Governor, such powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or, as the case may be, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as he deems appropriate, and thereupon the said Council, court or officer shall try the suits, cases or offences in exercise of the powers so conferred. (2) The Governor may withdraw or modify any of the powers conferred on a District Coun­cil, Regional Council, Court or officer under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph. (3) Save as expressly provided in this para­graph, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall not ap­ply to the trial of any suits, cases or offences in an autonomous district or in any autonomous region to which the provisions of this paragraph apply. (3) Save as expressly provided in this para­graph, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall not ap­ply to the trial of any suits, cases or offences in an autonomous district or in any autonomous region to which the provisions of this paragraph apply. (4) On and from the date appointed by the President under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 4 in relation to any autonomous district or au­tonomous region, nothing contained in this paragraph shall, in its application to that dis­trict or region, be deemed to authorise the Gov­ernor to confer on the District Council or Re­gional Council or on courts constituted by the District Council any of the powers referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph". 12. As has been observed by the Divi­sion Bench in the aforesaid decision, under Clause -5, the Governor is not invested with the power to constitute any court, but only invested with a power to authorise either the District Council or Regional Council or a court created by either of them (Village Court) to try cases in accordance with the procedure established by either the Cr.P.C. or the CPC, as the case may be, to the extent indicated by the Governor. 13. The inevitable conclusion derived by the Division Bench in the said decision is that all criminal cases irrespective of the fact that the de jure complainant is the State, are re­quired to be tried by the "Village Court" constituted under para-4 of the Sixth Schedule if both the accused and the victim of the offence also belong to same Scheduled Tribe. Such a construction has been held to be im­plied in view of the language and scheme of Clause-4 & 5 of the 6th Schedule. In para­graph 20 of the judgment, it has been ob­served thus: "The only exception to the abovementioned rule appears to be that Paras-5 in express terms recognizes the Governor's authority to appoint an officer for the purpose of trial of suits, cases or offences. As and when such an officer is appointed by the Governor for a specific pur­pose to the extend of the power conferred on him, such an officer appointed by the Governor would have jurisdiction to try such case as specified by the Governor to the exclusion of the Village Courts. As and when such an officer is appointed by the Governor for a specific pur­pose to the extend of the power conferred on him, such an officer appointed by the Governor would have jurisdiction to try such case as specified by the Governor to the exclusion of the Village Courts. Even such an officer is re­quired to exercise only such powers of the Criminal Procedure Code or the Code of Civil Procedure as conferred by the Governor super­ficially". 14. With the above conclusion reached, the Division Bench answered the question as to whether the petitioner in that case was re­quired to be tried only by a "Tribal Court" or any other court/person, such as, Presiding Officer of the Fast Track Court, would depend on the existence of any specific confer­ment of power by the Governor on the Pre­siding Officer of the Fast Track Court. It has been held that in the absence of any such con­ferment, the accused is required to be tried only by the appropriate Tribal Court. 15. The aforesaid findings arrived at by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision now lead us to the question as to whether the Fast Track Court in question, has been con­ferred with the power by the Governor by way of issuing any notification under the afore­said provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Constitution. In other words, whether there is any specific conferment of power by the Governor on the Fast Track Court to try the kind of offences with which we are concerned in the instant proceeding. 16. While Mr. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General has placed reliance on the notification dated 10.12.2007, on the basis of which the learned Fast Track Court, has passed the impugned order, Mr. Massar, learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the document annexed to the additional affi­davit, submitted that there being no conferment of power as envisaged under Clause- 5 of the 6th Schedule on the Fast Track Court, the said court is not vested with the jurisdic­tion to proceed with the trial and that the case is required to be transferred to the District Council Court. The aforesaid notification dated 10.12.2007 is reproduced below: "No. LJ (A) 77/200/151-A-Further under sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Meghalaya Autonomous District Administration of Justice Act (Assam Act XIV of 1960 as adapted and amended, the Governor of Meghalaya on the recommended of the Gauhati High Court is pleased to appoint Smti. B. Giri Additional Dis­trict and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shillong, Meghalaya as the Additional Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District for then trial of all offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than 5 (five) years under the Indian Penal Code or under any law for the time being applicable to the District and also to hear all Civil & Criminal Revisions, appeals, etc; from the decision of the Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner within the said District and shall also for the purposes aforesaid, exercise all the powers of the Deputy Commissioner within the said District". 17. Similar notification was issued on 28.3.2003, a copy of which is available at page 32 of the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner. Both the notifications have been issued under Section 2 of the Meghalaya Autonomous District (Administration of Jus­tice) Act, 1960., as adapted and amended. By the said notification dated 10.12.2007, the particular Presiding Officer has been ap­pointed as the Additional Deputy Commis­sioner, East Khasi Hills District for the trial of all offences punishable with death, imprison­ment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than five years, under the IPC or under any law for the time being applicable to the District and also to heard all civil and crimi­nal revisions, appeals, etc; from the decision of the Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner within the said District and shall also for the purposes aforesaid, exercise all the powers of the Deputy Commissioner within the said District. Be it stated here that the particular officer is the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court). 18. The said notification is not the one as envisaged under Clause-5 of the 6th Schedule, about which elaborate discussions have been made in the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench. The notification being not the one under Clause-5 of the 6th Schedule and being under Section 2 of the aforesaid Act of 1960, cannot be said to be in conformity with the exception curved out in the aforesaid decision. The notification being not the one under Clause-5 of the 6th Schedule and being under Section 2 of the aforesaid Act of 1960, cannot be said to be in conformity with the exception curved out in the aforesaid decision. Conferment of power and jurisdic­tion on the particular Court or the Presiding Officer there of by the aforesaid notification under Section 2 of the Act, or general provision, generally empowering the particu­lar Court/Presiding Officer is not the confer­ment of power and jurisdiction, specially pro­vided for under clause 5 of the 6th Schedule about which elaborate discussions have been made in the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench. It is in this context, Mr. Massar by referring to the provisions of the Acts and the Rules mentioned above brought out the dis­tinctive features of the said provisions and the provisions under clause-5 of the 6th Sched­ule. 19. In the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner, the decision of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 11 (SH) 2007 has also been referred to. The said petition was disposed off by order dated 11.12.2007, holding that the particular Fast Track Court having not been conferred with the specific power un­der Clause-5 of the 6th Schedule, the order passed by him was not sustainable in law. While holding so, the aforesaid decision has also been referred to. 20. In U. Bakingster Sylemiong (supra), this court under similar circumstances observed that the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to try the particular case and it was the District Council Court, which was the competent court. 21. The decision on which Mr. Mahanta, learned Addl. Advocate General has placed reliance i.e. Brij Mohan lal (supra) is not in the context of the 6th Schedule of the Con­stitution of India. The whole emphasis of the Apex Court in the said decision was on the scheme of the Fast Track Court. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the apex court appreciating the laudable objectives with which the Fast Track Court scheme has been conceived and introduced, issued certain directions to take care of initial teething problems highlighted by the parties. None of the problems referred to or the guidelines is­sued deals with the kind of situation in which the present case is. None of the problems referred to or the guidelines is­sued deals with the kind of situation in which the present case is. When there can be no denial of the laudable efforts towards estab­lishing the Fast Track Courts, such efforts cannot be said to be in disregard of the spe­cific provisions of the 6th Schedule, in con­sideration of which the Division Bench ren­dered the aforesaid decision. 22. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that in terms of the aforesaid decision, this case is required to be transferred to the District Council Court, as the same is exclusively triable by the said court, there being no conferment of power upon the Fast Track Court by the notification issued by the Governor under Clause-5 of the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India. 23. The revision petition is allowed by set­ting aside and quashing the impugned order dated 31.3.2009 with further direction to the court below to transmit the case records to the District Council Court for trial.