COMMON JUDGMENT: (C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J) These two writ appeals arise out of orders dated 24.07.2008 and 21.07.2008 in WP.Nos.8889 of 2008 and 2183 of 2008 respectively. The background facts: The lands belonging to the respondents were acquired, as they were coming under foreshore submergence of Somasila Project. In respect of the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1765 of 2008, a common notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was published on 22.02.1994 and for the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1785 of 2008, a similar notification was issued on 11.02.1994. Along with the lands of these respondents, lands of others were also acquired under the said two notifications. After following the due procedure, the Land Acquisition Officer (for short, ‘the LAO’) passed two separate awards covering the respondents in each of these writ appeals respectively in the year 1994. Some of the landowners covered by the two notifications sought for reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act for determination of the market value. The reference proceedings pertaining to the acquisition under the notification under which the lands of the respondents in WA.No.1765 of 2008 were acquired pending before the Senior Civil Judge, Rajampet, were transferred to Lok Adalath, Kadapa, which enhanced the compensation to 75% over and above the award passed by the LAO by its award dated 23.03.2007. In respect of the notification concerning the respondents in WA.No.1785 of 2008, the District Court, Kadapa, by its award dated 22.05.2002 enhanced the compensation to 100% over and above the market value awarded by the LAO. The respondents in both these writ appeals, who did not seek reference under Section 18 of the Act, filed their respective applications under Section 28-A for re-determination of compensation on the basis of the abovementioned two awards. Appellant No.3 passed awards dated 09.01.2008 and 21.08.2007 in respect of the lands of the respondents in WA.Nos.1765 and 1785 of 2008 respectively by allowing payment of enhanced market value in terms of the abovementioned two awards, but restricted payment of interest to 9% per annum from the dates of filing of their applications under Section 28-A and to 15% per annum from the expiry of one year and till the date of payment. These two awards were questioned by the respondents in the two separate writ petitions, namely; WP.No.8889 of 2008 and 2183 of 2008 to the extent of appellant No.3 disallowing the award of interest to them from the date of taking possession till the date of filing applications under Section 28-A of the Act. After hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and held that the respondents shall be entitled to interest and other statutory benefits in terms of the awards passed by the Lok Adalath and Civil Court. Assailing these orders, the appellants filed the present writ appeals. Contentions: At the hearing, learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition has strenuously contended that the learned Single Judge fell into error in allowing the respondents to receive the same benefits as were allowed to the claimants in the two reference cases under the awards of the Lok Adalath and the Civil Court. He contended that interest does not form part of compensation payable to the landowner for the land acquired from him in accordance with Section 23 of the Act and that under Section 28-A, the land owners, who did not seek reference, are only entitled to payment of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. According to the learned Government Pleader, the phrase “the amount of compensation” used in Section 28-A does not include interest payable under Section 34 of the Act and that therefore the respondents do not have a vested right in law to claim interest on par with the landowners at whose instance references under Section 18 were made and compensation enhanced. He further contended that if the respondents were aggrieved by the award passed under Section 28-A(2), they are entitled to seek reference under Section 28-A(3) of the Act and that therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. Opposing the contentions of the learned Government Pleader, Sri N. Vasudeva Reddy and Sri Y. Venkat Satyam, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the very object of amendment to the Act by introduction of Section 28-A was to provide the same amount of compensation to the landowners, who did not seek reference under Section 18, as was paid to the persons at whose instance references were made to the civil Court and compensation is enhanced. They also contended that the Collector has no discretion to pass an award at variance with the award of the Court and that as the respondents are unjustly denied the statutory benefits, the writ petition is maintainable. Analysis: The State is vested with the power of eminent domain to acquire the private land of any person against his will. The Supreme Court in a catena of judgments held that as the provisions of the Act are ex-propriatory in nature, they are liable to be strictly construed by the Courts, whenever challenge to such acquisition is made by the land owners (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [1], Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan [2] and Collector of Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. [3] While Article 300-A mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, second proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution envisages that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to such acquisition of land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The expression ‘estate’ is given a very wide definition in Article 31-A (2) to include any land under ryotwari settlement and any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto. Though right to property was a fundamental right under the Constitution, under the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 it has been deleted from Part-III and the owner of the property is given constitutional protection by introducing Article 300-A under Chapter IV by ensuring that he is not deprived of the property without the authority of law. Keeping these constitutional parameters, the submissions of the learned Government Pleader are required to be examined. Act 68 of 1994 introduced several amendments to the Act, which were intended to benefit the landowners. Keeping these constitutional parameters, the submissions of the learned Government Pleader are required to be examined. Act 68 of 1994 introduced several amendments to the Act, which were intended to benefit the landowners. One such amendment was by way of insertion of Section 28-A, which enables the landowners to seek re-determination of compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court under Part-III of the Act notwithstanding the fact that they did not seek reference. The statement of objects and reasons for introduction of the said provision is reproduced hereunder: “Considering that the right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act.” (Emphasis added) In Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and others [4] a question arose as to whether in a series of awards passed by the LAO after commencement of the Amendment Act the limitation for seeking re-determination starts running from the date of the first award in the series or from the dates of subsequent awards. The Himachal Pradesh High Court, relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Babu Ram v. State of U.P. [5] and Union of India v. Karnail Singh [6], held that the limitation starts running from the date of the first award and accordingly dismissed the writ petitions of the landowners. In the civil appeals, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court did not agree with the view expressed in Babu Ram (5 supra) and Karnail Singh (6 supra). In the civil appeals, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court did not agree with the view expressed in Babu Ram (5 supra) and Karnail Singh (6 supra). The Apex Court considered the objects and reasons underlying the enactment of Section 28-A and held that the said provision was introduced to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil Court under Section 18 of the Act and that this is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek re-determination on the basis of the orders passed for payment of higher compensation on the reference made under Section 18 of the Act. The Supreme Court held: “Section 28-A therefore is in a nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to the beneficent legislation, the law is well settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.” The Supreme Court further held that under Section 28-A, a right accrues to a person, whose land is covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) and who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, but had not made an application to him under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. It further held that the right to make an application under Section 28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person makes the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. It further held that the right to make an application under Section 28-A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person makes the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. In Sunder v. Union of India [7] a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, which resolved the conflict between the divergent views expressed in Union of India v. Sri Shri Ram Mehar [8], Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Limited v. State of Kerala [9] and Yadavrao P.Pathade v. State of Maharashtra [10] on the one side and Mir Fazeelath Hussain v. Special Deputy Collector [11] on the other, on the issue whether solatium provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of compensation and interest is payable thereon, held as under: “We make it clear that the compensation awarded would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub-section (1) of Section 23, but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. It is thus clear from Section 34 that the expression “awarded amount” would mean the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub-sections thereof.” In Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited v. State of Gujarat [12] the High Court of Gujarat rejected the claim of the landowners for payment of a portion of the interest under Section 34 on the ground that their cross appeals in that regard were rejected as time barred. In that context, the Supreme Court while considering what an award is, held that on a conjoint reading of Sections 23 and 26 it is clear that the award, which is deemed to be a decree, is the sum total of conclusions reached by the Courts in determining the compensation under Section 23 of the Act on appreciation of the evidence between the parties. It further held that the costs under Section 27 and the interest under Sections 28 and 34 are added to the compensation amount to make it a consolidated award. It further held that the costs under Section 27 and the interest under Sections 28 and 34 are added to the compensation amount to make it a consolidated award. On a careful analysis of the Apex Court’s judgments discussed above and on the application of the reasoning contained in various judgments, we have not felt persuaded to accept the rigid and literal construction placed by the learned Government Pleader on the expression “the amount of compensation” occurring in Section 28-A. While it is true that interest payable under Sections 28 and 34 does not form integral part of compensation in stricto sensu, nevertheless they form part of a consolidated award as held by the Supreme Court in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited (12 supra). After adding the components of interest to the compensation, the claimants, in the proceedings under Section 18, are paid the amount under the award, which in a broader sense is called compensation. This being so, we do not find any rationale in the appellants seeking to exclude a part of the interest component under Section 34 from the award to be passed by the Collector under Section 28-A while determining the compensation in favour of the persons, who did not seek reference under Section 18, by placing a narrow and pedantic interpretation of the expression “the amount of compensation” in Section 28-A. Such a course defeats the very purpose and object for which the said provision is inserted in the Act, namely, to remove the inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land. The learned Government Pleader tried to sustain the restriction of payment of interest only to the period from the date of filing of applications on the ground that the respondents not being diligent in seeking reference under Section 18 are not entitled to claim interest. In our view, such a contention is wholly meritless. Whether they applied for enhancement of compensation or not, the statute conferred a benefit on the respondents for re-determination of compensation on the basis of the award passed by the Court. That being so, no further distinction can be drawn between the persons, who sought for reference and those who have not. Such a distinction can only be termed as purely artificial without any sanction of law. That being so, no further distinction can be drawn between the persons, who sought for reference and those who have not. Such a distinction can only be termed as purely artificial without any sanction of law. This argument also militates against the purpose for which Section 28-A is introduced, namely, to ensure that the landowners, who have not claimed reference, are equally entitled to the same amount of compensation as those who claimed reference. When a right is vested in the persons, who did not seek reference, to seek re-determination of compensation, notwithstanding the fact that they were not diligent in seeking reference, they cannot be deprived of any part of the statutory benefit on the jejune ground of not being diligent in seeking reference. The right conferred on the landowner to receive interest on compensation is based on denial of his right to enjoy the property till such time as compensation amount is paid to him. This being the purpose of payment of interest, the respondents’ failure to seek reference under Section 18 has no relevance to or bearing on their right to claim interest. We therefore reject the first contention of the learned Government Pleader. As regards the contention of the learned Government Pleader that if the respondents were aggrieved by the award passed under Section 28-A(2), they are entitled to seek reference under Section 28-A(3) of the Act, we have not felt persuaded to accept the same. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is not circumscribed by any restrictions. However, the constitutional courts have placed on themselves certain self imposed restrictions in entertaining Writ Petitions when the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy. But, at the same time, it is held that availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In A.V. Venkateshwaran Vs. However, the constitutional courts have placed on themselves certain self imposed restrictions in entertaining Writ Petitions when the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy. But, at the same time, it is held that availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In A.V. Venkateshwaran Vs. R.S.Wadhwani [13] the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held thus: “The wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est and that in all other cases, Courts should not entertain petitions under Art. 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners cannot be accepted. The two exceptions to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain the petition and grant the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the court, and in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the court.” In Harbanslal Sahnia Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [14], the Supreme Court considered the situations in which the High Court can exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy and held: “The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [14], the Supreme Court considered the situations in which the High Court can exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy and held: “The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks { (1998) 8 SCC 1 }. The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners’ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” As noted supra, the Constitution vested a fundamental right in the owner of the property to receive compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value on the pain of invalidation of any law if such a law does not make provision for such payment. While on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 28-A as above, the respondents are entitled to receive interest as awarded by the civil Court and Lok Adalath, denial of such interest, falls foul of Article 300-A of the Constitution. Therefore, when the respondents are denied the right accrued to them both under the Constitution and the express statutory provisions contained under the Act, it will be unjust to drive the respondents to undergo the rigmarole of a reference under Section 30 of the Act. Therefore, when the respondents are denied the right accrued to them both under the Constitution and the express statutory provisions contained under the Act, it will be unjust to drive the respondents to undergo the rigmarole of a reference under Section 30 of the Act. Indeed, in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Limited (12 supra) while rejecting the contention of the State that the claimants were not entitled to payment of higher interest as their cross objections were rejected on the ground of limitation, the Supreme Court held that payment of interest is not dependant on any claim by the person whose land has been acquired, that when once the provisions of Section 34 are attracted, it is obligatory for the Collector to pay the interest and that if he fails to do so, the same can be claimed from the Court in proceedings under Section 18 of the Act or even from the appellate Court thereafter. The Supreme Court further held that the procedural hazards cannot come in the way of a substantial right of a citizen under the Act. On such reasoning the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for the claimant to have filed separate appeals/cross-objections before the High Court for the purposes of claiming interest under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petitions and granting relief to the respondents instead of relegating them to the alternative remedy under Section 28-A (3) of the Act. One other reason for us to reject the plea of alternative remedy is that no disputed questions of facts are involved to decide the claims of the respondents. A pure question of interpretation of the provisions of the Act in general and Section 28-A in particular is involved in the cases before us. Therefore, it is more desirable that such questions are decided by a constitutional Court rather than allowing a civil Court to decide the same. We therefore reject this contention of the learned Government Pleader too. For the reasons as above, the writ appeals fail and they are accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the writ appeals, WAMP.Nos.3429 and 3489 of 2008 in WA.No.1765 of 2008 filed by the appellants for interim reliefs are also dismissed.