Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal procedure (for brevity crpc ). The appellant M/s Delton Impex Private limited is a Private Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is having its registered office at 3-B, Rupchand Roy Street, kolkata (W. B. ). It is aggrieved by the order-dated 22. 08. 2007 passed by District Judge, Katni in Civil Suit No. 5-A/2005. By that order, while directing prosecution of the respondent no. 5 Kuldeep Singh (hereinafter referred to as r5) for the offences punishable under sections 193 and 205 of the IPC, learned District Judge refused to make a complaint against the respondent nos. 1 to 4 (for short r1 to r4) under sub-Section (1) of Section 340 of the Code. ( 2. ) THE background facts may be summed up as under - (i) The Civil Suit was instituted on 09. 11. 2005 against R5 for a declaration that the plaintiffs were the owners of the following agricultural lands which are parts of Number bandobast 363 and situated in Rajaswa Nireekshak mandal at village Murwara Tahsil and Distt. Katni -SAURAS0_53_TLMPH0_2009.HTM Relief of permanent injunction restraining R5 and his associates from disturbing the physical possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands was also sought. The plaint contained a specific averment that on 06. 11. 2005, R5 claiming himself to be the caretaker and representative of the appellant-Company had come to the suit lands with some known anti-social elements and had made efforts to stop digging of the lands for lying foundation for construction of shelter rooms for guards. An application for grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short cpc) was also moved. (ii) On 11. 11. 2005, in response to notice to show cause, Shri B. K. Shrivastava, Advocate appeared on behalf of R5 and filed reply to injunction application along with affidavit sworn in by R5. (iii) On 14. 11. 2005, observing that the suit suffered from defect of non-joinder of the State of Madhya pradesh, learned District Judge directed the plaintiffs to make good the default. He also recorded an undertaking given by Shri B. K. Shrivastava, Advocate that R5 would not interfere with or transfer any part of the suit lands in possession of the plaintiffs. (iv) On 28. 11. He also recorded an undertaking given by Shri B. K. Shrivastava, Advocate that R5 would not interfere with or transfer any part of the suit lands in possession of the plaintiffs. (iv) On 28. 11. 2005, the Company came forward to intervene and moved an application under Section 340 read with 195 (1) (b) of Crpc (hereinafter referred to as the application) for making a complaint against R1 to R5 in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 193, 199, 205, 209 and 210 read with S. 34 of the IPC. In this application, it was alleged that R1 to R4 were not only acting in collusion to grab the suit lands that were owned and possessed by the Company but were also practising fraud on the Court whereunder the interim injunction was obtained on 14. 11. 2005 against the Company despite the fact well within their knowledge that R5 was not the authorized representative thereof. Attention was also invited to non-maintainability of the suit in view of the provisions of Order 29 of the CPC. (v) On 01. 12. 2005, an unsigned reply to the application was filed by the counsel for R1 to R4 but, Shri B. K. Shrivastava, Advocate for R5, informed the Court that, even after service of notice by registered post, he was not able to seek instructions from R5. (vi) On 09. 12. 2005, Shri B. K. Shrivastava pleaded no instructions on the ground that despite his best efforts, R5 could not be contacted. Observing that, there was sufficient ground for proceeding against r5, the District Judge directed that a copy of application be forwarded to CJM, Katni for necessary action and vacated the interim order-dated 14. 11. 2005. However, he declined to proceed against R1 to R4 opining that it would not be reasonable to initiate action against them without making a preliminary enquiry. (vii) Being aggrieved by the order-dated 09. 12. 2005, R5 preferred an appeal, under Section 341 of Crpc, that was numbered as Cri. Appeal No. 2580/2005 and was allowed vide order-dated 13. 04. 2006 by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court on the ground that no preliminary enquiry as contemplated under section 340 of Crpc was made before directing prosecution of R5. 12. 2005, R5 preferred an appeal, under Section 341 of Crpc, that was numbered as Cri. Appeal No. 2580/2005 and was allowed vide order-dated 13. 04. 2006 by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court on the ground that no preliminary enquiry as contemplated under section 340 of Crpc was made before directing prosecution of R5. Accordingly, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the lower court with a direction to decide the application afresh in respect of the all the non-applicants viz. R1 to R5 by following the procedure prescribed under Section 340 of Crpc. The appellate order also required the parties to appear before the District court on 24. 04. 2006. (viii) But, even after being so directed, R5 failed to appear before the District Judge on 24. 04. 2006; he remained absent on subsequent dates of hearing and did not participate in the enquiry inspite of service of notice by publication in Daily Newspaper. (ix) In pursuance of the appellate Order, notices were issued to R1 to R4 through their counsel Shri B. N. Agrahari, who refused to receive the same. Consequently, they were also proceeded against ex-parte. To substantiate the allegations as contained in the application, the Company examined only one witness namely Alok Kumar Goenka as its authorized representative. (x) On 22. 08. 2007, after passing the impugned order, learned District Judge also dismissed the suit as withdrawn in the light of permission already granted as early as on 23. 12. 2005. ( 3. ) A bare perusal of the impugned order would reveal that learned district Judge, even after taking note of the fact that the reply filed on behalf of R1 to R4 did not bear signatures of anyone of them or their counsel, declined to make complaint against them for the reasons that from the material on record, only R5 appeared to be prima facie responsible not only for falsely representing himself as representative of the Company but also for filing a reply admitting the case of the plaintiffs viz. R1 to R4. ( 4. ) LEGALITY and propriety of the order in question have been assailed on the ground that R1 to R4 were apparently the main accused inasmuch as an collusive suit to grab the property of the company was filed by them only. ( 5. R1 to R4. ( 4. ) LEGALITY and propriety of the order in question have been assailed on the ground that R1 to R4 were apparently the main accused inasmuch as an collusive suit to grab the property of the company was filed by them only. ( 5. ) IN response, learned counsel for R1 to R4 strenuously contended that the refusal to make a complaint against them was fully justified in view of the following facts - (i) immediately after knowing about the real status of R5, they had withdrawn the suit and filed another suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit lands and permanent injunction against the Company and moolchand, admittedly, the common predecessor in title. (ii) It is a common averment in both the suits that the suit lands were purchased by them from one Moolchand for a total consideration of Rs. 11 lacs. (iii) The undertaking, forming basis of the complaint, was not given on behalf of the Company. ( 6. ) THIS apart, certain objections as to maintainability of the application, under Section 340 of Crpc, have also been raised. According to learned counsel for R1 to R4, it was due to lack of proper communication that the Bench of this Court, while allowing R5s appeal had directed parties to appear in a suit that already stood withdrawn. He is further of the view that the application moved by a stranger to the suit was not entertainable in law. It has also been canvassed that any action under Section 340 of Crpc could only be taken only after decision of the suit on merits. However, the fact of the matter is that r5, even after availing sufficient opportunity, has not come forward to question legality of the inquiry conducted by the District Judge in compliance with the direction given by this Court at his instance only. ( 7. ) ADVERTING to the merits of the objections, it may be observed that none of them deserves acceptance. It is true that ordinarily action under Section 340 of Crpc should be taken only after closure of the case in which the offence is committed but, as pointed out already, the impugned order was passed only after vacation of the interim order dated 14. 11. 2005. It is true that ordinarily action under Section 340 of Crpc should be taken only after closure of the case in which the offence is committed but, as pointed out already, the impugned order was passed only after vacation of the interim order dated 14. 11. 2005. Although, the Company was apparently having an interest in the subject-matter of the suit yet, as observed by the Apex Court in N. Natarajan v. B. K. Subba Rao AIR 2003 SC 541 , complaint under Section 340 of Crpc even at the instance of a stranger to the proceedings is tenable. ( 8. ) AS per averments made in the application, the appellant-Company has purchased the entire area of land bearing survey no. 378 and an area of 0. 188 hectare out of the land bearing survey no. 380 from Moolchand and Gayadeen vide registered sale-deed dated 05. 02. 2001, 03. 08. 2001 and 10. 09. 2001 whereas in both the suits, R1 to R4 have pleaded that Moolchand had transferred the lands in their favour by executing sale-deed on 17. 10. 2005. ( 9. ) IT is well settled that in an inquiry, under Section 340 (1) of Crpc, that corresponds to Section 476 (1) of the old Code, the Court irrespective of the result of the main case, is required to consider the following questions - Whether a prime facie case is made out, which if unrebutted (i)may have reasonable likelihood to establish the specific offence. (ii) Whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to take action [k. karunakaran vs. T. V. E. Warrier AIR 1978 SC 290 referred to]. ( 10. ) SECTION 340 (1) has to be read conjointly with Section 195 (1) (b)of Crpc. The legislative intent, object and purpose of the provision was expressed by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs. Kushal Pal Singh AIR 1931 All 443 in the following terms -The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195 (1) (b)and (c) Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the courts control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. These offences have been selected for the courts control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice, which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the civil Court to file complaint. [quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat ( 1971 (2)SCC 376 )] ( 11. ) SECTION 195 (1) (b) of Crpc deals with two distinct categories of offences against public justice. Clause (i) concerns offences committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court whereas Clause (ii)relates to offence relating to documents produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. The guiding principle that expediency for making complaint will be judged by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by the offence falling under clause (ii) [supra] as laid down by Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh vs. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 is squarely applicable to the offence under Clause (i) [above]. ( 12. ) IN this view of the matter, the argument that no substantial injury was caused to the appellant-Company by the offending acts in question is not of much relevance. ( 13. ) R5, who had not appeared in person before the Court in any proceedings as yet, was impleaded by R1 to R4 only as the person causing obstruction to the proposed construction work on the suit lands. As indicated already, the reply containing material admissions and supported by an affidavit said to have been sworn in by R5 was filed within 2 days of the filing of the suit and only 3 days thereafter, r5s counsel gave the undertaking to desist from interfering with or transfer any part of the lands in their possession. Moreover, on being asked to show cause against the proposed prosecution, R1 to R4 did not prefer to participate in the inquiry. Moreover, on being asked to show cause against the proposed prosecution, R1 to R4 did not prefer to participate in the inquiry. In the wake of the overwhelming material on record suggesting complicity of R1 to R4 in procuring an interim order detrimental to the interests of the Company in an apparently collusive suit, it was a fit case for directing prosecution of R1 to R4 also. A contrary view taken by learned District judge deserves to be set aside as grossly erroneous and manifestly perverse. ( 14. ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order so far as it relates to R1 to R4 is hereby set aside. Instead, it is directed that the District Judge shall make a complaint on the basis of the allegations made in the application and material on record arraigning r1 to R5 namely Sanjay Dang, Pankaj Pateriya, Rafiq Khan, Sanjay sengar and Kuldeep Singh respectively as accused and forward the same to the Magistrate having jurisdiction. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.