JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By judgment and order, dated 20-12-2005, passed, in Sessions Case No. 2/2000, learned Addl. Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Yupia, has convicted the accused, Deepak Panyang, under Sections 302 and 379, IPC and sentenced him, for his conviction, under Section 302, IPC, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to suffer, for his conviction, under Section 379, IPC, rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. 2. A reference has accordingly been registered by the High Court in terms of the provisions of Section 30(1) of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences passed against him, the accused too has preferred an appeal, which has given rise to Criminal Appeal No. 2 (AP)/2006. As both - the reference as well as the appeal - have arisen out of the judgment and order, dated 20-12-2009, aforementioned, we propose to dispose of the reference as well as the appeal by this common judgment and order. 3. The prosecution case may, in brief, be described thus : (i) Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) hailed from Pasighat, but, being a teacher, at Higher Secondary School, Itanagar, she used to live with her daughter, Epi Jamoh (P.W. 1), at her allotted residential quarter in Sector-P, Itanagar. On 2-12-2002, Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) brought her daughter, Epi Jamoh (P.W. 1), to the house, at G. Sector, where the aunt of Epi (P.W. 1) used to live, and left P.W. 1 there, because Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) was to leave, on the following day (i.e. on 3-12-2002), for Pasighat and she, therefore, asked her daughter, Epi (P.W. 1), to remain at her aunt's house until she (Smt. K. P. Jamoh) returned to Itanagar from Pasighat. Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) had also told her daughter, Epi (P.W. 1), that she would telephone her (P.W. 1) from Pasighat. P.W. 3 is the aunt of P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 is son of P.W. 3. However, as no telephone call was received, P.W. 1 started making enquiry, on 4-12-2002, from her mother's friends. Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) had also told her daughter, Epi (P.W. 1), that she would telephone her (P.W. 1) from Pasighat. P.W. 3 is the aunt of P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 is son of P.W. 3. However, as no telephone call was received, P.W. 1 started making enquiry, on 4-12-2002, from her mother's friends. P.W. 1 called her relatives at Along and Pasighat, but was told that her mother had not reached there. P.W. 1, accompanied by P.W. 4, (at whose house P.W. 1 was staying), visited the residential quarter of her mother at Itanagar and found the house open, but the bedroom of her mother stood locked from outside. However, the TV, in the sitting room, was on. Seeing the TV switched on, P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 thought that Smt. K. P. Jamoh had gone to Pashighat after locking her bedroom from outside and that the accused, who used to stay at Smt. K. P. Jamoh's house, had gone somewhere nearby. On the following day, i.e. on 5-12-2002, P.W. 1 and P.W. 4, once again, (accompanied by P.W. 4's sister) came to Smt. K. P. Jamoh's house and found the house in the same condition in which they had found the house on the previous day. On making enquiry in the neighbourhood, P.W. 1 was told by one of her aunts, namely, Noshi, who used to reside opposite the quarter of Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased), that she had seen Deepak Panyang, i.e. the present accused-appellant taking away Smt. K. P. Jamoh's Maruti Zen, bearing registration No. AR-08-4556, in the early morning from the said quarter. The accused, who was not related to the said deceased, had started staying, temporarily, at the residential quarter of the deceased, for about two months prior to the incident and on the day P.W. 1 had left her mother's house on 2-12-2002, the accused was very much present at the said quarter. (ii) Having failed to trace out the whereabouts of her mother, P.W. 1, accompanied by her friend (P.W. 4), who is now her husband, came, on 6-12-2002, to the house of one David Wasi (P.W. 2), a friend of the accused, and told him that her mother's whereabouts were not known and the accused had been seen taking away her mother's vehicle. On coming to know from P.W. 1 that her mother's room stood locked from outside, David advised them to break open the lock. Accompanied by her present husband (P.W. 4) and David (P.W. 2), P.W. 1 came to her mother's residential quarter, which had two bed-rooms, one used to be occupied by her mother and the other one by P.W. 1 herself, whereas, the accused used to sleep in the sitting room. On breaking open the lock with a rod, they found Smt. K. P. Jamoh lying dead with deep cut injuries on her head and hands. P.W. 1 lodged written information about her mother's death at Itanagar Police Station. Ext. 1 is the FIR lodged by her in this regard. The police accordingly registered a case under Section 302 and 379, IPC against the accused as the suspect. During investigation, police visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the dead body and post-mortem examination was conducted. The police, being unable to trace out the whereabouts of the accused, gave, vide Ext. 6, wide publicity of the photograph of the accused informing the public that the police were looking for the accused in connection with the case aforementioned. (iii) As a matter of fact, according to the prosecution, the accused was a drug addict, he had picked up, sometime between the night of 2-12-2002 and 30-12-2002, a quarrel with Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased), killed her by giving several blows with a dao and left the house by driving away the vehicle of the deceased. The accused did not reveal his name at Bandardewa check-post. In drugged state of mind, the accused could not drive the vehicle properly and met with an accident after crossing Gohpur, in the district of Sonitpur, Assam. The accused left the vehicle at the place of accident, picked up a public bus and reached Tezpur and took a room at Hotel Dhruba. In the hotel, the accused happened to meet Narayan Tarafdar (P.W. 6), who owns a shop near the said hotel. During the course of their conversation, the accused informed P.W. 6 that he had sustained injuries, while driving his vehicle, somewhere, near Gohpur and that he had left the vehicle at the place of accident. In the hotel, the accused happened to meet Narayan Tarafdar (P.W. 6), who owns a shop near the said hotel. During the course of their conversation, the accused informed P.W. 6 that he had sustained injuries, while driving his vehicle, somewhere, near Gohpur and that he had left the vehicle at the place of accident. Out of curiosity, P.W. 6 asked him to show the R.C. Book of the vehicle and, though the accused produced the same, P.W. 6 noted that the name, in the R.C. Book, did not tally with the name of the accused. The accused, then, told P.W. 6 that the vehicle belonged to his brother-in-law and also told P.W. 6 that his brother-in-law would come. The accused expressed to P.W. 6 that he wanted to sell the vehicle, whereupon P.W. 6 accompanied the accused to the site of the accident and came to learn that the vehicle was lying near Bihali. Police Station. The accused took zimma of the vehicle from the said police station and brought the same to a nearby garage, belonging to P.W. 5 for repairing and left the vehicle there. P.W. 6 also accompanied the accused to the office of the District Transport Officer (in short, 'DTO') at Tezpur, but the DTO's office informed the accused that the presence of the owner of the vehicle would be necessary for transfer of ownership of the vehicle. Having come to know that the accused was staying at Dhruba Hotel, police came, arrested the accused and, then, seized the vehicle at the workshop of P.W. 5. 4. During the course of investigation, the accused made judicial confession and, on completion of investigation, the police laid charge-sheet under Sections 302/379, IPC against the accused. 5. During trial, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him under Sections 302and 379, IPC. 6. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether nine witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313, Cr. P.C. and in his examination aforementioned, the accused presented his version and what transpires from his version is as under: (a) On 1-12-2002, he went to purchase beer from Bank Tinali, at Itanagar, by driving the vehicle of the deceased and, after purchasing beer, he went to Naharlagun to buy S.P. Tablet (i.e. drug), but did not get S. P. Tablet and returned to Itanagar. On reaching the house, he found the room of the said deceased locked and thought that the deceased had gone to play cards, whereupon he switched on the Television and drank beer. Something around 4 a.m. he took the vehicle and proceeded towards Bandardewa to purchase S. P. Capsules and, having purchased S. P. Capsules from Bandardewa, he proceeded towards Rangapara to buy more S. P. Capsules, because he had Rs. 5,000/- with him, but he met with an accident due to overdose of S. P. Capsules. (b) The accused admits that before the incident, he had a quarrel with the said deceased, but maintained that the quarrel was just like a quarrel between a mother and son and that the said deceased had become angry, because the accused used her car. The accused further admits that he had tried to sell the vehicle, but he claims that he wanted to sell the vehicle so as to purchase a new one from Tezpur. The accused also admits that he was arrested by the police from a lodge at Balipara, Assam. The accused claims that one Adi boy told him (accused) that he (the accused) was wanted, in Arunachal Pradesh, in connection with a murder case. (c) According to the accused, having received the said information from the boy, the accused left for Rangapara and lived one day at Rangapara and next day morning, he went to Balipara, where he was arrested by police and he led the police to the garage, where he had kept the damaged vehicle for repairing. 7. The accused has also adduced evidence by examining himself as witness. Having found the accused guilty of the charges framed against him, the learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentences against him as mentioned hereinabove. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence passed against him, the accused has preferred the appeal as pointed out above. 8. We have heard Mr. M. Pertin, learned Counsel, for the appellant, and Mr. N. Lowang, learned Public Prosecutor, Arunachal Pradesh. 9. While considering the evidence on record, it needs to be noted that it is not in dispute that Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) hailed from Pasighat and as she is a teacher, she used to stay, in the residential quarter, allotted to her, at P-Sector, Itanagar. N. Lowang, learned Public Prosecutor, Arunachal Pradesh. 9. While considering the evidence on record, it needs to be noted that it is not in dispute that Smt. K. P. Jamoh (since deceased) hailed from Pasighat and as she is a teacher, she used to stay, in the residential quarter, allotted to her, at P-Sector, Itanagar. It has also not been in dispute that the accused is not related to the said deceased and that he had been, temporarily, staying with the said deceased for about two months prior to the death of Smt. K. P. Jamoh. 10. How Smt. K. P. Jamoh happened to die and who was, if any, responsible for her death are, now, the two pertinent questions. 11. Out quest for answer to the above questions brings us to the evidence of P.W. 1, the daughter of the said deceased. Accordingly to her evidence, on 2-12-2002, her mother brought her to the house of her aunty and left her there by asking her to stay until she (her mother) returned from Pasighat. While leaving her daughter, at her aunt's house, the said deceased told her that she would telephone her from Pasighat. However, as no telephone call was received from her mother, P.W. 1 started making enquiry from her mother's relatives and friends. P.W. 1 also made calls to her maternal grandfather's house, at Along, but came to know from Pasighat and Along that her mother had not reached there. P.W. 1, then, went to her mother's house but found that while the house was lying open, her mother's bedroom stood locked from outside. From enquiry in the neighbourhood, particularly, from her aunty, Noshi, who used to reside opposite the quarter of the said deceased, P.W. 1 came to learn that the accused had been seen taking away her mother's Maruti Zen in the morning hours. 12. P.W. 1 has deposed that the accused, who is not their relative, have been, temporarily, staying at their house from about two months prior to the incident. P.W. 1 has also deposed that on the day she was brought by her mother to her aunt's house, the accused was very much present at her mother's house. Having learnt that the accused had taken away the vehicle belonging to her mother, P.W. 1, accompanied by her friend (P.W. 4), who has, now, become her husband, started a search for the accused. Having learnt that the accused had taken away the vehicle belonging to her mother, P.W. 1, accompanied by her friend (P.W. 4), who has, now, become her husband, started a search for the accused. Her search brought her to the house of P.W. 2 (David Washi), a friend of the accused. On being informed that the accused had been seen taking away the vehicle and that her mother's room stood locked from outside, P.W. 2 advised P.W. 1 to break open the door of her mother's bedroom, whereupon P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 (Tai Cop) came to the house of the said deceased, which had two bedrooms, one of the bedrooms used to be occupied by the mother of P.W. 1 and the other one used to be in occupation of P.W. 1. The accused used to sleep in the sitting room. 13. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that on breaking open the door, they found her mother's dead-body, lying on the bed, with deep cut injuries at her hands and forehead. The four fingers of her left hand were chopped off and the wrist was cut. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 1 that her mother used to wear a gold ring in her left little finger. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 1 that she, immediately, reported the matter to the Police at Itanagar. The evidence on record also discloses that treating the said written information as FIR, a case was registered under Sections 302 and 379, IPC with the present appellant as the suspected accused. In her cross-examination, P.W. 1 has clarified that the relation between her mother and the accused was like mother and son and that she had not seen any quarrel between them. 14. What is, now, necessary to note is that the evidence of P.W. 1 has remained completely unchallenged and unshaken by the defence. In this regard, it also needs to be noted that Noshi, who is claimed by P.W. 1 to have told her that the accused had been seen taking away the vehicle, in the morning, has not been examined. What is, now, necessary to note is that the evidence of P.W. 1 has remained completely unchallenged and unshaken by the defence. In this regard, it also needs to be noted that Noshi, who is claimed by P.W. 1 to have told her that the accused had been seen taking away the vehicle, in the morning, has not been examined. The information, which P.W. 1 received from Noshi is relevant only to the extent that it was the information given by Noshi that made P.W. 1 worried as to why the accused had disappeared with her mother's vehicle and where her mother and the accused were. The question, as to whether Noshi had really seen the accused driving away the vehicle, is a question, which cannot, on the strength of the evidence of P.W. 1, be answered, in the affirmative, inasmuch as the evidence, given by P.W. 1 as to what Noshi had told her, is nothing but hearsay if the Court has to determine as to whether Noshi had really seen the accused driving away the vehicle. At any rate, so far as the evidence, given by P.W. 1 that Noshi had told her that the accused had been seen by her driving away the vehicle, is concerned, the said piece of evidence is relevant to the extent that such an information had been given by Noshi to P.W. 1; but, from the evidence of P.W. 1 it is not discernible as to whether the information, so given by Noshi, was or was not correct. 15. Even if, for a moment, we keep the said information, given by Noshi to P.W. 1, excluded from the purview of our consideration, the fact remains that it is the admitted case of the defence that the accused had taken away the vehicle belonging to the said deceased. 16. When we come to the evidence of P.W. 2, we notice that this witness has admitted that he used to go to the residential quarter of the said deceased, because the accused used to stay there and that both he and the accused were good friends. 16. When we come to the evidence of P.W. 2, we notice that this witness has admitted that he used to go to the residential quarter of the said deceased, because the accused used to stay there and that both he and the accused were good friends. P.W. 2 has deposed that on 6-12-2002, P.W. 1 and her husband (P.W. 4) came to his house at about 12 noon and told him that the mother of P.W. 1 and the accused were not at home and she (P.W. 1) enquired from P.W. 2 if the accused had come to P.W. 2, but P.W. 2 replied by saying that he had not been in touch with the accused for the last four-five days. P.W. 2 has also deposed that P.W. 1 told him that the vehicle was not at home and the door of the house was lying open. P.W. 2 has further deposed that he, accompanied by P.W. 1 and P.W. 4, came to the house of Smt. K. P. Jamoh, broke open the lock of the door, whereupon P.W. 1 went inside the room and cried out by saying, "mummy hai, mummy hai". It is also in the evidence of P.W. 2 that P.W. 1 started crying and told him that her mother was lying dead inside the room. In his cross-examination by the defence, P.W. 2 has admitted that he had stated before the police that the accused had informed him over phone that he had quarreled with aunty, i.e. the said deceased. 17. Broadly in tune with the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 is the evidence of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, being husband of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 being his mother. Both these witnesses have deposed that the mother of P.W. 1 had left P.W. 1 at their house, while leaving for Pasighat, on 2-12-2002. On 3-12-2002, when no information was received from her mother, P.W. 1 made telephone calls to Pasighat and Along and came to learn from her relatives that her mother had not reached there. Both these witnesses have deposed that the mother of P.W. 1 had left P.W. 1 at their house, while leaving for Pasighat, on 2-12-2002. On 3-12-2002, when no information was received from her mother, P.W. 1 made telephone calls to Pasighat and Along and came to learn from her relatives that her mother had not reached there. It is in the evidence of P.W. 4, that, accompanied by P.W. 1, he (P.W. 4) came to the quarter of the mother of P.W. 1 and found that both the doors of the house lying open, but the bedroom of the said deceased was locked and the television, which was lying in the sitting room, was on. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 4 that they thought, on seeing the TV on, that the said deceased had gone to Pasighat and the accused must be nearby and, that is why, the bedroom of the deceased was locked. Thereafter, they left and, on the next day, he (P.W. 4) accompanied by his sister and P.W. 1, came back to the said house and found the house in the same state in which they had seen the house on the previous day. P.W. 4 has also deposed that on 6-12-2002, he, (P.W. 4), accompanied by P.W. 1 and P.W. 2, came to the house of his mother-in-law and, on breaking open the door, P.W. 1 went inside the room, came out running holding her head and sat outside. P.W. 4 has further deposed that he and P.W. 1, then, went to the police station, informed the police and, on coming back to the house, he saw the dead body of his mother-in-law with incised wound on her head and hands and that her hair had fallen on the floor. 18. When we turn to the evidence of P.W. 8 (the doctor), who had conducted post-mortem examination on the said dead-body. We notice that according to her evidence, she conducted post-mortem examination on the dead-body of K. P. Jamoh, on 7-12-2002, at 11.00 a.m. Ext. 13 has been proved as the post-mortem report. The post-mortem, conducted by her, revealed as follows: 1. Four major incised wound, one on the right palm almost chopped - 5" x 2". 2. One in the left wrist - 3" x 4" depth. 3. Scalp head injury left frontal 5" x 4" depth. 13 has been proved as the post-mortem report. The post-mortem, conducted by her, revealed as follows: 1. Four major incised wound, one on the right palm almost chopped - 5" x 2". 2. One in the left wrist - 3" x 4" depth. 3. Scalp head injury left frontal 5" x 4" depth. Parietal and left parietal bone on head 4" x 2". 19. According to P.W. 8, the wounds found on the said dead body were sufficient to cause death of a person. 20. In her cross-examination. P.W. 8 (doctor) has clarified that while conducting the post-mortem examination, slight smell was felt coming out, the dead body was about 2/3 days' old and the blood had dried. 21. From the evidence given by P.W. 8, it becomes clear that apart from the cut injuries received on left parietal bone by the said deceased, the deceased had sustained multiple incised wounds at her hands, particularly, wrist. 22. While considering the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, it needs to be noted that it has been pointed out, on behalf of the appellant, that according to the evidence of P.W. 4, there was no four smell around the house. This shows, according to the defence, that Smt. K. P. Jamoh might have been killed after the accused had left the house of the said deceased in the morning of 3-12-2002. While considering this aspect of the case, it needs to be noted that apart from the fact that there can be variety of reasons for which P.W. 4 might not have sensed foul smell, what is extremely important to note is the fact that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was alive, on 2-12-2002, is not in dispute inasmuch as she had, admittedly, left P.W. 1, on the night of 2-12-2002, at the house of P.W. 3 and told her daughter that, on the following day, she would leave for Pasighat. Since Smt. K. P. Jamoh was never seen alive by anyone thereafter, she did not go the Pasighat and her dead-body was found lying in her bed-room, as described above, with clotted blood, on the floor, are all indicative of the fact that she was killed in her bedroom. Since Smt. K. P. Jamoh was never seen alive by anyone thereafter, she did not go the Pasighat and her dead-body was found lying in her bed-room, as described above, with clotted blood, on the floor, are all indicative of the fact that she was killed in her bedroom. In such circumstances, there can be no doubt that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was put to death some time between 2-12-2002 night and the morning of 3-12-2002, because, according to the evidence given by the accused himself, he had left, finally, the house of the said deceased at about 3-30 a.m. on 3-12-2002. 23. The above discussion of the evidence on record brings us to the evidence of P.W. 6. According to his evidence, he has a shop near hotel Durba at Tezpur, and, one day, in the month of December, 2002, after opening his shop, at about 8 a.m. when he went to the said hotel to take tea, he saw the accused present there in injured condition. It is in the evidence on P.W. 6 that on humanitarian ground, when he asked the accused as to how he had sustained injury, the accused told him that he had sustained injuries, while driving Maruti Zen, somewhere, near Gohpur and had come to the hotel leaving the vehicle. P.W. 6 asked the accused to show him the RC Book and P.W. 6 noticed that there was variation in the name. According to P.W. 6, the accused told him that the vehicle actually belonged to his brother-in-law. It is in the evidence of P.W. 6 that the accused told him that his brother-in-law would come and he (the accused) expressed his desire to sell the vehicle, whereupon P.W. 6, accompanied by the accused and 3-4 others, went to the place of accident and found the vehicle lying near Behali Police Station. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 6 that the accused took zimma of the vehicle from Behali Police Station, brought the same to a garage for repairing and, handing over the vehicle, at the garage, the accused left. P.W. 6 has also deposed that he along with the accused went to the DTO's office, at Tezpur, and came to know from the DTO's office that the owner's presence was necessary to transfer the vehicle. 24. P.W. 6 has also deposed that he along with the accused went to the DTO's office, at Tezpur, and came to know from the DTO's office that the owner's presence was necessary to transfer the vehicle. 24. Close on the heels of the evidence of P.W. 6 is the evidence of P.W. 5, who owns a workshop, namely, Auto Engineering Works, at Tezpur. According to P.W. 5, the accused told him that his vehicle had met with an accident at Gohpur, whereupon he (P.W. 5) went along with the accused and one Narayan (P.W. 6) to the place of accident. The vehicle was found at the police station, the accused took the vehicle, but since it was not in the condition of being driven, the vehicle was brought to his garage for the purpose of repairing. The accused told P.W. 5 that his brother-in-law would come and, thereafter, the estimate would be prepared, but his brother-in-law did not appear; rather the accused was brought by police to his garage and, later on, he (P.W. 5) came to know that the vehicle was a stolen one. 25. The evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 have remained unshaken by the defence. When the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 is considered in the light of the evidence, given by P.W. 1 and P.W. 4, what becomes clear is that the Maruti Zen, which belonged to the said deceased, had met with an accident near Gohpur, and according to what the accused had told P.W. 5 and P.W. 6, the accused had come with the said vehicle to Gohpur and leaving the vehicle at the place of accident, he had reached Tezpur and stayed at hotel Dhruba. The accused told P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 that the vehicle belonged to his brother-in-law and he expressed his desire to sell the same. Since the DTO's office, Tezpur, informed that the presence of the owner would be necessary to transfer the vehicle, the accused could not sell the vehicle. 26. The accused told P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 that the vehicle belonged to his brother-in-law and he expressed his desire to sell the same. Since the DTO's office, Tezpur, informed that the presence of the owner would be necessary to transfer the vehicle, the accused could not sell the vehicle. 26. As far as the Investigating Officer (P.W. 9) is concerned, his evidence is that on the basis of the First Information Report, lodged, on 6-12-2002, by P.W. 1, a case was registered under Sections302/379, IPC and that he visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the dead-body, seized the bloodstains and hair found on the spot and a dao was also seized, the dao having been found by one Pissa Tame, on 3-12-2002, near the house of one Padi Richo, whose house is situated in front of the house of the deceased. 27. The Investigating Officer (P.W. 9) has also deposed that Ext. 6 is the notice, which was published. This notice (Ext. 6) shows that the notice was given to the effect that the police were looking for the accused in connection with the case aforementioned. 28. As regards the seized dao, we may hasten to point out that since there is no evidence on record to prove that the said dao was used as a weapon of offence, we have kept excluded from the purview of our consideration, the fact that the said dao was found and seized. This apart, there is no evidence that the said dao was used by the accused, particularly, when the Investigating Officer has himself deposed that he did not try to ascertain if the finger prints of the accused were available on the dao. Assigning the reason for not obtaining the fingerprints of the accused, the Investigating Officer has deposed that he did not take the fingerprints, because the dao already stood washed. 29. What is, however, relevant to note, in the evidence of P.W. 9, is that according to him, he received, on 8-1-2003, information that accused was staying at Balipara lodge, Balipara, in the district of Sonitpur, Assam, whereupon he, along with other police personnel, went to Balipara lodge, arrested the accused on 9-2-2003, recorded his disclosure statement (Ext. 7) and it was on the basis of the information, so given by the accused, that the stolen vehicle was seized from Auto Engineering Works, Tezpur. 30. 7) and it was on the basis of the information, so given by the accused, that the stolen vehicle was seized from Auto Engineering Works, Tezpur. 30. We have closely scrutinized the disclosure statement (Ext. 7) and we find that though prosecution has sought to establish from the said statement that the accused had tried to sell the vehicle for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- and P.W. 5 had offered to buy the same, at the said price subject to verification of the documents by the DTO, we find that these statements had not led the police to recover the said Maruti Zen and, hence, these statements are kept excluded by us from consideration. What is, however, relevant and admissible, in evidence, in the statement made by the accused, which reads, "I can lead the party to show, where the vehicle No. AR-8-4556 is kept." In fact, the fact that the accused had led the police to the garage of P.W. 5 from where the said vehicle was seized is not even disputed by the defence. 31. We, now, turn to the evidence of P.W. 7, a magistrate. According to the prosecution, P.W. 7 had recorded confessional statement (Ext. 4) of the accused. The voluntariness of the said statement has not been disputed by the defence. We must, however, point out that we cannot treat the said statement, recorded by P.W. 7, as confessional statement inasmuch as P.W. 7 has clearly replied, in response to the question put by the defence, at the trial, that the accused has told him that he had not killed Smt. K. P. Jamoh. 32. In view of the fact that in the statement, which has been recorded as the judicial confession of the appellant, the appellant has denied that he had killed Smt. K. P. Jamoh, the question, which naturally arises, is as to whether, in the face of such denial, the said statement could have been construed as confession. The second question is : if the said statement cannot be construed as confession, can a part of that statement be used as admission? The second question, so posed, brings us to a more important question and the question is as to whether it is possible to rely on a part of a confessional statement, while rejecting the another part of the same confessional statement. 33. The second question, so posed, brings us to a more important question and the question is as to whether it is possible to rely on a part of a confessional statement, while rejecting the another part of the same confessional statement. 33. Above all, when an accused denies to have committed the offence charged with, but, while making such a denial, admits certain incriminating facts, and if the facts, so admitted by the accused, suggest inference of his guilt or gives rise to inference of his guilt, whether such a statement can amount to confession and, if not, whether the admissions, made, in such a confessional statement, can be used against the accused? Yet another equally important question is as to whether, while rejecting a confessional statement made by an accused, in police custody, to a person, other than a police officer, is it possible for the Court to rely on a part of such confessional statement, which may amount to admission of certain incriminating facts ? 34. What, then, is admission? Whether an admission of a person is admissible only in a civil proceeding or in a criminal proceeding too ? 35. Admission is defined by Section 17 of the Evidence Act as a statement, oral or documentary, or contained in electronic form, which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances as specified in Sections 18, 19, 20and 21. 36. A close reading of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Evidence Act clearly shows that the admissions made in various circumstances, as envisaged by Sections 18, 19 and 20, are admissible in suits or proceedings of civil or quasi-civil nature. Sections 22, 23 and 24 stipulates the circumstances where admission may not be allowed to be to brought into evidence. That leaves us with Section 21, which reads as under: Section 21. Sections 22, 23 and 24 stipulates the circumstances where admission may not be allowed to be to brought into evidence. That leaves us with Section 21, which reads as under: Section 21. Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf .- Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest, but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following cases: (1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons under Section 32. (2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable. (3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission. 37. A close and patient examination of the provisions, contained in Section 21, clearly shows that though an admission cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person, who makes the admission, except in the cases as specified in Section 21, yet an admission is relevant and may be proved against a person, who makes it. There is nothing, in Section 21, indicating that Section 21 applies to civil proceedings only. Far from this, the illustrations, given in Section 21, make it more than abundantly clear that these illustrations are in the realm of criminal law and not necessarily confined to civil law. The illustrations read as under: (a) The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged. The illustrations read as under: (a) The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged. A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B may prove a statement by A that the deed is forged; but A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine, or can B prove a statement by himself that the deed is forged. (b) A, the captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away. Evidence is given to show that the ship was taken out of her proper course. A produce a book kept by him in the ordinary course of his business showing observations alleged to have been taken by him from day to day and indicating that the ship was not taken out of her proper course. A may prove these statements, because they would be admissible between third parties, if he were dead, under Section 32 Clause (2). (c) A is accused of a crime committed by him at Calcutta. He produces a letter written by himself and dated at Lahore on that day, and bearing the Lahore post-mark of that day. The statement in the date of the letter is admissible, because, if A were dead, it would be admissible under Section 32, Clause (2). (d) A is accused of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen. He offers to prove that he refused to sell them below their value. A may prove these statements, though they are admissions, because they are explanatory or conduct influenced by facts in issue. (e) A is accused of fraudulently having in his possession counterfeit coin which he knew to be counterfeit. He offers to prove that he asked a skilful person to examine the coin as he doubted whether it is counterfeit or not, and that person did examine it and told him it was genuine. A may prove these facts for the reasons stated in the last preceding illustration. 38. A close examination of the illustrations, as given in Section 21, makes it more than abundantly clear that an admission of a fact can be used against the maker even in criminal law. 39. Let me, now, turn to the question as to what is 'confession' and how does 'admission' differ from 'confession ? 38. A close examination of the illustrations, as given in Section 21, makes it more than abundantly clear that an admission of a fact can be used against the maker even in criminal law. 39. Let me, now, turn to the question as to what is 'confession' and how does 'admission' differ from 'confession ? 40. The Evidence Act does not define confession. Stephen, in his Digest on the Law of Evidence, defines confession as an admission made, at any time, by a person charged with crime or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. Straight, J. in R. v. Jagrup reported in (1885) ILR 7 All 646, and Chandawarkar, J. in R. V. Santya Bandhu reported in (1902) 4 Bom LR 633, did not, however, accept such a wide definition and gave a narrower meaning to the expression 'confession' by holding that only a statement, which was a direct acknowledgment of guilt, would amount to 'confession' and that a 'confession' would not include merely inculpatory admissions, which fall short of being admission of guilt. The controversy, as to what 'confession' means, came to be, eventually, resolved and settled, way back in 1939, by the Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47). The Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), explained as to what 'confession' means but, did not, strictly speaking, follow Stephen's definition of confession that 'admission' of facts, made by an accused, suggesting an inference that he had committed the crime, is confession. The Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), laid down that no statement, containing self-exculpatory matter, would amount to confession if the exculpatory statement was of some facts, which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to have been confessed. It was further pointed out, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), that the word 'confession' as used in Evidence Act cannot be construed as meaning "a statement by an accused 'suggesting the inference that he committed' the crime." 41. In its often quoted passage, defining confession, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), Lord Atkin stated thus: Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the office. In its often quoted passage, defining confession, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), Lord Atkin stated thus: Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the office. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g. an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused death with no explanation of any other man's possession. Some confusion appears to have been caused by the definition of confession in Article 22 of Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence which defines a confession as an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. If the surrounding articles are examined, it will be apparent that the learned author after dealing with admissions generally is applying himself to admissions in criminal cases and for this purpose defines confessions so as to cover all such admissions, in order to have a general term for use in the three following articles : confession secured by inducement, made upon oath, made under a promise of secrecy. The definition is not contained in the Evidence Act. 1872: and in that Act it would not be consistent with the natural use of language to construe confession as a statement by an accused "suggesting the inference that he committed" the crime. 42. From what has been defined as confession by the Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), it becomes clear that a statement cannot be confession unless it either admits, in terms, the offence or, at any rate, substantially all the facts, which constitute the offence. The definition, so given, in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), also makes it clear that admission of certain facts which suggests an inference that the maker of the admission has committed the crime charged with, will not be treated as confession. The Apex Court has consistently followed this definition of confession in its subsequent decisions in Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab ( AIR 1952 SC 354 ), Om Prakash v. State of U. P. (AIR 1959 SC 205), A Nagesia v. Bihar State ( AIR 1965 SC 79 ), and Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1964 SC 57). 43. 43. In Palvinder Kaur (supra), the statement, made by the accused, was that she had placed her husband's dead body in a trunk and had carried it in a jeep and thrown it into a well. But with regard to the cause of her husband's death, her statement was that her husband had accidentally taken a poisonous substance erroneously thinking that to be a medicine. The Supreme Court referred to Pakala Narayana Swami's case (supra), and the dictum of Lord Atkin, held that a statement, which contained self-exculpatory matter would not amount to a 'confession' if the exculpatory matter is of some fact, which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. The Court also added that a statement, to be a 'confession' must either admit, in terms, the offence or, at any rate, substantially, all the facts, which constitute the offence and that an admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not, of itself, a confession. 44. From the definition of confession, as given in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), it becomes clear, as already indicated above, that unless an accused admits, in terms, the offence or, substantially, all the facts, which constitute the offence, such a statement will not amount to confession. In other words, if an accused does not own up his guilt or does not admit, substantially, all the facts, which constitute the offence, then admission of such facts, which may give rise to an inference that he has committed the crime, will not be treated as confession. 45. However, the admission, made in such a statement which does not amount to confession, may, nevertheless, be admissible, under Section 21 of the Evidence Act, against an accused depending, of course, on the facts of given case, for, Section 21 permits such admission to be proved and the embargo, placed by Section 26, which prohibits confession, made by a person, "whilst he is in custody of a police officer" from being admitted into evidence, will not be attracted. The contours of Section 21 are not bounded by the limitations of the person being in the custody of the police officer. The contours of Section 21 are not bounded by the limitations of the person being in the custody of the police officer. If an admission, made by an accused, while in the custody of police, to a person, other than police officer, amounts to confession, such admission would transgress into forbidden area of confession and would not be admissible under Section 26; but if such admissions are short of confession, such admissions would be admissible against the maker. One may, in this regard, refer to the case of Faddi v. Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1964 SC 57), the appellant lodged a first information report and, based on this information, the dead body of his step son was recovered and three persons were arrested. As a result of the investigation, however, the appellant was arrested, was sent up for trial, which resulted in his conviction and a sentence of death. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended that the first information report ought not to have been admitted, because of Section 25of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This contention was turned down on the ground that neither of the two provisions barred admissibility of the first information report as that report was only an admission by the appellant of certain facts, which had a bearing on the question as to how and by whom the murder was committed and whether the statement of the appellant, in the Court, denying the evidence of certain prosecution witnesses was correct or not. Such admissions, held the Supreme Court, in Faddi (supra), were admissible under Section 21 of the Evidence Act and, as such, could be proved against the accused. 46. From the decision, in Faddi (supra), what becomes transparent, as already indicated above, is that when a statement, made by an accused, not being a direct acknowledgment of guilt, or not being admission of the facts, which constitute the offence charged with, can, nevertheless, be admissible in evidence, as admission, by virtue of Section 21 of the Evidence Act and can be proved against the accused. 47. 47. Clarifying the position of law with regard to the question as to whether a confession, which falls short of an actual admission of guilt, may be used as evidence against the maker, under Section 21, the Supreme Court, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. C. Shukla ( AIR 1998 SC 1406 ) ; (1998 Cri LJ 1905), observed and held as under: 45. It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct acknowledgment of guilt is a confession but when a confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may nevertheless be used as evidence against the person who made it or his authorised agent as an 'admission' under Section 21. The law in this regard has been clearly and - in our considered view - correctly explained in Monir's Law of Evidence (New Edition at pages 205 and 206), on which Mr. Jethmalani relied to bring home his contention that even if the entries are treated as 'admission' of Jains still they cannot be used against Shri Advani. The relevant passage reads as under :- "the distinction between admissions and confessions is of considerable importance for two reasons. Firstly, a statement made by an accused person, if it is an admission, is admissible in evidence under Section 21 of the Evidence Act, unless the statement amounts to a confession and was made to a person in authority in consequence of some improper inducement threat or promise, or was made to Police Officer, or was made at a time when the accused was in the custody of Police Officer. If a statement was made by the accused in the circumstances just mentioned, its admissibility will depend upon the determination of the question whether it does not amount to a confession. If it amounts to a confession, it will be inadmissible, but if it does not amount to a confession, it will be admissible under Section 21 of the Act as an admission, provided that it suggest an inference as to a fact which is in issue in or relevant to. the case and was not made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is admissible against others who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a confession. the case and was not made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, a statement made by an accused person is admissible against others who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a confession. Where the statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible only against its maker as an admission and not against those who are being jointly tried with him. Therefore, from the point of view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act also the distinction between an admission and a confession is of fundamental importance. 48. In Kanda Padayachi v. State of Tamil Nadu ( AIR 1972 SC 66 ), the question was admissibility of a statement, which had been made by the accused, while he was in the police custody, to a doctor regarding some minor injuries found on his person. The accused had stated to the doctor, while in the police custody, that it was the deceased, who, at about midnight, on July, 10, 1969, had caused injury by biting him. The Supreme Court, referring to the case of Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), held, in Kanda Padayachi (supra), that the said statement amounted to only an admission of fact, however, incriminating, but since the said statement did not, by itself, establish the guilt of the maker of such admission, the statement would not amount to confession within the meaning of Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court makes it clear, in Kanda Padayachi (supra), that the admissibility of an admission, which does not amount to confession, is not barred and cannot be questioned under Section 26 and that such admission is admissible in evidence and can be relied upon as an admission under Section 21. 49. We may pause here to point out that Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') makes provisions for examination of witnesses by the police during investigation. There is no specific provision in the Code providing for examination of an accused person. Should it, therefore, mean that an accused cannot be examined by a police officer? There is no specific provision in the Code providing for examination of an accused person. Should it, therefore, mean that an accused cannot be examined by a police officer? While answering the question, so posed, it needs to be borne in mind that though the heading of Section161 reads, "Examination of witnesses by police", the provisions, contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 161, clearly state that 'a police officer may, during investigation, examine, orally, any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case'. The language, used in Sub-section (1) of Section 161, thus, refers to "any person" and does not used the expression "any witness". It, therefore, logically, follows that the expression "any person" occurring in Section 161, would include not only witnesses but also an accused, for, an accused would also be a person, who is 'supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case'. 50. What is, now, necessary to point is that Section 162 of the Code provides that a statement, made to a police officer, and recorded by him, under Section 161, is inadmissible in evidence except for the purpose of contradicting the maker of the statement, when he appears, as a witness, at the trial. What is of utmost importance to note, in this regard, is that when the maker of a such statement, as described in Sub-section (1) of Section 162, dies, or when such a statement relates to the cause of death or to any of the circumstances of the transaction, which resulted in his death, in the cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, or, when such a statement leads to the discovery of a fact, as provided in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, such statements, according to Sub-section (2) of Section 162, should not be treated as a statement, which Sub-section (1) of Section 162 make inadmissible in evidence. Thus, a statement of an accused, recorded under Section 161, shall, according to Section 162(2), be admissible in evidence if the statement leads to discovery of a fact. The provisions, so made in Section 162(2), fortify the conclusion that Sub-section (1) of Section 161 covers examination of an accused. 51. Thus, a statement of an accused, recorded under Section 161, shall, according to Section 162(2), be admissible in evidence if the statement leads to discovery of a fact. The provisions, so made in Section 162(2), fortify the conclusion that Sub-section (1) of Section 161 covers examination of an accused. 51. What is, now imperative to note is that since a statement of an accused, recorded by a police officer, during investigation, under Section 161, is, in the light of the provisions of Section 162, not admissible unless the statement, in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, leads to discovery of a fact, the question is whether an admission made, by an accused, of an incriminating fact, to a police officer, when such statement is not covered by Section 161, (i.e. when the statement containing 'admission' has not been made during investigation) be not barred under the law ? While considering this aspect of the case, it needs to be noted that while Section 25 makes a 'confession' made to a police officer, under any situation, completely barred from being admitted into evidence, no such bar is imposed on statement(s) of an accused, which may amount to 'admission' of some incriminating fact, which does not amount to 'confession'. Necessarily, therefore, when a statement is made by an accused to a police officer and when such a statement, though amounts to admission, is not covered by Section 161, such a statement, of even an incriminating fact, would be admissible in evidence provided that the statement does not, if we may reiterate, fall within the meaning of Section 161(1) read with Section 162(1). 52. Thus, when a statement falls short of a plenary acknowledgment of guilt, it would not be a confession, even though the statement is in respect of some incriminating facts, which taken, along with other evidence, tends to prove the guilt of the accused. However, such a statement would, indeed, be admission. 53. The statement made by an accused to the doctor as to how he had sustained injuries or as regards the cause of injury was nothing, but certain admissions made by the accused. Such admissions were held to be admissions under Section 21. However, such a statement would, indeed, be admission. 53. The statement made by an accused to the doctor as to how he had sustained injuries or as regards the cause of injury was nothing, but certain admissions made by the accused. Such admissions were held to be admissions under Section 21. Thus, when a statement amounts to confession, such admissions will not be admissible in evidence if at the time when such admissions were made, the accused was in police custody; but if such admissions do not amount to confession, the admissions would be admissible in evidence, under Section 21, against the accused even if he, at the relevant point of time, was in the custody of police (See Kanda Padayachi v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1972 SC 66 ). The relevant observations made, in Kanda Padayachi (supra), read as under: 14. ...it is clear that the statement in question did not amount to a confession. It was an admission of a fact, no doubt, of an incriminating fact and which established the presence of the appellant in the deceased's room but which clearly was not barred under Section 26. The Sessions Judge and the High Court were, therefore, right in holding it to be admissible and in relying upon it. In this view, counsel's second contention also fails and has to be rejected. 54. Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1969 SC 422 ) is a Constitution Bench decision on the controversy as to whether a Court can admit a part of a statement, made by an accused, as admission and reject the other part, for, the argument, advanced in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), was whether the statement, allegedly made by the accused and recorded by the village Mukhiya (village headman), before the accused was handed over to the police, was admissible in evidence; and, if so, whether the Court could reject a part of such statement as unbelievable and rely, on the remainder part, along with the other evidence on record, to hold the accused guilty of the offence charged with. The question, posed in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), therefore, as indicated by the Constitution Bench, were : "Whether the statement of the appellant recorded by a village Mukhiya before he was handed over to the police is admissible in evidence, and if so, whether the Court could reject a part thereof and rely on the remainder along with other evidence adduced to hold him guilty of an offence he is charged with?" 55. In Nishi Kant Jha (supra), the evidence against the appellant was, as in the present case, substantially circumstantial in nature. This apart, in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), the case was such that if the statement made before the Mukhiya was held inadmissible in evidence, the appellant could not have been held guilty. In Nishi Kant Jha (supra), the High Court had culled out the following incriminating circumstances against the accused: 10. On the evidence the High Court found that the train had left Jasidih at 3.23 p.m. its next halt being Madhupur where it reached at 3-52 p.m. The door of the first class compartment was found closed at Jasidih and could not be opened. In the view of the High Court the murder was committed in the lavatory of the first class compartment between Jasidih and Madhupur. On a close scrutiny of the evidence adduced, the High Court found the following incriminating circumstances against the appellant: (a) Only about two hours after the murder i.e. between 5 to 6 p.m. he was seen washing his blood stained clothes on the bank of the river Patro. (b) At the time of his apprehension by Ram Kishore Pandey and others he was holding blood-stained exercise books and other books some of the pages being blood-stained. (c) He also had with him at that time a knife the length of the blade and the handle of which was about 9". (d) According to the medical evidence the injuries of the victim could have been caused by that knife which was in the possession of the appellant. One of the horizontal incised injuries i.e. injury No. 6, was 5" x 2" x 3/4". (e) The left hand of the respondent was noticed with a cut injury at the bank of the said river. The marks of other injuries on the body of the appellant were compatible with a scuffle with the victim in the compartment of the train. (e) The left hand of the respondent was noticed with a cut injury at the bank of the said river. The marks of other injuries on the body of the appellant were compatible with a scuffle with the victim in the compartment of the train. (f) The explanation of the appellant with regard to the possession of blood-stained clothes and articles and the injury on his body was not acceptable. 56. Taking note of the circumstances appearing against the appellant, in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), the Supreme Court observed: 11. In the light of the above incriminating circumstances culled from the evidence, the acceptance of the statement of the appellant in Ex. 6 that he had travelled together with an unknown person, later identified as the victim Jai Prakash Dubey in the same compartment would be conclusive to prove the guilt of the appellant if his further statement in Ex. 6 about the part played by Lal Mohan Sharma be rejected. The* appellant had admitted his presence on the scene of the murder, but it was his version that the crime was committed by someone else while he himself was a helpless spectator. When the assailant jumped off the train he followed suit (sic) being apprehensive of arrest on the charge of murdering the unknown person. He had done so near the river Patro. Some portions of the statement were not found to be acceptably, It is not possible to believe that if Lal Mohan Sharma wanted to commit the murder he would prevent the appellant from getting off the train at Jasidih so as to have a witness who knew his name and address and testify to his commission of the crime. Lal Mohan Sharma was not in the train at Jhajha and no details were given about any quarrel between him and the victim which might lead the former to make the attack on Jai Prakash. Apparently there is no motive for Lal Mohan Sharma's commission of the crime. Again it is not possible to believe that Lal Mohan Sharma should not have tried to do away with the appellant also. The version of the appellant receiving the injury on his left hand in the railway compartment was also unbelievable. So was his story of a scuffle with the herdsman and cutting his hand as a result thereof. Again it is not possible to believe that Lal Mohan Sharma should not have tried to do away with the appellant also. The version of the appellant receiving the injury on his left hand in the railway compartment was also unbelievable. So was his story of a scuffle with the herdsman and cutting his hand as a result thereof. The cause of the herdsman abusing the appellant and his remonstrance followed by an attack on his person all appear to be imaginary. The only incised injury which the appellant had suffered was skin deep and it is impossible to accept the story that the bleeding was so profuse as to have necessitated his washing his shirt and trousers in the river. Nor does such an injury account for the other articles like his belt, shoes and books being stained with blood which was sought to be removed by washing. 57. It was urged before the Supreme Court that if the statement made by appellant, Nishi Kant Jha (supra), is to be considered at all, it must be taken either as a whole or not at all; and that the Court could not have acted upon a portion of the statement, while rejecting the other portions. In Nishi Kant Jha (supra), if the statement, made by the appellant, was taken into account, as a whole, it would have revealed that he was not the person, who had killed Jai Prakash Dubey, and, hence, in such a situation, it was contended that it was not open to the Court not to believe that part of the statement made by the accused, which was to the effect that Jai Prakash was killed by an unknown assailant, and, at the same time, believe the statement of the accused that he was present in the railway compartment, when Jai Prakash was put to death. The contention of the appellant, as noted by the Supreme Court, appears at para 15, which reads: 15. In Roscoe's book on Criminal Evidence (16th Edition, page 52), the statement of law is much to the same effect. The contention of the appellant, as noted by the Supreme Court, appears at para 15, which reads: 15. In Roscoe's book on Criminal Evidence (16th Edition, page 52), the statement of law is much to the same effect. Roscoe also cites a decision in Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car & 221 where the confession of the prisoner charged with murder that he was present at the murder but that it was committed by another person and that he took no part in it, was left to be considered by the jury with a direction that the jury might, if they thought proper, believe one part of it and disbelieve another. According to Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Thirty-sixth Edition, page 423): In all cases the whole of the confession should be given in evidence; for it is general rule that the whole of the account which a party gives of a transaction must be taken together; and his admission of a fact disadvantageous to himself shall not be received, without receiving at the same time his contemporaneous assertion of a fact favourable to him, not merely as evidence that he had made such assertion, but admissible evidence of the matter thus alleged by him in his discharge.... It has been said that if there be no other evidence in the case, or none which is incompatible with the confession, it must be taken as true: but the better opinion seems to be that, as in the case of all other evidence, the whole should be left to the jury, to say whether the facts asserted by the prisoner in his favour be true. 58. Having analysed the facts of the case and also the various decisions relevant thereto, the Court concluded at para 23 as under: 23. In this case the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury which the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342, Cr. P.C. to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342, Cr. P.C. to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13th October 1961 negatives both these versions. Neither of these version accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in the river Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, P.W. 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood as also his books, his exercise book and his belt and shoes. More than that the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6. The High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piecing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime. 59. From what have been observed and held above by the Apex Court, in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), it becomes clear that when a statement, made by an accused, has both inculpatory as well as exculpatory parts and when the Court, in such a case, finds the exculpatory part inherently improbable or when the exculpatory part is contradicted or belied by the other evidence on record, there is no impediment, in law, for the Court to reject the exculpatory part and rely upon the inculpatory part. This apart, what the decision, in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), further makes clear is that if such inculpatory part, combined with other pieces of evidence on record or statement of the accused made under Section 313, Cr. P.C. proves that the accused was the author of the crime, there is no impediment, in law, in convicting the accused in such a case. 60. P.C. proves that the accused was the author of the crime, there is no impediment, in law, in convicting the accused in such a case. 60. In Bhagwan Singh Rana v. State of Haryana AIR 1976 SC 1797 it was contended before the Supreme Court that the Courts below erred in accepting those parts of the statement of the appellant in Exhibits PB and PC, which were inculpatory and in rejecting those parts, which were exculpatory, and that this approach was incorrect inasmuch as the requirement of the law, it was contended, is that such statements should either be accepted, as a whole, or not at all. 61. Referring to the decision, in Nishi Kant Jha (supra), the Supreme Court, in Bhagwan Singh Rana (supra), held, once again, that it is open to the Court to reject the exculpatory part and take the inculpatory part of a statement made by an accused, if there is other evidence to prove the exculpatory part incorrect. An examination of Exhibit PB and PC shows, points out the Supreme Court, in Bhagwan Singh Rana (supra), that the appellant admitted that he was working as Sub-Post Master, when P.W. 5 came to the post office and delivered a parcel under postal certificate. In his presence, the parcel was opened by Taj Ram and that he (Taj Ram) took out a lady's wrist watch from the parcel and gives it to the appellant. This admission, made by the appellant, was treated as admissible in evidence. 62. In Keshoram Bora v. State of Assam, ( AIR 1978 SC 1096 ), there was an admission by the accused that he did assault the deceased with a sharp-cutting weapon, which is called 'holonga', and as a result of such assault, the deceased fell down. The justification, offered by the accused, for assaulting the deceased was that he had assaulted the deceased in order to protect his ploughman from being attacked with a dao. The Supreme Court found that the accused did not dispute the fact that he had fatally assaulted the deceased; but what the accused had pleaded was self-defence. The Supreme Court held that in such a case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, shall be judged in the light of the admission made by the accused. 63. The Supreme Court found that the accused did not dispute the fact that he had fatally assaulted the deceased; but what the accused had pleaded was self-defence. The Supreme Court held that in such a case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, shall be judged in the light of the admission made by the accused. 63. In Keshoram Bora (supra), too it was submitted before the Court that it was not open to the Court to take the inculpatory part into consideration and reject the exculpatory part. It was, therefore, submitted, before the Supreme Court, that an admission can be taken either as a whole or not at all. The Supreme Court, referring to Nishi Kant Jha (supra), pointed out that the law stands well-settled that where a confession or admission is separable, there can be no objection to the taking of one part into consideration, which transpires to be true, and reject the other part, which transpires to be false. 64. What crystallises from the above discussion is that a statement cannot be a 'confession' and cannot be treated to be a 'confession' unless the accused confesses to have committed the crime, which he is alleged to have committed, or unless he admits all such facts, which constitute the offence. While confession made by an accused, who is in police custody, to a police officer or while 'confession' made by an accused to any person is inadmissible in evidence if, at the time of making 'confession', the accused was in the custody of a police officer unless the 'confession' is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, such 'confession' is not admissible, the 'admission' made by such an accused, who is in police custody, to a person, other than a police officer, would nevertheless be admissible, if voluntarily made, however incriminating the 'admission' of the accused may be. When a statement, treated as a confessional statement, contains both exculpatory as well as inculpatory statements, it is possible for the Court to reject exculpatory parts of such a confessional statement, which stands belied by the other evidence on record, and rely upon that inculpatory part of the confessional statement, which is proved to be true by the evidence on record. 65. What follows from the above discussion is that the since the accused has, while making the statement (Ext. 65. What follows from the above discussion is that the since the accused has, while making the statement (Ext. 4), which has been treated as confessional statement, had denied to have killed Smt. K. P. Jamoh, the statements, contained in Ext. 4 cannot be treated as confessional statement. However, the admissions made therein are nevertheless admissible in evidence if such admitted facts, in the light of the other evidence on record, can bring one to conclude, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused had intentionally put to death Smt. K. P. Jamoh, there would be no impediment, in law, in founding conviction of the accused on such evidence on a charge of murder. 65A. We, now, turn to yet another question and the question is this : Whether the law permits using of admissions or confessions made by an accused, during the course of his examination, under Section 313, Cr. P.C. and if so, how and to what extent. 66. While considering the scope and value of a statement made by an accused under Section 313, Cr. P.C. what needs to be pointed out is that under Section 313(1)(a), Cr. P.C. a trial Judge is empowered to put any question to an accused at any stage of the trial; but at the end of the trial, it is, under Section 313(1)(b), mandatory for the trial Judge to put to the accused, facing trial, every such piece of evidence, which appears to be incriminating against the accused, and reply of the accused shall be sought thereto. In fact, Section 313, Cr. P.C. aims at enabling an accused to personally explain circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Examination of an accused, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. is, therefore, not an empty formality, but a solemn act of every trial Court. 67. As observed by the Apex Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 2100 ) : (1992 Cri LJ 3454), Section 313, Cr. P.C. is a statutory provision, which embodies the fundamental principle of a fair trial based on the maxim audi alteram partem, that attention of the accused must be specifically invited to inculpatory pieces of evidence or circumstances, laid on record, with a view to giving the accused an opportunity to offer his explanation if he chooses to do so. 68. P.C. is a statutory provision, which embodies the fundamental principle of a fair trial based on the maxim audi alteram partem, that attention of the accused must be specifically invited to inculpatory pieces of evidence or circumstances, laid on record, with a view to giving the accused an opportunity to offer his explanation if he chooses to do so. 68. As a matter of fact, as indicated in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. not only casts a solemn duty on the trial Court to elicit the response of the accused to every piece of incriminating circumstance, which may appear against him, but also confers a corresponding right on the accused to receive an opportunity so that he can offer his explanation, if he has any, with regard to such incriminating materials or circumstances as may be appearing against him from the evidence on record. Examination of the accused under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. is reached after the witnesses of the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called on to enter upon his defence. At the stage of closure of prosecution's evidence and before recording statement of the accused under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. the trial Judge is not expected to evaluate the evidence for the purpose of deciding whether or not he should question the accused. 69. Before an accused is examined under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. the trial Judge is not expected to sift the evidence and pronounce whether or not he would accept the evidence regarding any incriminating material against the accused to determine whether or not he would examine the accused on that material. To do so, points out the Apex Court, in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), would amount to pre-judging the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314, Cr. P.C. No wonder, therefore, that the Supreme Court, in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), has observed that however weak or scanty the prosecution evidence may be with regard to an incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereto. It is only after that stage is over that the oral arguments have to be heard before the judgment is rendered and it is only where the Court finds that no incriminating material has surfaced that the accused may not be examined under Section 313. It is only after that stage is over that the oral arguments have to be heard before the judgment is rendered and it is only where the Court finds that no incriminating material has surfaced that the accused may not be examined under Section 313. In short, if there is material against the accused, he must be examined, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. however, weak or scanty the evidence against the accused may be. The relevant observations read as follows: To do so would be to pre-judge the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 of the Code. Therefore, no matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to a certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereon. It is only after that stage is over that the oral arguments have to be heard before the judgment is rendered. It is only where the Court finds that no incriminating material has surfaced that the accused may not be examined under Section 313 of the Code. If there is material against the accused he must be examined. In the instant case it is not correct to say that no incriminating material had surfaced against the accused, particularly accused 5, and hence the learned trial Judge was not justified in examining the accused under Section 313 of the Code. (Emphasis is added) 70. What emerges from the above discussion is that when the prosecution's evidence is closed, it is imperative, on the part of the trial Judge, to examine the accused under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. In such examination, the Judge has the duty to put to the accused all such circumstances, which appear from the evidence on record, incriminating against the accused and solicit the response of the accused thereto. This would give an opportunity to the accused to explain incriminating materials, which may have surfaced on the record against him. The answer, so given, by the accused may be taken into consideration along with the evidence on record. 71. In order to correctly appreciate the scope of Section 313, Cr. P.C. it is necessary to recall the facts of the case of Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra). The answer, so given, by the accused may be taken into consideration along with the evidence on record. 71. In order to correctly appreciate the scope of Section 313, Cr. P.C. it is necessary to recall the facts of the case of Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra). In Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), accused 1 Sukhdev Singh alias (Sukha) and accused 5 (Jinda), along with others, faced amongst others, a charge, under Section 302, IPC, on the ground that they had killed General Vaidya, retired Chief of Army Staff, and his wife. When the charges were framed at the trial, both these accused, along with others, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried; but barely two weeks thereafter, the accused 1, orally, informed the learned trial Judge that he had killed General Vaidya and he did not desire to contest the case. At a latter stage, when accused 1 was examined under Section 313, Cr. P.C. he made a statement to the effect that according to him, killing of General Vaidya was not a crime, because General Vaidya was responsible for conducting operation Blue Star, which had damaged a sacred religious place like the Akal Takht of the Golden Temple and, that is why, he had not pleaded guilty. The learned trial Judge gave time to accused 1 to reflect on the admissions, which he had made, and, on the date fixed, accused 1 presented a written statement, wherein also he had admitted to have fired four shots to General Vaidya and killed him. Even when his statement, under Section 313, Cr. P.C. was, later on, recorded, accused 1 owned the statement, which he had so made in writing (Ext. 60A). 72. So far as accused 5, in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), was concerned, he, having not pleaded guilty to the charge, continued to contest the case until he was examined under Section 313, Cr. P.C. wherein he made statements, in writing, admitting to have driven the motor cycle with accused 1 as a pillion rider and also admitting that the accused 1 had fired fatal shots on General Vaidya, while still sitting in the pillion seat. Accused 5 supplemented this statement by yet another statement, which he submitted, in writing, and proved as Ext. 922. 73. Accused 5 supplemented this statement by yet another statement, which he submitted, in writing, and proved as Ext. 922. 73. Thus, in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), the two accused, in their oral as well as written statements, had made it clear that they believed that General Vaidya was responsible for conducting operation Blue Star, which had damaged Akal Takht, and it also injured the religious belief and sentiments of the Sikh community and General Vaidya was, therefore, guilty of serious crime and they had merely executed him and, in doing so, they had not committed any crime whatsoever. These facts are clearly noted at paragraphs 46, 47 and 48 of the decision in Sukhdev Singh (supra). 74. It was in the above fact situation that it was submitted before the Apex Court, on behalf of the two accused, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that when there is no evidence or circumstance, appearing in the prosecution evidence implicating an accused with the commission of a crime with which he is charged, there is really nothing for the accused to explain and, hence, his examination would be wholly unnecessary and improper. In fact, it was submitted, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that in such a situation, the accused cannot be questioned at all and his answers cannot be used in the evidence, which may have been adduced, and, hence, the statements, made by accused 1 and accused 5, during their examinations under Section 313, Cr. P.C. should be totally discarded. It was further suggested to the Court that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was so weak that even if such evidence was taken to have been proved, the Court would not be in a position to convict the two accused and, hence, in such circumstances, it was unnecessary to examine the accused under Section 313, Cr. P.C. for the answers cannot be used for the purpose of filling up the gaps in the evidence, which the prosecution has adduced against them. This apart, the statements, made by the said two accused in Sukhdev Singh (supra), being admission of guilt, the question was as to whether the Court could have acted upon the said admission of guilt. 75. Reaching to the above submissions made in Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), the Apex Court pointed out, already indicated above, that at the stage of examination under Section 313, Cr. 75. Reaching to the above submissions made in Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha (supra), the Apex Court pointed out, already indicated above, that at the stage of examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. the Court does not sit on the judgment and so long as there is any incriminating evidence appearing against the accused, however weak such evidence may be, the Court is duty bound to question the accused. 76. Before proceeding any further what is important to bear in mind is that though a statement, recorded under Section 313, Cr. P.C. is not a statement made on oath and is not, strictly speaking, evidence, yet the statement, so made, can, indeed, be taken into consideration, at the trial, against the accused for the purpose of arriving at the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In no uncertain words made the Apex Court clear this position of law, when it observed and held, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), as follows: 51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why Sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he give false answer. Then comes Sub-section (4), which reads : "313 (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. Thus, the answers given by the accused, in response to his examination, under Section 313, can be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, Sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R. B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : (1968 Cri LJ 95). This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, Sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R. B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : (1968 Cri LJ 95). This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M. B. (1953 Cri LJ 1933 : AIR 1953 SC 468 ) held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may, at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence, shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing, in the evidence, against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident, which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By Sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may 'be taken into consideration' at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him, the Court may, reiving upon that confession, proceed to convict him ; but if he does not confess and explaining circumstance, appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety. Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to Sub-section (1) of Section 342of the old Code except that it, now, stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons case, where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under Clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old Sub-section (41 and the present Sub-section (3) corresponds to the old Sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present Sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old Sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force. (Emphasis is supplied) 77. From what have been observed and laid down in Sukhdev Singh (supra), it becomes transparent that if an accused person, in his examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. confesses to the commission of the offence(s) charged with, the Court may, relying upon such confession, proceed to convict the accused and it is only when the accused does not confess and/or the accused chooses to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him or sets up his own version of the occurrence claiming to the effect that he had committed no offence, the statement of the accused, made during the course of examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. can be considered in its entirety along with other pieces of evidence on record. To put it a little differently, there is no impediment in law for a Court to found conviction of an accused on his confession made by him during his examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. and/or to rely upon an admission of facts made by an accused during his examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. 78. It further logically follows from what have been observed and laid down, in Sukhdev Singh (supra), that an admission of a piece of evidence, which an accused may voluntarily make, at the stage of his examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C. can be relied upon and there is no impediment, in law, in convicting an accused on such admission made in the statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. if such statement, taken in its entirety, in the light of the other evidence on record, proves beyond doubt that the accused is the one, who has committed the offence. 79. P.C. can be relied upon and there is no impediment, in law, in convicting an accused on such admission made in the statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. if such statement, taken in its entirety, in the light of the other evidence on record, proves beyond doubt that the accused is the one, who has committed the offence. 79. The legal position, as discussed above, with regard to the object and scope of Section 313, Cr. P.C. is further reinforced by a three Judge Bench decision in State of U. P. v. Lakhmi reported in (1998) 4 SCC 336 : (1998 Cri LJ 1411). In order to appreciate the law, on the use of the statement of an accused made under Section 313, Cr. P.C, it is necessary to take note of the material facts of the case in Lakhmi (supra), wherein accused Lakhmi faced the charge of murder for having put his wife to death intentionally. Prosecution's case was largely based on the testimony of P.W. 2 (Ramey). On the day of the occurrence, according to prosecution, Lakhmi inflicted blows with a phalli (a spade-like agricultural implement) on the head of the deceased. Her skull got smashed and she died on the spot. Ramey, who claims to have been working in the adjacent, field, claimed that on hearing the screams of the deceased, he had rushed to the house of the accused and, on peeping through the windows, witnessed the accused smashing his wife's head by giving her blows with a phalli and, on hue and cry being raised by him (P.W. 2), some neighbours, who heard the noise, came to the place of occurrence, broke open the door, which was bolted from inside, and overpowered the assailant. During the course of examination of the accused, under Section 313, Cr. P.C. in Lakhmi (supra), one of the questions, put by the Court to the accused and the answer to the question read as follows: What have you to say about the evidence of Ramey (P.W. 2) that he peeped through the window and saw you standing near her bed and you killed her with phalli (Ex. Ka-1) and Kunda (Ex. Ka-2)? The answer of the accused to the said question was this : "It was not like that. I murdered her with a kunda and not with a phalli." 80. Ka-1) and Kunda (Ex. Ka-2)? The answer of the accused to the said question was this : "It was not like that. I murdered her with a kunda and not with a phalli." 80. The learned Sessions Judge, in Lakhmi (supra), convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The High Court, while acquitting the appellant, held the evidence of P.W. 2 (Ramey) was not creditworthy and at any rate, his evidence had received no corroboration from any other reliable evidence. While so acquitting the accused, the High Court did not attribute any importance to the answers, given by the appellant, which we have reproduced herein-above, wherein, he had practically, admitted, that he had killed his wife. 81. In the circumstances, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court, in Lakhmi (supra), has pointed out that answers to questions put to the accused may be, on most of the occasions, flat denial or outright repudiation of those circumstances, but, in certain cases, the accused would offer some explanations to the incriminating circumstances and in very rare instances, the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him, perhaps, for the purpose of adopting legally recognized defences. In all such cases, points the Apex Court in Lakhmi (supra), the Court gets the advantage of knowing the version of the accused about those aspects and it helps the Court to effectively appreciate and evaluate the evidence in the case. If an accused admits any incriminating circumstance, appearing in the evidence against him, there is no warrant for the proposition that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence strategy. 82. Having pointed out that Sub-section (4) of Section 313 amounts to a legislative guideline for the Courts to give due weight to the answers, which an accused may give to the question put to him, the Court has clarified, in Lakhmi (supra) that when answers, given by an accused, contain admissions of circumstances appearing against him and when such admissions are not delinked from the evidence, such admissions can be used for arriving at a finding that the accused had committed the offence. 83. In the backdrop of the position of law, as discussed above, let me, now, take note of the statement (Ext. 83. In the backdrop of the position of law, as discussed above, let me, now, take note of the statement (Ext. 4), which the accused made to P.W. 7, and determine as to what the effect of the admissions made therein by the accused, in his trial, could have been. 84. In his statement (Ext. 4) recorded under Section 164, Cr. P.C. and treated as confessional statement, the accused responded as under: Do you agree and sure that the incident took place was the resident of Lt. KP Jamoh at P Sector, Itanagar? Ans : Yes. Did you murder Lt. K. P. Jamoh at her residence on 2-12-2002? Ans : No. I was staying with deceased Jamoh for 1/2 months. On this 2-12-2002, same day at 930 (approx.) pm self went to Naharlagun to purchase Spacimo Proximon capsule. The boy who supplied this capsule was not available at that time. So, I returned to Itanagar and came inside the Qtr of Lt. Jamoh. I took the vehicle of the deceased during my journey from Itanagar to Naharlagun and back after obtaining the permission from her. When you return and entered into the qtr of late Jamoh what you have seen or noticed ? Ans : We usually return and entered from back door since the front side local door was always kept locked as RCC step of front side was broken. When I entered inside the room I have noticed that door lock was not properly locked. All rooms were opened except the room of Lt. Madam Jamoh, her room was locked when I notice on that very day. Telephone wire was also not working properly at that time. Nobody was with me and I started taking beer and also consumed SP capsules. Also I was enjoying TV programme. After that I slept without knowing nothing. Suddenly I wake up at about 230 am to get/purchase more SP capsule. I again left for Bandardewa. When I reached at B/Dewa, there was no sufficient SP capsule at Pharmacy. Further I left for Rangapara at about 430 hours keeping view to purchase more SP capsules at cheaper rate from Rangapara. After crossing Gohpur, I was intoxicated due to overdose of SP Capsules and my vehicle got accident. After my sense and found eyes, then I was inside the P/Bus of Assam. After that what had happened ? Further I left for Rangapara at about 430 hours keeping view to purchase more SP capsules at cheaper rate from Rangapara. After crossing Gohpur, I was intoxicated due to overdose of SP Capsules and my vehicle got accident. After my sense and found eyes, then I was inside the P/Bus of Assam. After that what had happened ? Ans: When this P/Bus reached Biswanath Chariali, I got sensed and felt chest/abdomen pain. I purchased pain killer tablet and taken. Again myself boarded into the same bus and went to Tezpur. I booked one room in the hotel Dhurbo, Tezpur. Then I asked hotel boy to call a mechanic to check the accident car which was taken by me one Mr. Narayan Talukdar comes to me and was ready to purchase this car. Therefore, we both went to the place of occurrence and found that the vehicle was kept at P.S. Helem, Assam. Then, we returned to Tezpur again. The rate of the accident vehicle was fixed at Rs. 70,000/- next day i.e. on 4-12-2003, I went to Balipara and stayed there. After 10 days I went to P.S. Helem and released the vehicle and the vehicle was brought to Tezpur, vehicle was kept with one Shri Gopal a garage owner. Again I came to Balipara lodge, Assam, and was staying there. From Balipara lodge, SI T. Tamut and Inspector J.S. Yadav came and arrest me and taken to P.S. Itanagar and till today I am at PS lockup Itanagar. Q. Do you have any idea regarding character, behaviour of Lt. Jamoh and what about your relationship with Lt. Jamoh? Ans: I have no broad idea or knowledge about her character and activities. But then she used to play gambling for 24 hrs sometime. Even she usually attended the duty by late hours. Before the incident took place, (2 days before) one Marowadi, one Monpa Chap, one Nishi boy and Lt. Jamoh madam played gambling (RAMI) at the residence Lt Jamoh madam. One Bihari fellow who accompanied the Marowadi gentleman was also present. But he did not play. I was also there to serve them tea etc. Later on, they also played 3 patti, Lt. Jamoh madam won the game and she got Rs. 40,000/- (approx) and stopped playing. Marowadi fellow taken loan of Rs. 40,000/- from Lt. Jamoh madam. At last Nishi boy gained the whole amount of gambling party. But he did not play. I was also there to serve them tea etc. Later on, they also played 3 patti, Lt. Jamoh madam won the game and she got Rs. 40,000/- (approx) and stopped playing. Marowadi fellow taken loan of Rs. 40,000/- from Lt. Jamoh madam. At last Nishi boy gained the whole amount of gambling party. Therefore, I dropped them by the vehicle of Lt. Jamoh Madam. By relation, she treated me like her own son and loved me. Sometime she. scolded me and abused me when she lost her temper. Q. Any more to say or add? Ans. Nothing. 85. We may also pause here and point out that in his statement, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr. P.C. the accused stated as follows: Q. 1. There are evidence that you were residing with Lt. KP Jamoh for about two months and on the day of incident, i.e., on 2-12-2002, you were present in her house. What have you say? Ans. On 1-12-2002, I went to purchase beer at Bank Tinali, Itanagar, using Zen vehicle. After purchasing the beer, I directly went to Naharlagun to buy SP tablet, I did not get the SP tablet so I returned back to Itanagar, On reaching the house, I saw madam KP Jamoh room was lock. I thought madam must have gone to play cards. I switched on the TV and drank beer. I did not check the telephone. I thought before she returns I have get the SP tablet from Bandardewa and at about 4 am, I took the vehicle and proceeded towards Bandardewa to purchase SP capsules. I purchase SP capsules from Bandardewa and to purchase huge quantity to keep in stock I proceeded towards Rangapara. I had 5,000/- with me. I met with an accident on the way due to overdose of SP tablet as I have taken the tablet at Itanagar. Q.2. There is evidence that you had quarrel with Lt. Jamoh just before the incident. What have to say? Ans: The quarrel was like mother and son. She was angry with me for using her car. I have used the car because she told me to open the room and play cards. Q.3. There are evidence that you expressed your desire to sell the Zen vehicle, which belong to Lt. KP Jamoh. What have you to say ? Ans: The quarrel was like mother and son. She was angry with me for using her car. I have used the car because she told me to open the room and play cards. Q.3. There are evidence that you expressed your desire to sell the Zen vehicle, which belong to Lt. KP Jamoh. What have you to say ? Ans : I tried to sell the vehicle because the vehicle met with an accident, so I tried to sell the vehicle and to purchase a new one from Tezpur. Q.4. You were arrested by police from a lodge at Balipara, Assam. What have you to say ? Ans: Yes. Q5. Do you what (have) to say anything before this Court ? Ans : 1 have not known about the murder. At Balipara one Adi boy happen to meet me and told me that I am wanted at Arunachal Pradesh for one murder case. I was in a Hotel. The Adi boy further told me not to stay in the hotel because the police may come anytime to arrest me. That boy left for Dimapur. The next day, I left for Rangapara live one (might) at Rangapara and the next morning returned to Balipara from where the police arrested me. The police inquired me about the vehicle. I took the police to the garage, where I kept the damaged vehicle for repairing. Police has beaten me with lathi. 86. From the confessional statement of the accused, what clearly transpires is that on 2-12-2002, at about 9.30 pm, the accused went to purchase Spacimo Proximon capsule, which is a drug, but the boy, who used to supply the said capsule, was not available, whereupon the accused returned to the residential quarter of Smt. K. P. Jamoh and, after obtaining permission from Smt. K. P. Jamoh, took the vehicle of Smt. K. P. Jamoh to go to Naharlagun and back. When the accused returned to the said house, he found the bedroom of Smt. K. P. Jamoh locked. The accused, then, started taking beer and, while watching TV programme, he also consumed SP capsules. When the accused returned to the said house, he found the bedroom of Smt. K. P. Jamoh locked. The accused, then, started taking beer and, while watching TV programme, he also consumed SP capsules. The accused fell asleep and when he, suddenly, woke up at 2-30 a.m. he left for Bandardewa to purchase more S.P. capsules, but, on reaching Bandardewa, the accused found that there was no sufficient capsule at the pharmacy, whereupon he left, at about 4.30 a.m. for Rangapara in order to purchase more S.P. capsules and, while driving the vehicle in drugged state of mind, he met with an accident, somewhere, near Gohpur. When the accused regained his full senses, he found himself in a public bus. On reaching Biswanath Chariali, the accused started feeling pain in his chest and abdomen, he purchased pain killer and came, by a public bus, to Tezpur and took one room at hotel Dhruba and asked a boy, working there, to call for a mechanic. P.W. 6 accordingly came there and he was ready to purchase his vehicle. Both of them went to the place of occurrence and found that the vehicle had been kept at Helem Police Station. Then, they returned to Tezpur. On 4-12-2003, he went to Balipara and stayed there and, after about 10 days, he went to Helem Police Station, got the vehicle released and brought the same to Tezpur and the vehicle was kept in the garage of P.W. 5. The accused, then, came to Balipara lodge and stayed there until he was arrested by the police and brought back to Itanagar. 87. Broadly, in tune with his statement, recorded under Section 164, Cr. P.C. the accused, in his statement, under Section 313, Cr. P.C. has admitted that there was a quarrel between him and the deceased before the incident. The accused also admits that he tried to sell the vehicle as the vehicle met with accident and he wanted to purchase a new one from Tezpur. P.C. the accused, in his statement, under Section 313, Cr. P.C. has admitted that there was a quarrel between him and the deceased before the incident. The accused also admits that he tried to sell the vehicle as the vehicle met with accident and he wanted to purchase a new one from Tezpur. The accused also stated that one Adi boy happened to meet him at the hotel and told him that the police were looking for him in connection with a murder case and, after the Adi boy had left, the accused left for Rangapara and, in the following morning, he returned to Balipara, where police arrested him, and he led the police to the garage, where he had kept the vehicle for repairing. 88. Coupled with the above and as already indicated above, the accused has examined himself as a witness and, in his evidence, while denying that he had killed K.P. Jamoh, what the accused deposed was that he had been staying at the residence of Smt. K. P. Jamoh from September, 2002, and his only mistake was that while taking the vehicle, he had not obtained Smt. Jamoh's permission. It is, however, in the evidence of the accused that he did not enter his real name at the check-post at Banderdewa, but entered some fictitious name due to hangover caused by his taking of SP capsules (intoxicating drugs), that he was apprehensive that while returning to Itanagar with a huge quantity of SP capsules in his possession, which he intended to purchase, he would be caught by the police. 89. Explaining his conduct, the accused has deposed that he had taken the vehicle to Bank tinali with permission of K.P. Jamoh and, from there, he proceeded to Naharlogun, he came back to the house of K.P. Jamoh, but he found her room locked and, then, he took the vehicle and came to Banderdewa at about 2-30/3-30 a.m. The accused has also deposed that after purchasing SP tables at Banderdewa, he left for Rangapara in order to get more SP capsules as the capsules were cheaper at Rangapara; but on the way, he met with an accident due to overdose of the capsules. The accused has further deposed that he wanted to sell the vehicle, because the vehicle had met with an accident. The accused has further deposed that he wanted to sell the vehicle, because the vehicle had met with an accident. It is in the evidence of the accused that he intended to sell the vehicle at a price of Rs. 70,000/- and, thereafter, purchase a new vehicle, at Tezpur, at a cheaper rate and deliver the vehicle to K. P. Jamoh. 90. In his cross-examination, the accused has also clarified that on 2-12-2002, he started from Naharlagun intending to go to Rangapara. In his evidence, the accused has clarified that he had taken two SP capsules and that he takes about sixteen capsules a day and that he cannot stay without taking SP capsules. 91. In his cross-examination, the accused has deposed that he left Itanagar by the vehicle in the early morning, when it was still dark. It is clearly admitted by the accused, in his cross-examination, that earlier, when he left for Itanagar, P.W. 1 had been left at the house of P.W. 2. The accused has also admitted that on the night of 2-12-2002, he and madam (K. P. Jamoh) were the only ones in the residential quarter of K. P. Jamoh. The accused has further clarified, in his cross-examination, that he met with the accident due to overdose of SP capsules. 92. It is also in the evidence of the accused that when he left the quarter of the said deceased, her bedroom was locked from outside. 93. Though the accused has deposed that he thought that madam (K. P. Jamoh) had gone out to play cards, the fact remains that there is no corroborative evidence on record to show that the accused had made any attempt, at any point of time, to contact the said deceased or anyone, who was interested in the welfare of the said deceased. 94. Though the accused has claimed that he had telephone P.W. 2 to inform P.W. 2 that madam (K. P. Jamoh) had played cards with three persons, no such evidence has been given by P.W. 2. Far from this, what has been deposed by P.W. 2, and not disputed by the defence, is that P.W. 2 stated before the police that the accused had informed him over telephone that the accused had 'jhhagda' (quarrel) with 'aunty' (K. P. Jamoh). 95. Far from this, what has been deposed by P.W. 2, and not disputed by the defence, is that P.W. 2 stated before the police that the accused had informed him over telephone that the accused had 'jhhagda' (quarrel) with 'aunty' (K. P. Jamoh). 95. In his cross-examination, the accused has admitted that he had left Itanagar for Naharlagun and Rangapara on 2-12-2009, i.e. on the night, when the said deceased was last seen, and that was the day, when she had come to the house of P.W. 3 by driving her said car. The accused admits that he was arrested by police 9-1-2003. The accused also admits that he is addicted to S.P. capsules and he takes about 13 capsules a day and that without taking S.P. capsule, he cannot stay. He also admits that there is a criminal case pending against him at Pasighat. He admits that the police apprehended him after one month and seven days, i.e. on 9-1-2003. 96. From the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 6 and P.W. 8, the relevant and admitted circumstances are: (i) Smt. K. P. Jamoh used to reside, as a teacher, in a residential quarter at Sector-P, Itanagar. The said quarter had two bed rooms and a sitting room. Smt. K. P. Jamoh used to occupy one of the bed rooms, her daughter (P.W. 1) used to live in the other bedroom and the accused, who had been staying at the said house, used to sleep in the sitting room. (ii) As Smt. K.P. Jamoh was to leave for Pasighat, she left her daughter (P.W. 1) at the house of P.W. 3, who is mother of P.W. 4, their house being situated at G. Sector, Itanagar. (iii) On the night of 2-12-2002, K. P. Jamoh came, driving her Maruti Zen to the house of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4, and told her daughter (P.W. 1) that she would, on the following day, leave for Pasighat, and P.W. 1 should remain at the house of P.W. 3. While leaving the house of P.W. 3 though K. P. Jamoh had told her daughter that she would telephone her (P.W. 1) from Pasighat, no telephone call was received from her on 3-12-2002. While leaving the house of P.W. 3 though K. P. Jamoh had told her daughter that she would telephone her (P.W. 1) from Pasighat, no telephone call was received from her on 3-12-2002. P.W. 1 became worried and started making enquiry about the whereabouts of her mother from 4-12-2002, but was informed by her relatives and friends that her mother had not reached Pasighat. (iv) As can be seen from the evidence of P.W. 1 read with the undisputed evidence of P.W. 4, they, on 4-12-2002, came to the house of K. P. Jamoh and found that both the front as well as the back door of the house were open and the television was on, but the bedroom of Smt. K. P. Jamoh stood locked from outside. On seeing the television on, P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 thought that Smt. K. P. Jamoh had gone to Pasighat and the accused must be nearby. They, therefore, left the house. They, again, accompanied by the sister of P.W. 4, went to the house of K. P. Jamoh and found the house in the same condition in which they had found the house on the previous day, whereupon P.W. 4 returned home alone and that P.W. 3 and his (P.W. 4's) sister came home later. On reaching home, P.W. 1 started crying saying that her mother ought to have, at least, made a telephone call. P.W. 4 consoled P.W. 1 saying that her mother must have got engaged in some urgent piece of work. (v) On the next day, i.e. on 6-12-2002, P.W. 1, accompanied by P.W. 4, went to the house of P.W. 2, who had developed friendship with the accused at Itanagar, and, at the house of P.W. 2, they decided to break open the lock of the bedroom of Smt. K.P. Jamoh. They accordingly came to the said house and broke open the door, whereupon they found Smt. K. P. Jamoh's dead body, lying on her bed, with cut injuries on her hands and head. The fact that Smt. K. P. Jamoh died as a result of the cut injuries sustained by her is not in dispute. This apart, because of the blows, which had been given on her head, some hair of Smt. K. P. Jamoh got cut and the same fell on the floor of the said bedroom. The fact that Smt. K. P. Jamoh died as a result of the cut injuries sustained by her is not in dispute. This apart, because of the blows, which had been given on her head, some hair of Smt. K. P. Jamoh got cut and the same fell on the floor of the said bedroom. This shows that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was killed inside her bedroom, when she was lying on her bed. (vi) Between the night of 2-12-2002 and the morning of 3-12-2002, the accused took the vehicle of K. P. Jamoh and drove the same out of Itanagar. While going out of the territorial limits of the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the accused did not, at Bandardewa check-post, disclose his real name and gave a fictitious name. While driving the vehicle, the accused committed an accident and the vehicle got badly damaged, whereupon the accused came, by a bus, to Tezpur and took a room at hotel Durba, where he happened to meet P.W. 6. (vii) During the course of conversation, which the accused and P.W. 6 had, the accused told him (P.W. 4) about the accident and also expressed his desire to sell the vehicle. The accused, instead of telling the truth that the vehicle belonged to Smt. K. P. Jamoh, told P.W. 6 that the vehicle belonged to his brother-in-law. The accused, then, accompanied by P.W. 5, who has an Auto Engineering workshop, went to Bihali Police Station and took Zimma of the vehicle from the said Police Station, but the vehicle could not be sold as the DTO's office, at Tezpur, made it clear to the accused that the owner's presence was necessary for transferring the vehicle. 97. Even from the evidence of the accused as defence witness (D.W.), what clearly transpires is that he had used the vehicle twice. He, first, came to Naharlagun and from there, he went back to the said house. If this piece of evidence is considered, in the light of the statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr. P.C., it becomes clear that he went back after purchasing the drug. He, first, came to Naharlagun and from there, he went back to the said house. If this piece of evidence is considered, in the light of the statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr. P.C., it becomes clear that he went back after purchasing the drug. Even in his evidence, the accused has stated that on returning to the said house, he had beer and between 2-30 to 3.30 a.m., he again, took the vehicle to Bandardewa and, on not getting the drug, at Bandardewa, he thought of going to Rangapara to purchase the drug as the same is cheaper at Rangapara, but due to overdose, he met with an accident. 98. The accused also admits that he wanted to sell the vehicle at Rs. 70,000/- with intent to purchase a new one from Siliguri and, thereafter, to deliver the new vehicle to Smt. K. P. Jamoh. In this regard, it is important to note that in his statement, under Section 313, Cr. P.C., the accused has stated that he wanted to sell the vehicle and purchase a new one from Tezpur. Till the time the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313, Cr. PC, he gave absolutely no indication that he ever intended to come back to Itanagar and/or hand over the new vehicle to Smt, K. P. Jamoh. The statement of the accused, which was recorded under Section 164, Cr. P.C., gives no indication at all that he over intended to return to Itanagar. This too clearly demonstrates that the accused knew that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was not alive. This inference gets reinforced from the fact that there is no evidence on record to show that the accused tried to contact Smt. K. P. Jamoh and/or her daughter from the time he left Itanagar until the time he was arrested by police. 99. Above all, the accused was, admittedly, present at the house, where the occurrence took place till, at least, 3.30 a.m. to 4.00 a.m. and there is nothing, in the evidence on record, to show that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was seen alive after 2-12-2002. 100. 99. Above all, the accused was, admittedly, present at the house, where the occurrence took place till, at least, 3.30 a.m. to 4.00 a.m. and there is nothing, in the evidence on record, to show that Smt. K. P. Jamoh was seen alive after 2-12-2002. 100. Thus, the entire chain of circumstances, when considered together, make a complete unshaken chain and unerringly prove that the accused had not only put Smt. K. P. Jamoh to death but also taken away her vehicle without her consent with no intention to come back or hand over the vehicle to its rightful owner, Thus, the accused had committed not only murder, but also theft. 101. There remains no room for doubt that the prosecution has proved that the accused had intentionally killed Smt. K. P. Jamoh and committed thereby offence of murder punishable under Section 302, IPC. 102. Though the accused has also been convicted under Section 379, IPC, it needs to be noted, as already indicated above, that the accused is proved to have committed theft of the said vehicle and since the theft had been committed from the house, conviction ought to have been under Section380, IPC. 103. We may also point out that merely taking of a property without consent of the owner or possessor of the property is not theft, but when the property is removed from the possession of the possessor without consent of the possessor and also with dishonest intention, it amounts to theft. When anyone uses a property without consent of the possessor with intent to make wrongful gain or wrongful loss, it amounts to theft. When the accused removed the vehicle without the consent of Smt. K. P. Jamoh and, for the purpose of making wrongful gain, he must be held to have committed an offence under Section 380, IPC. 104. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the accused-appellant has been proved, beyond reasonable doubt, to have committed offences under Sections 302 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. 105. Situated thus, we uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant under Sections 302 and alter his conviction from under Section 379, IPC to one under Section 380, IPC. 106. 104. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the accused-appellant has been proved, beyond reasonable doubt, to have committed offences under Sections 302 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. 105. Situated thus, we uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant under Sections 302 and alter his conviction from under Section 379, IPC to one under Section 380, IPC. 106. We may, now, point out that on noticing that the accused-appellant, on having been convicted under Section 302, IPC, stands sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 10 years; whereas an offence, under Section 302, IPC, is punishable by death or imprisonment for life with fine, we caused a notice served on the appellant so that we could hear the accused-appellant as to why "his sentence of imprisonment for a period of ten years be not enhanced to death or imprisonment for life. Pursuant to the notice so served on him, the accused-appellant has been heard, in person, on sentence, which may be passed against him for his conviction under Section 302, IPC. 107. Having held the accused-appellant, as already indicated above guilty under Section 302, IPC and having, heard him, in person, on the question of sentence to be passed against him for the offence of murder, which he is proved to have committed, we sentence him to imprisonment for life and also pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. 108. For the offence of theft, committed by him, the accused-appellant is convicted under Section380, IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months. 109. The appeal fails as a whole and shall accordingly stand dismissed. The conviction of the accused-appellant and the sentences passed against him, to the extent, as indicated hereinabove, shall accordingly stand modified and confirmed. 110. With the above observations and directions, the reference as well as the appeal shall stand disposed of. 111. Send back the LCR.