JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mehta on behalf of appellant. 2. The appellant insurance company has challenged judgment and order passed by W.C. Commissioner, Anand in W.C. fatal case no. 15 of 2003 exh 55 decided on 26-11-2008 awarded Rs. 80,664/- in favour of claimant with 6% interest from 7-10-1995 against respondent no. 2 appellant and 6% interest from date of accident 23-7-1994 to 6-10-1995 which amount is to be deposited by respondent no. 1 before Commissioner and also directed to respondent no. 1 to pay 20% penalty amount Rs. 16,132/- with costs of Rs. 500/- in favour of claimant. 3. The present appeal preferred u/s 30 of W.C. Act 1923, following substantial question of law raised by learned advocate Mr. Mehta before this Court, which are quoted as under: "(A) Whether the murder of Salimbhai Abdulbhai Vohra can be said to be an accident occurring in the course of employment so as to fall within Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. (B) Whether there was any evidence at all before the Commissioner to suggest that there has existed an employer employee relationship between Yusufbhai Abdulbhai Vohra and the deceased Salimbhai Abdulbhai Vohra? (C) Whether the decision of the Commissioner is not inconsistent and incompatible with the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Malikaarjuna G. Hiramath v. the Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, 2009 (3) SCALE 210 (D) Whether interest on the amount of Workmen's Compensation is payable at all by the Insurance Company despite the ratio of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v. Harshadray A. Modhiya, 2006 (5) SCALE 70 ?" 4. Learned advocate Mr. Mehta submitted that Commissioner has committed gross error in awarding amount of compensation against appellant insurance company as condition in section 3 of W.C. Act is not satisfied. He also submitted that Commissioner has committed gross error in coming to conclusion that deceased Salimbhai Vohra died in accident arising out of or in course of his employment. According to him, deceased was murdered but nothing was shown to relate deceased's murder to him being in course of employment. 5. He submitted that relationship between employer and employee means Yunushbhai Vohra and his brother Salimbhai Vohra not established before Commissioner. According to him, deceased was murdered but nothing was shown to relate deceased's murder to him being in course of employment. 5. He submitted that relationship between employer and employee means Yunushbhai Vohra and his brother Salimbhai Vohra not established before Commissioner. Therefore, claimants are not entitled for amount of compensation from appellant. He relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd v. Sorumai Gogoi & Ors reported in 2008 (2) SCALE 463 and in case of Ritadevi reported in 2000 ACJ 801 . He also relied upon decision of Apex Court in case of New India Assurance Company Ltd v. Harshadray A. Modhiya reported in 2006 (5) SCALE 70 . 6. He submitted that insurance company can not be held liable for interest amount. Therefore, decision taken by Commissioner is contrary to law. In short, his submission is that Commissioner has committed gross error in awarding compensation in favour of respondent-claimants. 7. I have considered submission made by learned advocate Mr. Mehta and I have perused judgment and order passed by W.C. Commissioner, Anand. The deceased Salimbhai Vohra aged 32 years was employed by respondent no. 1 w.e.f. March 1994 engaged as driver in Taxi no. GJ-6-T-8600 belongs to respondent no. 1 who was paying Rs. 700/- monthly wages and over and above Rs. 50/- allowances. On 20-6-1994 as per direction/instruction given by respondent no. 1, deceased Salimbhai Vohra taken passengers during course of employment in taxi going to out side in different village but Salimbhai was not come back to his house. Therefore, it was inquired by claimants, but none is massaging about deceased. After some time on 23-6-1994, claimant was receiving information from LCD police Anand that one dead body lying at Langdaj police station which found to be similar as description given by claimant in respect to Salimbhai Vohra. Thereafter, claimant went to that place compared dead body with photographs which ultimately found that it was a dead body of Salimbhai Vohra. Therefore, dead body was handed over to claimant and at Mogal village funeral ceremony was carried out. 8. The claimant has filed claim application claiming Rs. 1,22,310/- against respondent no. 1. The respondent no. 1 has obtained insurance policy of vehicle taxi from respondent no. 2 having policy number 14250/323/3916/11483. Therefore, according to respondent no. 1, it is a liability of insurance company to pay compensation. 8. The claimant has filed claim application claiming Rs. 1,22,310/- against respondent no. 1. The respondent no. 1 has obtained insurance policy of vehicle taxi from respondent no. 2 having policy number 14250/323/3916/11483. Therefore, according to respondent no. 1, it is a liability of insurance company to pay compensation. The cause of action arise on 20-6-1994 and accident occurred during course of employment while working as driver on taxi carrying passengers going to out side. On 6-10-1995 register notice was sent to respondent but no reply was given by any of respondent and amount of compensation is not deposited by respondent before Commissioner. Therefore, 50% penalty demanded by claimant with interest. 9. In response to summons received from Commissioner, respondent no. 1 has filed reply Exh. 22 and admitted facts mentioned in claim petition that Salimbhai Vohra was employed by respondent no. 1 w.e.f. March 1994 paying Rs. 700/- per month salary and Rs. 50/- allowance per day and on receiving instruction from respondent no. 1 Salimbhai was carried passengers in taxi on 20-6-1994 and his dead body was found on 23-6-1994. Therefore, Salimbhai was died during course of employment. The respondent no. 2 has filed reply Exh. 27 denying averment made in claim petition. Thereafter, claimant has produced certain documents before Commissioner Exh. 44 to 47 and vide Exh. 29 application for production of documents filed and vide Exh. 28 certain documents also produced on record by claimant. On behalf of respondent no. 1 certain documents produced on record vide Exh. 53 but no documents have been produced by respondent no. 2 before Commissioner. It is necessary to note that insurance company has not pressed by purshis Exh. 54 contention about breach of condition of policy. The claimant has filed written argument Exh. 37 and relying upon certain decision of Patna High Court. On behalf of respondent no. 1, written argument submitted vide Exh. 35 and on behalf of respondent no. 2 written argument placed on record Exh. 40. Thereafter, issues have been framed by Commissioner Exh. 29(A). The Commissioner has come to conclusion, considering evidence on record of Salmaben Salimbhai Vohra widow of deceased Exh. 30 which supported averment made in claim petition. In written statement Exh. 22 respondent no. 1 admitted fact that deceased was appointed by him paying salary of Rs. 700/- per month and Rs. 50/- per day allowance. 29(A). The Commissioner has come to conclusion, considering evidence on record of Salmaben Salimbhai Vohra widow of deceased Exh. 30 which supported averment made in claim petition. In written statement Exh. 22 respondent no. 1 admitted fact that deceased was appointed by him paying salary of Rs. 700/- per month and Rs. 50/- per day allowance. Therefore, averment made in claim petition admitted by respondent no. 1 and none was examined on behalf of respondent no. 1 and 2. Exh. 44 documents produced on record by claimant being complaint filed by claimant for accident occurred to Salimbhai. In dead body of Salimbhai certain marks were made where injury has been caused on neck and other parts of body which prima facie shown to be murdered by somebody else of Salimbhai during course of his employment. The PM report produced on record Exh. 44 and cause of death is injuries received by deceased on his body and neck and due to that he died. Vide Exh. 46, panchnama of taxi stand at Anand Railway Station produced and according to panchnama in first row five taxis were standing. One ambassador car no. GJ-6-T-8600 was standing first and name of driver was Salimbhai Vohra. On 20/6/1994 deceased was carried passengers and started journey as per contract with passengers. Before panch of taxi stand one Vohra Valimohmmed Kasimbhai made it clear that there was no evidence available which suggested that Salimbhai Vohra is a live person. The Salimbhai Vohra was died due to murdered during course of employment of respondent no. 1. The claimant Salmaben is widow of Salimbhai examined vide Exh. 30. According to her evidence, her husband was murdered by somebody else and received dead body on 23-6-1994. Her husband was working as driver on taxi no. GJ-6-T-8600. However, Salimbhai is brother of Yunusbhai, but real brother can be appointed by other brother to work on taxi belongs to respondent no. 1 as driver. For that, salary was paid by respondent no. 1 as admitted by respondent no. 1 in his written statement. The respondent no. 2 on being demand made by respondent no. 1 insurance company has paid Rs. 93,000/- to respondent no. 1 on 17-11-1994. Therefore, issue no. 1, 3 and 4 decided by Commissioner affirmative. 10. Thereafter, issue no. 2 has been examined by Commissioner considering Rs. 1000/- being wages of deceased including Rs. 1 in his written statement. The respondent no. 2 on being demand made by respondent no. 1 insurance company has paid Rs. 93,000/- to respondent no. 1 on 17-11-1994. Therefore, issue no. 1, 3 and 4 decided by Commissioner affirmative. 10. Thereafter, issue no. 2 has been examined by Commissioner considering Rs. 1000/- being wages of deceased including Rs. 50/- per day allowances in favour of deceased. Therefore, Commissioner has considered Rs. 15/- allowance monthly Rs. 450 + Rs. 700 salary, total amount comes 1150/-, but maximum Rs. 1000/- salary is to be counted for compensation according to provision of W.C. Act. The birth certificate of deceased was not produced by claimant but School Leaving Certificate of Salmaben was produced on record where date of birth of Salmaben is 25-5-1963, aged about 31 years at the time of murder of her husband. Therefore, presumption is that her husband was aged about 33 years. The Commissioner has considered issue no. 5 to 8 and come to conclusion that if driver has been murdered during course of employment then it should have to be considered an accident and claimants are entitled compensation from respondent. Vide Exh. 54, dispute raised by insurance company due to breach of condition has not been pressed, and that challenged has been withdrawn by insurance company. The insurance policy was obtained by respondent no. 1 from respondent no. 2 in respect to deceased. Therefore, respondent no. 2 is also duty bound to pay compensation to claimant. 11. In light of this back ground, considering age of 33 years of deceased, 40% wages of Rs. 1000/- comes to Rs. 400/- and relevant factor 201.66 multiplied comes to Rs. 80,664/- and accordingly that much amount has been awarded as compensation in favour of claimant. The insurance company is duty bound to pay 6% interest amount w.e.f. 7-10-1995 and prior to that it is a liability of respondent no. 1 to pay 6% interest in favour of claimant. Considering fact instead of 50% penalty Commissioner has awarded 20% penalty and on that basis Commissioner has passed an order in favour of claimant. 12. I have considered submission made by learned advocate Mr. Mehta and I have also perused decisions which have been relied by learned advocate Mr. Mehta. 1 to pay 6% interest in favour of claimant. Considering fact instead of 50% penalty Commissioner has awarded 20% penalty and on that basis Commissioner has passed an order in favour of claimant. 12. I have considered submission made by learned advocate Mr. Mehta and I have also perused decisions which have been relied by learned advocate Mr. Mehta. The accident is not defined under M.V. Act and W.C. Act but it should have to be considered untoward incident being unexpected incident where injury caused to person or damage to any property to person either he may be died or receiving bodily injury. 13. The division bench of Calcutta High Court in case of Dipa Ganguly & Anr v. New India Assurance Company Limited & Anr. reported in AIR 2009 Calcutta 122 (DB). The relevant observation made in para 17, 18, 21, 22 and 23 are quoted as under: "17. We are, however, of the opinion that an accident within the meaning of the Act may occur not only from the negligent act but also from positive or intended act. Our aforesaid view finds support from the explanation added to Section 147(1) of the act according to which the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damage was not in a public place at the time of accident, if the act of omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. 18. Therefore, according to the said explanation, the accident within the meaning of the Act may cause either due to "omission"or "an act" of a person and in our opinion, such omission or the act need not be unintentional as would appear from the fact that in the proceedings under Section 140, 163-A or 163-B of the Act, the Tribunal is not required to consider whether there was rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle or whether there was contributory negligence on the part of victim. However, in order to invoke section 166 of the Act, accident must not cause due to the self incurred act on the part of victim. However, in order to invoke section 166 of the Act, accident must not cause due to the self incurred act on the part of victim. But if the driver of the offending vehicle with the intention of killing the victim deliberately runs over the victim, the case will attract the provision of Section 166. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. Francis de Costs reported in 1993 (Suppl) 4 SCC 100 while dealing with the undefined word "accident" in the context of Employee's State Insurance Act: "Accident has not been defined under the Act. The popular and ordinary sense of the word 'accident' means the mishap or untoward happening not expected and designed to have an occurrence is an accident. It must be regarded as an accident from the point of view of the workman who suffers from it, that its occurrence is unexpected and without design on his part, although either intentionally caused by the author of the act or otherwise. It may also arise in diverse forms and not capable of somewhat concrete happening at a definite point of time and an injury or incapacity results from such happening." 21. In the case of Ranju Rani v. Branch Manager, New India Insurance Company ltd. (supra), the victim while travelling in a Motor cycle was shot at due to animosity between the victim and the accused and as a result of such injury he died. In that context, the Patna High Court while dealing with an application under Section 163-A of the Act was of the opinion that the death did not arise out of an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle but was an outright murder through bullet injury. In out view, it was rightly pointed out that the death had no connection with use of the motor vehicle but the death occurred due to firing. We quite appreciate that simply because a person has died while travelling in a motor vehicle, such fact by itself can not bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal unless it is shown that the use of motor vehicle is the cause of injury or the death resulting from the negligence or act of somebody done in a public place. Therefore, the said decision of the Patna High Court is not applicable in the facts of present case. 22. The case of Rita Devi (Supra), rather goes against the Insurance Company. In that case under Section 163-A of the Act, an auto rickshaw driver was murdered in the process of theft of the said auto rickshaw. In that context, the Supreme Court came to the following conclusion. "A conjoint reading of the above two sub clauses of Section 163-A shows that a victim or his heirs are entitled to claim from the owner/insurance company a compensation for death or permanent disablement suffered due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle (Emphasis supplied) without having to prove wrongful act or neglect or default of any one. Thus it is clear, if it is established by the claimants that the death or disablement was caused due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle then they will be entitled for payment of compensation. In the present case, the contention of the Insurance Company which was accepted by the high Court is that the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was not caused by an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, we will have to examine the actual legal import of the words 'death due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle.' "Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then it can not but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the auto rickshaw." 23. In out opinion, the said decision rather supports the case of appellants. In the case before us, the Tribunal by relying upon the contents of the FIR pointed out that the victim as a traffic sergeant having charged the driver of the taxi concerned, under Section 184 of the Act for traffic rule violation sometime earlier on the same day, the driver being enraged, knocked the victim down resulting in his death. If in the process of stealing of an auto rickshaw a murder of the driver is committed, such death is held to be 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle in public place", on the said analogy, killing of a traffic sergeant by the driver of a motor vehicle being infuriated by the booking of the said very vehicle for violation of the traffic rules earlier on the self same day, by running him over with the use of the said vehicle is on a better footing than the facts leading to murder in the case of Rita Devi and others. In this case, the taxi itself is the root of trouble and is also the tool used for killing the victim while in the case of Rita Devi and other (supra), the auto rickshaw was the object of felony but not the instrument used in killing the driver." 14. The division bench of Kerala High Court has also considered similar aspect in case of Venugopal Narayanan Nair & Ors v. T.L. Paulson & Ors reported in AIR 2009 Kerala 86, where death has been considered was caused due to accident. The division bench of Kerala High Court has come to conclusion that even in case of committing suicide due to depression is also amounts to accident considering medical evidence indicating that depression arose consequentially to head injuries sustained in accident reported in AIR 2009 Kerala 86. 15. In case of Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. The division bench of Kerala High Court has come to conclusion that even in case of committing suicide due to depression is also amounts to accident considering medical evidence indicating that depression arose consequentially to head injuries sustained in accident reported in AIR 2009 Kerala 86. 15. In case of Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd reported in 2000 ACJ 801 , Apex Court has come to conclusion that murder was due to accident arising out of use of Motor vehicle and claimants are entitled compensation. The relevant discussion made in para 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 18 are quoted as under: "10. The question, therefore, is: can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that 'murder', as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a 'murder' which is not an accident, and a 'murder' which is an accident depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simpliciter, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder. 11. In Challis v. London and South Western Railway Company, (1905) 2 KB 154, the Court of Appeal held where an engine driver while driving a train under a bridge was killed by a stone wilfully dropped on the train by a boy from the bridge, that his injuries were caused by an accident. In the said case, the court rejecting an argument that the said incident can not be treated as an accident held: "The accident which befell the deceased was, as it appears to me, one which was incidental to his employment as an engine driver, in other words it arose out of his employment. In the said case, the court rejecting an argument that the said incident can not be treated as an accident held: "The accident which befell the deceased was, as it appears to me, one which was incidental to his employment as an engine driver, in other words it arose out of his employment. The argument for the respondents really involves the reading into the Act of a proviso to the effect that an accident shall not be deemed to be withing the Act, if it arose from the mischievous act of a person not in the service of the employer. I see no reason to suppose that the legislature intended so to limit the operation of the Act. The result is the same to the engine driver, from whatever cause the accident happened; and it does not appear to me to be any answer to the claim for indemnification under the Act to say that the accident was caused by some person who acted mischievously." 12. In the case of Nisbet v. Rayne and Burn, (1910) 1 KB 689, where a cashier, while travelling in a railway to a colliery with a large sum of money for the payment of his employer's workmen, was robbed and murdered. The Court of Appeal held: "That the murder was an 'accident' from the standpoint of the person who suffered from it and that it arose 'out of' an employment which involved more than the ordinary risk, and consequently that the widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. In this case the court of Challis v. London and South Western Railway Company, (1905) 2 KB 154. In the case of Nisbet, the court also observed that it is contended by the employer that this was not an 'accident' within the meaning of the Act, because it was an intentional felonious act which caused to death, and that the word 'accident' negatives, the idea of intention. In my opinion, this contention ought not to prevail. I think it was an accident from the point of view of Nisbet, and that if makes no difference whether the pistol shot was deliberately fired at Nisbet or whether it was intended for somebody else and not for Nisbet." 14. In my opinion, this contention ought not to prevail. I think it was an accident from the point of view of Nisbet, and that if makes no difference whether the pistol shot was deliberately fired at Nisbet or whether it was intended for somebody else and not for Nisbet." 14. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then it can not but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the auto rickshaw. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents contended before us that since the Motor Vehicles Act has not defined the word 'death' and the legal interpretations relied upon by us are with reference to definition of the word 'death' in Workmen's Compensation Act, the same will not be applicable while interpreting the word 'death' in Motor Vehicles Act because according to her, the objects of the two Acts are entirely different. She also contends on the facts of this case no proximity could be presumed between the murder of the driver and the stealing of the auto rickshaw. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the objects of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts is to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. We do not see how the objects of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts is to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapter X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours, we are supported by section 167 of the motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence, judicially accepted interpretation of the word 'death' in Workmen's Compensation Act is, in our opinion, applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also. 18. In the instant case, as we have noticed the facts, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the murder of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was due to an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle. Therefore, the trial court rightly come to conclusion that the claimants were entitled for compensation as claimed by them and the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the death of Dasarath Singh was not caused by an accident involving the use of motor vehicle." 16. In view of aforesaid decision where identical question was examined by Apex Court in case of Rita Devi ( 2000 ACJ 801 ) which has been relied by Division Bench of Calcutta High Court as referred above and also considering one important aspect that breach of condition of insurance policy has not been pressed by insurance company vide exh 54. Therefore, impliedly insurance company has accepted liability of payment and considering fact that accident occurred during course of employment. The relationship as an employer and employee established on the basis of written statement filed by respondent no. Therefore, impliedly insurance company has accepted liability of payment and considering fact that accident occurred during course of employment. The relationship as an employer and employee established on the basis of written statement filed by respondent no. 1 where admission has been made and no rebuttal evidence has been produced by insurance company respondent no. 2. Therefore, respondent no. 1 and 2 both are rightly held liable for payment of compensation which has been rightly worked out by Commissioner, Anand, for that, Commissioner has not committed any error which would require interference by this Court. 17. The insurance company has issued insurance policy under provision of Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, according to recent decision of Apex Court in case of Kamla Chaturvedi v. National India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2009 (1) LLJ 542 , liability of interest upon insurance company not upon respondent no. 1. All issues decided by Commissioner rightly based on legal evidence and also finding given with application of mind which can not consider to be baseless and perverse. On the contrary, it based on legal evidence. Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Mehta can not be accepted. 18. The decisions which have been relied by learned advocate Mr. Mehta are not applicable to facts of present case. Hence, there is no substance in present appeal, therefore, first appeal is dismissed. Today, first appeal is dismissed by this Court, therefore, no order is required to be passed on civil application. Accordingly, civil application is also disposed of. 19. The W.C. Commissioner, Anand is directed to pay Rs. 1,38,187/- by A/c payee cheque in name of Salmaben Vohra after proper verification immediately without fail in respect to W.C. case no. 15/2003. Appeal dismissed.