JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MOHIT S. SHAH) In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Palanpur Bar Association and its President have challenged - (i) State Government Notification dated 11.10.1999 (Annexure-A) issued under Section 12 read with Sections 6 and 13 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as ?the Bombay Act?) or ?the old Act?) establishing a Court of Joint District Judge at Deesa in the District of Banaskantha and also investing the Joint District Judge at Deesa with the powers co-extensive with and jurisdiction concurrent with the District Judge, Palanpur for disposal of cases arising out of Deesa Taluka and 11 other Talukas of Banaskantha District (out of which 2 Talukas have by now gone to another District called Patan District). (ii) High Court Notification dated 13.10.1999 (Annexure-B) issued under Section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ?the Cr.PC?) specifying Deesa as additional place of sitting of the Court of Sessions of Banaskantha sessions division which is having Palanpur as its ordinary place of sitting, exercising all powers of the Sessions Judge co-extensively in respect of the cases arising out of the area of Deesa Taluka and 11 other Talukas specified hereinabove (out of which 2 Talukas have by now gone to another District called for Patan District). (iii) Order dated 16.10.1999 of the District & Sessions Judge, Palanpur transferring all the pending civil and criminal matters [except MACP pending on the file of MAC Tribunal and atrocity cases pending in the Special Court at Palanpur] on the file of the District & Sessions Court, Banaskantha District at Palanpur as well as on the file of Assistant Judges & Additional Assistant Judges, Palanpur arising from the jurisdiction of Deesa Taluka and the above-named specified Talukas to the file of the Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. 2. Banaskantha is one of the 25 Districts in the State of Gujarat. The Headquarters of the District is at Palanpur. Petitioner No.1 ? Palanpur Bar Association is an association of Advocates practising in the District Court at Palanpur and Courts subordinate thereto in the 4 Talukas from which the civil and criminal cases go to the District & Sessions Court at Palanpur. Originally, Banaskantha District consisted of 11 revenue Talukas (Tehsils). The Headquarters of the District is at Palanpur. Petitioner No.1 ? Palanpur Bar Association is an association of Advocates practising in the District Court at Palanpur and Courts subordinate thereto in the 4 Talukas from which the civil and criminal cases go to the District & Sessions Court at Palanpur. Originally, Banaskantha District consisted of 11 revenue Talukas (Tehsils). In the year 1997-98, 5 new Talukas were formed by the State Government and, therefore, just before issuance of the impugned notifications in the year 1999, the total number of Talukas in Banaskantha District was 16. During pendency of the petition, 2 Talukas viz. Radhanpur and Santalpur were excluded from Banaskantha District and included in the newly constituted Patan District. Hence at present Banaskantha District consists of 14 Talukas. From the geographical map of the Banaskantha District (Annexure-D), it appears that the distance between Palanpur and Deesa is 26 kms.. The 4 Talukas are closer to Palanpur and the other 10 Talukas including Deesa Taluka are closer to Deesa. In fact for travelling from all those 10 Talukas to Palanpur one would have to pass Deesa. 3. The Bar Association, Deesa passed Resolution dated 11.2.1993 and sent the representation to the High Court to establish the Court of Assistant Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. After considering the workload and other aspects, the High Court decided to establish the Court of Joint District Judge and Additional District Judge at Deesa. The District Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur was asked to arrange a meeting with the President of the Bar Associations of Palanpur, Deesa and other Talukas on 27.9.1999. The President of Bar Associations of various Talukas gave in writing that areas of their respective Courts should be kept within the jurisdiction of the proposed court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. The High Court also received memorandum dated 21.9.1999 sent by the President of the Palanpur Bar Association opposing establishment of the proposed Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. The then Acting Chief Justice also gave hearing to the President and members of the Palanpur Bar Association on 29.9.1999. Thereafter the Standing Committee of the High Court decided at its meeting held on 7.10.1999 that Deesa and other specified Talukas be kept within the jurisdiction of the proposed Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. The then Acting Chief Justice also gave hearing to the President and members of the Palanpur Bar Association on 29.9.1999. Thereafter the Standing Committee of the High Court decided at its meeting held on 7.10.1999 that Deesa and other specified Talukas be kept within the jurisdiction of the proposed Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. Accordingly by letter dated 22.2.1999 the High Court informed the State Government that on consideration of the representation dated 11.2.1993 received from the President of Deesa Bar Association, the High Court has decided to establish the Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa, provided the State Government sanctions necessary post of Joint District Judge with attendant staff for the said Court. 4. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 6 and 13 of the Bombay Act, the State Government in consultation with the High Court issued Notification dated 11.10.1999 establishing the Court of Joint District Judge at Deesa and investing the Joint District Judge with co-extensive powers and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge, Palanpur for disposal of cases arising from the specified talukas. NOTIFICATION Legal Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar Date. : 11th Oct. 1999. No. GM/29/99/CCA/1089/CMR/140/D. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section-12 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (Bom.XIV of 1869) read with section 6 and Section 13 thereof the Government of Gujarat, hereby directs that, with effect on and from the 18th October 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said date'). 1. There shall be a Court of Joint District Judge (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Court') at Deesa in the District of Banaskantha; 2. The said Court shall be presided over by a Joint District Judge; 3. The Joint District Judge, subject to the provision of para (4), is hereby invested with the powers co-extensive with an the concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge, Palanpur, for disposal of cases arising out of Deesa, Bhildi, Dhanera, Pathawada, Dantiwada, Tharad, Wav, Deodar, Bhabhar, Sihori, Radhanpur and Santalpur talukas of Banaskantha District ; 4. The jurisdiction of Joint District Judge so invested shall pro-tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Banaskantha, from the said limits. By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. Sd/- (I.A. Dholakia) Deputy Secretary to Government, Legal Department.? 5. The jurisdiction of Joint District Judge so invested shall pro-tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Banaskantha, from the said limits. By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. Sd/- (I.A. Dholakia) Deputy Secretary to Government, Legal Department.? 5. The High Court also issued Notification dated 13.10.1999 under Section 9(6) of the Cr.PC declaring Deesa as an additional place of sitting of the Court of Sessions of Banaskantha Sessions Division which was having Palanpur as its ordinary place of sitting. The Court of Sessions at Deesa was also invested with co-extensive powers in respect of cases arising out of the specified Talukas. No. A 2403/81 NOTIFICATION BY THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT, SOLA, AHMEDABAD. (For insertion in the Gujarat Government Gazette Part-IV-A). In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (6) of Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (Act 2 of 1974), the Honourable the Acting Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Gujarat , are pleased to specify, in partial modification of direction No.2 contained in Government of Bombay Notification. Home Department No.CCA 1558/61973 (b)-III dated 5th December, 1958. Deesa as an Additional Place of sitting of the Court of Sessions of Banaskantha Sessions Division which is having Palanpur as its ordinary place of sitting, with effect from 18th October 1999, exercising all powers of the Sessions Judge co-extensively in respect of the cases arising out of the area of Deesa, Bhildi, Dhanera, Panthawada, Dantiwada, Tharad, Wav, Deodar, Bhabhar, Sihori, Radhanpur and Santalpur talukas of Banaskantha District. High Court of Gujarat, at Sola sd/- Ahmedabad-380 060 (A.A. Kureshi) Date : October 13, 1999 Registrar 6. The District & Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur issued the consequential order dated 16.10.1999 (Annexure-C) transferring all the pending civil and criminal cases (except MACT cases and Atrocity cases) on the file of the District & Sessions Court Banaskantha at Palanpur arising from the jurisdiction of Deesa Taluka and the other specified Talukas. The aforesaid notifications and the consequential order are challenged in this petition filed by the Palanpur Bar Association. 7. The aforesaid notifications and the consequential order are challenged in this petition filed by the Palanpur Bar Association. 7. Mr KG Vakharia, learned Senior Counsel with Ms Avni Mehta, learned advocate for the petitioners has raised the following contentions :- 7.1 Part III of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (Bombay Act or the old Act for short)provides for establishment of a District Court in each District and the District Court is to be presided over by a Judge to be called the District Judge. Section 12 confers power upon the State Government to appoint Joint District Judges to assist the District Judge but there is no provision for establishing the Court of Joint District Judge. Section 12 makes it more than amply clear by providing that the State Government may appoint in any district, the Joint District Judge who shall be invested with co-extensive powers and a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge except that he shall not keep a file of civil suits and shall transact such civil business only as he may receive from the District Judge or as may have been referred to the Joint Judge by order of the High Court. Section 19 of the Bombay Act confers powers of the State Government to invest an Assistant Judge with all the powers of a District Judge within a particular part of a district and only investment of such jurisdiction in the Assistant Judge shall pro tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the said limits. Hence issuance of the impugned notification by the State Government on 11.10.1999 excluding the jurisdiction of the District Judge was without any authority of law. 7.2 Even the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 (Gujarat Act or the new Act for short) only provides for establishing the Court of a District Judge for each District and the Court is to be presided over by the Judge called the Principal District Judge (Sections 3 and 4). Sub-section (3) of Section 4 also confers power on the State Government to appoint, in consultation with the High Court, to the District Court one or more Judges to be called Additional District Judges when the business pending before a Court of a District Judge so requires. Such Additional District Judges are to be appointed to decide only those matters which the Principal District Judge may assign to him. Such Additional District Judges are to be appointed to decide only those matters which the Principal District Judge may assign to him. Section 20 of the Gujarat Act also makes it clear that it is only the Principal District Judge who has the powers with respect to filing of the suits and the appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like, and that an Additional District Judge is not supposed to perform all these administrative functions so long as the Principal District Judge is holding the office. It is only in the event of death or very serious illness or absence on leave or any other reason preventing the Principal District Judge from performing his duties that the senior most Additional District Judge at the District headquarters will assume the charge of the office of the Court of Principal District Judge and perform all the administrative duties referred to hereinabove. 7.3 The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5 permits the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, to establish a Court of a Senior Civil Judge for a part of a District and specify the local limits of its jurisdiction, but no such power is conferred to establish a Court of Additional District Judge for a part of a District and specify the local limits of its jurisdiction. Absence of such power with respect to demarcating territorial jurisdiction of the Court of a Additional District Judge for a part of a District is more than sufficient to hold that the impugned notification dated 11.10.1999 at Annexure-A cannot continue to have any legal effect after coming into force of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005, upon its publication in the Gazette dated 23.3.2005. 7.4 Section 7(1) of the Cr. PC defines sessions division as a district or more than one districts. Hence sessions division is not synonymous with the district. Section 7 does not provide for dividing a sessions division into sub-divisions. It only provides for dividing a district into sub-divisions. Section 7(3) provides for creating sub-divisions out of a district. The purpose for which such power is conferred is only to provide for Courts of Executive Magistrates or to enable the State Government to appoint sub-divisional magistrates who are executive Magistrates in a part of the District and to put them in-charge of sub-divisions. Section 7(3) provides for creating sub-divisions out of a district. The purpose for which such power is conferred is only to provide for Courts of Executive Magistrates or to enable the State Government to appoint sub-divisional magistrates who are executive Magistrates in a part of the District and to put them in-charge of sub-divisions. Section 7(3) only contemplates creating a sub-division out of a sessions division or appointing a Sessions Judge for a sub-division or a part of a district. Section 20(4) of the Cr.PC, therefore, only provides for appointment of sub-divisional magistrates or executive magistrates in some divisions of a district. The title of Chapter II of the Cr. PC is Constitution of Criminal Courts and Offices. The phrase Criminal Courts refers to Judicial Courts and the phrase Offices refers to offices of executive magistrates. Sections 9 to 19 relate to Judicial Courts defining their territorial jurisdiction, administrative control and subordination. On the other hand, Sections 20 to 23 exclusively relate to executive magistrates or offices of executive magistrates and contain separate provisions for their establishments, jurisdiction, subordination and control. 7.5 The petitioners' contention that sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 9 provide for appointment of a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge in the sessions division and not a part of a sessions division is also borne out by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 24 providing for appointment of a public prosecutor in a district and not for a sessions division. In a given case, a sessions division may consist of more than one districts and, therefore, a public prosecutor is appointed for a district and not for the entire sessions division. 7.6 Section 185 of Cr. PC empowers the State Government to give directions that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions division. This section uses both the words district and sessions division and draws out the distinction between the two clearly. This amply proves that the words district and sessions division are intentionally separately used in different context and connote different meanings and, therefore, should not be confused with each other. 7.7. This section uses both the words district and sessions division and draws out the distinction between the two clearly. This amply proves that the words district and sessions division are intentionally separately used in different context and connote different meanings and, therefore, should not be confused with each other. 7.7. Section 9(6) of Cr PC confers power on the High Court only to provide for an additional seat for the Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge like a circuit Court, but it does not confer power to establish a separate exclusive court for part of a sessions division. The smallest area or minimum area for a sessions division is a district and nothing less. The sessions division cannot be established in part of a district. Establishing a Court is different from appointing a Judge in any such Court. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Gokaraju Rangraju vs. State of A.P., 1981 Cr. LJ 876 (para 17) and Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing Under trial Prisoners vs. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 731 to explain the distinction between establishing a Court and appointing a Judge therein. Reliance is also placed on several other decisions in support of the other contentions. 7.8 Section 24 of CPC confers power on the District Court to transfer suits from one subordinate Court to another subordinate Court within the same district. However, the impugned notifications confer powers on the Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa to decide all cases arising from 12 specified Talukas to the exclusion of the powers of the District and Sessions Judge at Palanpur. Section 30 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act contains repeal and savings clause. From the appointed date i.e. 23.3.2005, all appeals under Section 12(2) and 15(2)(a) and 15(3) lie to the Court of a District Judge and under Section 30(3) all pending cases must be transferred to the Court of the Principal District Judge at Palanpur. 7.9 The impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 at Annexure - B takes away powers of the Sessions Judge under Section 194, 408 and 409 Cr PC. 7.10 The order dated 16.10.1999 of the District and Sessions Judge, Palanpur at Annexure - C to the petition is even otherwise illegal as it gave retrospective effect to the notifications at Annexures 'A' and 'B'. 7.10 The order dated 16.10.1999 of the District and Sessions Judge, Palanpur at Annexure - C to the petition is even otherwise illegal as it gave retrospective effect to the notifications at Annexures 'A' and 'B'. The pending cases on the file of the District & Sessions Judge at Palanpur and the files of Assistant Judges and Additional Sessions Judge at Palanpur could not have been transferred to the so-called Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. 8. On the other hand, Mr JB Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court and Mr Nikunt Raval, learned Assistant Government Pleader have opposed the petition and made the following submissions :- 8.1 The petitioner-association has no locus-standi to file the petition challenging the establishment of the Court of Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa or continuance thereof as the Court of Additional District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. Strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in SP Gupta & Ors. vs. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (Para 974) = 1981 Suppl. SCC 87 (Para 989) observing that it cannot be said that only because they have a right to practise in a court, lawyers have 'locus standi' to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning judges, courts and administration of justice and that there are many such matters in which they have no 'locus standi' to ask for relief. For instance, lawyers cannot question the establishment of new court on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby. Strong reliance is also placed on the decisions in Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 Raj. 232 (para 14), Madhusudan Mills vs. Calcutta Municipality, AIR 1976 Cal. 133 (para 22) and Ramniklal N Bhutta vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1236 (page 1240, para 10). 8.2 Even otherwise the present petition is not maintainable as no public interest is involved in challenge to the notifications issued by the State Government and the High Court after considering the public interest and after consulting the Bar Associations of the specified Talukas from which cases are to go to the Court at Deesa presided over by Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa now the Court presided over by Additional District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. The impugned notifications were issued after taking into consideration convenience of the litigants in the specified Talukas for whom Deesa is closer than Palanpur. The petitioners have conceded the powers of the State Government and the High Court to provide for additional place of sitting at Deesa for District & Sessions Judge or for Additional District & Additional Sessions Judge previously known as Joint District & Additional Sessions Judge. It is also not disputed that the District & Sessions Judge at Palanpur can assign all the cases arising from the specified Talukas to the Additional District & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. The principal objection is to the power conferred on the Court at Deesa to directly receive civil and criminal cases from the people in the specified Talukas. It would cause great inconvenience and hardship to the people in these specified Talukas if they are compelled to go to Palanpur, for first filing the cases and then to go to the Court at Deesa for giving evidence and to attend the hearings of those cases. No prejudice is caused to any litigant by permitting the Court at Deesa to receive the cases directly from the litigants in the specified Talukas. 8.3 The impugned notifications do substantial justice to the people in the district, and particularly the litigants in the 12 specified Talukas. As held by the Apex Court in AM Allison vs. BL Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 and by this Court in Saurashtra Paper & Board Mills vs. State of Gujarat, 1992 (2) GLR 871 , the writ Court will not exercise its jurisdiction and interfere with a statutory notification or an administrative order if it does not cause any injustice. 8.4 The Principal District Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur still retains the powers under Section 24 CPC and under Section 408 Cr PC to transfer a civil or a criminal case from one subordinate Court in Banaskantha district to another subordinate Court in the Banaskantha district, whether such Court is in Deesa Taluka or any other Taluka in the Banaskantha district. Section 24(3) CPC specifically provides that Courts of Additional Judges (i.e. Additional District Judges) shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. Section 24(3) CPC specifically provides that Courts of Additional Judges (i.e. Additional District Judges) shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. 8.5 Section 19 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act conferred power on the State Government to invest an Assistant Judge with all or any of the powers of a District Judge within a particular part of a district, and thereupon the jurisdiction of an Assistant Judge so invested shall pro tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the said limits. When the Bombay Act conferred such wide powers to exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the Talukas, by conferring jurisdiction on an Assistant Judge, the impugned orders may not be interfered with when the jurisdiction is conferred on a Joint District Judge (now Additional District Judge) who is higher in rank and cadre than an Assistant Judge (now a Senior Civil Judge). The Joint District Judge was posted at Deesa for disposal of cases arising out of Talukas mentioned in the notification. 8.6 Even otherwise, Section 7 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 confers power on the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, to fix the place or places at which every Civil Court shall be held. The Civil Court includes the Court of a District Judge and also of Additional District Judges appointed under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act. 8.7 Section 9(1) provides that the Court of District Judges, existing immediately prior to the appointed date shall, with effect from the appointed date, be deemed to be Courts of District Judges established under this Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 9 also provides that the place at which a civil court deemed to be established under sub-sections (1) to (3) is being held immediately prior to the appointed date shall be deemed to be the place fixed under the said sub-section (1) of section 7. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of Sections 7 and 9 would indicate that the Court of the Joint District Judge at Deesa continues to be the Court of the District Judge at Deesa which is presided over by an Additional District Judge. 9. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of Sections 7 and 9 would indicate that the Court of the Joint District Judge at Deesa continues to be the Court of the District Judge at Deesa which is presided over by an Additional District Judge. 9. In rejoinder, Mr Vakharia, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that it is not open to the respondents to raise any contention about locus-standi of the Bar Association in absence of any such objection in the affidavit-in-reply which was filed as far back as on 31.1.2000. It is submitted that even otherwise the Apex Court has been taking a liberal view about locus-standi. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union Sindri vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 (paras 41 to 44) and Krishnaswami vs. Union of India, 1992 (4) SCC 605 (paras 36 and 42). The Palanpur Bar Association is the only body or persons who could have filed the present petition. It is only the association of advocates which is conscious of, and concerned with, the legality of establishment of Courts and conferment of jurisdiction upon them in accordance with law and that ordinary citizens or any individual litigant would not have any idea about the exact ambit and scope of such statutory provisions. It is submitted that when the distance between Palanpur and Deesa is only 26 kms., the impugned notification cannot be justified as in larger public interest. If the State Government intended to exercise the powers of issuing the notification in larger public interest, the State Government would have bifurcated the Banaskantha district into two districts called Palanpur and Deesa. Although such bifurcation was effected in other districts like bifurcation of Kheda district into Kheda and Anand or Panchmahals into Panchmahals and Dahod, Mehsana into Mehsana and Patan and so on and so forth, but no such bifurcation was effected in case of Banaskantha district because there was no justification then and at present also there is no justification for dividing Banaskantha district into two parts Palanpur and Deesa for the purposes of conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Additional District & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. On the contrary, public interest and convenience of the litigants would be better served by permitting the District & Sessions Court at Palanpur to conduct all the cases arising from all the Talukas in the Banaskantha district because the offices of the Collector, District Panchayat, District Superintendent of Police, Superintending Engineer, Panchayat office, Labour Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Assistant Charity Commissioner, Registrar of Cooperative Societies etc. are at Palanpur and not at Deesa. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we have given anxious and serious consideration to the issues involved. 11. First taking up the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent about locus-standi of the petitioner-association, it is true that in para 989 of the judgment in SP Gupta vs. Union of India, 1981 Suppl. SCC 87 a Bench of seven Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court observed that - It has, however, to be made clear that it cannot be said that lawyers only because they have a right to practise in a court have 'locus standi' to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning judges, courts and administration of justice. There are many such matters in which they have no 'locus standi' to ask for relief. By way of illustration, lawyers cannot question the establishment of new court on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby. (See V.R. Mudvedkar vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1971 Mys. 202). However, the observations of the Apex Court in SP Gupta's case cannot be read in isolation because the Court also made the following pertinent observations :- Before leaving this topic, it has to be observed that the question of locus standi in the field of administrative law is still in a fluid state and it is not possible to lay down in any one case the principles which can govern all situations. Besides, the doubt expressed on the locus standi of the lawyers to question the establishment of a new Court would be relevant where the lawyers challenge such decision on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby. In the facts of the instant case also, that may be the underlying motive. Besides, the doubt expressed on the locus standi of the lawyers to question the establishment of a new Court would be relevant where the lawyers challenge such decision on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby. In the facts of the instant case also, that may be the underlying motive. However, this Court cannot decline to consider the case where the plea raised is not damnum sine injuria, but the challenge is to curtailment of the powers and jurisdiction of the Principal District Judge at the District Headquarters over the subordinate Courts within the district. The legal contentions raised by the petitioners are substantially weighty enough to merit serious consideration. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied on the following observations in BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) vs. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350 :- It will seen that whenever the Court has interfered and given directions while entertaining PIL it has mainly been where there has been an element of violations of Article 21 or of human rights or where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to Court due to some disadvantage. In those cases also it is the legal rights which are secured by the Courts. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Kushum Lata vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 2643 wherein the Court referred to definition of 'public interest litigation' given by the Council for Public Interest Law in its 1976 report as under:- Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interest. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others. In Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka vs. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 2544 , the Apex Court held that the petitioner Federation was not the accredited representative of the litigants of Karnataka. However, the Apex Court did not dismiss the petition on that ground and examined the merits of the petition and dismissed it after it found no substance in the petition. 13. However, the Apex Court did not dismiss the petition on that ground and examined the merits of the petition and dismissed it after it found no substance in the petition. 13. In M.S. Jayaraj vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala, (2000) 7 SCC 552 , the Apex Court noticed that the strict interpretation regarding locus standi has changed and a much wider canvass has been adopted in later years regarding a person's entitlement to move the High Court invoking writ jurisdiction. Reference was made to a four Judge Bench decision in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 pointing out three categories of persons vis-a-vis the locus standi : (1) a person aggrieved; (2) a stranger; and (3) a busybody or a meddlesome interloper. Learned Judges in that decision pointed out that anyone belonging to the third category is easily distinguishable and such person interferes in things which do not concern him as he masquerades to be a crusader of justice. While cautioning that the High Court should do well to reject the petitions of such busybodies at the threshold itself, Their Lordships made the following observations :- 38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be 'persons aggrieved'. The Bar Associations, though not falling in the central zone of certainty, can certainly be considered as falling in the grey outer circle. To a lay person, it may indeed seem strange that a stranger should have locus standi to file such a petition. Is the Bar Association to be considered as a mere stranger ? 14. That question cannot be answered without considering another dimension. In Ex-Capt. To a lay person, it may indeed seem strange that a stranger should have locus standi to file such a petition. Is the Bar Association to be considered as a mere stranger ? 14. That question cannot be answered without considering another dimension. In Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 739, while holding that lawyers have no right to go on strike, the Constitution Bench approved, inter-alia, the following observations made by the Delhi High Court in BL Wadehra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others, AIR (2000) Delhi 266 :- In view of the nobility and tradition of the legal profession, the status of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and the fiduciary character of the relationship between a lawyer and his client and since strike interferes with the administration of justice and infringes the fundamental right of litigants for speedy trial of their cases, strike by lawyers cannot be approved as an acceptable mode of protest, irrespective of th gravity of the provocation and the genuineness of the cause. Lawyers should adopt other modes of protest which will not interrupt or disrupt Court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Thereby lawyers can also set an example to other sections of the society in the matter of protest and agitations. (emphasis supplied) In the same decision, the Apex Court made the following observations :- However, by merely holding strikes as illegal, it would not be sufficient in present day situation nor serve any purpose. The root cause for such malady is required to be cured. It is stated that resort to strike is because the administration is having deaf ears in listening to the genuine grievances and even if grievances are heard appropriate actions are not taken. To highlight, therefore, the cause, call for strike is given. In our view whatever be the situation in other fields, lawyers cannot claim or justify to go on strike or give a call to boycott the judicial proceedings. It is rightly pointed out by Attorney General that by the very nature of their calling to aid and assist in the dispensation of justice, lawyers normally should not resort to strike. Further, it had been repeatedly held that strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. 15. It is rightly pointed out by Attorney General that by the very nature of their calling to aid and assist in the dispensation of justice, lawyers normally should not resort to strike. Further, it had been repeatedly held that strike is an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. 15. On the one hand there is no dispute about the locus standi of aggrieved litigants to file such a petition. On the other hand the lawyers are considered as officers of the Court and they also have fiduciary relationship with the clients. Since the lawyers are not to have any right to go on strike, there must be some forum where an association of persons who are both officers of the Court and persons having fiduciary relationship with the consumers of justice may ventilate their grievances in relation to the establishment of Courts and conferment or curtailment of the powers of the Court. In the matters such as the present one, that forum would obviously be the High Court on the administrative side. Before the impugned decision was taken in this case, the District Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur had arranged a meeting with the President of various Bar Associations including Palanpur Bar Association the petitioner herein; the High Court had also received and considered the memorandum dated 21.9.1999 sent by the President of the Palanpur Bar Association. In fact, by letter dated 23.9.1999, the High Court also informed the President of the Palanpur Bar Association that the members of the Bar Association may meet the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice on 29.9.1999. The members of the Palanpur Bar Association were accordingly heard by the then learned Acting Chief Justice on that day. Consideration of the representations made by the Bar Associations and the hearing afforded by the Head of the State Judiciary would indicate that the petitioner Bar Association was treated as a stake holder in the system, and not as a mere stranger. 16. Consideration of the representations made by the Bar Associations and the hearing afforded by the Head of the State Judiciary would indicate that the petitioner Bar Association was treated as a stake holder in the system, and not as a mere stranger. 16. It may, therefore, be safely said that while the Courts have been more liberal in enlarging the scope of locus standi in public interest litigation complaining about violation of Article 21 or human rights or for the benefit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to come to court due to some disadvantage, when it comes to public interest litigation on other issues of public importance or issues pertaining to public institutions, grant of locus standi to a stake holder in the system would not militate against any settled legal principle. Of course, even after expansion of the concept of locus standi, there would be no expansion of the grounds for judicial review of administrative action, particularly in the matter of challenge to a policy decision in public interest litigation instituted by Bar Associations. Subject to this clarification, the Court does not accept the preliminary contention canvassed on behalf of the respondents. 17. Coming to the merits of the controversy, prior to the coming into force of the Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005, there were four cadres in the State Judiciary - (i) cadre of District Judges & Joint District Judges (Joint Judges in the original Bombay Act. (ii) cadre of Assistant Judges (iii) cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division) (iv) cadre of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Pursuant to the recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission, now there are only three cadres, (i) cadre of District Judges consisting of Principal District Judges and Additional District Judges (ii) cadre of Senior Civil Judges (iii) cadre of Civil Judges. The District Judges are re-designated as Principal District Judges and Joint District Judges are re-designated as Additional District Judges. The cadre of Assistant Judges does not exist. 18. The Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (the old Act) provided that there shall be in each district, a District Court presided over by a Judge called the District Judge (sec. 5). It further provided that the District Judge shall ordinarily hold the District Court at the sadr station in his district, but may, with the previous sanction of the High Court, hold it elsewhere within the district (sec.6). 5). It further provided that the District Judge shall ordinarily hold the District Court at the sadr station in his district, but may, with the previous sanction of the High Court, hold it elsewhere within the district (sec.6). It further provided that the District Court shall be the Court of Appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force (sec.8). This was subject to certain exceptions. Sections 16 and 17 pertained to the jurisdiction of Assistant Judges and Section 26 provided for appeals from decrees passed by a civil court to the High Court where the pecuniary subject matter exceeded the specified amount. 19. Part IV of the old Act provided for appointment of Joint Judges. Sections 12 and 13 read as under :- 12. Power to appoint Joint Judges :- The State Government may appoint in any District a Joint Judge who shall be invested with co-extensive powers and a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge, except that he shall not keep a file of civil suits and shall transact such civil business only as he may receive from the District Judge, or as may have been referred to the Joint Judge by order of the High Court. 13. Enactments applied to Joint Judge, Joint Judge's seal. - All Regulations and Act now or hereafter in force and applying to a District Judge shall be deemed to apply also to the Joint Judge; and the seal of the Joint Judge shall be the same as is used by the District Judge. (emphasis supplied) 20. Part V of the old Act contained provisions for appointment of Assistant Judges and conferment of jurisdiction on them. The peculiar position of Assistant Judges was that Section 16 conferred power upon the District Judge to assign original suits or applications or references under the Special Act and in such cases, the appeals were to lie to the District Judge or to the High Court depending on the value of the subject matter. Section 17 conferred appellate jurisdiction on Assistant Judges to try such appeals from the decrees of the subordinate Court as would lie to the District Judge and as may be referred by him to the Assistant Judge. Section 17 conferred appellate jurisdiction on Assistant Judges to try such appeals from the decrees of the subordinate Court as would lie to the District Judge and as may be referred by him to the Assistant Judge. However, Sections 14, 15 and 19 of the Bombay Act need to be read a little more closely :- 14. Power to appoint Assistant Judges :- The State Government may appoint one or more Assistants to the District Judge. 15. Situation of Assistant Judge's Court .- An Assistant Judge shall ordinarily hold his Court at the same place as the District Judge, but he may hold his Court elsewhere within the district, whenever the District Judge shall, with the previous sanction of the High Court, direct him so to do. 19. Power to invest Assistant Judge with powers of District Judge. -The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette invest an Assistant Judge with all or any of the powers of a District Judge within a particular part of a district, and may by like notification, from time to time determine and alter the limits of such part. The jurisdiction of an Assistant Judge so invested shall pro tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the said limits. Every Assistant Judge so invested shall ordinarily hold his court at such place within the local limits of his jurisdiction as may be determined by the State Government, and may, with the previous sanction of the High Court, hold it at any other place within such limits. (emphasis supplied) 21. It appears that the Deesa Bar Association had passed a Resolution requesting the High Court to establish the Court of an Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. After considering various aspects including the workload, the High Court recommended establishment of a Court of Joint District Judge. The impugned Government Notification also provided that the jurisdiction of the Joint District Judge so invested shall pro tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the limits of Deesa and other specified Talukas. When the cadre of Assistant Judges was admittedly lower in rank than the cadre of District Judges (which included Joint District Judges), it was quite baffling to appreciate the object underlying the provisions of Section 12 on the one hand and Section 19 on the other hand. When the cadre of Assistant Judges was admittedly lower in rank than the cadre of District Judges (which included Joint District Judges), it was quite baffling to appreciate the object underlying the provisions of Section 12 on the one hand and Section 19 on the other hand. An Assistant Judge could be invested with all the powers of a District Judge within a particular part of a district and such jurisdiction so invested in an Assistant Judge shall pro tanto exclude jurisdiction of the District Judge from within the said limits. However, a Joint District Judge, who could be invested with co-extensive powers and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge, could not be invested with the power to keep a file of civil suits. The Joint District Judges were to do appellate work but not to try any original suits and, therefore, they were not to keep the file of civil suits. They were to transact such civil business only as they may receive from the District Judge or as may have been transferred to them by order of the High Court. On the other hand, an Assistant Judge was either to hold the Court at the district headquarter or he could be directed to hold his court elsewhere within the district. Under Section 16 the District Judge could refer to the Assistant Judge even original suits. Thus an Assistant Judge could be assigned exclusive jurisdiction for a particular part of a district to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the District Judge within the said limits. 22. Testing the impugned notification dated 11.10.1999 at Annexure-A solely on the basis of the provisions of Sections 12 read with Sections 15 and 19 of the old Act, it would make clause 4 of the impugned notification dated 11.10.1999 quite vulnerable and the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court also fairly conceded that the jurisdiction of the Joint District Judge so invested could not pro tanto exclude the jurisdiction of the District Judge, Banaskantha from the limits of the specified Talukas like Deesa and others. However, clause 4 of the impugned notification is quite severable and clauses 1 to 3 of the said notification are capable of holding their own without the aid or support of clause 4. 23. However, clause 4 of the impugned notification is quite severable and clauses 1 to 3 of the said notification are capable of holding their own without the aid or support of clause 4. 23. Absence of any specific provision conferring power on the State Government, High Court or the District Judge requiring or permitting the Joint District Judge to hold his Court at any place other than the District Headquarters, unlike the Court of the Assistant Judge under Sections 15 and 19 of the old act, did not mean that a Joint District Judge could not be posted outside the District Headquarters, because Section 6 did permit the District Judge to hold the District Court at any place within the district other than the sadr station (headquarters) and Section 12 empowered the State Government to invest the Joint District Judge with co-extensive powers and a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge. Besides we must take into account the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 (the new Act) because sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the new Act provides that the repeal of the old Act shall not affect anything done or any action taken including the districts formed, limits defined, courts established or constituted, functions assigned, powers granted, jurisdiction defined or vested and notifications issued under the provisions of the old Act. Establishment of such Courts, functions assigned and powers granted under the old Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the new Act, be deemed to have been issued under the corresponding provisions of the new Act and shall continue in force unless and until superseded by any action taken under the new Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners would, however, urge that certain provisions of the new Act also militate against the establishment of a Court of Additional District Judge for a part of a district without any administrative control of the Principal District Judge. 24. Section 3 of the new Act provides for the following classes of civil courts in the State namely, (a) court of a District Judge; (b) court of a Senior Civil Judge; (c) court of a Civil Judge. 25. Now the cadre of District Judges includes Principal District Judges as well as Additional District Judges. 24. Section 3 of the new Act provides for the following classes of civil courts in the State namely, (a) court of a District Judge; (b) court of a Senior Civil Judge; (c) court of a Civil Judge. 25. Now the cadre of District Judges includes Principal District Judges as well as Additional District Judges. Hence a Court of Additional District Judge is as much a Court of a District Judge as a Court presided over by the Principal District Judge. The Court of District Judge, Banaskantha is presided over by a Judge called the Principal District Judge. In view of the provisions of section 4(3), the Court presided over by Additional District Judge is also a Court of a District Judge because when Additional District Judge presides over a court and hears and decides appeals, that Court exercises all the powers and functions of the Court of a District Judge under the Gujarat Civil Courts Act or any other law for the time being in force. The relevant Sections read as under :- 4. Establishment of courts of District Judges, - (1) There shall be established by the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, by notification, in each district, a court of a District Judge. (2) Each court of a District Judge shall be presided over by a Judge to be called the Principal District Judge. (3) (i) When the business pending before a court of a District Judge so requires, the State Government may, in consultation with the High Court, appoint to that court one or more judges to be called as Additional District Judges, for such period as it deems necessary. (ii) The Additional District Judge appointed under this sub-section shall, subject to the general or special orders of the High Court, discharge all or any of the functions of a District Judge under this Act or any other law for the time being in force which the Principal District Judge may assign to him and in the discharge of those functions, he shall exercise all the powers of the court of a District Judge. 10. Posting of District Judges, Senior Civil Judges and Civil Judges. 10. Posting of District Judges, Senior Civil Judges and Civil Judges. (1) No person other than a person belonging to the cadre of District Judge in the judicial service of the State of Gujarat shall be eligible to be posted as a Principal District Judge or as an Additional District Judge. 7. Location of civil court, - (1) The place or places, at which every civil court under this Act shall be held, shall be fixed, and may from time to time, be altered by the State Government, in consultation with the High Court. (emphasis supplied) By virtue of Section 9(1), the Court of Joint District Judge under the old Act, existing immediately prior to the appointed date (23.3.2005) shall, with effect from the appointed date, be deemed to be a Court of District Judge established under the new Act. The place at which a Court of a District Judge deemed to be established under section 9 (1) is being held immediately prior to the appointed date shall be deemed to be the place fixed under Section 7(1). 26. The prohibition contained in Section 12 of the old Act that a Joint District Judge shall not keep a file of civil suits is not to be found in the new Act. This read in conjunction with the fact that Section 7(1) of the new Act empowers the State Government to fix the place or places at which a Court of a District Judge shall be held are wide and flexible enough to permit the State Government to establish the Court of Additional District Judge at Deesa for deciding cases arising from the specified Talukas. Hence clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the impugned notification can certainly be sustained under the new Act, but the provisions of the new Act do not contain any power to exclude the jurisdiction of the Principal District Judge. Therefore, under the new Act also, clause 4 of the notification dated 11.10.1999 cannot be permitted to operate. 27. Hence clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the impugned notification can certainly be sustained under the new Act, but the provisions of the new Act do not contain any power to exclude the jurisdiction of the Principal District Judge. Therefore, under the new Act also, clause 4 of the notification dated 11.10.1999 cannot be permitted to operate. 27. As regards the contention that the new Act does not empower the State Government to establish the Court of Additional District Judge for a part of a district and to specify the local limits of its jurisdiction, it is true that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5 as well as sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Gujarat Act expressly confer powers on the State Government to establish a Court of Senior Civil Judge for a part of a district and to specify the local limits of its jurisdiction and similarly to establish a number of courts of Civil Judges and to specify the local limits of jurisdiction of each such court. It is true that no such express provision is to be found in the new Act in so far as establishing the new Court of District Judge is concerned. But the power to establish a new or additional court of Additional District Judge at any place to exercise power of a District Judge can be exercised by the State Government in consultation with the High Court under Section 7 read with Section 4(3)(ii) of the new Act and the restriction which was to be found in Section 12 of the old Act restraining a Joint District Judge from keeping a file of civil matters is not to be found in the new Act. Having regard to this legislative history, we are unable to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Court of a District Judge presided over by an Additional District Judge cannot be permitted to receive the new cases at Deesa. The above legislative history and availability with the High Court the power to issue general orders under Section 4(3)(ii) support the submission of the respondents. 28. The above legislative history and availability with the High Court the power to issue general orders under Section 4(3)(ii) support the submission of the respondents. 28. We may also note the statement coming from the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court and the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Banaskantha that it is the Principal District & Sessions Judge at Palanpur who exercises all the powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Section 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus the powers of the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur are not curtailed in so far as the powers under Section 24 CPC and Section 408 Cr PC are concerned. Section 24(3) CPC specifically provides that Courts of Additional Judges (i.e. Additional District Judges) shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court. This would also apply to powers under Section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005. 29. Section 4 provides for establishment in each District a court of a District Judge. Each court of a District Judge shall be presided over by a Judge to be called the Principal District Judge. Sub-section (3) empowers the State Government to appoint in the Court of a District Judge presided over by the Principal District Judge one or more Judges to be called Additional District Judges to discharge all the functions of a District Judge and to exercise all the powers of the Court of a District Judge. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction of a Court of District Judge shall extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that a Court of District Judge shall, subject to the general control of the High court, have control over all other civil courts within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides that a Court of District Judge shall, subject to the general control of the High court, have control over all other civil courts within the local limits of its jurisdiction. It is also vehemently urged that Section 20 contemplates and permits only the Principal District Judge to perform the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like and that it is only in absence of the Principal District Judge on account of any event like death, grave illness or absence of leave that the senior most Additional District Judge in the district, shall perform these duties without interruption to his ordinary duties. 30. The above argument is indeed formidable. While the administrative powers of the Principal District Judge under Section 12(3) of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 and under Section 24 of the CPC are not disputed, the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court has submitted Section 4(3) (ii) of the Gujarat Act permits the High Court by general or special orders, to direct that an Additional District Judge may discharge all or any of the functions of a District Judge and in the discharge of those functions, the Additional District Judge shall exercise all the powers of the Court of a District Judge. 31. In our view, the above powers certainly permit the Additional District Judge to discharge all or any of the functions of a District Judge under the Gujarat Civil Courts Act or any other law for the time being in force and in the discharge of those functions, he can also exercise all the powers of a Court of a District Judge. The submission on behalf of the respondents, however, does not take care of the distinction which Section 20 of the Act has in terms made between functions and powers of the Court of a District Judge and functions and powers of holder of the office of Principal District Judge. Section 20 thus contemplates and provides that it is the holder of the office of Principal District Judge who performs the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like and not an Additional District Judge. Section 20 thus contemplates and provides that it is the holder of the office of Principal District Judge who performs the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like and not an Additional District Judge. Section 21 also makes it clear that in case of the Court of Senior Civil Judge also, the duties as specified in section 20 are to be performed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and in the event of death, suspension or temporary absence of any Principal Senior Civil Judge, the Principal District Judge may empower any other Senior Civil Judge in the district to perform such duties as are specified in Section 20. Similarly, Section 22 provides that the duties as specified in Section 20 for the court of a Civil Judge are to be performed the Principal Civil Judge of the concerned Taluka Court and in the event of death, suspension or temporary absence of any Principal Civil Judge, the Principal District Judge may empower any other Civil Judge to perform the duties as are specified in Section 20 but in every such case the registers and records of the two Courts shall be kept distinct. 32. Sections 20 and 21 thus contemplate that in all three classes of civil courts (Court of a District Judge, Court of a Senior Civil Judge and Court of a Civil Judge) there is one Principal judicial Officer who is invested with the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like. The scheme as revealed by Sections 20 and 21 of the Act is, however, subject to the general or special orders which may be passed by the High Court under Section 4(3)(ii) for assigning to an Additional District Judge all or any of the functions of a District Judge under the Gujarat Civil Courts Act and in discharge of those functions, he shall exercise all the powers of a Court of District Judge. The powers of the Court of a District Judge would also include the powers of the Court of a District Judge presided over by the Principal District Judge under Section 20 of the Act. The powers of the Court of a District Judge would also include the powers of the Court of a District Judge presided over by the Principal District Judge under Section 20 of the Act. It is, therefore, open to the High Court to issue such orders under Section 4(3)(ii) requiring an Additional District Judge to preside over the Court of a District Judge at a place other than the headquarter of the District to perform the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like in respect of cases arising from talukas , which are specified by the High Court. To this extent, we accept the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court that while the Legislature authorized the State Government to establish the Court of an Additional District Judge nearer the home of the litigants with powers to hear their cases, but the Legislature could not have intended to prohibit such Court from receiving filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like. There is nothing in the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act which prohibits the High Court from assigning such duties to the Court of an Additional District Judge at a place other than the district headquarters. 33. Moreover Article 235 of the Constitution expressly vests in the High Court the control over the District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. It is settled by catena of decisions that the word control referred to in Article 235 of the Constitution has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the control and superintendence of the High Court over the subordinate Courts and the persons manning them, both on the judicial and the administrative side [vide Gauhati High Court vs. Kaladhar Phukan, AIR 2002 SC 1589 ]. So also Article 227 of the Constitution confers on the High Court the power of superintendence over all the Courts. So also Article 227 of the Constitution confers on the High Court the power of superintendence over all the Courts. The wide range of this power can be gauged from clause (2) of Article 227 which reads as under :- (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may - (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. [emphasis supplied] In light of the above Constitutional provisions and in absence of anything in the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act prohibiting the High Court from assigning duties referred to in Section 20 to the Court presided over by an Additional District Judge at a place other than the district headquarters, we are clearly of the view that it is open to the High Court to issue orders to assign to the Court of District Judge at Deesa presiding over by an Additional District Judge duties with respect to filing of suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, etc. as referred to in Section 20 of the Gujarat City Courts Act, 2005. It is sometimes not appreciated that Article 235 is to High Court's power of control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto what Article 73 is to executive power of the Union and Article 154 is to executive power of the State. It has been held by the Apex Court in Ram Jwaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549 that such executive power has to be exercised within the limits of the constitutional provisions, but it does not follow from this that in order to enable the executive to function, there must be a law already in existence and that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of those laws. 34. But even while upholding the power of the High Court to issue such orders, our attention is not invited to any such general or special order of the High court assigning the duties referred to in Section 20 of the Act to the Court of the Additional District Judge at Deesa. 34. But even while upholding the power of the High Court to issue such orders, our attention is not invited to any such general or special order of the High court assigning the duties referred to in Section 20 of the Act to the Court of the Additional District Judge at Deesa. However, having regard to the fact that the Court of the Additional District Judge, Deesa (formerly the Court of Joint District Judge at Deesa) has been performing the duties with respect to filing of the suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like for the last about ten years, restraining the Court of the Additional District Judge at Deesa from suddenly receiving the appeals and other civil cases arising from the specified Talukas on the ground of absence of any specific order of the High Court under Section 4(3)(ii) would cause great inconvenience and grave hardship to the people in the specified Talukas if the respondents are directed to make an abrupt change in the present system. We are, therefore, of the view that the interests of justice would be served, if the High Court is permitted to issue such orders under Article 235 of the Constitution and Section 4(3)(ii) read with Section 20 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 within two months from today. 35. We are inclined to give this opportunity to the High Court in view of the settled legal position emerging from the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court that a writ Court will not exercise its jurisdiction if the impugned action of an authority does not cause injustice and that final order has to be moulded after noticing equitable considerations :- (i) In AM Allison vs. BL Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 , the Apex Court has held that the proceedings by way of certiorari under article 226 are not of course [vide Halsburys Laws of England]. The High Court has the power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there is no failure of justice. (ii) In Kewal Krishan vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held as under :- Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. The High Court has the power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there is no failure of justice. (ii) In Kewal Krishan vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held as under :- Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the Court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order as public interest dictates and equity projects. Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go where only private interests are involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon consideration as of public interest. Following the aforesaid decision, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr Justice JM Panchal (as His Lordship then was), has made the following pertinent observations:- 15. It has been rightly observed that legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable considerations and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal Court of Appeal, which it is not. (iii) In Kushum Lata vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 2643 , the Apex Court made the following observations:- Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. 36. Now coming to the High Court Notification dated 13.10.1999 (Annexure-B), we have carefully examined the submissions made by Mr Vakharia with regard to legality or otherwise of the said notification under Section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 6 of the Cr. 36. Now coming to the High Court Notification dated 13.10.1999 (Annexure-B), we have carefully examined the submissions made by Mr Vakharia with regard to legality or otherwise of the said notification under Section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 6 of the Cr. PC provides for the following classes of criminal courts in every State :- (i) Courts of Session ; (ii) Judicial Magistrates of the first class and, in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrates; (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the second class; and (iv) Executive Magistrates. Section 7(1) provides that every State shall be a sessions division or shall consist of sessions divisions; and every sessions division shall, for the purposes of the Code be a district or consists of district. Sub-section (2) thereof confers power on the State Government to alter, after consultation with the High Court, the limits or the number of such divisions and districts. Sub-section (3) also empowers the State Government to divide, after consultation with the High Court, any district into sub-divisions and may alter the limits of the number of such sub-divisions. The relevant provisions of Section 9 read as under :- 9. (1) The State Government shall establish a Court of Session for every sessions division. (2) Every Court of Session shall be presided over by a Judge, to be appointed by the High Court. (3) The High Court may also appoint Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session. (4) & (5) ... ... ... .... ... ... (6) The Court of Session shall ordinarily hold its sitting at such place or places as the High Court may, by notification, specify; but, if, in any particular case, the Court of Session is of opinion that it will tend to the general convenience of the parties and witnesses to hold its sittings at any other place in the sessions division, it may, with the consent of the prosecution and the accused, sit at that place for the disposal of the case or the examination of any witness or witnesses therein. Explanation: For the purposes of this Code, appointment does not include the first appointment , posting or promotion of a person by the Government to any service, or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, whereunder any law, such appointment, posting or promotion is required to be made by Government. (emphasis supplied) 37. A bare perusal of the above provisions, particularly sub-sections (3) and (6) indicate that the High Court has the power to appoint Additional Sessions Judges and to specify the place or places where the Court of Sessions shall ordinarily hold its sittings. When the power is conferred on the High Court in such express terms, we see no illegality in the impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 issued by the High Court, specifying Deesa also as a place where the Court of Sessions of Banaskantha district shall hold its sitting over and above its sitting at Palanpur, and that the Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa shall exercise jurisdiction at Deesa in respect of criminal cases arising from specified talukas. 38. The powers conferred by Section 9(3) to appoint Additional Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session and by Section 9(6) of the Cr PC to specify place/s where the Court of Sessions shall ordinarily hold its sittings taken together imply the power of the High Court to specify that the Sessions Court holding its sitting at Deesa and presided over by an Additional Sessions Judge shall try cases arising from a particular area of the sessions division. That is in acknowledgment of the administrative power of the High Court flowing from Articles 227 conferring the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the State including the power to make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts and also the administrative power of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution vesting the control over the district courts and courts subordinates thereto in the High Court as discussed in para 33 hereinabove. Hence exercise of the powers of the Sessions Judge under the Cr PC to assign cases to Additional Sessions Judges has to be subject to the arrangements which may be made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred by Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution read with sub-sections (3) and (6) of the Cr PC. Even if the impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 had not specified the Talukas case from which shall be tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa, the Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur by general order under Section 194 could have specified the Talukas from which the cases shall be tried by the Court presided over by Additional Sessions Judge, at Deesa. We, therefore, see no reason why the High Court while appointing an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 9(3) and specifying the place/s of sitting of the Court of Session under Section 9(6) cannot specify the talukas from which cases shall be tried by the Court presided over by the Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa. 39. The contention that the impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 creates a sub-division consisting of 12 (previously 14) Talukas out of the Sessions division of Banaskantha district and that, therefore, the notification is contrary to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act cannot be accepted. It is true that Section 7 provides that a State shall consist of a sessions division and every sessions division shall be a district or consist of districts and that it is the State Government which may after consultation with the High Court, divide any district into sub-divisions and may alter the limits or the number of such sub-divisions. However, what the impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 does is not to create any sub-divisions as such. All that the impugned notification does is that the High Court has specified Deesa as the additional place of sitting of the Court of sessions in Banaskantha district, which is the sessions division. Merely because the notification specifies the talukas from which the cases will be tried by the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa does not make it illegal. Carving out a separate sub-division out of the existing sessions division by the State Government under Section 7 is not a condition precedent for exercise of the power by the High Court under sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 9 Cr. PC. Carving out a separate sub-division out of the existing sessions division by the State Government under Section 7 is not a condition precedent for exercise of the power by the High Court under sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 9 Cr. PC. The very object of conferring such power on the High Court under subsection (3) and (6) is that the High Court would be in a better position to appreciate needs and conveniences of the people in the concerned sessions division. 40. The argument that Section 20 of the Cr PC provides for appointment of Executive Magistrates or Sub-divisional Magistrates in sub-division of a district does not militate against the exercise of the powers of the High Court under Section 9 read in the backdrop of Article 235 of the Constitution, as discussed above. 41. The controversy about filing and receiving civil appeals etc. in the Court of Additional District Judge at Deesa arose in view of the provisions of Section 12 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act and Section 20 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act. In light of the discussion in para 33 hereinabove and in absence of any such provisions in the Cr PC, the High Court is not prohibited from permitting the Court presided over by the Additional Sessions Judge at a place other than District headquarters from exercising administrative powers like receiving criminal cases including bail applications arising from the specified Talukas. We do, however, note the statement made by the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court that the power under Section 408 Cr PC to transfer a criminal case from one subordinate Court to another subordinate Court in the District is to be exercised by the Sessions Judge at the headquarters of the Sessions Division i.e. Sessions Judge at Palanpur in the instant case. 42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not consider it necessary to discuss all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. We would refer to only some of them. 43. Kamleshwarsing vs. Dharmendersing, AIR 1957 Patna 375 (FB) (paras 6 & 12) and In Re Pasupulati Nanjappa, AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 471 (para 11). 42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not consider it necessary to discuss all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. We would refer to only some of them. 43. Kamleshwarsing vs. Dharmendersing, AIR 1957 Patna 375 (FB) (paras 6 & 12) and In Re Pasupulati Nanjappa, AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 471 (para 11). 43.1 These cases were cited in support of the contention that Assistant or Additional Sessions Judge exercising jurisdiction in the Court of Session has no separate or independent entity in the sense that the Court over which he presides does not constitute an independent court of session within the meaning of Section 9(1) and also that Additional Sessions Judge has no power to receive and admit appeals by virtue of his office. 43.2 The above decisions were rendered on the basis of interpretation of Section 409 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which, in juxtaposition with Section 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as under :- 43.3 In Kamleshwar Singh Vs. Dharamdeo Singh, AIR 1957 Patna 375 (Full Bench), Sahai, J. laid down the following propositions :- .(1) There can be only one court of Session in a Sessions division and there can be only one Judge of the Court, or, in other words, there can be only on Sessions Judge in a Sessions division. But, there can be more than one Additional Sessions Judge to exercise jurisdiction in one Court of Session. (2) A court presided over by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge is also a Court of Session and is a part or constituent of the same court of Session which is headed by the Sessions Judge. (3) A Sessions Judge has complete jurisdiction by virtue of his position as Judge of the Court of Session to receive, hear and dispose of all matters, such as applications, appeals or cases which are required by law to be submitted to, or filed in the court of Session. An Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, however, is not competent by virtue of his office to receive, hear or dispose of any matter submitted to, or filed in, the Court of Session in which he exercises jurisdiction. An Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, however, is not competent by virtue of his office to receive, hear or dispose of any matter submitted to, or filed in, the Court of Session in which he exercises jurisdiction. He gets jurisdiction to deal with such a matter only when it is placed before him either under a general or special order of the State Government or a general or special order of the Sessions Judge of the division. (4) An Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge exercises full powers of a Court of Sessions subject only to such limitations or restrictions as are expressed placed upon his powers by law in respect of cases which are legally placed before him for disposal. An Additional Sessions Judge has, in cases within his session, the same powers as a Sessions Judge. 43.4 In the case before the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the State Government had issued Government orders dated 26.3.1956 and 13.4.1956 as under :- G.O. dt. 26-3-1956 : .... The Additional District and Sessions Judges ... will also be specifically empowered under Section 409(2) Cr PC to receive and hear appeals from II and III Class Magistrates , so that parties may file their appeals directly in the Court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge ... G.O. dt. 13-4-1956 : In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 409 Cr PC ... the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby directs that the Additional District and Sessions Judges ... .. shall hear appeals of persons convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of second or third class exercising jurisdiction within the Districts mentioned ... After referring to the propositions laid down in the above judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held in In Re Pasupulati Nanjappa, (AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 471) that Section 409 (2) did not authorize the State Government to direct any Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge to receive and admit, or authorize any convicted accused to present such appeals before an Additional Sessions Judge. Section 409(2) also does not expressly or by implication give power to an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge to receive appeals direct from parties and to admit them and to taken them on file. Section 409(2) also does not expressly or by implication give power to an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge to receive appeals direct from parties and to admit them and to taken them on file. 43.5 On the basis of the above two judgments of the Full Benches of Patna and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, it was vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioners that the High Court could not have vested in the Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa the power to receive any criminal appeals or cases arising from Deesa and other specified Talukas. 44. In the first place, sub-section (2) of Section 409 of the old Cr.PC conferred the powers on the State Government and the Sessions Judge to assign Criminal Appeals to the Additional Sessions Judge. On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 381 of the new Cr.PC confers this power on the Sessions Judge and the High Court. As discussed in para 38 hereinabove, the High Court, unlike the State Government, has the constitutional power of exercising control over the subordinate Courts which includes the power of general superintendence of the working of the subordinate Courts. 45. In our view, it is only when the Sessions Judge and the Additional Sessions Judge hold their Courts at the same place that in order to ensure that the litigant is not to be permitted to choose the Court that the criminal appeals and other cases will first have to be filed in the Court of Session presided over by the Sessions Judge. However, where the High Court on an assessment of the relevant aspects comes to the conclusion that the place of sitting of the Court presided over by the Additional Sessions Judge is to be at a place other than the District headquarters in the district and that such Additional Sessions Judge is required to be assigned all the criminal cases and appeals arising from some of the Talukas of that district, and that it will be to the general convenience of the litigants that the criminal cases not only be heard by the Additional Sessions Judge but also that the criminal cases be received by the Court presided over by the Additional Sessions Judge at that place, there is nothing in the Cr.PC to prohibit the High Court from making such administrative arrangements. We are, therefore, of the view that the decisions of the Full Benches of Patna and Andhra Pradesh High Courts dealing with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 409 of the old Cr.PC vis-a-vis the powers of the State Government cannot apply while interpreting the provisions of Section 381(2) or other provisions of the Cr.PC of 1973 vis-a-vis the powers of the High Court. 46. Supdt. And remmu brances of Legal Affairs, W.B. vs. Mansurali & Ors., 1978 Cr. LJ. 1497 (Calcutta) (para 10) was cited in support of the contention that the Court of Session under Section 439 means court of Session presided over by the Sessions Judge and does not include any Court presided over by either Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge. It is submitted that Section 194 provides that the Additional Sessions Judge shall try such case as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special order, make over to him for trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try. It is submitted that Section 381 empowers the Sessions Judge to make over appeals to the Additional Sessions Judge. Section 400 empowers the Additional Sessions Judge to hear revisions which may be transferred by or under general or special orders of the Sessions Judge but there is no provision like this for making over bail applications to Additional Sessions Judge. The submission cannot be accepted. The power to grant bail under Section 439 is conferred on the High Court and the Court of Session. The power is not conferred on the Sessions Judge as such. The power of Sessions Judge of a division to assign cases to Additional and Assistant Judges under Section 194 will also cover the power to assign bail applications under Section 439. Section 9 (3) specifically provides that a High Court may also appoint Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session. Moreover, in Lakshman vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Bom. 313, the Special Bench held that the Assistant Sessions Judge, the Additional Sessions Judge, and the Sessions Judge exercise co-ordinate or equal jurisdiction of a Sessions Court within the limits of the authority conferred on them by the Code, and are nevertheless different Courts each subordinate to the High Court. 47. Moreover, in Lakshman vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Bom. 313, the Special Bench held that the Assistant Sessions Judge, the Additional Sessions Judge, and the Sessions Judge exercise co-ordinate or equal jurisdiction of a Sessions Court within the limits of the authority conferred on them by the Code, and are nevertheless different Courts each subordinate to the High Court. 47. Arunmugha Solagan vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Madras 697 (FB) was cited in support of the contention that Section 7(1) does not empower State Government to constitute a sessions division out of a district and that the sessions division shall not consist of a fraction of a district. As indicated above, the impugned notification dated 13.10.1999 issued by the High court does not create any sub-division out of a sessions division. The powers of the Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur under Section 408 Cr PC to transfer cases and appeals still remain with the Sessions Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur even in respect of cases and appeals arising from Deesa taluka and other specified Talukas. 48. Keharsing & Ors. vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 609 was cited to explain holding a sitting or place of sitting in Section 9(6) of Cr PC. There is no difficulty because the first part of Section 9(6) refers to the power of the High Court to specify additional place/s of sitting for a Court of Sessions in the sessions division. The second part of Section 9(6) refers to the power of the Sessions Court to hold sitting at a particular place looking to the convenience of the parties and witnesses in a particular case. 49. As regards challenge to the order dated 16.10.1999 (Annexure-C) of the District & Sessions Judge, Banaskantha transferring the criminal and civil cases arising from Deesa Taluka and other specified Talukas from the file of the District & Sessions Judge and from the file of Assistant District Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge, the order is not only consequential to the notifications at Annexures A and B, but is also capable of holding its own by virtue of the powers vested in the District & Sessions Judge, by section 194, 381 and 400 of the Cr PC and Section 4(3)(ii) of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005. 50. As regards the contention that looking to the distance between Palanpur and Deesa being only 26 kms. 50. As regards the contention that looking to the distance between Palanpur and Deesa being only 26 kms. and that all other District offices are at Palanpur, there was or is no justification for establishing the Court of Additional District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa, the contention cannot be accepted as this Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not sit in appeal over the decision of the respondents taken after considering the workload, other relevant factors and after hearing the concerned Bar Associations. 51. In view of the above discussion, the petition is disposed of after holding that - (1) In view of the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005, clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the impugned Government notification dated 11.10.1999 (Annexure-A) establishing what was then the Court of Joint District Judge at Deesa and now the Court of Additional District Judge at Deesa and assigning to it the cases arising from the Talukas specified therein, are valid. (2) However, clause 4 of the said notification excluding the jurisdiction of the Principal District Judge, Banaskantha with respect to the cases arising from those specified Talukas is struck down as contrary to the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 as well as contrary to the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005. (3) The High Court Notification dated 13.10.1999 (Annexure-B) issued under Section 9(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 specifying Deesa as additional place of sitting of the Court of Session of Banaskantha sessions division for exercising all the powers of the Sessions Judge co-extensively in respect of the cases arising out of the Talukas specified therein, is valid. (4) The order dated 16.10.1999 of the District & Sessions Judge, Palanpur (Annexure-C) transferring the pending civil and criminal matters on the file of the District & Sessions Court, Banaskantha District at Palanpur as well as on the file of the Assistant District Judges and Additional Sessions Judges in the District Court, Banaskantha at Palanpur arising from specified Talukas to the file of the then Joint District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge, now re-designated as the Additional District Judge & Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa, is valid. (5) As indicated in para 28 hereinabove, the Principal District Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur retains the powers under Section 24 CPC and under Section 408 Cr PC to transfer a civil or a criminal case from one subordinate Court in Banaskantha district to another subordinate Court in the Banaskantha district. (6) As discussed in paras 30 to 34 hereinabove, it is open to the High Court to issue orders to assign to the Court of District Judge at Deesa presided over by an Additional District Judge duties with respect to filing of suits and appeals, receiving pleadings, execution of processes, return of writs and the like as referred to in Section 20 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005. (7) As discussed in paras 33 and 41 hereinabove, it is open to the High Court to issue orders to assign to the Court of Sessions with its sitting at Deesa presided over by an Additional Sessions Judge to receive criminal cases arising from the talukas to be specified in such orders. (8) Until such orders are passed, the position prevailing since October, 1999 regarding filing of civil and criminal cases arising from Deesa and other specified Talukas before the Court presided over by the Additional District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge at Deesa shall continue for a period of two months from today. 52. Subject to the above findings and observations, Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. The petition is accordingly disposed of.