Judgment :- This civil revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of arrest made in E.P.No.231 of 2006 in R.C.O.P.No.13 of 2001 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif Court), Theni. 2. The respondent herein filed R.C.O.P.No.13 of 2001 before the Rent Controller (District Munsif Court), Periyakulam, under Sections.10(2)(i) and 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, contending that the petitioner herein committed wilful default in payment of rent to the building viz., two rooms bearing Door No.641 and 656, for which rent was agreed to be paid at the rate of Rs.150/-and Rs.500/- per month respectively, and also on the ground that the petitioner had sub-let a portion of the stalls to some third parties. 3. The revision petitioner, though resisted the said eviction petition, the Rent Controller, by order dated 19. 2003, ordered eviction on the ground of wilful default. Insofar as the ground of sub-letting is concerned, the eviction petition was rejected. The revision petitioner vacated the premises and handed over vacant possession of the rental premises to the respondent, pursuant to the order passed in E.P.No.35 of 2004 and delivery of possession was recorded on 3. 2005 through the Court Amin. 4. In the eviction petition, in addition to the prayer for eviction on the above two grounds, the respondent herein sought for a direction to the petitioner herein to pay all the arrears of rent to the respondent herein. The eviction petition having been allowed with a direction to pay the rental arrears within three months, the respondent herein filed E.P.No.231 of 2006 and prayed for execution of the decree insofar as the noncompliance of the order directing payment of arrears of rent. 5. The said execution petition was resisted by the petitioner/tenant by filing counter affidavit contending that the direction issued to pay the arrears of rent by the Rent Control Court is without jurisdiction and no amount was quantified and therefore the respondent cannot file execution petition for realisation of the amount of Rs.34,750/-. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the execution petition filed as such is not maintainable. 6. The learned Rent Controller rejected the contention raised in the counter affidavit and ordered arrest of the petitioner/tenant by 7. 2007 under Order XXI Rule 37 CPC. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the execution petition filed as such is not maintainable. 6. The learned Rent Controller rejected the contention raised in the counter affidavit and ordered arrest of the petitioner/tenant by 7. 2007 under Order XXI Rule 37 CPC. The said order is challenged in this revision petition on the ground that the Rent Control Court, constituted under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, has no jurisdiction to give direction to pay the arrears of rent and the prayer made by the respondent in the eviction petition for a direction to pay the arrears of rent while ordering eviction for wilful default in payment of rent is unsustainable. 7. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction to order payment of arrears of rent and hence the decree passed for paying the arrears of rent while ordering eviction is a nullity and the said plea was raised in the execution proceedings before the Rent Controller, which was not properly considered and therefore this revision petition is filed on the plea that nullity of the decree, which is incapable of execution, can be challenged in any proceeding. According to the learned counsel, the same is challenged in this revision petition under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel also submitted that as per the explanation to Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, the claim being realisation of money, the respondent has to file civil suit by paying Court fee and shall obtain a decree and in this case, no money suit is filed before the Civil Court for recovery of money/rental arrears. Hence the learned counsel contended that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to order arrest of the petitioner for realisation of the arrears of rent. 8. Hence the learned counsel contended that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to order arrest of the petitioner for realisation of the arrears of rent. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the respondent having filed R.C.O.P.No.13 of 2001 with a specific prayer for consequential direction to the petitioner/tenant in the eviction petition, to pay all the arrears of rent and the said petition having been allowed, there is a valid decree obtained by the respondent for the arrears of rent and the petitioner having not filed any appeal against the said portion of the decree and the decree having become final, the respondent is entitled to file execution petition to implement that portion of the decree as the said decree has become final and binding and therefore there is no illegality in the order passed by the Executing Court viz., the Rent Controller and the same cannot be interfered with in this revision petition. 9. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent. 10. From the above narrated pleadings and arguments the following issues arise for consideration: .(1) Whether the Rent Controller is vested with the jurisdiction to order payment of arrears of rent after ordering eviction ? .(2) Whether the Rent Controller is bound to consider the plea of nullity of decree in the execution proceedings ? Issue No.1 - Whether the Rent Controller is vested with the jurisdiction to order payment of arrears of rent after ordering eviction ? 11. The respondent herein filed R.C.O.P.No.13 of 2001 on two grounds viz., under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The said two grounds urged in the eviction petition are on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The said provisions are extracted hereunder: "Sec.10. Eviction of tenants.- .(1) ............ (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. The said two grounds urged in the eviction petition are on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The said provisions are extracted hereunder: "Sec.10. Eviction of tenants.- .(1) ............ (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied- .(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, or .(ii) that the tenant has after the 23rd October, 1945 without the written consent of the landlord- .(a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so, or ................." From the perusal of the above statutory provisions it is clear that non-payment of rent i.e, wilful default, sub-letting are grounds for filing the eviction petition and if the said grounds are established, the Rent Controller is empowered to order eviction of the tenant. Nowhere in the said sections, the Landlord is given the right to demand arrears of rent in the eviction petition. In proviso to Section 10 it is stated that if the default in payment of rent is not wilful, he may notwithstanding anything contained in Section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by the tenant and if the same is complied with, he shall reject the application seeking eviction. 12. The power of the Rent Controller to order deposit of the rent is again provided under Section 11 of the Act, which reads as follows: "Sec.11. 12. The power of the Rent Controller to order deposit of the rent is again provided under Section 11 of the Act, which reads as follows: "Sec.11. Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction.- (1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 10 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Controller under that Section, or to prefer any appeal under Section 23 against any order made by the Controller on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposits, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. .(2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. .(3) Where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub-section (1) the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, on application made to him either by the tenant or by the landlord, and after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. .(4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and made an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. .(5) The amount deposited under sub-section (1) may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him in that behalf to the Controller or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be." Section 9 of the Act empowers the tenant to deposit the rent in the Court in certain circumstances viz., when the address of the landlord or his authorised agent is not known to the tenant. The tenant may deposit the rent before the Controller unless and until the address of the landlord or his authorised agent becomes known to the tenant. Section 8(5) of the Act also enables the tenant to deposit the rent before the Controller after following the mandatory procedures contemplated under Sections 8(2)(3) & (4). 13. Under the above provisions, a tenant can deposit the rents if the landlord refuses to receive the same. Nowhere in the Rent Control Act, the Rent Controller is given power to give a direction to pay the arrears of rent while ordering eviction. Only for the continuance of the Rent Control proceeding or on filing appeal, the tenant may be directed to deposit the rent in the Court. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner is right in his submission that if the arrears of rent is to be collected by the landlord and if it is refused to be paid by the tenant, the only remedy available is to file the money suit. The term money suit or suit for money is explained under Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, which reads as follows: "Section 22. Suits for money.- In a suit for money (including a suit for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically), fee shall be computed on the amount claimed. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the expression "suit for money" shall in respect of the transferred territory, also include suits for rents, pattam, michavaram, adukkuvathu, janmikaram, or other dues of a like nature." From the reading of Section 22, it is evident that a suit for recovery of the rent is also a money suit. Admittedly the respondent has not filed any suit for recovery of the arrears of rent/money before the competent civil Court. The Rent Controller is a statutory authority created under the Act, discharges his duties in a different capacity than the civil court. Further, the respondent has not quantified the arrears of rent and no court fee is also paid for realisation of the alleged rental due of Rs.34,750/-. 15. The Rent Controller is given jurisdiction to deal with eviction matters and also to fix the fair rent under the Act. The Rent Controller is an authority conferred with the powers under the Act. 15. The Rent Controller is given jurisdiction to deal with eviction matters and also to fix the fair rent under the Act. The Rent Controller is an authority conferred with the powers under the Act. The Tenant is a statutory tenant as per the Act. When the Rent Controller is getting powers under the statutory enactment, he has to exercise his powers within the four corners of that statute and not beyond that. Since no power is vested with the Rent Controller to pass a decree for payment of arrears of rent under the Act, the decree passed by the Rent Controller ordering payment of arrears of rent within three months while ordering eviction is a statutory violation. Therefore, the decree passed directing payment of arrears of rent is a nullity. It is a well settled proposition of law that a statutory authority can perform his statutory functions only within the statute. In the decision reported in (1974) 1 SCC 242 (Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam), the Honourable Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller can pass orders only in accordance with the statute. Paragraphs 15 to 17 of the decision read as follows: "15. All these three Acts lay down specific grounds more or less similar, on which a decree or order of eviction can be passed by the Rent Court or the Tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction. In the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated form under Section 13, while the same thing has been split up into two and provided in two Sections (12 and 13) in the Bombay Rent Act which represent the negative and positive parts of the same pattern. Taken together, they are exhaustive of the grounds on which the Rent Court is competent to pass a decree of possession. Similarly, in the Madras Rent Act, the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, are given in Sections 10, 14 to 16. 16. Section 13 of the Delhi Rent Act starts with a non obstante clause viz. Taken together, they are exhaustive of the grounds on which the Rent Court is competent to pass a decree of possession. Similarly, in the Madras Rent Act, the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, are given in Sections 10, 14 to 16. 16. Section 13 of the Delhi Rent Act starts with a non obstante clause viz. "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant...." Likewise, Section 10(1) of the Madras Rent Act starts with the clause, "a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Section or Sections 14 to 16". 17. It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and the Madras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant Sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13, and to the parties that they shall not contract out of those statutory grounds, is inherent in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act)." 16. The word "controller" is defined under Section 2(3) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as follows: Sec.2(3) "Controller" means any person appointed by the Government, by notification, to exercise the powers of a controller under this Act for such area as may be specified in the notification." It is evident that even though a Civil Judge is appointed by the Government by notification as Rent Controller, he is only a designated authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, i.e. persona designata. 17. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner is right in contending that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to give direction to pay the arrears of rent after ordering eviction on the ground of wilful default. 17. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner is right in contending that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to give direction to pay the arrears of rent after ordering eviction on the ground of wilful default. The objection raised before the learned Rent Controller on the ground that the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.13 of 2001 has become final, cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to pass a decree directing payment of arrears of rent to the landlord after ordering eviction. Issue No.2 - Whether the Rent Controller is bound to consider the plea of nullity of decree in the execution proceedings? 18. The executability of the decree, which is non-est is considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in very many decisions. .(a) In AIR 1954 SC 340 (Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan) in paragraph 6 the Honourable Supreme Court held thus: ."6. ...... It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether, it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. ........" .(b) In AIR 1962 SC 199 (Hira Lal v. Kali Nath) in paragraph 4 the Supreme Court held as follows: ."4. ........ The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it would not have seizin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. ......" .(c) In AIR 1970 SC 1475 (V.D.Modi v. R.A.Rehman), in paragraph 7 it is held thus, ."7. ......" .(c) In AIR 1970 SC 1475 (V.D.Modi v. R.A.Rehman), in paragraph 7 it is held thus, ."7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record ........." .(d) In (1977) 2 SCC 662 (Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash) in paragraph 3, the Supreme Court held as follows: "3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) and Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath ( AIR 1962 SC 199 ). By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) and Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath ( AIR 1962 SC 199 ). It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was competent to the executing court to examine whether the decree for eviction was a nullity on the ground that the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could declare it to be such and decline to execute itagainst the respondent." (e) In (1990) 1 SCC 193 (Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra) in paragraphs 5 to 9 the Supreme Court held as follows: "5. ..........It is the finding of the forums below that the shop in question stands mainly on the land of the landlord and a small portion is located on municipal land. Therefore, we are of the view that the building was governed by the provisions of the Act and the exemption accorded by the government under Section 3 was not attracted to the premises. In Sadhu Singh v. District Board, Gurdaspur (AIR 1962 Punj 204) the question was whether to the reconstructed building governed by the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act the exemption under Section 3 applied. It was held to be so by the Division Bench. But the present facts are different. 6. In Barraclough v. Brown (1897 AC 615: 66 LJ QB 672: 13 TLR 527) the House of Lords held that when a special statute gave a right and also provided a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the common law court has no jurisdiction. 7. In Doe d. Rochester (BP.) v. Bridges ((1831) 1 B&Ad 847, 859: 109 ER 1001) the famous and oft quoted words of Lord Tenterdan, occur: "Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." 8. 7. In Doe d. Rochester (BP.) v. Bridges ((1831) 1 B&Ad 847, 859: 109 ER 1001) the famous and oft quoted words of Lord Tenterdan, occur: "Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." 8. This statement of law was approved not only by the House of Lords in several cases, but also by this Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke ( (1976) 1 SCC 496 ) where this Court was called upon to consider whether the civil court can decide a dispute squarely coming within the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. While considering that question, this Court laid down four propositions and third of them is relevant for consideration here. It is as follows: (SCC pp. 513-14, para 23) "(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act." 9. Thus on construction of relevant provisions of the Act and in the light of the position in law it must be held that the provisions of Section 13 of the Act apply to the building leased out to the appellant by the landlord and the Controller was the competent authority to pass a decree of ejectment against the appellant and the civil court lacked inherent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause and to pass a decree of ejectment therein. ......." (f) The question arose as to whether after enactment of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, a civil Court can order eviction in the building located in the notified area, came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in JT 1991 (2) SC 397 : (1991) 3 SCC 230 (M/s.East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.) wherein in paragraphs 7 and 10 it is held thus, "7. Section 10 of the Act, as seen above, prohibits eviction of a tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section or Sections 14 to 16. Section 10 of the Act, as seen above, prohibits eviction of a tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section or Sections 14 to 16. These provisions as well as the other provisions of the Act are a self-contained code, regulating the relationship of parties, creating special rights and liabilities, and, providing for determination of such rights and liabilities by tribunals constituted under the statute and whose orders are endowed with finality. The remedies provided by the statute in such matters are adequate and complete. Although the statute contains no express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court, except for eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise", the provisions of the statute are clear and complete in regard to the finality of the orders passed by the special tribunals set up under it, and their competence to administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil suits. Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by the tribunals constituted under it. Although the jurisdiction of the civil court is not expressly barred, the provisions of the statute explicitly show that, subject to the extraordinary powers of the High Court and this Court, such jurisdiction is impliedly barred, except to the limited extent specially provided by the statute. See in this connection the principle stated by this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. ( (1968) 3 SCR 662 ). See also Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. ((1939-40) IA 222 (PC), Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in Council ((1946-47) IA 50 (PC) and Barraclough v. Brown ((1897) AC 615 (HL)). 8. ................. 9. ................. 10. Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked only where the Controller comes to a decision, and records a finding, that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona fide. If the Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court would arise. 9. ................. 10. Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked only where the Controller comes to a decision, and records a finding, that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona fide. If the Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court would arise. But the decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides, and not the correctness or validity, of the denial or claim, for these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters. .........." (Emphasis Supplied) (g) In (1993) 2 SCC 507 (Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and Others) in paragraph 20, the Supreme Court held thus, "20. .............. the probate court has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to grant probate of the will of the deceased annexed to the petition (suit); on grant or refusal thereof, it has to preserve the original will produced before it. The grant of probate is final subject to appeal, if any, or revocation if made in terms of the provisions of the Succession Act. It is a judgment in rem and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also the entire world. The award deprives the parties of statutory right of appeal provided under Section 299. Thus the necessary conclusion is that the probate court alone has exclusive jurisdiction and the civil court on original side or the arbitrator does not get jurisdiction, even if consented to by the parties, to adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the will propounded by the executrix, the applicant. ........" (h) The nullity of the decree is further explained in the decision reported in (1993) 2 SCC 458 (Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas). In paragraph 8 the Supreme Court held as follows: "8. It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears, there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". It may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears, there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". In the context which we are dealing, a decree is said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree." (i) Whether the decree which is a nullity can be challenged even at the execution stage, came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1994) 4 SCC 370 (Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam and Others). In paragraphs 8 the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: "8. The question then is, whether it is open to the appellant to raise the objections on the execution side as to allotment of acquired land under the award. We have already said that what is executable is only an award under Section 26(2), namely, the amount awarded or the claims of the interests determined of the respective persons in the acquired lands. Therefore, the decree cannot incorporate any matter other than the matters determined under Section 11 or those referred to and determined under Section 18 and no other. Since we have already held that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to allot land in lieu of compensation, the decree even, if any, under Section 18 to the extent of any recognition of the directions in the award for the allotment of the land given under Section 11 is a nullity. It is open to the appellant to raise the invalidity, nullity of the decree in execution in that behalf. Accordingly we hold that the execution proceedings directing delivery of possession of the land as contained in the award is, invalid, void and inexecutable. It is open to the appellant to raise the invalidity, nullity of the decree in execution in that behalf. Accordingly we hold that the execution proceedings directing delivery of possession of the land as contained in the award is, invalid, void and inexecutable. Accordingly it is set aside." (j) In the decision reported in (1996) 3 SCC 301 (Sabitri Dei and Others v. Sarat Chandra Rout and Others), it is held that the objection regarding invalidity of the decree sought to be executed can be raised at the execution stage or in collateral proceedings. In paragraph 6 it is held thus, "6. .......... Once a decree is held to be a nullity, the principle of constructive res judicata will have no application and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in any collateral proceeding. This question no longer remains res integra and has been so held in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra to which one of us (brother Ramaswamy, J.) was a member. It has been held in the aforesaid case: "Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial could be waived by the party. They could be corrected by way of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or revisional forums, provided law permits. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC is founded on public policy. An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus the decision of a competent court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law it does not operate as res judicata. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a question of jurisdiction of a court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or interpretation of provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a court. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction." (k) An illegal decree cannot be executed. What kinds of decrees are executable, came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2004) 1 SCC 287 (Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin), wherein in paragraph 8 it is held thus, "8. A distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings." (l) In AIR 2007 SC 1155 : (2007) 2 SCC 481 (National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh) in paragraph 23 (in AIR) the Supreme Court held thus, "23. ................ A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings." (l) In AIR 2007 SC 1155 : (2007) 2 SCC 481 (National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh) in paragraph 23 (in AIR) the Supreme Court held thus, "23. ................ It is well known that where an order is passed by an authority which lacks inherent jurisdiction, the principles of res judicata would not apply, the same being a nullity. (See Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 and Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1)." .(m) A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in (2008) 4 MLJ 495 (Sivakalai Muthu v. State of T.N.) held that after constitution of the administrative Tribunal, the decree passed by the Civil Court altering the date of birth of a Government Servant is a nullity as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted under section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, with effect from 12. 1988. .(n) In the Division Bench decision reported in 1993 WLR 534 (Little Flower Teacher Training Institutes for Men and Women, etc. v. The State of Tamil Nadu & three others) a question arose as to whether the Civil Court can give a direction to grant recognition to the Teacher Training Institution, when the said power is given to the Government/Department. In paragraphs 3 and 4, this Court held as follows: "3. The decree as such is a nullity. The civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of grant of recognition. The civil court should have stopped with considering status of the petitioner-institution and giving a declaration to that effect. It should not have proceeded to consider the question of granting recognition. It is for the authorities to decide the same, if at all the Civil Court could only have issued a mandatory injunction directing the authorities to consider the question and pass appropriate orders on the application of the petitioner for recognition. The principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases. Suffice it refer to one of them M/s.Chingleput Bottlers v. M/s.Majestic Bottling Co. (AIR 1954 SC 1030). 4. As the decree of the civil court is a nullity it cannot be enforced in any forum. The principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in several cases. Suffice it refer to one of them M/s.Chingleput Bottlers v. M/s.Majestic Bottling Co. (AIR 1954 SC 1030). 4. As the decree of the civil court is a nullity it cannot be enforced in any forum. The respondents are entitled to set up the nullity of the decree at any stage and in any proceeding (Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ). We have already considered this question and taken this view in the Writ Petition No.6289 of 1990 by our order dated 30.3.1993." (Emphasis supplied) 19. From the above referred decisions it is abundantly clear that if a decree passed by the Court is wholly without jurisdiction, the same is to be treated as nullity and the said decree is not executable. The said plea even though was raised before the Rent Controller, it was not considered by him and arrest of the petitioner was ordered. Hence the petitioner is justified in filing this revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 20. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is explained by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2003) 3 MLJ 60 (SC) : (2003) 6 SCC 675 (Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai). In paragraph 21 (para 22 in SCC), the Supreme Court held as follows: "21. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned her eat. It is well settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar." 21. Applying the above law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and having regard to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, I hold that the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, ordering payment of arrears of rent within three months while ordering eviction on the ground of wilful default, is unsustainable and the consequential execution petition filed to execute that portion of the decree is also not maintainable. The ultimate order of arrest passed in the execution proceeding against the petitioner cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. 22. The civil revision petition is allowed. It is open to the respondent to file separate suit for recovery of the rental arrears in accordance with law, if the respondent is advised to do so. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.