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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 640 (MP)

LALIT OSWAL v. A K TRIVEDI

2009-05-14

RAJENDRA MENON

body2009
Judgment ( 1. ) AS common questions of law are involved in both these applications, they are being considered and decided by this common order. ( 2. ) ARBITRATION Case No. 3/2007 is filed under section 11 (6) read with sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the act); whereas Arbitration Case No. 14/2007 is filed under section 11 (6) read with section 15 of the Act. ( 3. ) IN Arbitration Case No. 3/2007, applicant Lalit Oswal is Managing Partner of M/s Lalit Construction Company, a Partnership Firm having its office at Durg, district Chhatisgarh. The Firm is engaged in the business of execution of Civil works, which mainly includes construction of bridges. Respondent No. 2 M/s Keti Constructions Limited is a Company registered under the provisions of Companies Act and has its office at Indore. This Company is also engaged in the business and execution of civil contracts. ( 4. ) IT is stated that in the year 1999, Government of Maharashtra gave a contract to respondent No. 2 for construction of a bridge alongwith approach road and culverts at Koyana River, Satara, Maharashtra. The aforesaid work was awarded to respondent No. 2 under Built, Operate and Transfer Scheme. It is averred that applicant was appointed as Sub Contractor by respondent No. 2 for the purpose of executing some of the work allotted to respondent No. 2 by the Government of maharashtra. Accordingly, for the work assigned to the applicant by respondent no. 2 - Agreement A/1 was entered into on 24. 9. 1999. Clause 13 of the aforesaid agreement contained an arbitration clause for resolution of all disputes or differences by reference to a sole arbitrator. It seems that certain dispute arose between the parties i. e. . respondent No. 2 and the present applicant in the matter of execution of work and, therefore, the matter was referred to one Shri S. S. Patwardhan, who was named as the sole arbitrator in the Agreement in question alongwith supplementary Agreement - Annexure A/2 dated 18. 12. 2000. When the sole arbitrator named in the Agreement expressed his inability to function as an arbitrator, with the consent of the applicant and respondent No. 2, respondent no. 1 Mr. A. K. Trivedi, a retired Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, MP was appointed as an Arbitrator. 12. 2000. When the sole arbitrator named in the Agreement expressed his inability to function as an arbitrator, with the consent of the applicant and respondent No. 2, respondent no. 1 Mr. A. K. Trivedi, a retired Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, MP was appointed as an Arbitrator. The Arbitrator commenced his proceedings and it is the case of the applicant that the Arbitrator did not disclose all the material facts, which were relevant to be informed under section 12 of the Act. It is stated that initially a declaration was made by the arbitrator that he has no interest in the matter, but subsequently it transpired that certain criminal cases were pending against him, he belongs to Indore city where respondents are residing and there was possibility of common friendship. It is further stated that when issues were to be framed, the arbitrator did not frame proper issues, application were filed for framing proper issues, which were not properly considered and finally adjournments on certain dates were also refused without any justification. Contending that the arbitrator has committed breach, which is a ground for challenge under section 12 of the Act and he has also committed certain acts due to which he can be removed under section 13, challenge was made to the procedure of Arbitration and when the Arbitrator rejected the challenge, this application is filed under section 11 (6) read with sections 14 and 15, for termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator. All the documents pertaining to the Agreement, the proceedings held by the Arbitrator, the criminal case in which he was involved and other relevant documents are available on record and if required, shall be referred to in detail subsequently. ( 5. ) AS far as Arbitration Case No. 14/2007 is concerned, applicant was granted a contract by respondent Railway Administration for supply of 65 mm stone Ballast at Sleemnabad Depot vide Contract Agreement dated 3. 3. 2004. Clause 66 of the agreement contemplated an arbitration provision. Dispute arose between the parties and, therefore, on 17. 10. 2005, the applicant invoked the arbitration clause and in accordance to the terms and conditions, requested the General Manager to constitute an Arbitration Tribunal. When the request was not acceded to an application under section 11 (6) of the Act was filed before this Court, being MCC no. 525/2006. Dispute arose between the parties and, therefore, on 17. 10. 2005, the applicant invoked the arbitration clause and in accordance to the terms and conditions, requested the General Manager to constitute an Arbitration Tribunal. When the request was not acceded to an application under section 11 (6) of the Act was filed before this Court, being MCC no. 525/2006. It is stated that the Arbitrator was appointed, but as the Arbitrator was not proceeding in the matter within time and as the matter is being delayed, prayer made is to terminate the mandate of the Arbitrator and nominate a person to constitute the Arbitration Tribunal by this Court. Accordingly, in Case No. 14/ 2007, on the ground of delay being caused by the Arbitrator, prayer made is to terminate the mandate and to appoint another Arbitrator under section 11 (6) of the Act. ( 6. ) SHRI V. R. Rao and Shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocates, referred to the provisions of Sections 11,12,13,14 and 15 of the Act and submitted that when the ground of challenge contemplated under sections 12 and 13 are available and when the Arbitrator acts in a manner, resulting in failure or impossibility to act, a mandate for termination of the Arbitrator contemplated under section 14 can be sought for and a prayer can be made under section 15 to terminate the mandate and substitute the Arbitrator. Taking me through the facts that have come on record evidencing the irregularity/illegality said to have been committed by the Arbitrator, both the learned Senior Advocates submitted that it is a fit case where the directions as sought for can be issued. ( 7. ) SHRI Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocate, during the course of hearing submitted that even though under sub-section (4) of Section 13, after the challenge is rejected by the Arbitrator, the aggrieved party has to wait till the final award is made to challenge the order. It is his contention that in a case falling under section 14 (1), the application can be filed directly before this Court. It is his contention that in a case falling under section 14 (1), the application can be filed directly before this Court. It was emphasized by him that the conduct of the Arbitrator in the matter of not disclosing the correct facts with regard to pendency of the criminal case against him and various other factors, creates a situation where the Arbitrator becomes de jure unable to perform his function and, therefore, it is argued by him that this Court exercising power under section 14 can terminate the mandate. It was argued by both the learned senior Advocates that the termination of the mandate by applying to the Court contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 14 means the Court, which has appointed the Arbitrator or the Court, which has jurisdiction to appoint the Arbitrator under section 11. According to learned counsel, an application under section 14 (2) would lie before this Court and it was emphasized by them that the definition of court appearing in section 2 (e), so far as it relates to proceeding under section 14, would include the Court empowered to appoint the Arbitrator under section 11, of the Act. ( 8. ) INVITING attention of this Court to the principles laid by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the cases of S. B. P. and Company Vs. Patel Engineering limited and Another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 ; and, by another Bench in the case of national Thermal Power Corporation Limited Vs. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451 ; Shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocate emphasized that the Court referred to in Section 14 would be this Court and the jurisdiction to proceed in the matter is available only to this Court. By referring to the observations made by the Supreme Court, in paragraph 7 and 18 in the case of patel Engineering (supra) and the principles laid down in the said judgment, Shri aradhe emphasized that when the mandate of the Arbitrator is required to be terminated for the grounds contemplated in the Act, this Court can pass appropriate orders. By referring to the observations made by the Supreme Court, in paragraph 7 and 18 in the case of patel Engineering (supra) and the principles laid down in the said judgment, Shri aradhe emphasized that when the mandate of the Arbitrator is required to be terminated for the grounds contemplated in the Act, this Court can pass appropriate orders. Shri V. R. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, supported the aforesaid contention and added that when the Arbitrator is appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be under section 11, it cannot be conceived that the Arbitrator can be removed by terminating his mandate by an inferior court i. e. . the District Court. Accordingly emphasizing that the court defined under section 2 (e) of the Act for the purposes of sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 would mean the same Court, which has power to appoint the Arbitrator under section 11 or the High Court, both the learned Senior Advocates argued that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application. That apart, pointing out bias and misconduct committed by the Arbitrator, both learned Senior Advocates argued that it is a fit case where interference should be made and the mandate terminated. ( 9. ) IN support of the contention with regard to bias and misconduct by the arbitrator, Shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocate, invited attention of this court to judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 . ( 10. ) REFUTING the aforesaid contention and placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited Vs. AES Corporation and others, 2002 7 SCC 736 ; M. Mohan Reddy Vs. Union of india and others, 2000 (1) Arb. LJ 39 AP; R. K. Agrawal and another Vs. B. P. K. Johri and others, 2001 (1) Kar. LJ 17; and referring to the definition of court as contemplated under section 2 (e) of the Act, Shri Ashish Shroti and shri Sudhir Shrivastava argued that the court referred to in Section 14 would mean the principal Civil Court or the High Court having original civil jurisdiction and not the Chief Justice or his nominee as envisaged under section 11 or the high Court. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the applications filed are not maintainable and the applicants, if aggrieved by rejection of their objection for termination of mandate are required to wait till passing of the final award and thereafter they can challenge the rejection in accordance to the procedure contemplated under section 34 read with section 37. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the courts referred to in the Act will not include the Chief Justice or his nominee contemplated under section 11 and, therefore, at this stage the application before this Court, which is only empowered to exercise jurisdiction under section 11 is not maintainable. Accordingly, learned counsel for the respondents pray for rejection of this application. ( 11. ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. At this stage, before entering into the merits of the allegations levelled against the arbitration Tribunals and the grounds and reasons, which have been placed on record seeking termination of the mandate, it is necessary first to address the question of jurisdiction. ( 12. ) THE Act of 1996 is a comprehensive legislation intended to resolve international and commercial dispute by Arbitration and Conciliation in a speedy manner. It is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to international commercial arbitration and domestic arbitration. The preamble of the Act clearly indicates that after the modern law for commercial arbitration was adopted by the general Assembly of the United Nations through the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the recommendation was to consider the Model Law and to establish a unified legal frame work for fair, effective and earl) settlement of dispute arising in international and commercial activities. It is because of the aforesaid reason that the Arbitration Act of 1940 was replaced by the present Act and if the Scheme of the present Act is- scanned, it would be seen that the Scheme contemplates a detailed procedure for speedy and effective disposal of arbitration in the manner contemplated under the Act. Section 11 of the Act contemplates a procedure for appointment of Arbitrator. Section 11 of the Act contemplates a procedure for appointment of Arbitrator. Under the said scheme pertaining to appointment of Arbitrator, it is the Chief Justice of a State, his nominee (i. e. any person) or the institute designated by him, which is empowered to appoint an Arbitrator for domestic arbitration and with regard to international arbitration it is the Chief Justice of India or the person or institute designated by him, which is to perform the function of arbitration. A perusal of Section 11 would indicate that the power to appoint an arbitrator is not conferred on any Court. Section 11 speaks about Chief Justice or any person or institute designated by him. ( 13. ) SUB-SECTION 2 (e) of the Act defines a court and the same reads as under: "2. (e) "court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. " (Emphasis supplied)Section 12 contemplates the grounds of challenge to the person appointed as Arbitrator and mandates the Arbitrator appointed to disclose any disqualification, which he may have. Sub-section (3) of this section entitles the parties to challenge the Arbitrator. The procedure for challenge contemplated under section 12 is provided for in section 13, whereas section 14 deals with matters arising due to failure or impossibility for an Arbitrator to Act. Section 15 provides detailed procedure for termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator and substitution by another Arbitrator. Section 16, which is provided in Chapter IV, deals with jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and competency of the Tribunal to decide objections on its jurisdiction. On a perusal of the various provisions, particularly sections 13 and 16, it would be seen that in the event of failure of challenge or rejection of objection, the aggrieved person has to wait until the final award is made and the decision on the objection to jurisdiction can only be challenged in an appeal in accordance to Section 34 of the Act. However, certain matters, which include objection with regard to acceptance of jurisdiction, can be challenged under section 37 of the Act. ( 14. ) THE same being the Scheme of the Act, it would be appropriate at this stage to consider the objection raised by the respondents with regard to tenability of the applications before this Court. ( 15. ) FOR the purpose of considering the objection raised by the respondents, meaning of the term court defined under section 2 (1) (e) and indicated in Sections 14, 34 and 37 would become relevant. In the present cases meaning of the word court referred to in section 14 may only be relevant, but as the word court is used. in other sections also i. e. . under sections 34 and 37, it is appropriate to consider the same also. ( 16. ) A perusal of the definition of court as provided in Clause 2 (l) (e) would indicate that a court means the the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and it includes the High Court, which exercises original civil jurisdiction and having jurisdiction to decide questions forming the subject-matter of arbitration in case the same has been subject-matter of a suit. ( 17. ) ADMITTEDLY, this Court is presently exercising jurisdiction as a person designated by the Chief Justice under section 11 (5) read with section 11 (6) of the act. The question, therefore, would be as to whether the Chief Justice or his nominee or the institute designated by the Chief Justice under section 11 would be a Court for the purposes of section 14 (2) also. ( 18. ) SHRI Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocate, placing reliance on the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Patel Engineering (supra) emphasized, that over-ruling an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Konkan Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Rani Construction (P) Limited, 2002 (2) SCC 388 , the Constitutional Bench has held that the orders passed by the Chief Justice or his nominee exercising jurisdiction under section 11 are not administrative in nature, but they are judicial orders passed exercising judicial powers and, therefore, it is submitted by him that the word court indicated in the Act "and defined in section 2 (e) would include this Court while exercising powers under section 11 (6 ). ( 19. ( 19. ) THE question is as to whether the aforesaid contention of Shri V. R. Rao and shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocates, are correct or not? Answer to the aforesaid question can be found if the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 13, in the case of Patel Engineering (supra) is scanned. In paragraph 13, it has been so held by the Supreme Court: "13. It is common ground that the Act has adopted the uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, but at the same time, it has made some departures from the model law. Section 11 is in the place of Article 11 of the Model Law. The model Law provides for the making of a request under Article 11 to "the court or other authority specified in Article 6 to take the necessary measure". The words in. Section 11 of the Act are "the chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him". The fact that instead of the court, the powers are conferred on the chief Justice, has to be appreciated in the context of the statute. court is defined in the Act to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction of the district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is normally the District Court. The High courts in India exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction are not too many. So in most of the States the court concerned would be the District Court. Obviously, Parliament did not want to confer the power on the District Court, to entertain a request for appointing an arbitrator or for constituting an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11 of the Act. It has to be noted that under Section 9 of the Act, the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction, has the power to make interim orders prior to. during or even post arbitration. It has also the power to entertain a challenge to the award that may ultimately be made. The framers of the statute must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the definition of court in the Act. It is easily possible to contemplate that they did not want the power under Section 11 to be conferred on the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction. The framers of the statute must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the definition of court in the Act. It is easily possible to contemplate that they did not want the power under Section 11 to be conferred on the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction. The intention apparently was to confer the power on the highest judicial authority in the State and in the country, on Chief Justices of High Courts and on the Chief Justice of India. Such a provision is necessarily intended to add the greatest credibility to the arbitral process. The argument that the power thus conferred on the Chief Justice could not even be delegated to any other Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, stands negatived only because of the power given to designate another. The intention of the legislature appears to be clear that it wanted to ensure that the power under Section 11 (6) of the Act was exercised by the highest judicial authority in the concerned State or in the country. This is to ensure the utmost authority to the process of constituting the Arbitral Tribunal. " (Emphasis supplied)Thereafter, in paragraph 18, it is held as under: 18. It is true that the power under Section 11 (6) of the Act is not conferred on the Supreme Court or on the High Court, but it is conferred on the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the High Court. One possible reason for specifying the authority as the Chief Justice, could be that if it were merely the conferment of the power on the High Court, or the Supreme Court, the matter would be governed by the normal procedure of that Court, including the right of appeal and the Parliament obviously wanted to avoid that situation, since one of the objects was to restrict the interference by Courts in the arbitral process. Therefore, the power was conferred on the highest judicial authority in the country and in the State in their capacities as Chief Justices. They have been conferred the power or the right to pass an order contemplated by section 11 of the Act. We have already seen that it is not possible to envisage that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice as persona designata. They have been conferred the power or the right to pass an order contemplated by section 11 of the Act. We have already seen that it is not possible to envisage that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice as persona designata. Therefore, the fact that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice, and not on the court presided over by him is not sufficient to hold that the power thus conferred is merely an administrative power and is not a judicial power. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 20. ) IT is clear from the aforesaid enunciation of law and Scheme of the Act that it is only a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which is normally the District court and a High Court which exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction that fall within the purview of Courts as defined under section 2 (e) and the Chief Justice or his nominee exercising power under section 11 (6) do not fall in the category of court defined under section 2 (e ). This aspect of the matter is evident from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 13, reproduced hereinabove, particularly with regard to the highlighted portion and when the observations made in paragraphs 19 and 20 are considered. The purpose of the Act, the reasons for empowering the Chief Justice to nominate an Arbitrator and various other factors, which are considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case clearly indicates that the contention of Shri V. R. Rao and Shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior advocates, is not tenable. ( 21. ) FURTHER reference in this regard may be made to the observations and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 40 and 41 of the said judgment. It may also be relevant to refer to Clause (vi) and the conclusion made by the Constitution Bench in paragraph 47 of the said judgment, which reads as under: " (vi) Once the matter reaches the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with orders passed by the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 22. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 22. ) IN the case of Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited (supra) relied upon by shri Shroti, even though it is held that the Chief Justice or his designate exercising power under section 11 (6) is not a Court and, therefore, a conjoint application under section 11 (6) read with section 14 would not lie, but the said judgment is mainly passed on the principle that the Chief Justice or his designate Judge does not discharge judicial functions in view of the law laid down in the case of Konkan railway Corporation Limited (supra), which judgment has been over-ruled by the Constitution Bench in the case of Patel Engineering (supra ). ( 23. ) HOWEVER, the Supreme Court has again considered the meaning of the word court as contained in Clause 2 (1) (e), in the case of M/s Pandey and Co. Builders private Limited Vs. State of Bihar and another, AIR 2007 SC 465, and in paragraphs 16 and 17, the matter is so dealt with: "16. Unlike the 1940 Act, the Arbitrator is entitled to determine his own jurisdiction. In the event, the Arbitrator opines that he has jurisdiction in the matter, he may proceed there with, which order can be challenged along with the award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If the Arbitrator opines that he has no jurisdiction to hear the matter, an appeal lies before the court. court has been defined in Section 2 (1) (e) of the 1996 Act in the following terms: "court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;" 17. It is not disputed before us that the Patna High Court does not exercise any original civil jurisdiction. The definition of "court" as noticed hereinbefore means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court which exercises the original civil jurisdiction. If a High Court does not exercise the original civil jurisdiction, it would not be a court within the meaning of the said provision. The definition of "court" as noticed hereinbefore means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court which exercises the original civil jurisdiction. If a High Court does not exercise the original civil jurisdiction, it would not be a court within the meaning of the said provision. Constitution of the courts vis-avis the hierarchy thereof is governed by the 1857 Act, Section 3 whereof reads as under: "3. Classes of Courts - There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act, namely: - (a) The Court of the District Judge; (b) The Court, of the Additional Judge; (c) The Court of the Subordinate Judge; and, (d) The Court of the Munsif. " (Emphasis supplied)Finally, the following observations are made in paragraph 25, after taking note of the law laid down in the case of Patel Engineering (supra ). "25. An order passed by a Chief Justice or his nominee under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act may be a judicial order, as has been held by a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court in sbp and Company Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd and another (supra) but the same does not take away the effect of the appellate jurisdiction to be exercised by a court under sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the 1996 Act. " In the case of Bharat Coking Coal Limited Vs. Annapurna Construction, 2008 6 SCC 732 , the judgment in the case of Patel Engineering (supra) is again considered and the principle reiterated. The question is again considered in Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited Vs. Krishna Travel Agency, 2008 6 SCC 741 , and the matter is so dealt with in paragraph 9: "9. There is another facet of the problem. The party will be deprived of the right to file an appeal under section 37 (1) (b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This means that a valuable right of appeal will be lost. Therefore, in the scheme of things, the submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. Taking this argument to a further logical conclusion, when the appointment is made by the High Court under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, then in that case, in every appointment made by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 11 (6 ). Taking this argument to a further logical conclusion, when the appointment is made by the High Court under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, then in that case, in every appointment made by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 11 (6 ). the High Court will become the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 (1) (e) of the 1996 Act. That is certainly not the intention of the legislature. Once an arbitrator is appointed then the appropriate forum for filing the award and for challenging the same, will be the Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction. Thus, the parties will have the right to move under section 34 of the 1996 Act and to appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, in the scheme of things, if appointment is made by the High Court or by this Court, the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction remains the same as contemplated under section 2 (1 ) (e) of the 1996 Act. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 24. ) A conjoint reading of the judgments in the cases referred to hereinabove would clearly indicate that it is only a High Court that exercises original civil jurisdiction, which would come within the meaning of the word court as defined under section 2 (e) and as the High Court of Madhya Pradesh does not exercise any original civil jurisdiction, it would not be a court for the purpose of Section 2 (1 ) (e) of the Act The legislative intent and various other factors that are apparent on going through the judgments of the Supreme Court, in the cases referred to hereinabove, would clearly indicate that the Chief Justice or his nominee (i. e. . any person) or the institute designated by the Chief Justice is not a court envisaged under section 2 (1 ) (e) and it is only those High Courts which exercise original civil jurisdiction that come within the purview of court defined in the Act. ( 25. ) IN that view of the matter, this Court finds much substance in the objection raised by the respondents with regard to maintainability of the applications under section 14 and 15, this Court only exercises jurisdiction under section 11 (6) of the act and, therefore, is not a court within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (e ). ( 25. ) IN that view of the matter, this Court finds much substance in the objection raised by the respondents with regard to maintainability of the applications under section 14 and 15, this Court only exercises jurisdiction under section 11 (6) of the act and, therefore, is not a court within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (e ). That apart, it may further be taken note of that under the Scheme of the Act of 1996, any aggrieved person, who is aggrieved by failure to the challenge made under section 12, is required to wait till the award is pronounced and can challenge the rejection of his challenge only after the final award is made under section 13 (4 ). It is only the orders contemplated under section 37, which are appealable, and in such cases the appeal would lie to a Court authorized by law to hear appeals from an original decree of the Court passing the order. ( 26. ) CONSIDERING the totality of the circumstances and the material available on record, I am of the considered view that the present application filed under section 11 read with sections 14 and 15 is not maintainable and, therefore, finding substance in the objection raised by the respondents, both these applications have to be rejected. ( 27. ) IN view of the aforesaid, it is not appropriate to go into the merits of the matter argued by Shri V. R. Rao and Shri Alok Aradhe, learned Senior Advocates, now in these applications. ( 28. ) ACCORDINGLY, the applications are rejected. Application rejected.