Judgment By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 27-4-2005 and the order dated 22-2-2007 passed by respondent nos. 2 and 1 annexed as Annexure-1 and Annexure-2 to the petition. 2. Relevant facts giving rise to the present writ petition in brief are that the respondent no. 3 Hem Chandra Bansal moved an application for release of the shop No. 781, situate in Sadar Bazar Ranikhet, under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) on the ground of bona fide requirement with the allegation that the disputed shop was let out to the petitioner on rent @ Rs. 400/- per month about 20 years back; that the son of the applicant-respondent no.3, Mr. Sandeep Kumar Bansal, is unemployed and to put him in the business, the disputed shop is required by the applicant. The petitioner-opposite party is a wealthy person in Ranikhet and he is having many houses in Ranikhet town. The petitioner has purchased the property which comprises two shops just in front of the disputed property and he also owns a shop at about 200 mt. away from the disputed shop. The petitioner has a big house in Kumpur Bazar, Ranikhet town. The petitioner can easily shift his business in the property owned by him and there is no question of hardship to be caused to him. 3. The petitioner resisted the application by filing his written statement. The relationship of ownership and tenant has been admitted, but rest of the allegations made in the application have been denied. It has been asserted that no notice was given by the landlord and all the eleven co-owners were not arrayed as party to the proceeding. The applicant has already got a number of shops situate in Ranikhet released in his favour in different cases as mentioned in the written statement and he has sufficient accommodation to engage his son in the business. The applicant is running a medical store and due to business rivalry, the application for release has been moved. The tenant has earned goodwill of his shop for a long time. There is no shop in possession of the petitioner in Kumpur Bazar and the place being at a distance of about 4 kms. The applicant is running a medical store and due to business rivalry, the application for release has been moved. The tenant has earned goodwill of his shop for a long time. There is no shop in possession of the petitioner in Kumpur Bazar and the place being at a distance of about 4 kms. from Ranikhet town, there will be no useful purpose of the medical store being run there. 4. In support of his claim, the applicant-respondent no. 3 has filed affidavits along with other documentary evidence. The petitioner also filed affidavits and some documentary evidence in support of his contention. 5. The learned Prescribed Authority after hearing both the parties and on perusal of the evidence led by them, did not accept the contention of the opposite party that notice was required to be given to the tenant before filing the release application. The Prescribed Authority also did not find favour with the tenant that all the co-owners of the disputed property were not made party to the application. The learned Prescribed Authority has also rejected the contention of the tenant that by purchase of 1/11 share of the disputed property, the tenant cannot claim that being a co-owner, the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is not maintainable against him. 6. The Prescribed Authority on the point of bona fide requirement of the landlord has held that the applicant-landlord has bona fide need for the disputed shop to settle his son Sandeep Kumar in business. On the point of comparative hardship, the Prescribed Authority has observed that the alternative shops are available to the opposite party, while by rejection of release application, the landlord would suffer greater hardship. Ultimately, by order dated 27-4-2005, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application and directed the petitioner to vacate the disputed shop within a period of one month. It was also directed that the landlord shall pay amount of one year’s rent to the tenant as compensation. 7. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner preferred an appeal (Rent Appeal No. 2 of 2005 B.P.Goel Vs. Hem Chandra Bansal) before the District Judge Almora. The learned appellate court after elaborately discussing the evidence led by the parties has recorded a categorical finding that the landlord has bona fide requirement for the disputed shop to settle his son Sandeep Kumar in business. Hem Chandra Bansal) before the District Judge Almora. The learned appellate court after elaborately discussing the evidence led by the parties has recorded a categorical finding that the landlord has bona fide requirement for the disputed shop to settle his son Sandeep Kumar in business. On the point of comparative hardship, it has been held that the tenant has not made any effort during the period of last seven years to search an alternative shop, therefore, it was held that the balance of comparative hardship also tilted in favour of the landlord. The appellate court also did not find favour with the petitioner that by purchase of 1/11th share in the disputed property, the petitioner could be deemed to have become co-owner. Accordingly, the appellate court has dismissed the appeal by order dated 22-2-2007. 8. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up in this writ petition before this Court. 9. The respondent no. 3 filed his counter affidavit. It has been asserted that the Bansal Building Ranikhet consists of 12 shops. The petitioner got a sale deed executed in his favour by Smt. Rajesh Agrawal to the extent of 1/11th share in the entire Bansal Building. The sale deed is void because Smt. Rajesh Agrawal has already sold her share to respondent no. 3 before executing the sale deed in favour of the petitioner and the civil suit is pending before the civil court. It has also been asserted that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not come to an end by purchase of aforesaid 1/11th share. It has been denied that the shop nos. 777, 778, 783 and 783-E are vacant and in possession of respondent no. 3. 10. The respondent no. 3 has also filed supplementary affidavit in this Court and has also annexed a copy of the allotment order of a shop made by the Cantonment Board Ranikhet in favour of the petitioner, whereby a shop has been allotted to the petitioner on 8-3-2007. 11. The petitioner has also filed rejoinder affidavit and has reiterated the same facts as pleaded in the memo of writ petition. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material placed including the memo of petition, the counter version and the rejoinder affidavit. 13. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is limited. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material placed including the memo of petition, the counter version and the rejoinder affidavit. 13. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. It has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675 that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” In the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) by LRs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) by LRs. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, Page 1], the Apex Court has held that the findings on the point of bona fide requirement is the finding of fact. 14. In the case at hand, there is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below that the landlord has bona fide requirement for the disputed shop to engage his son Sandeep Kumar in the business. It has also been held by the two courts below that the tenant-petitioner has not made any effort to search for alternative shop for the last seven years hence the balance of comparative hardship also tilted in favour of the landlord. 15. The admitted facts of the case are that the release application was filed by the landlord-respondent before the Prescribed Authority for release of disputed shop on the ground of bona fide need to engage his son Sandeep Kumar Bansal in the business. It is also not disputed that the petitioner purchased 1/11th share in the disputed property from co-owner Smt. Rajesh Agrawal alias Rajeshwari Agrawal by registered sale deed on 9-6-2003 and that no specific portion was sold out by the vendor in favour of the petitioner. 16. The main ground of challenge raised in this writ petition is that because the petitioner has purchased 1/11th share in the entire property. It was vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner after having purchased 1/11th share in the disputed property has become co-owner of the shop in question and as such the application for release filed by one of the co-landlords was not maintainable because on the basis of sale-deed dated 10-6-2003 the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties came to an end and ceased. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Abdul Alim Vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari and others [(1998) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 683] wherein the Apex Court has held inter alia in para 4 that “the change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal co-owner of the unpartitioned property, would, therefore, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not maintainable. It is not disputed that there has been no partition of the suit premises till date. It is not disputed that there has been no partition of the suit premises till date. The High Court was, under the circumstances, not justified in upsetting the findings of the trial court and the appellate court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.” 17. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3-landlord has argued that by mere purchase of 1/11th share by the tenant in the disputed property, the relationship of landlord and tenant does not cease and it cannot be held that the application for release against the petitioner has become incompetent. Learned counsel further submitted that the case-law Abdul Alim Vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari and others (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others Vs. Bibi Husn Bano and others reported in 2005(2) ARC 921 (Supreme Court). The Apex Court while referring to the case of Abdul Alim (supra) in paragraph 7 has inter alia observed as under:- “7. In Abdul Alim v. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, the question has not been considered with reference to the relevant provision of the Transfer of Property Act referred to above. There is also no discussion on this question. It appears that in that case, an application filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for release of the building from the tenant, was held to be not maintainable because the tenant had in the meanwhile l\acquired co-ownership in the demised shop. It is simply stated ‘that the change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal co-owner of the un-partitioned property, would, therefore, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not maintainable. It is not disputed that there has been no partition of the suit premises till date. It is simply stated ‘that the change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal co-owner of the un-partitioned property, would, therefore, lead to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not maintainable. It is not disputed that there has been no partition of the suit premises till date. The High Court was under the circumstances not justified in upsetting the findings of the trial Court and the appellate Court in exercise of its powers under writ jurisdiction.’ With respect, we cannot consider this decision as laying down a prop0osition of law that on a tenant acquiring the right of a co-owner landlord, the tenancy of a building gets extinguished and the landlord cannot seek eviction of the tenant under the Act or the fixation of fair rent under the Act.” 18. In view of the Apex Court judgment, I hold that the petitioner having purchased 1/11th shared of the unpartitioned property cannot claim that the application for release by co-owner against the other co-owner i.e. the petitioner is not maintainable. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate Court has rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner on this score. 19. Moreover, I am of the considered opinion that the tenant-petitioner having acquired 1/11th share in the disputed property, the release against such tenant is fully maintainable. I am fortified by the Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Sarju Devi and others Vs. The Prescribed Authority Kanpur and another [1976, Allahabad Weekly Cases, Page 752] has observed in paragraph 20 as under:- “20. Even if it should be established that the tenant had acquired one-fourth share in the suit house, we do not see how the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority would become incompetent. So long as the tenancy is not extinguished by merger of the interest of the landlord and that of the tenant in the entire demised premises, the tenant does not by reason of his purchasing a share of the landlords’ interest, cease to be a tenant. It follows that he does not become a landlord as the same person cannot, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Badri Narain’s case (supra), at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant. It follows that he does not become a landlord as the same person cannot, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Badri Narain’s case (supra), at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant. Hence the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority had to be continued even if it was established that the tenant had purchased one-fourth share of the landlords in the suit house and had become a co-owner.” 20. The Apex Court in the case of T. Lakshmipathi and others Vs. P. Nithyananda Reddy and others [(2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases, 150] while considering the provisions of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, has observed in paragraph 18 as under:- “18. In the case a hand, it cannot be denied, nor has it been denied, that the appellants herein are not purchasers of the entire ownership interest in the property. What they have purchased is interest of some out of all the co-owners of the property. The interest of Respondent 1, whatever be its extent, has not come to vest in the appellants. The appellants have also acquired the tenancy rights in the property. Thus they have acquired partial ownership and full tenancy rights. It cannot be said that the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property have become vested in the appellants at the same time and in the same right. The lease cannot be said to have been determined by merger. So long as the interests of the lessee, the lesser estate and of the owner, the larger estate do not come to coalesce in full, either the water of larger estate is not deep enough to enable annihilation or the body of lesser interest does not sink or drown fully.” 21. So far as the findings on the point of bona fide requirement of the landlord is concerned, I find that the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding of fact that the disputed shop is required by the applicant for the business of his unemployed son Sandeep Kumar Bansal and that the need of the landlord is bona fide and genuine. On the point of comparative hardship, the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that the petitioner has not made sincere effort to get alternate shop and therefore, the point of comparative hardship was decided against the petitioner. On the point of comparative hardship, the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding that the petitioner has not made sincere effort to get alternate shop and therefore, the point of comparative hardship was decided against the petitioner. The appellate court has also recorded its independent finding on the point of bona fide requirement as well as comparative hardship by a detailed judgment. As mentioned earlier, there are concurrent findings of fact recorded by two courts below against the petitioner. I have perused the entire material placed before this Court and I find that the findings have been recorded by the courts below on proper appraisal of evidence. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent No.3-landlord has also submitted that during the pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner was allotted a shop by the Cantonment Board, Ranikhet on 8-3-2007. Learned counsel urged that this Court can take notice of this fact while deciding the writ petition. The landlord-respondent no.3 has annexed the copy of allotment order as Annexure-1 to the supplementary affidavit. A perusal of letter dated 1-5-2007 issued by the Public Information Officer Cantonment Board Ranikhet goes to show that the petitioner has deposited the transfer fee of Rs. 25,000/- and security amount of Rs. 25,000/- with the Cantonment Board and a shop near bus station Ranikhet has been transferred in the name of the petitioner. 23. For the reasons and discussion aforesaid, I am of the view that the petitioner having purchased 1/11th share in the disputed property is not entitled to claim that the relationship of landlord and tenant between respondent no.3 and the petitioner has ceased, The application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is maintainable. I do not find any perversity in the impugned orders passed by the two courts below. The writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed outright. 24. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. However, the petitioner is granted six months’ time to vacate the dispute shop and to deliver its peaceful vacant possession to the respondent no.3, provided the petitioner furnishes a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority to that effect within a period of four weeks from today. In case, the petitioner fails to furnish the said undertaking within the stipulated period, the respondent no.3 shall be at liberty to get the disputed shop vacated through court in accordance with law.