Elipe Dharma Rao, J.:-This petition has been filed under Section 151 C.P.C. for modification/clarification of the judgment dated 31.1.2008 rendered by this Court in W.A.No.583 of 2000. 2. Before adverting to other aspects of the case, first of all we want to point out that this petition filed under the garb of Section 151 CPC, praying to modify/clarify our judgment, is not maintainable, since after the disposal of the main case, no such miscellaneous petitions could be maintained. If at all, the petitioner/appellant felt that there are errors apparent on the face of the judgment, they should have filed a petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, seeking to review the judgment passed by us. In the case on hand, no such errors apparent on the face of record have been pleaded and established on the part of the petitioner/appellant. Thus, though this petition is liable to be rejected on this simple ground of maintainability, since elaborate arguments have been advanced on either side and to give a quietus to the entire issue, we shall now proceed to discuss the other aspects raised on either side, in detail - both factually and legally. 3. The petitioner had filed W.A.No.583 of 2000, as against the order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.7054 of 1992, dated 25.11.1998. This Court has disposed of the said Writ Appeal, following the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India Staff Union vs. Food Corporation of India [ AIR 1995 SC 1344 = 1995 (1) LLN 783]. After extracting the guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court in the above case and while rejecting the plea of the learned Additional Advocate General that if secret ballot system is adopted, it will cause lot of expenditure to the State, we have directed in Para No.11 of our judgment, dated 31.1.2008 as follows: "We are unable to accept the same since in our democratic society, the only way for assessment of representative character of the Trade Unions is the secret ballot system as has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Moreover, the period for recognition of the trade unions in the writ petition is over long back. Moreover, the period for recognition of the trade unions in the writ petition is over long back. Therefore, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it appropriate to give a direction to the 1st respondent Corporation to take appropriate steps to conduct elections to assess the representative character of the unions within a period of six months, following the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the FCI's case (cited supra)". 4. Now, this petition has been filed praying to clarify/modify the orders of this Court, dated 31.1.2008 made in W.A.No.583 of 2000 to the effect that the words 'Union/Unions' mentioned in Para 8(xviii) of the judgment would mean: "That if one Union secures 51% of the votes polled then that will be the only recognised Union. But if one Union does not secure 51% of votes, then the Union/Unions which put together secure 51% of the votes polled would be the recognised Unions as in NLC case in W.A.No.502 & 503 of 2005 batch." 5. At the outset, it is to be stated that in Para No.8 of our judgment dated 31.1.2008, we have extracted the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court delivered in FCI case (supra) and amending Para No.8(xviii) of our judgment, as has been prayed for in this petition, would mean reading between the lines and amending the very judgment of the Honourable Apex Court, which is impermissible since para No.8(xviii) of our judgment, is nothing but the extract of the guideline issued by the Honourable Apex Court in the above said FCI case (supra). 6. In support of their contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that if the system of recognising only one Union which secures highest number of votes is adopted and if a particular Union has secured only 10% of the votes and that is the highest compared to the votes secured by the other 23 unions, then that Union alone would be recognised even though they represent only the interest of the 1/10th of the entire employees and it may not reflect the aspirations of the majority of employees and even if the action that single recognised Union is against the interest of the 90% of the employees, the decisions would be binding on the large majority. He would further submit that this aspect has been considered by the First Bench of this Court by its common judgment dated 11.12.2007 made in W.A.Nos.502 and 503 of 2005 etc. batch (The General Secretary, N.L.C. Labour and staff union and others vs. NLC United Workers Union And Others) and would pray to allow this petition by following the above judgment of the First Bench of this Court. 7. It is to be pointed out that though this judgment of the First Bench is dated 11.12.2007, whereupon much reliance is being placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner now, the same was neither brought to our notice nor relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner or for that matter by anybody, when we were disposing of Writ Appeal No.583 of 2000 on 31.1.2008. Further, by virtue of the above judgment of the First Bench of this Court, the petitioner wants to amend or modify the guideline No.(xviii) issued by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra), which we have extracted in para No.8 of our judgment, as if by virtue of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, even the judgment of the Supreme Court can be clarified/modified/interpreted in a manner, which it has not been meant for. 8. In Para Nos.22 and 23 of the above said judgment of the First Bench, The Honourable Mr.Justice V.Ramasubramaniam, speaking for the Bench, has held as follows: ".... The above statistics has been furnished on the basis of the check off system and it is seen from the statistics that no single Union enjoys the support of 51% of the total number of workmen. It is only a combination of two or more Trade Unions, which would actually enjoy the support of at least 51% of the total number of workmen. Therefore, we are of the considered view that recognition need not be restricted to a single largest Trade Union, as it may not be reflective of the aspirations of a simple majority of workmen. Therefore, we are of the considered view that recognition need not be restricted to a single largest Trade Union, as it may not be reflective of the aspirations of a simple majority of workmen. But at the same time, the request of the Trade Unions to recognise all Trade Unions which secure 10% of the votes polled, subject to a ceiling of 65% of the total votes, cannot also be acceded to, in view of the fact that the membership in several Unions, as seen from the above statistics, appears to be almost equally distributed, without huge deviation (except in the case of a Union mentioned in Sl.No.(i) above). Therefore, we are of the considered view that the employer should recognise not only the single largest Union, selected on secret ballot, but also recognise the 2nd, 3rd and/or next largest Trade Unions, subject to a prescription that those Unions together command at least 51% of the total votes polled in the secret ballot. If the single largest Union and the 2nd largest Union together secure at least 51% of the votes, the employer shall recognise both of them. If together they secure less than 51% of the total votes, the 3rd largest Union should also be recognised and the process so continued till there is representation of all Unions, which together secure at least 51% of the votes. 23. In view of the above, both the writ appeals and the writ petitions are disposed of with the following directions: - (a) The employer shall hold a secret ballot, under the supervision and control of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Sastri Bhavan, Chennai, within a period of 3 months, to test the strength of all the Trade Unions. (b) In consultation with the representatives of the management, the Regional Labour Commissioner shall draw an election schedule and the employer is directed to provide all assistance as well as the infrastructure to the Regional Labour Commissioner, to enable him to conduct the election. (c) The Regional Labour Commissioner will be at liberty to draw necessary supporting staff either from his own office or from the managerial and supervisory staff of the employer, who do not belong to the workman category. (c) The Regional Labour Commissioner will be at liberty to draw necessary supporting staff either from his own office or from the managerial and supervisory staff of the employer, who do not belong to the workman category. (d) If, at the conclusion of the elections, a single Trade Union had secured 51% of the total votes polled, the said Union may be recognised as the sole bargaining agent and called for negotiations relating to wage revision or any other matter. But if the single largest Union had secured less than 51% of the votes polled, the Regional Labour Commissioner shall see if the single largest Union and the 2nd largest Union had together secured 51% of the votes polled and recognise both of them as bargaining agents. If both of them together had secured less than 51% of the total votes, then the 3rd largest Union shall also be recognised, so that the total votes polled by all the three Unions represent at least 51% of the total votes polled. This process shall be continued up to the stage where 51% representation is reached. (e) The recognition granted to the Unions, in terms of the above, shall be for a period of 4 years. Thereafter, a fresh election by secret ballot shall be conducted, on the above lines, so that a new bargaining agent will be in place, when the next wage revision becomes due at the end of five years. (f) All the expenses in connection with the election shall be borne by the management." 9. Relying on the above said judgment of the First Bench of this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner would pray to clarify/modify Para No.8(xviii) of our judgment, dated 31.1.2008, which is nothing but the extract of the guideline issued by the Honourable Apex Cour in FCI case (supra). As has been observed by us supra, in Para No.8(xviii) of our judgment, we have extracted the guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra) and clarifying/modifying the same would amount to reading between the lines and interfering and interpreting the very judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in a wrong manner, which is impermissible. 10. As has been observed by us supra, in Para No.8(xviii) of our judgment, we have extracted the guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra) and clarifying/modifying the same would amount to reading between the lines and interfering and interpreting the very judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in a wrong manner, which is impermissible. 10. Insofar as the judgment of the First Bench of this Court, based on which the present prayer to clarify/modify our judgment has been made is concerned, dealing with the above said judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Para No.17 of its judgment, the First Bench of this Court has held as follows: "17. A system known as "check off system", whereby the subscription payable by a worker to the Union of which he is a member, is deducted every month from his salary by the employer himself, was also evolved as a third alternative, to find out the support enjoyed by every Trade Union. But in Food Corporation of India Staff Union – vs – Food Corporation of India [1995 Supp.(1) SCC 678], the Supreme Court observed as follows: - "The Check off system, which once prevailed in this domain, has lost its appeal and so efforts are on to find out which other system can foot the bill. The method of secret ballot is being gradually accepted." After holding so, the Apex Court issued as many as 19 directions in the said case, for assessing the representative character of Trade Unions by the secret ballot system. Out of those directions, 18 related to the method of conducting the secret ballot and the person to be in charge of the conduct of the secret ballot. Direction No.(xviii) mandated that the Union/Unions obtaining the highest number of votes in the process of election shall be given recognition by FCI for a period of 5 years from the date of conferment of the recognition. Thus the choice ultimately went in favour of the single largest Union, to be the sole bargaining agent for a period of 5 years. But the said order was actually passed by the Apex Court, almost by consent." (emphasis supplied) 11. Thus the choice ultimately went in favour of the single largest Union, to be the sole bargaining agent for a period of 5 years. But the said order was actually passed by the Apex Court, almost by consent." (emphasis supplied) 11. For better appreciation of the facts, we feel it apt to quote Para No.2 of the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court, which reads as follows: "In the appeal at hand, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the Unions representing the workmen have agreed to follow the "secret ballot system" for assessing the representative character of the trade unions. We have however, been called upon to lay down as to how the method of secret ballot should be tailored to yield the correct result. Keeping in view the importance of the said matter, an order was passed as early as on November 22, 1985 to issue notice and hear all the major all India trade union organisations on this aspect. Pursuant to this notice some trade unions' organisations have appeared; and we have heard the learned counsel representing them, so also Shri Thakur, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. 3. Shri Khera appearing for one of the trade unions has brought to our notice instruction No.25 of 1980 dated 18-12-1980 issued by the Office of the Chief Labour Commissioner, Ministry of Labour, Government of India. This communication styled as 'Memorandum' had stated that on receipt of request either from the management or union for recognition of the union for the purpose at hand, its eligibility for recognition is first required to be examined, as stated in paragraph 3 in which mention has been made about collection of some preliminary data. After this has been done, the exercise of determination of the strength of all eligible unions is undertaken. This is decided through secret ballot. The Memorandum has laid down a detailed procedure in this regard. We have also on record a scheme which has been prepared by the appellant for assessment of representative character of the trade unions through secret ballot system. This scheme is annexed to IA No.1 of 1994. 4. We have perused the aforesaid documents. We direct that the following norms and procedure shall be followed for assessing the representative character of trade unions by the "secret ballot system...." 12. This scheme is annexed to IA No.1 of 1994. 4. We have perused the aforesaid documents. We direct that the following norms and procedure shall be followed for assessing the representative character of trade unions by the "secret ballot system...." 12. Thus, it is seen that though the Food Corporation of India and the Unions representing the workmen have agreed to follow the "secret ballot system", the guidelines, totalling 19, have been framed by the Honourable Apex Court after issuing notice to all the major All India Trade Unions, not by consent, but by considering Memorandum No.25 of 1980, dated 18.12.1980 issued by the Office of the Chief Labour Commissioner, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, wherein a detailed procedure has been prescribed and further taking into consideration the Scheme prepared by the appellant therein for assessment of representative character of the trade unions through secret ballot system and after hearing all the parties concerned. Therefore, with great respect, we are unable to accept the reasoning given by the First Bench for arriving at a different conclusion, on the ground that 'the said order was actually passed by the Apex Court, almost by consent.', since the above guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court, in total consideration of the entire aspect, cannot be called as had been issued only with consent and are not a general principle of law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. 13. Article 141 of the Constitution mandates that 'the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India'. In M.S.L.Patil, Asst.Conservator of Forests, Solapur v. State of Maharashtra [ (1996) 11 SCC 361 ], the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'the general principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court is applicable to every person including those who were not parties to that order'. In Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sun Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. [ (1992) 4 SCC 363 ] and in State Of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh [ (1999) 6 SCC 172 ], the Honourable Apex Court has held that 'the judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court.' 14. In the light of the above judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, if we look at the observations made by the First Bench of this Court, the First Bench of this Court has proceeded on the wrong premise that since the above guidelines were issued by the Honourable Apex Court by consent, they will not have any binding effect to the facts of the case before it, ignoring the well established legal principle that even if the decision has been rendered by the Honourable Apex Court by consent, if the Honourable Apex Court lays down general principles of law in the matter, the same will bind every person including those who are not parties to that order. Even if it is presumed, without conceding, that the Honourable Apex Court has passed the above said order on consent, since the guidelines framed by the Honourable Apex Court, after hearing all the parties concerned including the major All India Trade Unions, are general principles of law, the same will bind every person including those who are not parties to that order. By its order, heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant, the First Bench of this Court has interpreted the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in a different manner, as against the very purport of the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court, which is impermissible, further running contrary to Article 141 of the Constitution. For these reasons, we are constrained to hold that the decision of the First Bench of this Court in W.A.Nos.502 and 503 of 2005 etc., dated 11.12.2007 is per incuriam. Therefore, we are not able to concur with the reasonings and the decision arrived at by the First Bench of this Court in W.A.Nos.502 and 503 of 2005 etc., dated 11.12.2007. 15. Coming to the factual aspect of this case, Mr.V.Prakash, the learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent would bring to our notice that after the judgment was passed by us on 31.1.2008, when the respondents tried to conduct the elections, the appellant/petitioner filed W.P.No.17934 of 2008, praying to quash the order dated 22.7.2008 issued by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation and obtained an order of interim injunction and thereafter withdrew the said writ petition and filed this petition to review/modify the order. It is also to be pointed out that the very same arguments, that only one Union has to be recognised, were advanced before us and rejecting such arguments and following the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra), we have delivered the judgment on 31.1.2008. On the part of the first respondent, by filing a detailed counter affidavit, it has been stiffly argued that as far as the issue of recognition of the trade union in the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation is concerned, it has been admitted, in principle, by both the parties that the Code of Discipline will apply and that the recognition has to be done in accordance with the Code of Discipline and implementation, as directed by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra). It has further been submitted that the Code of Discipline has two kinds of recognition – one is recognition for industrial establishment and the other is recognition for industry; that recognition for industry is granted as a representative union, whereas recognition for industrial establishment is granted to the majority union, industry meaning the entire industry, viz. cement industry, sugar industry, jute industry, etc. and industrial establishment is specific to one particular establishment where the majority rule prevails and where grant of recognition to the single majority trade union is the principle and the criteria for recognition of a single majority union in an industry or establishment is laid down in Annexure-I of the 'Recognition of Unions under the Code of Discipline' and clause (5) of the same reads as follows: "5. Where there are several unions in an industry or establishment the one with the largest membership should be recognized." Relying on the said clause, it has been submitted on the part of the first respondent that the single largest majority union is entitled to recognition, provided it has at least 15% membership in an industrial establishment while applying for recognition and therefore, if the petitioner/appellant is aggrieved by the fact that its contention that more than one union should be recognised has been rejected, then it is for the petitioner/appellant to work out his remedy by way of an appeal and not by an application disguised as a modification/clarification petition. It has further been submitted that the appellant Union does not satisfy the minimum criteria of 15% membership of an industrial establishment, even to apply for recognition and the Management of TNCSC has disclosed the above fact in the typed set of papers in W.P.No.17934 of 2008. 16. On a perusal of the entire materials placed on record, we are in total conformity with the arguments advanced on the part of the first respondent. Having agreed that the Code of Discipline will apply and that the recognition has to be done in accordance with the Code of Discipline, clause (5) of which mandates that where there are several unions in an industry or establishment, the one with the largest membership should be recognised, and having already failed in their attempt to convince this Court about the same arguments, the petitioner/appellant has come forward to file this petition, as if it is a clarification/modification and wanted to re-appreciate the entire facts of the case, which is impermissible under law. When the material on record would speak that the petitioner/appellant is not enjoying even the support of 15% member of an industrial establishment and from the actions of the petitioner/appellant it is clear that their intention is only to stall the elections and waste the public time of the Court, by initiating proceeding after proceeding, with no legally sustainable reasons/causes. The prayer in this petition besides being contrary to the established principles of law, since trying to give a different colour, meaning and interpretation to the guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra), is also a malicious one, to somehow satisfy their illegal desire of putting spokes into the ongoing process of conducting elections to the Unions and therefore, this petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be rejected. 17. To sum up, i. This petition is liable to be rejected, on the sole ground that it is not maintainable, since after the disposal of the main case, no such miscellaneous petitions could be maintained. If at all, the petitioner/appellant felt that there are errors apparent on the face of the judgment, they should have filed a petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, seeking to review the judgment passed by us. If at all, the petitioner/appellant felt that there are errors apparent on the face of the judgment, they should have filed a petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, seeking to review the judgment passed by us. In the case on hand, no such errors apparent on the face of record have been either pleaded or established on the part of the petitioner/appellant. ii. The clarification/modification sought for on the part of the petitioner/appellant is nothing but trying to give a different colour, meaning and interpretation to the guidelines issued by the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra), which has been followed by us, while delivering the judgment in W.A.No.583 of 2000, dated 31.1.2008. iii. The judgment of the First Bench of this Court, delivered in W.A.Nos.502 and 503 of 2005, dated 11.12.2007, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was not brought to our notice on 31.1.2008, when we disposed of W.A.No.583 of 2008. iv. For the discussions held hereinbefore, with great respect, we are constrained to hold that the above judgment of the First Bench of this Court, delivered in W.A.Nos.502 and 503 of 2005, dated 11.12.2007 is per incuriam, since running contrary to the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra), which we have extracted and followed in our judgment dated 31.1.2008, and therefore, we are unable to concur with the same. v. Having agreed that the Code of Discipline will apply and that the recognition has to be done in accordance with the Code of Discipline, clause (5) of which mandates that 'where there are several unions in an industry or establishment, the one with the largest membership should be recognised,' and having already failed in their attempt to convince this Court about the same arguments, the petitioner/appellant has come forward to file this petition, as if it is a clarification/modification and wanted to re-appreciate the entire facts of the case, which is impermissible under law. vi. vi. The petitioner/appellant filed W.P.No.17934 of 2008, praying to quash the order dated 22.7.2008 issued by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil supplies Corporation and obtained an order of interim injunction and thereafter withdrew the said writ petition, resulting in its dismissal on 12.8.2008 and thus having failed in his attempt to stall the ongoing election process, has filed this petition as if it is a modification/clarification of the order passed by us and wanted us to re-appreciate the entire facts once again, which we have fully considered while disposing of W.A.No.583 of 2000, dated 31.1.2008, following the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in FCI case (supra). The petitioner has resorted to this type of practice only with a malicious motive of stalling the ongoing election process. Therefore, for all the above reasons and discussions, while dismissing this petition as devoid of merits, we impose a cost of Rs.10,000/= (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) to be paid by the petitioner/appellant to the Chief Justice's Relief Fund within two weeks from today and the respondents are directed to complete the election process within six weeks from today.