JUDGMENT S.D. Anand, J.:- The appellant – wife is in appeal against the order dated 24.7.2006 vide which the learned Trial Court, while allowing the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) filed by the respondent – husband, ordered dissolution of their marriage. 2. The allegations by the respondent – husband in the first instance. 3. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 28.02.2000. It was a simple affair and no dowry articles were given. From the very beginning, the respondent – husband was very courteous and respectful towards the appellant – wife who, on the contrary, displayed an attitude of custom harshness vis-à-vis him. The appellant – wife did not allow the respondent – husband to consummate the marriage. On reaching the matrimonial house, the appellant – wife informed the respondent – husband that she had been married off to him without her consent and that she was otherwise inclined to marry elsewhere. Some time in the middle of March 2000, the appellant – wife was taken along by her mother to her natal house on the premise that she wanted to spend some time over there. Towards the end of April, the respondent – husband went over to his inlaws house to fetch the appellant – wife but her parents insulted him and did not send her along. In fact, the respondent – husband requested his parents-in-law to advise the appellant – wife to behave decently but they, instead of doing so, told him that they were not in a position to advise her, that he should take her along ‘As is where is basis’ or else she would continue to reside with them. The respondent – husband, in any case, brought her along to the matrimonial house where she stayed for few days. She was fetched by her maternal uncle to her natal house. Her fetching was otherwise against the wishes of the respondent – husband. She returned to the matrimonial house in the middle of July 2000. Her maternal uncle came over to drop her. On 23.07.2000, she made an abortive attempt to strangulate herself. She also held out a threat that she was not willing to stay with the respondent – husband at any cost and that if pressure was brought upon her, she would either strangulate herself or consume a poisonous substance. Her maternal uncle came over to drop her. On 23.07.2000, she made an abortive attempt to strangulate herself. She also held out a threat that she was not willing to stay with the respondent – husband at any cost and that if pressure was brought upon her, she would either strangulate herself or consume a poisonous substance. The respondent – husband telephonically intimated the episode to his parents-in-law who fetched her from the matrimonial house. While proceeding with them, the appellant – wife had also taken along all her gold ornaments and valuable clothes etc. She has not got back to the matrimonial house thereafter. 4. It was on the above allegation that the respondent – husband applied for a decree of divorce on plea of desertion and cruelty. 5. The appellant – wife denied the allegations levelled by the respondent – husband and proceeded to aver that she had throughout been cooperative and respectful towards her husband and her-in-laws who, however, were not satisfied with the adequacy of the dowry brought by her. The appellant – wife was, however, not in a position to fulfill their dowry greed because of the financial incapacity of her parents who had otherwise solemnized the marriage with great pomp and show, as desired by her in-laws side. For raising funds to solemnize the marriage at that level, her parents had to even sell away their residential house. 6. On one particular occasion, the respondent – husband and his parents raised a demand for being provided with a Maruti Esteem Car. However, the natal family of the appellant – wife was just not in a position to fulfill that dowry demand on account of their financial incapacity, particularly when they had already sold off their house. 7. The allegation that the marriage was not allowed to be consummated by her was denied. She alleged that the marriage was duly consummated and she did get pregnant as well but the mother of the respondent – husband took her to the City Hospital, Patiala, and got the pregnancy aborted. The averment, in the context, is that the appellant – wife had agreed to the abortion under the threats held out by her in-laws. She denied having ever tried to strangulate herself or having held out any threat to strangulate herself or consume a poisonous substance. The averment, in the context, is that the appellant – wife had agreed to the abortion under the threats held out by her in-laws. She denied having ever tried to strangulate herself or having held out any threat to strangulate herself or consume a poisonous substance. She also denied that she had been married against her wishes or that she was inclined to marry someone else. The averment made is that she was compelled by her dowry-greedy in-laws to leave the matrimonial house and to desert the respondent – husband. 8. The trial proceeded on the following issues:- “1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, as alleged? OPP 2. Relief.” 9. The learned Trial Court recorded finding in favour of the respondent-husband, and adverse to the appellant-wife and, on that premise, allowed the petition thereby ordering the dissolution of the marriage. 10. I have heard Mr. I.D. Singla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Vivek Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent and have carefully gone through the record. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-wife, in a bid to obtain invalidation of the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court, argued that the material obtaining on the file is not supportive of the finding and that there is enough evidence on the file to prove that the appellant-wife had always been ready and willing for the restitution of conjugal rights and it was always the respondent-husband who was disinclined in the relevant behalf. In support of the advocated view, the learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the fact that it was the appellant-wife who had filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act in the month of July, 2001. 12. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant-wife would appear to be attractive on the face of it but, on deeper analysis in the context of the material obtaining on the file, is found to be denuded of merit. The reasons therefor are as under:- 13. In the course of the petition, the husband had made the following precise allegation which, as per him, constituted act of cruelty which had been committed by the appellant-wife viz-a-viz the respondent-husband. 14. The reasons therefor are as under:- 13. In the course of the petition, the husband had made the following precise allegation which, as per him, constituted act of cruelty which had been committed by the appellant-wife viz-a-viz the respondent-husband. 14. She was thoroughly non cooperative from the very inception of the marriage and did not even allow the marriage to be consummated. Immediately after the marriage, she informed the respondent-husband and members of his family that she had been married to him against her wishes. She also told them that if she would be forced to stay at the matrimonial house, she would commit suicide either by strangulating herself or by consuming a poisonous substance. It was in the context of the above background that the respondent-husband made the allegation that the appellant-wife left the matrimonial house at different points of time. 15. There also was an averment, in the course of the petition, that the marriage between the parties was a simple affair. 16. Qua the above indicated averment (that the marriage was a simple affair, the wife offered a precise resistance by averring that it was at the instance of the respondent side that her father, who was otherwise not in a position to solemnise the marriage with pomp and show on account of financial incapacity, had to sell off his residential house in order to raise funds for solemnisation of the marriage with great pomp and show. This is one precise allegation which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant-wife to prove that the respondent-husband and members of his family had dowry-related greed and it is they only who insisted upon the solemnisation of the marriage with great pomp and show. We would first adjudicate upon the truthfulness or otherwise of that averment. 17. The averment in the pleadings that her father had to sell off his house to raise funds for solemnisation of marriage was followed up by the appellant-wife in the course of her affidavit Ex. RW2/A, which was tendered into evidence in lieu of her examination-in-chief, wherein she averred that her father spent more than Rs.7 lacs on the marriage. It was in the course of the cross-examination that she testified that she has no idea about when exactly did her father sell off the house. She also had no idea about the exact price it fetched. It was in the course of the cross-examination that she testified that she has no idea about when exactly did her father sell off the house. She also had no idea about the exact price it fetched. She did concede that her father purchased a new house again in the year 2004 but she had no idea about whether the new house purchased by father had an area bigger than the house sold by him in the year 1998. She also had no idea about whether her father is an income tax assessee or not. The fact that she was telling a lie is apparent from a perusal of testimony of RW-3 Raj Dulari, who is none else or other than the own mother of appellant-wife. It was in the course of cross-examination that she averred that though the recorded price of the house was Rs.50,000/-, it had actually been sold for Rs.4 lacs. Though initially she denied having been in the know of the fact about the consideration for which her husband had purchased a new house, she conceded in the latter part of the cross-examination that the new house purchased by her husband was bigger in size than the house sold by him. (“It is correct that the area of another house purchased by my husband was bigger than the area of house sold by my husband”). She also conceded that her husband is an income tax assessee. It is,thus, apparent from the above facts that sale proceeds of the previous house had not been utitilised for the solemnisation of the marriage of the parties on 28.2.2000, particularly when the appellant-wife had conceded (as correct) a suggestion that the house sold by her father in the year 1998 had fetched a price of Rs.50,000/-. Even otherwise, it is in her own statement that her engagement ceremony was performed on 28.1.2000. If that were so, it would be illogical to aver that the sale proceeds (Rs.50,000/-) of that house were utilised for raising funds to the tune of Rs. 7 lacs for solemnisation of the marriage on 28.2.2000. 18. The appellant-wife had further raised a plea that the respondent side had been raising various dowry demands from time to time and that the demands raised included an esteem car as well. 7 lacs for solemnisation of the marriage on 28.2.2000. 18. The appellant-wife had further raised a plea that the respondent side had been raising various dowry demands from time to time and that the demands raised included an esteem car as well. It was also in her testimony that she had filed criminal proceedings before the Women Cell of the police at Patiala and that she had also made complaints to the S.P., Yamuna Nagar. She proved Ex. PW5/1, Ex. PW6/1 and Ex. PW6/4, (the first to be copies of the complaints made by her to the Women Cell. The last indicated purports to be a statement she had made before the S.P., Yamuna Nagar). She conceded that all the three documents aforfementioned do not contain an averment about her having been subjected to any harassment on account of non fulfillment of the demand for a Maruti car and there also is no averment therein to the effect that a sum of Rs.50,000/- had been paid by her natal family on the occasion of Nirjala Akadashi and further she had been compelled to get her pregnancy terminated. With regard to Ex. PW5/1 she testified as under:- “It is correct that I had filed criminal proceedings against the petitioner in the Police Women Cell, Patiala. Ex.PW.5/1 is the same complaint. I do not know Panjabi vernacular. It is correct that at the time of making the complaint Ex.PW.5/1, I did not mention that I was being harassed for not handing over the esteem maruti car, Rs.50,000/- on the occasion of Nirajala Akadshi and the fact regarding the termination of pregnancy.” 19. Insofar as the complaint Ex. PW6/1 is concerned, she testified as under:- “It is correct that I alongwith my husband and his family members were summoned in the Women Cell. It is incorrect that the complaint filed by me was later on closed as no substance was found in the same. I do not know the fate of the complaint.” 20. Insofar as the statement Ex. PW6/4 is concerned, she testified as under:- “It is correct that in my statement before the S.P. Ex.PW.6/4 I have not narrated the fact regarding the demands made by the family of the petitioner and petitioner and the fact regarding the termination of my pregnancy.” 21. Insofar as the statement Ex. PW6/4 is concerned, she testified as under:- “It is correct that in my statement before the S.P. Ex.PW.6/4 I have not narrated the fact regarding the demands made by the family of the petitioner and petitioner and the fact regarding the termination of my pregnancy.” 21. If there was even an iota of truth in the allegations in the relevant behalf, there is no understandable reason why the relevant averment would not have found mention in the various complaints she made to the police at different points of time. It is apparent from the record that the relationship between the parties was far from easy by the time those complaints came to be made. In that view of things, it is illogical on her part to wriggle out of the predicament aforementioned by averring that she did not mention these facts as she “wanted to live in my matrimonial home in a peaceful manner and a cordial atmosphere.” 22. It is in her own statement that her husband and members of in-laws family were summoned to the Women Cell. Here, thus, was a case where the appellant-wife was responsible for getting her husband and member of her inlaws family summoned to the police. They had to undergo the agony of the facing of wrath of the police agency. In the light thereof, her having gone to the Court in a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is meaningless. If the appellant-wife was inclined to resume cohabitation , she ought to have considered the feasibility of having recourse to the other non-judicial forum for settlement. She cannot be heard to raise a plea of bonafides just because she happened to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act, particulary when she conceded, as correct, a suggestion that the petition under Section 9 of the Act was dismissed as withdrawn on 8.8.2003. Her clarification that she withdrew that petition only after the present petition under Section 13 of the Act came to be filed is neither here nor there. This petition came to be filed on 25.7.2001; whereas the petition under Section 9 of the Act came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 8.8.2003. There cannot, thus, possibly be any co-relation between the filing of the present petition and the withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Act by the appellant-wife. This petition came to be filed on 25.7.2001; whereas the petition under Section 9 of the Act came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 8.8.2003. There cannot, thus, possibly be any co-relation between the filing of the present petition and the withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Act by the appellant-wife. 23. In response to the precise averment by the respondent-husband that the appellant did not allow him to consummate the marriage, she raised a plea at the trial about the falsity of that averment and she proceeded to further raise a plea that she was compelled to undergo abortion. In order to cement that charge, she examined RW-1 Dr. (Mrs.) Prem Singla who was, at the relevant point of time i.e. 6.4.2000, functioning as Professional Consultant at City Hospital, Patiala. She is otherwise a Gynecologist. She testified, on the basis of discharge card, that Alka had been admitted to the City Hospital on 6.4.2000 and that her D & C (dilatation and curetagge) was done. That Doctor is no longer working over there. She left the City Hospital in November, 2000. She conceded that D & C could be done for various reasons and not only on account of pregnancy. It is in her statement that she had not conducted any D & C for the termination of pregnancy. Though she stated that it is evident from the discharge slip that it was a case of incomplete abortion, she withheld her final opinion saying that she cannot give the final opinion without going into the details of the record which had not been summoned for that date. The following question/response in her statement could clear the averment:- “Court Question: Explained as to whether you have treated the patient Alka and conducted the D & C for the partial/incomplete abortion? Answer: I cannot comment without going into the details of the complete record including the original discharge slip. “ 24. It cannot, thus, be said that the appellant-wife has been able to prove that she had been subjected to any dowry-related torture or that she had been forced to undergo abortion or further that she had been compelled to leave the matrimonial house. 25. “ 24. It cannot, thus, be said that the appellant-wife has been able to prove that she had been subjected to any dowry-related torture or that she had been forced to undergo abortion or further that she had been compelled to leave the matrimonial house. 25. The allegation by the appellant-wife that she had been turned out of the matrimonial house is falsified by the deposition on oath of her father to the effect that it was he who brought her from the matrimonial house as she telephonically informed him that she was being tortured and humiliated on account of her inability to meet their dowry demand.(“I brought my daughter with me on receiving a telephonic message from her that she was tortured and humiliated by the petitioner and his parents for not satisfying their demands.”) 26. The learned Trial Judge took notice of all relevant facets of the controversy and recorded record-based finding to the effect that the wife has not been able to establish the averments made by her. For advantage, we may refer to the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in the course of paras 23 to 30 of the judgment under challenge. 27. It is, thus, apparent from the above discussion that though the appellant wife had been to the law enforcement agency against the respondent-husband and other members of the family, the grievance ventilated over there did not include the allegation that she had been required to bring along a Maruti Car and that a sum of Rs.50,000/- had been paid by her natal family to her in-laws family on the occasion of Nirajala Akadshi and that she had been forced to abort the pregnancy. Further, the appellant-wife has not been able to prove that her father had to sell off their residential house only in order to be able to raise funds for the solemnisation of her marriage. The evidence available on the file is not able to prove any linkage between the sale off that house in the year 1998 and solemnisation of the marriage in the year 2000. In that context, it requires particular notice that the Income Tax Assessment record of the father of the appellant-wife was not produced at the trial and it is in evidence that he otherwise purchased a house (which is bigger than the house sold off by him in the year 1998). In that context, it requires particular notice that the Income Tax Assessment record of the father of the appellant-wife was not produced at the trial and it is in evidence that he otherwise purchased a house (which is bigger than the house sold off by him in the year 1998). This fact belie the averment of the appellant-wife that the respondent side was actuated by dowry greed and that it is only at the instance of the respondent side that her father had to raise funds (by the sale of his house to solemnise the marriage with great pomp and show. There is no acceptable evidence on the record to prove the allegation that the marriage had been indeed solemnised with great pomp and show. The finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge does not call for interference. The appeal is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed. --------------