JUDGMENT: Per ASHOK PARIHAR and G.S. SARRAF, JJ. The respondent no. 1 concerned workman was employed as unskilled, skilled labour intermittently on different projects for the period between October 21, 1982 till August, 1991. When his-services were lastly retrenched on completion of Basantgarh Copper Project vide order dated August 29, 1991, the same came to be challenged by the concerned workman in the writ petition filed before this Hon'ble Court relying on an award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur on February, 23, 1980, The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition vide order dated November 28, 1998 set aside the termination order and directed the present appellant to reinstate the concerned workman with full back wages. The learned single Judge held that the termination notice was in clear violation of the terms and conditions of the settlement and the award passed by the Tribunal. 2. As has already been referred above, there is no dispute that the concerned workman was employed on daily wages basis on different projects as un-skilled or skilled workman as per the requirement of the work from time to time. After completion of each project his services were retrenched and, thereafter, the concerned workman was again reemployed as a fresh on different project. Lastly as per retrenchment notice, the services of the concerned workman were sought to be retrenched after completion of Basantgarh Copper Project Post Pindwara, District Sirohi. 3. The Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur had passed the award dated February 23,1980 as per the settlement dated September 25, 1979 between the Management of the appellant 2 Corporation and the representative of the Union. The provision in regard to retrenchment in the settlement as approved by the Tribunal is be produced here as under: "The skilled and semi-skilled contingent workmen are not being retrenched on the closure of the camps. The MECE Union has been demanding that the un-skilled 'workmen may also not be retrenched when the camp is closed and they should be given alternate employment. The management of MECL was willing to give this safeguard to unskilled workmen who might have been engaged on or before April I, 1978 (sic). The MECE Union has been demanding that the un-skilled 'workmen may also not be retrenched when the camp is closed and they should be given alternate employment. The management of MECL was willing to give this safeguard to unskilled workmen who might have been engaged on or before April I, 1978 (sic). But, later on, as per the discussions held, during which the Union pointed out that 50% of the contingent workmen would themselves not shift to other camps even if they are given alternate jobs, it has been agreed that in case of retrenchment of unskilled workmen engaged on or before September 30, 1979 the, Union will be consulted and retrenchment will be resorted to when it would become inevitable. However, those who will be unwilling to go elsewhere, will be retrenched as per due process of law. It is also agreed that all future employment will be made for the specific work or duration of the Project/camps, These appointees will be retrenched on the completion of the work/closure of the project/camp." 4. The concluding portion of the settlement clearly stipulates that all future employment will be made for the specific work or duration of the Project/Camps. On completion of the project/camps the appointees will be retrenched accordingly. The present is not a case of regularisation. There is also nothing on record to show that earlier on completion of the particular projects, the concerned workman agitated the matter before a competent forum challenging the retrenchment or for regularisation. 5. In our opinion, the learned single Judge has totally mistreated ignored the concluding part of the settlement as referred above. 6. Learned counsel for the concerned workman submitted that after retrenchment in the present case, there had been different projects of the appellate (sic appellant) corporation and the concerned workman could have; been reemployed on those projects. However, in absence of any details in regard to future projects, no direction and relief can be granted by this Court. 7. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be I sustained in the eyes of law. 8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated November 28, 1998 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the respondent-employee also stands dismissed. There is no order as to costs.