JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—This bunch of writ petitions raising similar questions have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. All these writ petitions have been filed on similar facts and grounds. It is sufficient to refer to the pleadings of writ petitions No. 230 of 2009, 266 of 2009 and 22 of 2009 for deciding all these writ petitions. 2. Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding these writ petitions are ; New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘Noida’) issued a residential plot scheme 2004 (1) inviting applications for allotment of residential plots in different sectors including Sector No. 44. The petitioners submitted applications in response to the notice by depositing the registration amount. The Noida authority have conducted draw of lots on 2.7.2005 in which several applicants were selected for allotment. By a subsequent order dated 4.7.2005, the draw of lots held on 2.7.2005 was cancelled. A writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48287 of 2005, Deepak Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, was filed in this Court for a direction upon the respondents to execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioner Deepak Sharma on the basis of the allotment letter issued pursuant to draw of lots held on 2.7.2005. Subsequently by means of amendment application, the petitioner sought the quashing of the order dated 4.7.2005. Another writ petition No. 50418 of 2005, Manav Sewa Samiti and another v. State of U.P., was filed praying for a direction prohibiting the Noida authority to approve the draw of lots held on 2.7.2005 and for causing an investigation to be done by the suitable agency to determine the liability of individual officers and for holding a fresh draw of lots. The aforesaid two writ petitions were heard by a Division Bench of this Court and were decided by judgment and order dated 5.10.2005. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that in the draw of lots held on 2.7.2005, fraud and manipulation were done and the order dated 4.7.2005 cancelling the draw of lots was fully justified. The aforesaid two writ petitions were heard by a Division Bench of this Court and were decided by judgment and order dated 5.10.2005. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that in the draw of lots held on 2.7.2005, fraud and manipulation were done and the order dated 4.7.2005 cancelling the draw of lots was fully justified. The Division Bench further held that the official of the Noida authority had surpassed all levels of fraud and had lost confidence of public therefore, in order to find out the guilty persons responsible for fraud and manipulation in the draw of lots and in order to restore the confidence of the public in the matter, fresh draw of lots be not held by Noida authority and be held by a Committee as mentioned in the order. Investigation by Central Bureau of Investigation was also directed by Division Bench in the whole matter. The Division Bench directed draw of fresh lots by the Committee preferably within a period of four weeks. The order passed by the Division Bench was challenged before the apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 6794-6795 of 2005, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Deepak Sharma, as well as in Civil Appeal No. 6800-6801 of 2005, Deepak Sharma v. State of U.P. The apex Court passed an order staying the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. However, the Civil Appeal of the Noida was subsequently dismissed on 22.11.2007 on statements made on behalf of Noida to the effect that Noida has taken a decision to implement the decision of the High Court hence, the appeals are not pressed with a direction that appellant shall implement the direction of the High Court. The appeal filed by Deepak Sharma was dismissed as devoid of merit. Although the appeals were dismissed by apex Court on 22.11.2007 but the draw of lots was not held immediately. 3. A writ petition being writ petition No. 3274 of 2008, Drappled Paper Industries and others v. State of U.P., was filed before this Court for a direction to the Committee appointed by the Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 5.10.2005, to immediately held fresh draw of lots. Several orders were passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. Time was taken by learned Advocate General to obtain instructions and inform the Court of the progress made. Several orders were passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. Time was taken by learned Advocate General to obtain instructions and inform the Court of the progress made. A request was made by the Chairman of the Committee which was appointed by the Division Bench to hold fresh draw of lots to grant two months’ further time for holding draw of lots. Vide an order dated 12.9.2008, two months time was allowed by the Division Bench for holding fresh draw of lots. The fresh draw of lots could be held by the Committee appointed by the Division Bench on 8.11.2008. In pursuance of draw held on 8.11.2008, allotment letters were issued by the Noida authority to all the petitioners giving details of the plots allotted and due amount for payment. Rate of allotment per square meter for sector 44 was mentioned as Rs. 39,600/-. The amount was calculated and communicated to the petitioners for payment. The details of the allotment money, instalments and other charges were mentioned in the letters. The petitioners have come up in these writ petitions challenging the allotment letters. Similar reliefs have been claimed in all the writ petitions. It is sufficient to refer the reliefs claimed in writ petition No. 230 of 2009 which are as follows: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to : (i) quash the order of enhancement of rate/premium as communicated in letter of allotment dated 12/15.12.2008 (Annexure 4) of the petition. (ii) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to change the rate/premium as per terms notified in the Brochure in 2004. (iii) direct the respondents to handover the possession of the plot of land at the rate as notified in the Brochure issued in 2004. (iv) pass such other order or direction as deemed fit by this Hon’ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. The petitioners have come to this Court challenging the amount demanded by the impugned allotment letters and they pray that premium of plots be charged as per the rates mentioned in the Scheme 2004 (1). For Sector 44, the premium of plot was mentioned in the brochure 2004(1) as Rs. 11,200/- per square meter whereas in the impugned allotment letter Rs. 39,600/- per square meter has been demanded. 5. For Sector 44, the premium of plot was mentioned in the brochure 2004(1) as Rs. 11,200/- per square meter whereas in the impugned allotment letter Rs. 39,600/- per square meter has been demanded. 5. We have heard Sri V.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, Sri K.K. Singh, Sri N.P. Singh for the petitioners and Sri Ravindra Kumar and Ramendra Pratap Singh for Noida authority. Sri M.C. Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has been heard for the State. The submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners are as follows : (i) Noida authority having invited application at the rate of Rs. 11,200/- per square meter for sector 44, the petitioners are entitled for allotment according to the rate as provided in the brochure. (ii) The first draw of lots held on 2.7.2005 was cancelled due to large scale irregularities and illegalities in draw of lots held by Noida authority themselves and subsequently draw of lots could be held only on 8.11.2008. The lapse is on the part of Noida authority itself and the petitioners cannot be saddled with the higher rates as mentioned in the allotment letters. The delay being not on the part of the petitioners, the Noida authority cannot take benefit of its own wrong. (iii) The Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 5.10.2005 has directed for draw of fresh lots preferably within a period of one month. Noida authority itself challenged the said order and obtained stay order from the apex Court. Subsequently the appeal was got dismissed as not pressed on 22.11.2007 and even thereafter the lots were not drawn till 8.11.2008. The delay in drawing lots was due to inaction of Noida itself for which the petitioners cannot be held liable. (iv) No reasons have been given for escalation of price. No development has been carried out on the spot hence, the respondents are not entitled to escalate the price. Even the resolutions filed along with the counter affidavit of the Noida authority deciding to revise and enhance the price of land in Boards’ meeting dated 28.3.2005, vide letter dated 17.7.2007 and in the Board meeting held on 1.5.2008 does not contain any reason for escalation of price. The escalation of price is wholly unjustified, arbitrary and malafide. 6. Even the resolutions filed along with the counter affidavit of the Noida authority deciding to revise and enhance the price of land in Boards’ meeting dated 28.3.2005, vide letter dated 17.7.2007 and in the Board meeting held on 1.5.2008 does not contain any reason for escalation of price. The escalation of price is wholly unjustified, arbitrary and malafide. 6. Learned counsel appearing for Noida authority refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are not maintainable since the writ petitions arise out of a contractual matter. The petitioners having agreed to abide by rates as revised by the Noida authority from time to time, has no locus to challenge the rates which have been demanded from the petitioners through the allotment letters. Clause 6 of the brochure clearly provides that increase in the allotment rates by the Noida authority, shall be acceptable to the applicants hence, there is no cause to challenge the rates which have been revised and increased. No rights accrued to the petitioners on draw of lots and the rights, if any could accrue only on issuance of allotment letter and the rates demanded through the allotment letters are the rates which are applicable on the date of issuance of the allotment letter. In case the petitioners do not agree to take the allotment on the rates as indicated in the allotment letters, they are free not to accept the allotment offers. No deliberate delay has been caused by the Noida Authority in holding the draw of lots. By judgment dated 5.10.2008, the Division Bench had appointed a committee of two officers of the State Government to conduct the draw of lots and conduct of draw of lots was not in the hands of Noida authority and the delay, if any in draw of lots was caused by the Committee since at one stage one of the officers of the Committee has requested to relieve himself from the conduct of draw of lots. The writ petition No. 3274 of 2008, Dappled Papers Industries (P) Ltd. and others v. State of U.P. and others, was filed subsequent to the dismissal of the civil appeal by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 22.11.2007 with a direction to implement the judgment dated 5.10.2008 of this Court. The writ petition No. 3274 of 2008, Dappled Papers Industries (P) Ltd. and others v. State of U.P. and others, was filed subsequent to the dismissal of the civil appeal by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 22.11.2007 with a direction to implement the judgment dated 5.10.2008 of this Court. The Division Bench itself noticed the cause of delay in holding of the draw of lots and vide order dated 12.9.2008 granted two months’ time to the Chairman of the Committee to hold draw of lots and the draw of lots have been held within the period allowed by Division Bench on 12.9.2008. There is no delay in holding the draw of lots. The rate of land in different sectors including Sector 44 have been revised by the Noida authority from time to time which was within the power and jurisdiction of the authority. The petitioners are liable to make payment as applicable on the date of the allotment. There is no challenge to the different resolution of the Board i.e. decision dated 28.3.2005, 11.7.2007 and 8.5.2008 of the Noida authority revising the rates of plots in different sectors. The petitioners cannot be heard in complaining the revised rates of plots. The Noida authority is not responsible for any delay in draw of lots nor any malafide has been alleged against the Noida authority. 7. Learned Counsel for both the parties have referred to and relied on various judgments of apex Court and this Court which shall be referred to, while considering the submissions in detail. 8. U.P. Industrial Development Area Act, 1976 was enacted by the State Legislature to provide for constitution of an authority for the development of certain areas in the State into Industrial and Urban township and for matters connected therewith. The Noida was constituted under Section 3 of the Act. Under Section 6 of the Act one of the object of the authority is to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industrial, commercial or residential purposes. The residential plot Scheme 2004 (1) was opened on 8.11.2004 and was to close on 7.12.2004 inviting applications for allotment of residential plots in different sectors. Clause 6 of the brochure relates to premium of plots which is quoted as follows : “6. The residential plot Scheme 2004 (1) was opened on 8.11.2004 and was to close on 7.12.2004 inviting applications for allotment of residential plots in different sectors. Clause 6 of the brochure relates to premium of plots which is quoted as follows : “6. PREMIUM OF PLOT : (i) The premium of plot allotted will be as under : For Sector 92, 93B, 105, 108, 122 : Rs. 3,700/- per sqm.* For Sector 46, 47, 48, 71, 72 : Rs. 5,050/- per sqm.* For sector 43, 50, 51 & 52 : Rs. 6750/-per sqm.* For Sector 44 : Rs. 11,200/- per sqm.* *Note.—In case of increase in the allotment rates of above Sectors by the Board of Noida Authority, the same wil be acceptable to the applicants/allottees. (No request for consideration for specific sector shall be entertained. Application received with any such request shall be summarily rejected.) (ii) Location charges shall also be applicable as below in addition to the land rate mentioned above : (a) Corner plot—5% of the premium. (b) Plots facing Park/Green Belt—5% of the premium. (c) (i) Plots facing 18 mts. Wide road & above—5% of the premium. (ii) Plots facing 30 mts. Wide road & above—20% of the premium. (d) Plots having all the three above locational benefits—30% of the premium. But the Location charges in no case shall exceed 30% of the premium. (iii) Any enhancement towards rate of land compensation will be recoverable from the allottee.” 9. Clause 6 as quoted above mentions about the premium of plots for Sector 44 as 11,200 per square meter. In the counter affidavit copy of the proceedings of the Board dated 4.8.2003, in which meeting the rates of Sector 44 was proposed as 11,200/- copy of the Board meeting dated 28.3.2005 by which revised rates were enforced w.e.f. 1.4.2004 as 13,700 for Sector 44, the decision dated 17.7.2007 by which revised rates w.e.f. 17.7.2007 were fixed as 33,000/- for Sector 44 and the resolution dated 8.5.2008 by which rates of land included in Sector A from 33,000/- to 33,600/- were fixed (Sector 44 mentioned in Sector ‘A’), have been brought on record. 10. The impugned allotment letters were issued to the petitioners in December, 2008 (12/15.12.2008) on the basis of draw of lots held on 8.11.2008 mentioning the rate of plot in Sector 44 as Rs. 10. The impugned allotment letters were issued to the petitioners in December, 2008 (12/15.12.2008) on the basis of draw of lots held on 8.11.2008 mentioning the rate of plot in Sector 44 as Rs. 39,600/- per square meter as revised w.e.f. 1.5.2008, which is under challenge in these writ petitions. The petitioners pray that the rates as mentioned in the brochure of 2004 (1) Scheme i.e. Rs. 11,200 per square meter be only charged. 11. The submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petitions are not maintainable since it arises out of contractual matter hence, this Court may dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable, is in nature of preliminary objection, which needs to be dealt first. Learned counsel for the respondents elaborating his submissions contends that offer given by the Noida Authority for allotment of plots is in realm of contract. The petitioners having accepted in their applications to accept the rates as revised by the Noida authority from time to time, it is not open for them to challenge the rates. Learned counsel for the respondents in support of his submission has placed reliance on judgment of the apex Court in the cases of Radhakrishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 ; State of U.P. and others v. Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. and others, (1996) 6 SCC 22 and National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another, (2003) 7 SCC 410 . 12. The apex Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar (supra) has held that parties can only claim right conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract unless some Statutes confer some substantial statutory power or obligation in the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract. The relevant paragraphs of the apex Court are as follows : “It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd.’s case (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons, with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. At this stage, no doubt, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But, after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State of its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract.” 13. In Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) a written contract was already in existence between the appellant and the State of Bihar with a clause providing that “the rate of royalty will be revised every three years cycle in consultation with the lessee and the decision will be binding on the lessee.” The Apex Court in view of the aforesaid, held that the challenge raised by the petitioner in the writ petition of the Government order revising the rate of royalty could not have been entertained in writ proceedings same being in contractual field. The facts of the present case are substantially different which shall be shortly noticed herein below. 14. Another judgment relied by the respondent in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. and others (supra) was a case where disputes relating to term of private contract was sought to be raised in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the said case Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. which was a public sector company entered into a contract with the Government of U.P. for construction of road in U.P. The tender was accepted and the work was completed. The dispute was only about certain payment, which the petitioner claimed from the State of U.P. The apex Court while, dismissing the appeal laid down following in paragraph 16 : “16. The dispute was only about certain payment, which the petitioner claimed from the State of U.P. The apex Court while, dismissing the appeal laid down following in paragraph 16 : “16. Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or, may be, also by certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil Court, as the case may be. Whether any amount is due to the respondent from the appellant-Government under the contract and, if so, how much and the further question whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the Government is justified, or not, are all matters which cannot be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition, viz., to restrain the Government from deducting a particular amount from the writ petitioner’s bill(s) was not a prayer which could be granted by the High Court under Article 226. Indeed, the High Court has not granted the said prayer.” 15. Another judgment relied by the respondents is National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another (supra), wherein the apex Court again held that dispute relating to contract cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition laid down by the apex Court in the above cases. When there is concluded contract between the parties, the contract cannot be made subject matter of writ petition under Article 226. The present is not a case of any concluded contract between the parties. The present is a case, where the question regarding maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 against the development authority is under challenge on the subject of escalation of price. The subject of escalation of price was specifically considered by apex Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, 2008 (2) SCC 672 . Following was laid down in paragraph 67: “67. The subject of escalation of price was specifically considered by apex Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, 2008 (2) SCC 672 . Following was laid down in paragraph 67: “67. We would assume that the office orders were issued by DDA keeping in view the representations made by a large number of defaulters. The plea taken by DDA gives rise to a dichotomy. If it is a case of contract qua contract, the provisions of the Contract Act must be taken recourse to. If DDA was exercising a statutory power, the same must be tested on application of doctrine of ultra vires. Floating a scheme for providing housing facilities to a group of people, although is governed by statute, power under the statute by an executive not only can be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, but can also be tested on the touchstone of source of the power under the statute. No provision either in the Act or the Regulations was brought to our notice which makes the allottee bound by the purported policy decision taken by DDA. Even if it is so, the superior Courts may exercise its power of judicial review as the power which is sought to be exercised by a statutory authority is not under the contract but under a statute. When a contract emanates from a statute or is otherwise governed by the provisions thereof, the suprior Court can also exercise the power of judicial review.” 17. The apex Court in Indore Development Authority v. Sadhana Agarwal and others, (1995) 3 SCC 1 , laid down that the Development Authority owes a duty to explain and satisfy the Court the reasons for such high escalation although the High Court, while exercising the writ jurisdiction has not to examine every details of the constructions but High Court has to satisfy it on the materials on record that the authority has not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. Noida authority is covered within the definition of other authority under Article 12 hence, while dealing persons it can neither act arbitrary nor violate the fundamental rights of citizens. If action of Development Authority escalating the price is arbitrary, same can very well be made subject matter of challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court in writ petition. 18. If action of Development Authority escalating the price is arbitrary, same can very well be made subject matter of challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court in writ petition. 18. In the present case, the petitioners immediately after receiving the allotment order asking them to deposit the amount as per existing rate of plots of land have come up in these writ petitions challenging the demand at the rate of Rs. 39,600 per square meter. Neither any lease deed has been executed nor petitioners have taken possession of the plots in dispute. They are thus, fully entitled to challenge the action of Development Authority in writ jurisdiction. 19. In view of the aforesaid, the objection of the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is overruled. 20. The submission of the petitioners is that they are liable to make the payment as per rates of the land as disclosed in residential scheme, 2004 (1). For appreciating the above submission, it is relevant to refer to clause 6 of the Residential Plots Scheme-2004(1). The note appended to clause 6 as noticed above provides “In case of increase in the allotment rates of above Sectors by the Board of Noida Authority, the same will be acceptable to the applicants/allottees. Thus, the premium of plots as mentioned in the brochure of 2004 (1) scheme was subject to increase in the allotment rates of the sector. Clause 6 (iii) refers to enhancement towards rate of land compensation which was to be recoverable from the allottee, whereas note is part of clause 6 (i) which provides for the premium of plots. The premium of plots thus, as indicated in clause 6 were subject to increase of allotment rates of sector by Board of Noida authorities. The petitioners having submitted applications being fully aware of Note of Clause 6 (i), they now cannot insist that they are to be allotted plots as per the rate mentioned in the Scheme 2004 (1) alone. In the counter affidavit, the resolution of the Board dated 28.3.2005, increasing rate of land in Sector 44 from 11,200 to 13,200 has been brought on record as Annexure C.A.2. In the counter affidavit, the resolution of the Board dated 28.3.2005, increasing rate of land in Sector 44 from 11,200 to 13,200 has been brought on record as Annexure C.A.2. The decision of the Board as communicated vide order dated 17.7.2007 revising the rate from 17.7.2007 to 33,000/- has been filed as Annexure-C.A.3 and decision of the Board dated 8.5.2008 revising the rate of category A Sector from 33,000/- to 39,600/- has been brought on record as Annexure-C.A.4. Thus, the decision to revise the rate has been taken by the Board of Noida authority which decision has been contemplated under Note to clause 6 (i). 21. At this stage, one more submission of the petitioner with regard to decision of the Board of Noida be considered. Referring to Annexure-C.A. 3 to the counter affidavit, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the said rate as is mentioned in Annexure-C.A. 3 is rate for auction and is not a decision revising the rates of land of 2004 (1) scheme. A perusal of the order dated 17.7.2007 indicate that revised rates from 17.7.2007 after approval of the Board of Noida Authority is Rs,. 33,000/-. A star mark has been put which has been explained in the bottom that residential plots of category a,b,c shall be sold by auction. The endorsement in the bottom that land from 17.7.2007 shall be sold by auction at the revised rates is explanatory and clarificatory which in no manner militate the general decision of Board to revise price from 17.7.2007. The rate Rs. 33,000/- as fixed for sale by auction cannot be said to be inapplicable for fixing premium for allotment of plots. The revision of rate by the Board of Noida authority cannot be said to be not applicable on the allotment to be made subsequent to the revision of rates. Thus, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that rates of the plots of 2004 (1) scheme has not been revised specifically and the revision dated 17.7.2007 is only for sale by auction, cannot be accepted. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed heavy reliance on the judgment in the case of Delhi Development Corporation v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 494. Certain facts of the case needs to be noticed. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed heavy reliance on the judgment in the case of Delhi Development Corporation v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 494. Certain facts of the case needs to be noticed. The Delhi Development Authority published a scheme called “Registration Scheme of New Pattern of 1979” of intending purchasers of flats to be constructed by the Delhi Development Authority. The brochure also mentioned “it may please be noted that the plinth area of the flats indicated and the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending upon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc.” Draw of lots for allotment was held on 12.10.1990 intimation was sent in January, 1991 asking for initial deposits. In between the draw of lots and the date on which the allotment was communicated, the land rate was revised by the Delhi Development Authority by Circular dated 6.12.1990. The writ petition was filed by the allottees contending that only land rate prevailing on the date of draw of lots should be charged, which contention was accepted by the High Court. Two grounds were taken by the High Court for allowing the writ petition. The High Court had held that allottee had become entitled to get the flats on the rates when lots were drawn and any subsequent revision in rates of the land cannot effect the allottee. It is relevant to quote paragraph 6 of the judgment: “6. A perusal of the High Court’s order shows that it is based upon the following two reasons : (i) Though the draw was held on October 12, 1990, the allotment-cum-demand letter was issued to the respondent only on January 9/13, 1991. This delay was the result of inefficiency of the D.D.A. (ii) Inasmuch as the issue of allotment-cum-demand letter was delayed in the office of D.D.A., it cannot charge the revised land rates to the respondent inasmuch as the respondent became entitled to get the flat on October 12, 1990; the revision of land rates subsequent to the drawl of lots cannot affect the respondent.” 23. Reversing the judgment of the High Court following was laid down in paragraph 8 of the judgment by the apex Court : “ Now coming to the other ground, we are unable to find any legal basis for holding that the respondent obtained a vested right to allotment on the drawl of lots. Since D.D.A. is a public authority and because the number of applicants are always more than the number of flats available, the system of drawing of lots is being resorted to with a view to identify the allottee. It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify the allottee, i.e., it is a process of selection. It is not allotment by itself. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment at the price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The scheme evolved by the appellant does not say so either expressly or by necessary implication. On the contrary, clause (14) thereof says that “the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending upon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc.” It may be noted that registration of applicants under the said scheme opened on September 1, 1979 and closed on September 30, 1979. About, 1,70,000 persons applied. Flats were being constructed in a continuous process and lots were being drawn from time to time for a given number of flats ready for allotment. Clause (14) of the Scheme has to be understood in this context—the steady rise in the cost of construction and of land. No provision of law also could be brought to our notice in support of the proposition that mere drawl of lots vestes an indefeasible right in the allottee for allotment at the price obtaining on the date of drawl of lots. In our opinion, since the right to flat arises only on the communication of the letter of allotment, the price or rates prevailing on the date of such communication is applicable unless otherwise provided in the Scheme. If in case the respondent is not willing to take or accept the allotment at such rate, it is always open to him to decline the allotment. We see no unfairness in the above procedure.” 24. If in case the respondent is not willing to take or accept the allotment at such rate, it is always open to him to decline the allotment. We see no unfairness in the above procedure.” 24. The apex Court in the above judgment laid down that mere identification or selection of the allottee in draw of lots does not clothe the person selected with a legal right for allotment on the price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The apex Court further held that right to flat arises only on the communication of allotment and the price or rates prevalent on the date of such communication is applicable. The law declared by the apex Court in the above case, fully supports the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the allottees are liable to pay the rates as prevalent on the date of issue of allotment letters. 25. In view of the aforesaid, it is to be held that by virtue of note to clause 6(i), the Noida authority is entitled to charge the rates of land as prevalent on the date when letter of allotment was issued and the claim of the petitioners that they are entitled for allotment at the rate mentioned in the Brochure Scheme 2004 (1), cannot be accepted. 26. The second and third submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioners are interrelated and are being taken up together. Sri V.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate submits that even, if it is accepted that Board of Noida Authority has right to increase or enhance the rate of land, such enhancement cannot be arbitrarily done by the Noida Authority after residential Scheme 2004 (1) was issued by the Noida. The applicants have legitimate expectations that premium money as mentioned in the Scheme shall be charged. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that escalation of price is more than three times and Noida authority is under duty to explain and satisfy the Court. It is contended that Noida authority cannot act in arbitrary and erratic manner. The applicants have legitimate expectations that premium money as mentioned in the Scheme shall be charged. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that escalation of price is more than three times and Noida authority is under duty to explain and satisfy the Court. It is contended that Noida authority cannot act in arbitrary and erratic manner. Submission further is that draw of lots held on 2.7.2005 was cancelled by the Noida itself and when the writ petition challenging the draw of lots held on 2.7.2005 was decided on 5.10.2005, it was expected from the Noida authority to have immediately held draw of lots more so when the Division Bench directed for holding draw of lots preferably within a period of four weeks. The Noida Authority challenged the order of Division Bench before Supreme Court and had obtained interim order and subsequently got their appeal dismissed as not pressed on 22.11.2007 and even after 22.11.2007, draw of lots could not take place for about one year and all these delay is attributable at the part of Noida, which cannot take benefits of its own laches and wrong. 27. While considering the first submission, it has been found that right of allottee to a plot arises only when allotment order is issued. Mere draw of lots does not clothe an allottee with any right to the plot. The draw of lots was held on 8.11.2008 and the allotment letters were issued in December, 2008 to the petitioners. In the present case, there is no difference in rates of land on the date of draw of lots i.e. 8.11.2008 and on the date of issuance of allotment letters since revised prices were enforced by Noida Board w.e.f. 1.5.2008. The issue raised by the petitioner is that the delay has been deliberately caused by the Noida which has prejudicially affected the rights of the petitioners qua the rate of land. The Division Bench judgment dated 5.10.2005 of this Court was challenged by Noida as well as Deepak Sharma by filing two appeals. Interim orders were passed by the apex Court in both the appeals and both the appeals were decided on 22.11.2007. The appeal of Noida was disposed as not pressed with direction to implement the order of the High Court and the appeal of Deepak Sharma was dismissed on merits. Interim orders were passed by the apex Court in both the appeals and both the appeals were decided on 22.11.2007. The appeal of Noida was disposed as not pressed with direction to implement the order of the High Court and the appeal of Deepak Sharma was dismissed on merits. It is useful to quote the orders passed by apex Court in both the appeals. The order of the apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 6794-6795 of 2005, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Deepak Sharma, is as follows : “These appeals have been preferred by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 4.10.2005 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in CMWP No. 48287/2005 and CMWP No. 50418/2005. At the outset, Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned ASG appearing for the appellant contended that after application of mind and after careful consideration of the directions issued by the High Court, the appellant has taken a decision to implement the directions of the High Court. Accordingly, learned ASG contended that he has received instructions not to press these appeals. On this submission, the appeals are disposed of as not pressed with a direction that the appellant shall implement the directions of the High Court.” 28. In Civil Appeal No. 6800-6801 of 2005, Deepak Sharma v. State of U.P., the apex Court has passed following order : “These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 4.10.2005 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in CMWP No. 48287/2005 and CMWP No. 50418/2005. We have heard Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel for the appellant at length. Briefly stated that facts are as follows. The NOIDA Authority held draw of lots on 2.7.2005 for 1250 residential plots at NOIDA. As hue and cry has been raised against the procedure of the draw of lots, a conscious decision has been taken on 3.7.2005 by the NOIDA Authority for not approving the draw of lots on 2.7.2005. thereafter, by an order dated 4.7.2005, the draw of lots has been cancelled. The appellants are aggrieved by the cancellation of draw of lots. Draw of lots is only for the identification of the plots. Conducting draw of lots, no indefeasible rights whatsoever has been accrued to the appellants. thereafter, by an order dated 4.7.2005, the draw of lots has been cancelled. The appellants are aggrieved by the cancellation of draw of lots. Draw of lots is only for the identification of the plots. Conducting draw of lots, no indefeasible rights whatsoever has been accrued to the appellants. That no vested right has been accrued to the appellant by draw of lots has been held by this Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar Jain, 1994 Suppl. (3) SCC 494. In view thereof, these appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly, dismissed.” 29. The apex Court disposed of the appeal of Noida with the direction to Noida to implement the direction of the High Court. Now it is relevant to note the direction of the Division Bench dated 5.10.2005 regarding holding fresh draw of lots. The direction of the Division Bench are as follows : “132. The basic question, however, still has to be considered and that is how and by whom should the draw of lots be held. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the clear opinion that the NOIDA officials must not be permitted to be involved in the draw of lots. The draw of lots should be held by a Committee headed by Sri G.B. Patnaik, Principal Secretary, Agriculture State of U.P. with Sri Himanshu Kumar Vice-Chairman, Varanasi Development Authority as the other member. In view of the fact that the controversy that has arisen is because of the computerised draw of lots, we are further of the opinion that the draw of lots should be held manually. 133. The Court cannot be a mute spectator where fraud and manipulation of such a high magnitude has been practiced. In view of the fact that the controversy that has arisen is because of the computerised draw of lots, we are further of the opinion that the draw of lots should be held manually. 133. The Court cannot be a mute spectator where fraud and manipulation of such a high magnitude has been practiced. It is, therefore, a fit case where, in order to find out the guilty persons responsible for fraud and manipulation in the draw of lots and in order to restore the confidence of the public in the matter of draw of lots, we consider it necessary to issue the following directions for holding the fresh draw of lots and for investigation by CBI and they are : For Holding Fresh Draw of lots : (1) The draw of lots under the aforesaid ‘Residential Plot Scheme 2004 (1)’ shall be conducted by a Committee headed by Sri G.B. Patnaik, Principal Secretary, Agriculture State of U.P. with Sri Himanshu Kumar Vice-Chairman, Varanasi Development Authority as the other member. (2) The draw of lots shall be held manually. (3) The list of eligible applicants and ineligible applicants contained in the CDs has been supplied by NOIDA. We leave it to the discretion of the members of the Committee to take a decision regarding a fresh scrutiny and in case a decision is taken for a fresh scrutiny and some more applicants are found to be ineligible then such applications shall not be considered for draw of lots. (4) The draw of lots should be held preferably within a period of four weeks from today. (5) After the draw of lots is held, the Committee shall submit the list of successful applicants to NOIDA for proceeding in accordance with law. (6) Copies of the CDs and other documents supplied to the Court may be made available to the Committee by NOIDA or CBI. The NOIDA officials shall also render all the documents/information/assistance, as may be required by the Committee. (7) Sri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Additional Advocate General, State of U.P. shall communicate this order to the State Authorities through the Chief Secretary who shall ensure due compliance of the order.” 30. The NOIDA officials shall also render all the documents/information/assistance, as may be required by the Committee. (7) Sri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Additional Advocate General, State of U.P. shall communicate this order to the State Authorities through the Chief Secretary who shall ensure due compliance of the order.” 30. From the above direction, it is clear that Division Bench directed that Noida officials must not be permitted to draw the lots and draw of lots shall be conducted by a committee headed by Sri G.B. Patnaik, Principal Secretary, Agriculture, State of U.P. with Sri Himanshu Kumar, Vice Chairman of the Varanasi Development Authority. 31. In writ petition No. 266 of 2009, it has been pleaded that even after decision of the apex Court dated 22.11.2007, no steps were taken by the Noida to hold fresh draw of lots hence, writ petition No. 3274 of 2008 was filed before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to hold draw of lots pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench dated 5.10.2005 and it was only after filing of the writ petition, steps were taken and lots were drawn on 8.11.2008. By order dated 4.2.2009, we had called for record of writ petition No. 3274 of 2008, decided on 23.1.2009, which records have also been perused by us. Copy of the various orders passed in writ petition No. 3274 of 2008 has also been placed before us by learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 32. The Division Bench vide order dated 5.10.2005 has directed fresh draw of lots to be held by Committee appointed by the said judgment itself preferably within four weeks. In view of the Division Bench judgment, Noida itself was not authorised to draw fresh lots. A perusal of the order dated 25.7.2008 in writ petition No. 3274 of 2008 indicate that learned Advocate General had informed the Court about communication dated 9.7.2008 sent by Sri G.B. Patnaik to the Chief Executive Officer, Noida expressing his inability to continue as Member. The Division Bench observed that it is not appropriate to change the constitution of the committee at this stage. It is useful to quote the order dated 25.7.2008: “We have heared learned Advocate General and Shri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the parties. The Division Bench observed that it is not appropriate to change the constitution of the committee at this stage. It is useful to quote the order dated 25.7.2008: “We have heared learned Advocate General and Shri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the parties. Learned Advocate General has informed the Court that the committee constituted by the Court shall comply with the directions issued by the Court within next six weeks. Learned Advocate General has also placed before the Court the communication dated 9th July, 2008 sent by Shri G.B. Patnaik to the Chief Executive Officer, Noida expressing his inability to continue as member because of the difficulties mentioned in the letter. We do not find it appropriate to change the constitution of the committee at this stage. We, therefore, request Mr. G.B. Patnaik to continue as member of the committee and ensure compliance of the judgment and order passed by this Court. List this petition on 12th September, 2008. Learned Advocate General shall place before the Court the report of the Committee.” 33. Again writ petition was taken up on 12.9.2008 on which date, this Court noted the request of G.B. Patnaik praying for grant of two month’s time to do the needful. vide order dated 12.9.2008, the Court allowed the request of two month’s time in following words : “Sri G.B. Patnayak had made a request to us to grant two months time to make allotments. We allow the request and expect that proposed allotment will be carried out within a period of two months as requested by him.” 34. The draw of lots were held on 8.11.2008 i.e. within two months from 12.9.2008 and subsequently on 23.1.2009, writ petition No. 3274 of 2008 was dismissed as infructuous. The above sequence of events clearly indicate that draw of lots was to be conducted by two members committee appointed by Division Bench vide judgment dated 5.10.2005 and the request of the said committee for grant of two months’ time was accepted on 12.9.2008 in writ petition No. 3274 of 2008. Thus, subsequent to disposal of Civil Appeal by the apex Court on 22.11.2007 filed by Noida, it cannot be said that it is the Noida authority which deliberately delayed the draw of lots. Thus, subsequent to disposal of Civil Appeal by the apex Court on 22.11.2007 filed by Noida, it cannot be said that it is the Noida authority which deliberately delayed the draw of lots. The draw of lots was not to be held by officials of Noida authority and the draw of lots was to be held under the supervision of the committee appointed by Division Bench on 5.10.2005. There is neither any pleading nor any material on record to come to a conclusion that delay in holding the draw of lots was on account of deliberate laches by Noida authority. No allegation of malafide has been pleaded nor there is any material to that effect. 35. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner relied on the judgment in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1 and on the judgment in the case of Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd and others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and others, (1997) 5 SCC 772 . 36. In Shree Chamundi Mopeds (supra), the apex Court laid down that while considering the effect of interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge a distinction has to be made between the quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. It was held that order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order and it does not mean that said order has been wiped out from existence. The above judgment does not help the petitioner in the present case. In Kanoria Chemicals and Industries (supra) notification issued by U.P. State Electricity Board revising the rates of tariff was under challenge in the High Court by means of writ petition. Interim order was passed on 25.7.1990. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 1.3.1993. The Supreme Court held that after dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, consumer petitioners could not be relieved of their obligation to pay late payment surcharge for the period, the stay oder had remained operative. Interim order was passed on 25.7.1990. The writ petition was ultimately dismissed on 1.3.1993. The Supreme Court held that after dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, consumer petitioners could not be relieved of their obligation to pay late payment surcharge for the period, the stay oder had remained operative. The apex Court has further held that an order of stay granted pending disposal of writ petition comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the Court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the Court. 37. The learned counsel for the petitioner taking support from the above decision contended that Civil Appeals filed in the Supreme Court against Division Bench judgment dated 5.10.2005 having been dismissed on 22.11.2007 the petitioner (allottees) should have been at least relegated to the position as it was obtaining on the date of judgment i.e. 5.10.2005. It is true that in view of judgment dated 22.11.2007 of apex Court the judgment of High Court dated 5.10.2005 was to be implemented but implementation of judgment dated 5.10.2005 cannot mean that rates as on 5.10.2005 has only to be taken. Judgment dated 5.10.2005 had not directed for calculating the premium as on 5.10.2005 rather it had directed for fresh draw of lots by a Committee appointed by it. Apart from law laid down in Delhi Development Authority’s case (supra) the Apex Court, while deciding the Appeal of Deepak Sharma (Civil Appeal No. 6800-6801 of 2005) against the Division Bench judgment dated 5.10.2005 had held that draw of lots is only for the identification of the plots in conducting draw of lots, no indefeasible rights whatsoever has been accrued to the appellants. The present petitioners, who claim their rights on the basis Division Bench judgment dated 5.10.2005 are equally bound by the above dictum of the Supreme Court laid down while deciding appeal against the said judgment. 38. Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Kanpur Development Authority v. Smt. Sheela Devi and others etc., 2004 (1) AWC 739 (SC) : AIR 2004 SC 4000. 38. Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Kanpur Development Authority v. Smt. Sheela Devi and others etc., 2004 (1) AWC 739 (SC) : AIR 2004 SC 4000. The facts of the above case as noticed in the judgments were; three schemes were floated by Kanpur Development Authority in September, 1978 for allotment of flats for economically weaker Section Lower Income Group and Middle Income Group. Allotments on the basis of lottery was made on 25.10.1980. Middle Income Group were not allotted houses and their applications were kept pending for more than 18 years. Along with the applications under Middle Income Group, Kanpur Development Authority included the name of some more applicants after last date which gave rise to suit in the year 1981-82. The said suit was decreed and the applicants were directed to be allotted the flats. The Kanpur Development Authority instead of complying with the decree increased the cost of each house from 48000 to Rs. 2,08,000 by notification dated 24.12.1994. The writ petitions were filed challenging the increase of price. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that delay in allotting and delivery of possession was caused due to laches on the part of the Kanpur Development Authority. There was specific clause in the brochure mentioned about estimated cost of Rs. 48,000/- which can also exceed up to 10%. The Apex Court in above decision has approved the finding that the delay was caused by the Development Authority and although escalation could not exceed 10% as provided in the brochure but the escalation of more than four times was contrary to the contents of the own brochure of the Kanpur Development Authority. Thus, the judgment of the apex Court in Kanpur Development Authority was on its own facts where Kanpur Development Authority has delayed the allotment for 18 years and there was a specific clause permitting increase only up to 10%. 39. From the aforesaid discussions, it is found that no arbitrariness or malafide can be imputed on Noida authority for delay caused in holding the draw of lots on 8.11.2008 on the basis of which the petitioners can claim not to accept the increased rate of plots w.e.f. 1.5.2008. 40. 39. From the aforesaid discussions, it is found that no arbitrariness or malafide can be imputed on Noida authority for delay caused in holding the draw of lots on 8.11.2008 on the basis of which the petitioners can claim not to accept the increased rate of plots w.e.f. 1.5.2008. 40. Now comes the submission of the petitioners that no reason has been given for escalation of price and no development has been made on the spot. There being no development on the spot, the Noida authority is not entitled to escalate the price and the action of escalating the price is arbitrary and malafide. Replying the submission, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that fixation of price is in the domain of the Development Authority and this Court, while exercising the writ jurisdiction shall not enter into question of fixation of price by Noida authority. In price fixation, executive has wide discretion. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar and others v. Delhi Development Authority, (1980) 2 SCC 129 . 41. The note to clause 6 (i) of the brochure only refers to increase in the allotment rates by the Board of Noida authority. The increase by the Board of Noida authority on 28.3.2005, 17.7.2005 and 8.5.2005 has not been disputed as a fact. Copy of the said decisions have been brought on record, which clearly proves that Board of Noida has increased the price by aforesaid decisions. The submission is that no reason has been given in the resolution of the Board for increase of price, suffice it to say that the decisions on the aforesaid dates were decisions taken by the Board which have been brought on record and which resolutions mention increase in price. The above resolutions of the Board increasing the price has not been specifically challenged in any of the writ petitions. The fixation of price is in the domain of the Executive Authority and the apex Court has noticed in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar (supra) that the cost varies time-wise, place-wise, availability-wise and there is a wide discretion in the Executive Authority regarding fixation of price. Following was laid down by the apex Court in paragraph 9 : “...... The fixation of price is in the domain of the Executive Authority and the apex Court has noticed in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar (supra) that the cost varies time-wise, place-wise, availability-wise and there is a wide discretion in the Executive Authority regarding fixation of price. Following was laid down by the apex Court in paragraph 9 : “...... But to say that throughout its course of existence the Authority would be bound to offer flats income-group-wise according to the same price formula is to expect the Authority to ignore time, situation, location and other relevant factors which all enter the price structure. In price fixation execution has a wide discretion and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must be necessarily left to the government of the day to decide. The experts alone can work out the mechanics of price determination; Court can certainly not be expected to decide without the assistance of the experts (see Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India). In the leading judgment it has been observed that mechanics of price fixation have necessarily to be left to the executive and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class the processual basis of price fixation has to be accepted in the generality of cases, as valid........” 42. It is further relevant to note that in the brochure under the Scheme 2004 (1), the increase in the price has not been made dependent on development. The submission of the petitioners that since no development has been made over plots, the price cannot be increased, cannot be accepted. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Chief Administrator, Puda and another v. Shabnam Virk, (2006) 4 SCC 74 . Before the apex Court, the challenge was to the decision of the National Consumer Redressal Commission, New Delhi which held that reasons for price escalation of house was not proved or established. The respondent was entitled to get the house at the initial price. Before the apex Court, the challenge was to the decision of the National Consumer Redressal Commission, New Delhi which held that reasons for price escalation of house was not proved or established. The respondent was entitled to get the house at the initial price. In paragraph 2 of the judgment, the relevant clause has been quoted by the apex Court, which is as follows : “The price quoted is purely tentative and is based on the present cost of construction. It is likely to be revised on the higher side by the time houses are completed.” 43. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the apex Court rejected the submission that increase was possible only when there was increase in the cost of constructions. As laid down in the case of Premji Bhai Parmar (supra), there are several factors which determine the price including the time factor. 44. Sri M.C. Tripathi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel adopting the submissions made by Noida authority, has referred to the circle rates of 2004, 2007 and 2008 fixed by the Collector under the U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997. According to the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, the circle rate of Sector 44 in the year 2007 was fixed as Rs. 40,000/- and again in 2008, it was fixed as Rs. 40,000/-. Copy of the various orders passed by the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar have been placed by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. By order of Collector, circle rates were revised year-wise which are as follows : Year Rates 2004 ( w.e.f. 16.6.04) 12,500 per square meter 2005 15,500 per square meter 2006 (w.e.f. 1.7.2006) 25,000 per square meter 2007 (w.e.f. 20.8.2007) 40,000 per square meter 2008 (w.e.f. 1.9.2008) 40,000 per square meter 45. The circle rate as claimed by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel of plots of Sector 44 has not even been disputed by learned counsel for the petitioners. Thus, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that escalation of the price is arbitrary and malafide, cannot be accepted. 46. In view of the foregoing discussions, the petitioners have not made out any ground for grant of reliefs as claimed in the writ petition. The writ petitions lack merit and are dismissed. ————