JUDGMENT 1. These 23 appeals have arisen from the judgments and orders dated 27.3.2009 of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajpipla in 23 separate cases, out of which, by consent, the facts and judgment of the first case, i.e. Criminal Case No.2015 of 2005, is taken as representative and main judgment, all the cases having similar facts and common issues. The criminal cases were initiated by the present appellant on the basis of dishonour of cheques admittedly signed and issued by the respondent-accused person and, in each case, the accused person is acquitted of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the Act”) mainly on the ground that the complainant had failed to prove enforceable debt or legal liability on the part of the accused person. 2. The backdrop of indisputable relevant facts is that, in all, 23 cheques bearing dates of 14th, 15th and 16th July, 2005 were presented for clearance and returned by the bank. Again they were presented on 08.08.2005 and upon being dishonoured again, notice was issued and then the complaints were filed. It was stated by the appellant in the complaint that he had lent approximately an amount exceeding Rs.22 lakhs and the accused person had not repaid any amount towards the principal and hence issued 23 cheques in question. It is averred in the complaint that the accused person had given assurance when the amounts were lent to him that he would repay the amount in installments but having failed to abide by his promise, he had also committed offence under section 420 of IPC. 3. It is averred in the complaint that the accused person had given assurance when the amounts were lent to him that he would repay the amount in installments but having failed to abide by his promise, he had also committed offence under section 420 of IPC. 3. During the course of evidence, the complainant examined himself at Ex.15 to reiterate the averments of the complaint on oath and during the extensive cross-examination, he, inter alia, stated that he had the record of monies lent by him to the accused and the amounts received by him; that the transactions were spread over the period from 1997 to 2000; that he had paid or lent money to the accused person by cheque and by cash; that he had approached D.S.P., Bharuch with a complaint in respect of the same; that the dates of the cheques were filled up by him; that there was a condition that the accused person would give to the complainant fresh set of cheques every five months and he denied the suggestions that the accused had already repaid total sum of Rs.34 lakhs and the debt, if any, was, in any case barred by limitation for recovery thereof in a civil court. 3.1 The complaint dated 15.6.2005 made by the appellant to D.S.P., Bharuch (Ex.31) stated that the complainant had given to the accused total sum of Rs.22 lakhs in several parts during the period of 4 years and thereafter the accused has, by whiling away the period of 4 and a half years in making payment and betraying the friendship, given 23 cheques which have been dishonoured. By letter dated 14.7.2005 (Ex.30), Police Inspector of Valia, Dist. Bharuch, informed the complainant that, as against the aforesaid complaint dated 15.6.2005, the accused person has also given an application dt. 22.6.2005 along with an audio cassette of the conversations which took place between the parties. It is further stated that, as it transpires from the hearing of the audio cassette, the accused has already repaid the amount due to him and having regard to several aspects, the complainant was required to pursue his remedies in the court of law. Significantly, the proceedings before the police have taken place before the date of dishonour of cheques while, according to the complaint and the complainant, he was asked by the accused person to present the cheques again for realization. Significantly, the proceedings before the police have taken place before the date of dishonour of cheques while, according to the complaint and the complainant, he was asked by the accused person to present the cheques again for realization. And that creates a genuine doubt about veracity of the version of the complainant. 4. With the above background of facts, the trial Court recorded the finding of fact and came to the conclusion that the financial transactions between the parties clearly appeared to have taken place during the period from 1997 to 2000 and the complainant had failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that there was a legally enforceable debt or legal liability against which the cheques could be said to have been drawn or issued. 5. Learned counsel Mr.Shastri, appearing for the appellant, submitted that there was a continuing liability existing against the accused for discharge of which the accused was in the practice of giving sets of cheques to the complainant and, when the complainant sought to realize the amount of continuing debt in July 2005, the offences were committed in which the appellant stood to lose the amounts legally due from the accused person. He submitted that in the facts and by virtue of the presumptions of law and in absence of any evidence of any amount having been repaid by the accused as also in absence of any dispute about signature of the accused person on the cheques, Court was required to uphold the sanctity of the cheque and impose appropriate punishment on the accused person. He also submitted that the accused person also being a trader and money-lender, he was bound to have the knowledge of dishonour of the cheques in the first instance and presentation of the cheques again. Therefore, the version of the complainant that he was advised and instructed by the accused person himself to present the cheques again for realization was believable and could not be discarded. He also submitted that the accused person could have adduced necessary oral and documentary evidence to show any repayment by him and in absence of such evidence, the cheques were required to be presumed to be in discharge of the existing legal liability. He also submitted that even a man of ordinary prudence would have demanded the cheques back while repaying the amount of the debt. He also submitted that even a man of ordinary prudence would have demanded the cheques back while repaying the amount of the debt. Instead, it was not even the defence of the respondent that he ever demanded the cheques back or intimated the complaint not to present the cheques again and again as those cheques were not intended to make any payment towards any liability. 6. As against the above submissions of Mr.Shastri, learned counsel Mr.Sanjanwalla, appearing for the respondent, submitted that, admittedly, the cheques were proposed to be appropriated towards the principal amount which had fallen due during the period between 1997 to 2000 and the complainant had failed to adduce any evidence as to how it remained an enforceable debt. He submitted that the primary burden of proving all the ingredients of the offence was upon the complainant and he had admittedly failed to prove even the payments which were made by him to the respondent. Relying upon deposition of Branch Manager (Ex.35) of the bank concerned, it was pointed out that the cheque books from which the cheques were drawn were issued on 12.7.1999 by the bank. 7. The issues arising in the facts of the present cases having been partly decided by this Court very recently on 06.10.2009 in Criminal Appeal No.1189 of 2009, learned counsel on both sides relied upon the following observations made therein: 8.1 No contract gives rise to any liability, unless the transaction is supported by consideration. However, an important distinction in the case of negotiable instruments is to be noticed. These instruments being mercantile instruments intended for free circulation like cash, the Law Merchant lays down restrictions as to the defence of want of consideration. If a negotiable instrument is made, drawn, accepted, indorsed or transferred without consideration or for a consideration which fails, it creates no obligation between the parties to the transaction. Partial absence or partial failure of consideration consisting of money stands on the same footing as its total absence or failure. Hence, the payee is not entitled to recover to the extent to which the consideration has failed or is absent, but in case of partial absence or failure of consideration not consisting of money, such part of the consideration must be ascertainable in money without collateral inquiry; otherwise it will not bar the recovery of the whole amount. Hence, the payee is not entitled to recover to the extent to which the consideration has failed or is absent, but in case of partial absence or failure of consideration not consisting of money, such part of the consideration must be ascertainable in money without collateral inquiry; otherwise it will not bar the recovery of the whole amount. The general rules of evidence relating to negotiable instruments are those contained in the Indian Evidence Act, but some special presumptions arising out of the peculiar incidents attached to negotiable instrument are set out in the Act. 9. The presumption under section 139 is mandatory but rebuttable by proof of facts contrary to the receipt of cheque for discharge of any debt or other liability. The initial burden, however, of proving that the cheque was drawn by the drawee for payment of any amount of money and it being returned by the bank unpaid remains with the complainant. The presumptions under section 118 are also mandatory but rebuttable and could be availed only until the contrary is proved. Even as a bill of exchange, by definition, requires signature of the maker as also direction to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument, the provisions of section 20 permits signature and delivery of an incomplete negotiable instrument and provides that the maker thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete it into a negotiable instrument and makes the signatory of such instrument liable to any holder in due course to the extent of the amount intended to be paid thereunder. Therefore, harmonious reading of the provisions of sections 5, 6, 20, 118 and 139 would clearly indicate that a cheque could be drawn, delivered and received by the payee or holder in due course and could legally be completed under a legal authority and when such inchoate instrument is completed to make it a negotiable instrument, it would fall within the definition of “bill of exchange” and would render the signatory liable upon such instrument to the extent the amount mentioned therein is intended by him to be paid thereunder. Unless and until contrary is proved, such negotiable instrument would be presumed to be made or drawn for consideration and receipt thereof would be presumed to be for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. However, such debt or other liability is not by any legal presumption presumed to be a legally enforceable debt or other liability. Therefore, the onus of proving that the presumed or proved debt or legal liability was legally enforceable remains with the complainant. Consequently, in all given fact-situations, the Court is required to examine whether the presumptions regarding consideration and there being any debt or other liability are rebutted by the accused person by preponderance of probabilities and whether the complainant has proved that the debt or other liability, presumed or proved by overwhelming evidence, was legally enforceable. Although there is no presumption as regards any debt or other liability being legally enforceable, it would be found that once a debt or other liability is presumed and not properly rebutted, it would be legally enforceable, unless and until it is shown to be legally unenforceable. Such scheme of the provisions of law clearly indicates the object of serving the purpose of realization of the promise apparently contained in a negotiable instrument, which is that the amount for payment of which the bill of exchange was intended to be made will be paid to the payee or the holder in due course. 9.1 Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument, however, renders it void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless the alteration was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties. The provision to that effect contained in section 87 has to be read in harmony with section 20 which permits and authorizes the holder of a negotiable instrument to complete the instrument for any amount and renders the drawer liable to the holder in due course to the extent of the amount intended by the drawer to be paid under such instrument. It is clear from plain reading of provisions of section 20 and 87 that the injunction, under the pain of invalidating a negotiable instrument, against alteration operates only after an inchoate instrument is completed or a complete instrument falls within the definition of “negotiable instrument”. It is clear from plain reading of provisions of section 20 and 87 that the injunction, under the pain of invalidating a negotiable instrument, against alteration operates only after an inchoate instrument is completed or a complete instrument falls within the definition of “negotiable instrument”. Therefore, the legally permissible completion of an inchoate instrument cannot be construed as material alteration of a negotiable instrument. 10. The above analysis of the statutory provisions leads to the conclusion that, when a cheque bearing only signature of the drawer is delivered and received by a payee for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability, there is an implied authority for the person receiving such cheque to complete it by filling the blanks and the amount having been filled up under such implied authority would be the amount intended by him to be paid thereunder. The focus in such cases would shift to the aspect of such amount being for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any legally enforceable debt or other liability. Therefore, even with the props of legal presumptions, the onus of proving legally enforceable debt or other liability for the discharge of which a cheque must have been drawn has to be discharged by the prosecution for bringing home the charge of dishonour of cheque. It may, however, be facetious to hold that a blank cheque, drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment of any amount of money to another person, by merely putting his signature on it, would not be a “cheque” in the first place, because of not being a “bill of exchange” as it did not contain direction to a certain person to pay a certain sum of money to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument. When the Negotiable Instruments Act expressly permits and authorizes by a substantive provision the completion of an inchoate instrument by section 20 with the safe-guard provided in section 87, provisions of sections 5 and 6 defining “bill of exchange” and “cheque” have to be harmoniously read to mean that an instrument which was initially not a “cheque” falling within the definition of section 6 would become a “cheque” when it was completed by filling the blanks and its dishonour shall have all the legal consequences of dishonour of a cheque proper”. 8. Applying the ratio of the above judgment in the facts of the present case, it was seen that, while the accused person had not disputed his signature on the cheques in question, his specific defence was that the amounts in excess of the amount of cheques were repaid by him. It is true that the accused person did not lead any evidence to prove any payment by him but the liability was clearly disputed in defence and an added burden was cast upon the complainant to prove not only that there was an existing debt or liability but that debt or other liability was legally enforceable, particularly in view of the fact that the dates in the cheques were filled up in different hands for the purpose of recovering the debt which had admittedly arisen five years before that date. Except the assertions on oath of the complainant, there was no other evidence to prove that the parties were in the practice of exchanging fresh batches of cheques every five months and the parties have apparently refrained from adducing any documentary evidence regarding the financial transactions taking place between them. It is under such circumstances that, after an elaborate examination and discussion of the entire evidence, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the complainant had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was, at the time of dishonour of the cheques, a legally enforceable liability against the accused person, in discharge of which the cheques could have been drawn or issued in favour of the complainant. 9. As observed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde [ AIR 2008 SC 1325 ], existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under section 139 of the Act. 9. As observed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde [ AIR 2008 SC 1325 ], existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of the holder of a cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability. And, as held by the Apex Court in M.S.Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 39 , it is not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence. The standard or proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities and necessary inference could be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies. In Kamala S. Vidhyadharan M.J. [2008 (1) GLR 423], the Supreme Court also held it to be well-settled that when two views were possible, the High Court exercising its appellate power against a judgment of acquittal shall not ordinarily interfere. In John K. John v. Tom Varghese [ (2007) 12 SCC 714 ], the Supreme Court held that the High Court was entitled to take notice of the conduct of the parties and draw its own conclusion. If, upon analysis of the evidence brought on record by the parties, a finding of fact has been arrived at that the cheque had not been issued by the respondent in discharge of any debt, it could not be said to be perverse. Therefore, even assuming in favour of the complainant that there was an existing debt or liability for payment of which the cheques were drawn, or allowed to remain with the complainant, it was not perverse for the trial Court to conclude that the complainant had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the debt was legally recoverable on the date of the cheques in question. Under such circumstances, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss all the appeals and accordingly they are dismissed.