Judgment :- COMMON ORDER: (Ramesh Ranganathan, J.) W.P. No.18256 of 2008 is filed seeking a direction to quash the show cause notice, issued by the respondent on 02.02.2007, as without jurisdiction. The petitioner seeks a further direction for refund, with interest, of Rs.1,73,76,124/- and return of all the documents seized by the respondent as stated in the panchanama. W.P. No.20446 of 2008 is filed seeking a direction to quash the show cause notice, issued by the respondent on 07.02.2007, as without jurisdiction. The petitioner seeks a further direction for refund, with interest, of Rs.25,40,591/- and return of all the documents seized by the respondent as referred to in the panchanama dated 27.10.2005. As the questions raised, in challenge to the impugned orders, are common in both the writ petitions they were heard together and are now being disposed of by this common order. 2. Both Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. Rajasekhar Reddy, learned Assistant Solicitor General would submit that the facts in W.P. No.18256 of 2008 are representative of both the writ petitions and it would suffice for their disposal to note, in brief, the facts stated therein. 3. The petitioner in W.P. No.18256 of 2008 is engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. They claim to have exported the medicines manufactured by them to various countries, more particularly to African nations, under the incentive scheme, i.e., Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB scheme), extended by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) exercising powers under the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 (Act 22 of 1992). 4. On the warrants issued by the second respondent, the office premises of the petitioner company, its Managing Director and others were searched on 27.10.2005 and certain documents were seized. On completion of investigation and, on the basis of the statements recorded, the impugned show cause notice dated 02.02.2007 was issued by the 1st respondent. It is stated therein that specific intelligence, gathered by the officers of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Regional Unit, Hyderabad, indicated that the FOB value, of the goods exported by the petitioner, were highly inflated to avail DEPB (Duty Entitlement Pass Book) benefits in a fraudulent manner and that they were bringing overseas remittances, through illicit channels, into their bank accounts in the guise of export proceeds. By the impugned proceedings the petitioner company, its Managing Director and others were, jointly and severally, called upon to show cause as to why:- 1. The consignments exported through Chennai Port, with a FOB value of Rs.111,88,77,595, should not be held liable for confiscation under Section 113(i) of the Customs Act, 1962; 2. The FOB value of Rs.111,88,77,595/- declared in the shipping bills should not be rejected and the DEPB credit availed by them for Rs.11,27,74,483/- should not be denied; 3. DEPB credit amounting to Rs.11,27,74,483/-, already availed by M/s VPL, should not be recovered under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 along with interest under Section 28 AB; 4. Penalty under Section 114-A of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on M/s VPL; 5. Penalty under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on the Managing Director of M/s VPL and others; and 6. The amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- paid by M/s VPL voluntarily should not be appropriated towards the DEPB credit availed by them fraudulently. They were also asked to show cause why :- (1) The foreign currency equivalent of Rs.97,89,61,683/- remitted into the account of M/s VPL, and already withdrawn, should not be held liable for confiscation under Section 111 (d) read with Section 120 of Customs Act, 1962; and (2) Penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on each of them. 5. In respect of exports made through Air Cargo Complex, Hyderabad, the petitioner company, its Managing Directors and others were called upon to show cause why :- (1) The consignments exported through Air Cargo Complex, Hyderabad with a FOB value of Rs.6,18,87,146/- should not be held liable for confiscation under Section 113(i) of the Customs Act, 1962; (2) The FOB value of Rs.6,18,87,146/-, declared in the shipping bills, should not be rejected and the DEPB credit availed by them for Rs.69,46,807/- should not be denied; (3) The DEPB credit for Rs.69,46,807/-, already availed by M/s VPL, should not be recovered under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 along with interest under Section 28 AB; (4) Penalty under Section 114-A of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on M/s VPL; and (5) Penalty under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on the Managing Director of M/s VPL and others. The Petitioner, its Managing Director and others were also called upon to show cause why:- (1) Foreign currency equivalent to Rs.5,53,87,268/-, remitted into the account of M/s VPL and already withdrawn, should not be held liable for confiscation under Section 111 (d) read with Section 120 of the Customs Act, 1962; and (2) Penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on each of them. 6. They were called upon to produce evidence which they intended to rely, in support of their defence, in their written statement. They were also called upon to indicate in writing whether they wished to be heard in person before the case was adjudicated. They were informed that the show cause notice was being issued without prejudice to any other action that may be initiated under the Customs Act, 1962 or any other law for the time being in force. Along with the show cause notice the documents relied upon were annexed. It is this, and a similar, show cause notice which are subjected to challenge in these writ petitions. 7. The proceedings, impugned in these writ petitions, are notices to show cause and not orders passed after hearing parties. Issuance of a show-cause notice contemplates that the response shall be considered and only thereafter will the matter be decided. The person asked to show cause has, therefore, full opportunity to satisfy the authorities that no action should be taken against him. (Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd., ( (1996) 10 SCC 520 )). The purpose of issuing a show-cause notice is to afford an opportunity of hearing and, once cause is shown, it is open to the authority to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed and only thereafter can a final decision be taken in the matter. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature. (State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma ( AIR 1987 SC 943 ); Divisional Forest Officer v. M. Ramalinga Reddy ( (2007) 9 SCC 286 )). 8. Ordinarily, a writ court would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same, inter alia, appears to have been issued without jurisdiction, (Brahm Datt Sharma2, Special Director v. Mohd. 8. Ordinarily, a writ court would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause unless the same, inter alia, appears to have been issued without jurisdiction, (Brahm Datt Sharma2, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse ( (2004)3 SCC 440 ), Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 ), Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh ( (1996)1 SCC 327 ), Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore ( (2001) 10 SCC 639 ) and Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra ( (2006) 12 SCC 33 ), particularly when the petitioner has an effective remedy under the Act itself. (State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd., ( (2007) 11 SCC 363 )). But these are limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves in exercise of their jurisdiction and are not matters of jurisdictional factors. (Union of India v. Hindalco Industries ( (2003) 5 SCC 194 )). It would, ordinarily, not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the authority/Tribunal to deal with jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision, on such a preliminary issue, sought before a High Court in its writ jurisdiction. (Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Workers ( AIR 1963 SC 569 ), M. Ramalinga Reddy (supra)). However, the self-imposed restrictions on the High Court not to entertain a writ petition, if another effective and efficacious remedy is available, will not operate as a bar where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. (Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks ( (1998) 8 SCC 1 )). 9. In very rare and exceptional cases, the High Court can quash a show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction. A show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action as it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party. It is quite possible that, after considering the reply to the show-cause notice, the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the allegations are not established. A show-cause notice does not infringe the rights of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment, or otherwise adversely affecting a party, is passed that the said party can be said to have any grievance. (Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra)). 10. A show-cause notice does not infringe the rights of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment, or otherwise adversely affecting a party, is passed that the said party can be said to have any grievance. (Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra)). 10. On the other hand, where the threat of a prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, a person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be caused to him before seeking the court’s protection. If, however, the authority had the power in law to issue the show cause notice it would not be open to the person, asked to show cause, to approach the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice. (Chief of Army Staff v. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety ( (1985) 2 SCC 412 )). 11. The jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not be permitted to be invoked in order to challenge a show-cause notice unless, accepting the facts in the show-cause notice to be correct, the show-cause notice is, ex facie, without jurisdiction, (State of U.P. v. Anil Kumar Ramesh Chandra Glass Works ( (2005) 11 SCC 451 )), i.e., the notice is ex facie a ‘nullity’ or non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into the facts or totally “without jurisdiction” in the traditional sense of that expression — i.e., even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the face of it, and without anything more, is totally unauthorised. In all other cases, it is only appropriate that the party shows cause before the authority concerned and takes up the objection regarding jurisdiction therein. (Ramesh Kumar Singh (supra), Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra), M. Ramalinga Reddy (supra)). 12. Mere assertion by the petitioner that a notice is without jurisdiction would not suffice. It should, prima facie, be established to be so. Where factual adjudication is necessary interference is, ordinarily, ruled out. (Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories ( (2007) 13 SCC 270 )). Whether the show-cause notice is founded on any legal premise is a jurisdictional issue which can be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues can also be, initially, adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice before the aggrieved can approach the court. (Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra); M. Ramalinga Reddy (supra)). 13. Whether the show-cause notice is founded on any legal premise is a jurisdictional issue which can be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues can also be, initially, adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice before the aggrieved can approach the court. (Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (supra); M. Ramalinga Reddy (supra)). 13. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly note the allegations in the show cause notice. The case of the respondents, in short, is that M/s. Venkat Pharma Limited and M/s. Sravani Implex Pvt. Ltd, both sister concerns, exported goods, under the export promotion scheme viz., DEPB, during the years 2000-2005 mostly to African countries, that, at the relevant time, the scheme provided incentives in the form of credit certificates, between 12% to 15% on the value of exports, which was required to be utilized for payment of customs duty, that, in order to gain undue advantage of the scheme, the petitioner had inflated the value of exports several times, that the over invoiced amounts were remitted into the petitioner’s account by hawala operations, that one such hawala operator Sri Gollapudi Venu was engaged in the call diversion racket in U.S.A. & U.K. i.e., illegal diversion of telephone calls through VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol), that the amounts so earned had to be sent to India despite absence of a legal channel, that the petitioner required foreign remittances into their bank accounts to project the same as sale proceeds in order to gain DEPB benefits on the overvalued export goods, that, in order to circumvent the legal channel of sending money to India, certain individuals had paid M/s. Essvi Associates and M/s. PVS Corporation with a request that the amounts paid by them be transferred to their kith and kin in India, that the amounts so collected were remitted by these companies into the account of VPL in the guise of sale proceeds, that these remittances exceeded Rs. 100 crores, that the petitioner had floated companies in Nairobi, South Africa and USA, that they had fabricated/prepared purchase orders in their office at Hyderabad, had shown these firms as purchasers of the supplies made by the petitioner to African countries,that M/s. Essvi Associates and M/s. PVS Corporation had transferred funds through these floated firms also, that foreign exchange, equivalent to Rs.32 crores, was remitted into the petitioner’s account by Sri G. Venu, KRK International and M/s. PVS. Corporation, that these remittances were not the sale proceeds of the goods exported and, as such, the petitioner was not eligible to claim DEPB, that the petitioner, on receipt of such foreign currency in their account, had obtained Bank Realisation Certificates (BRC) from the respective banks and had produced them, as proof of realization of sale proceeds, along with the shipping bill endorsed by the Customs authorities as proof of export, that, by submitting such documents to the DGFT, they had obtained credit certificates, ranging from 12% to 15% of the inflated value of exports, that the petitioner had opened 22 bank accounts in fictitious names affixing photographs of their junior level employees, that the foreign remittances were transferred from the petitioner’s account into these accounts from which cash was withdrawn and paid to G. Venu, that introduction, for all these fictitious bank accounts, was given by the Managing Director of the petitioner company and the signatures of all these account holders were impersonated by the General Manager of the petitioner company, (a first cousin of the Managing Director and Directors of VPL), that the total value of the transactions in these fictitious accounts was around Rs.120 crores, that the petitioner had also exported narcotic drugs, prohibited under NDPS Act viz., Ephedrine, in the guise of regular medicines to African countries during the years 2000 to 2002, that the ephedrine tablets so exported to African countries were sold at 1000 US$ per carton for a total value of Rs.10 crores, that the amounts so collected were also transferred in the guise of sale proceeds of regular medicines through M/s. Relian e Pharma Limited, a company floated by the petitioner at Nairobi, Kenya, that they had also availed DEPB credit on such illegal supplies of narcotic drugs exported in the guise of regular medicines, that a complaint had been lodged before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and that the trial was nearing conclusion. 14. 14. While elaborate oral and written submissions are made both by Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. Rajasekhara Reddy, Learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, only those contentions relating to the jurisdiction of the respondent to issue the show cause notice are being noted and dealt with, for, if this contention were not to find acceptance, the petitioners must be relegated to their remedy of submitting their reply/objections to the said show cause notices. 15. Before examining the rival contentions it is necessary to note that medicines were notified as eligible for export incentives under the DEPB Scheme. The scheme required exporters to file a shipping bill in the prescribed form. GR forms, prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India, were also required to be filed along with the export documents to show the value of the goods exported and the extent of realization of export proceeds. On receipt of export proceeds, in convertible foreign currencies, the BRC issued by the receiving bank was to be produced before the Customs Officer who was required to verify whether it tallied with the export value declared in the Shipping Bill. On completion of verification, the Customs officer was required to make an endorsement, on the DEPB, under his signature and seal, certifying the fulfillment of export obligations under the relevant bill. He was also required to endorse the export quantity, and the amount of DEPB credit available to the exporter, in the DEPB. The DEPB, along with the customs endorsement, was then required to be forwarded to the DGFT who was empowered to sanction and grant advance DEPB licenses/scrips specifying the extent of credit available under the scrip. These DEPB scrips enabled import of duty free goods for the amounts mentioned therein. The license was issued by the DGFT only after the goods were exported and export proceeds were fully realized. These DEPB licenses/scrips were also freely sold in the market. 16. These DEPB scrips enabled import of duty free goods for the amounts mentioned therein. The license was issued by the DGFT only after the goods were exported and export proceeds were fully realized. These DEPB licenses/scrips were also freely sold in the market. 16. Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that Customs officers had no jurisdiction to deal either with grant of DEPB credit or its withdrawal even when it was established that such DEPB credit was granted without justification, that the DEPB licence had been granted, by the DGFT, under Act 22 of 1992, that, under Circular No15/97 dated 3.6.1997 issued by the Central Government, it was only the licencing authority ie., DGFT who had the power to grant credit at the rates notified, that, in case of violation, the DGFT alone had the power to withdraw or claim back the credit and that the impugned notices were, therefore, without jurisdiction. Placing reliance on Union of India v. Asian Foods ( (2006) 12 SCALE 105 ) and Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai v. Vishal Exports Overseas Ltd. ((2007) Vol.209 ELT 331), learned counsel would contend that the provisions of the Customs Act are not applicable to withdrawal of DEPB credit in the absence of a notification of prohibition issued under Sections 3(2) and (3) of Act 22 of 1992 and that the Customs authorities lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings to impose penalties outside the Customs Act and under Act 22 of 1992. Learned Counsel would also rely on Economic Traders (Gujarat) Limited v. Union of India (2006 (TLS) 216292), Pradip Polyfils Pvt Ltd. v. Union of India (2004 (173) ELT 3), Kanhaiya Exports v. Commissioner of Customs ( 2001 (133) ELT 280 ), and Vishal Exports Overseas Ltd. (supra) ). 17. Learned Counsel would also rely on Economic Traders (Gujarat) Limited v. Union of India (2006 (TLS) 216292), Pradip Polyfils Pvt Ltd. v. Union of India (2004 (173) ELT 3), Kanhaiya Exports v. Commissioner of Customs ( 2001 (133) ELT 280 ), and Vishal Exports Overseas Ltd. (supra) ). 17. Sri A. Rajasekhar Reddy, Learned Assistant Solicitor General, would submit that the DEPB Scheme was covered by Customs Notifications dated 07.04.1997 and 22.04.2002 which were in the nature of customs duty notifications/ exemption notifications, that an authority which granted exemption had the power to cause an enquiry for the purpose of satisfying itself that the exporter had complied with the conditions of the exemption notification and the licence under which he had availed the benefit, that such an enquiry was conducted on post exports and it was found that the petitioner had obtained DEPB scrips in a fraudulent manner, that, as DEPB credit scrips were in the nature of Customs duty, they fell under the ambit of Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 in case of fraud or mis-declaration and that the only course open to the Government was to demand the credit (customs duty). 18. Relying on Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, A.P., Vs. Suresh Jhunjhunwala ( 2006(203) E.L.T. 353 ), Om Prakash Bhatia v. Commissioner of Customs, Delhi (( 2003 (155) E.L.T. 423 (S.C.)), Gurucharan Singh v. DRI (Judgment in Crl.A. No. 576 of 2008, dated 01.04.2008), Commissioner of Customs v. Brown ( 2007 (10) SCC 396 ) and R.A. International v. Union of India (2005 (192) E.L.T. 101), Learned Assistant Solicitor General would submit that the petitioner's liability for confiscation of the export goods, and consequential penalties as envisaged under Section 113(i) and 114 of the Customs Act, 1962, was not wiped out merely because they had already exported the prohibited goods. He would submit that both Act 22 of 1992 and the Customs Act contained similar/parallel powers for the purpose of administering the particular Act/Scheme, that the primary responsibility of the Customs authorities was to investigate any irregularity committed by the licence holder which resulted in illegal availment of DEPB credit and that the overlapping provisions in both the enactments had to be interpreted harmoniously keeping in view that these provisions were meant to regulate import/export of goods. 19. 19. In Asian Foods (supra), the Central Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 5 of Act 22 of 1992 read with para 1.3 and para 2.1 of the Foreign Trade Policy, issued notification dated 4.7.2006 to the effect that the transititional arrangement, notified earlier in the Foreign Trade Policy, 2006, would not apply to export of pulses against irrevocable letters of credit opened on or after 22.6.2006 as its decision to prohibit export of pulses was announced, and had been widely publicized, on 22.6.2006 in the electronic and print media. It is this notification dated 04.07.2006 which was subjected to challenge before the Delhi High Court which allowed the writ petition. In the appeal preferred thereagainst, by the Union of India, the Supreme Court held that the power under Section 3 of Act 22 of 1992 was required to be exercised in the manner provided for under Section 5 of the said Act, that the provisions of Act 22 of 1992, the Foreign Trade Policy and the procedure laid down thereunder, provided for a composite scheme, that, in implementing the said provisions of the Scheme and, in the event an order of prohibition, restriction or regulation was passed, the provisions of the Customs Act would, mutatis mutandis, apply. The Supreme Court further observed that, in interpreting the provisions of Act 22 of 1992, the policy laid down and the procedures framed thereunder vis a vis the provisions of the Customs Act, the rate of customs duty had no relevance, what was relevant for the said purpose was the permission accorded by the proper officer granting clearance for exports and that, as soon as such permission was granted, the procedure laid down for export must be held to have been complied with. The questions which arise in the present case, as to whether Customs officers have jurisdiction to withdraw customs duty exemption, and pass an order of confiscation and penalty, on detection of fraudulent over-invoicing of exports made for the purpose of claiming excess DEPB credit, and illegal remittances of foreign exchange through hawala operators in the guise of export proceeds, did not fall for consideration in Asian Foods (supra). 20. In Economic Traders (Gujarat) limited (supra), the petitioner presented 30 shipping bills for export of goods under the DEPB scheme. The Customs authorities, after verification, permitted export thereof. 20. In Economic Traders (Gujarat) limited (supra), the petitioner presented 30 shipping bills for export of goods under the DEPB scheme. The Customs authorities, after verification, permitted export thereof. Later, the petitioner presented the DEPB scrips to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs for verification of the details of export and, as the original DEPB licences were not returned after verification, they invoked the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court. It is in this factual matrix that the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the overall scheme of DEPB was that a certain percentage of credit, on the FOB value of exports, was granted at specified rates by the DGFT, that, while issuing DEPB, the licensing authority was required to ensure that the numbers and dates of the shipping bills, FOB values etc. were endorsed thereupon and, before allowing imports against DEPB, the Customs authorities were required to verify whether the details of exports, as given in the DEPB, tallied with their records. The Division Bench, while observing that the view taken by it was similar to the one adopted by the Bombay High Court in Pradip Polyfils Pvt Ltd. (supra), held that it was apparent from the Scheme that determination of credit, under the DEPB, fell within the domain of the licensing authority i.e., the DGFT, that the role of Customs authorities was limited to the verification of details on the DEPB to ascertain whether they tallied with their records and nothing more, that once the licensing authority, on a consideration of the application of the exporter, held that the goods exported were eligible for benefits under the DEPB scheme, it was not open to the Customs authorities to sit in appeal against such an order, that when the licensing authority had held that the export product was covered under the DEPB scheme, and had issued a DEPB licence, the Customs authorities were not entitled to take the stand that the export goods were not covered under the DEPB scheme as the question of the petitioner’s entitlement to credit, under the DEPB licence issued by the licensing authority, was beyond the bounds of their authority and jurisdiction. 21. 21. In Pradip Polyfils Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the question which fell for consideration was whether, in respect of export of articles of Polypropylene effected prior to the amendment of the public notice on 15.12.1999, the Customs authorities were justified in holding that, as it was not covered under Chapter 39 of the ITC classification, the petitioners were not eligible for benefits under the DEPB Scheme. The application made by the petitioners, seeking DEPB licence, was in respect of Polypropylene filter plates and accessories. The Licensing Authority had issued DEPB licences enabling them to avail the benefit of the Scheme in respect of the above goods. It was contended before the Bombay High Court that, as no discrepancy in the description, quantity and FOB value of the export product was found by the Customs authorities, it was not open to them to deny the petitioners the benefit of the DEPB Scheme. The Bombay High Court held that, under Circular No.15/97 dated 3.6.1997, verification by the Customs authorities was restricted to the description, quantity and FOB value of the export product set out in the Shipping Bill, that it was not the case of the Customs authorities that there was any discrepancy in the description, quantity and FOB value of the export product and, under these circumstances when the DEPB licence was issued by the Licensing authorities specifically holding that the petitioners were entitled to avail benefits of the DEPB Scheme in respect of Polypropylene filter plates and accessories, the Customs authorities were not justified in rejecting the petitioners’ claim on the ground that the articles exported by them were not covered under Chapter 39 ITC (HS) classification. The Bombay High Court further held that the question, whether an item fell under Chapter 39 of ITC classification or not, was for the licensing authorities to consider before issuing the licence, that, even after issuance of the licences, the licencing authorities had not taken any steps to declare that the said licences were wrongly issued and, once the licencing authorities had held that the export product was covered under the DEPB Scheme and had issued the DEPB licence, it was not open to the Customs authorities to hold that the said export was not covered under the DEPB Scheme. 22. 22. In Kanhaiya Export (supra) the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court praying for the return of DEPB licenses, and for being allowed benefits under the DEPB Scheme. The Calcutta High Court held that Act 22 of 1992 was a complete code in so far as the method of issuance, suspension and cancellation of licences was concerned, that, by the impugned Circular, the legislative provision had been sought to be amended, that the said Circular interfered with the authority of the DGFT, that DEPB licenses were issued under Act 22 of 1992 by another authority, that the nature and character of the licence depended upon the policy of the Central Government and that the benefits of a licence under the Act could not be taken away by a circular. The Learned Judge further held that the Customs authorities, and the DGFT, operated in different and distinct fields, that one could not sit in appeal over the other, that, merely because DEPB licences were forged in a few instances, each and every person could not be denied return of the DEPB licences within time, that such licences could not be held up for an indefinite period on the apprehension of fraud. 23. Unlike Kanhaiya Exports (supra) where there was a mere apprehension of fraud, in the present case the allegations in the show cause notice is that the petitioner had resorted to fraud and deceipt. Reliance placed by Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the judgments of the Calcutta High Court in Kanhiaya Exports (supra), the Bombay High Court in Pradip Polyfils Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and the Gujarat High Court in Economic Traders (Gujarat) Ltd. (supra) is misplaced as the questions which fell for consideration therein did not relate to fraudulent over-invoicing of exports or illegal remittances of foreign exchange through hawala operators. 24. In Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) among the questions, which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court, was whether over-invoicing of goods for export meant attempt to export “prohibited goods”? 24. In Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) among the questions, which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court, was whether over-invoicing of goods for export meant attempt to export “prohibited goods”? The Supreme Court held that prohibition of importation or exportation could be subject to certain prescribed conditions to be fulfilled before or after clearance of the goods, that, if the conditions were not fulfilled, it may amount to “prohibited goods”, that Section 14 read with Section 2(41) of the Customs Act could be applied for determining the value of the goods sought to be exported and to find out whether the export value was truly stated in the shipping bill and, on a conjoint reading of Section 2(41) and Section 14 of the Customs Act with Section 18 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, (which required the exporter to furnish to the prescribed authority, in the prescribed form, a declaration of the true material particulars including the amount representing the full market export value of the goods i.e., the full and true sale consideration – export value of the goods), in cases where the export value was not correctly stated and there was intentional over-invoicing for some other purpose it would then amount to violation of the conditions of export of goods and that, over-invoicing of export goods, would result in illegal/irregular transactions in foreign currency. The order of the Commissioner, imposing redemption of fine and levy of penalty, was upheld. 25. In Gurucharan Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, having taken note of the interpretation placed on the words “prohibited goods” in its earlier judgment in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra), and the observations in Suresh Jhunjhunwala (supra), that, in order to find out whether the export value was truly stated in the shipping bill, Section 14 (1) read with Section 2(41) of the Customs Act could be referred to for determining the true export value of the goods sought to be exported, held that, as the petitioner was alleged to have floated fictitious firms with the dishonest intention of obtaining duty draw back, prima facie, an offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act was made out. 26. 26. In Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi v. Brooks International ( (2007) 10 SCC 396 ), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence detained the export consignment on noting that, prima facie, the goods did not tally with the description, quantity and value disclosed in the bills. The Commissioner of Customs directed confiscation of all the goods under Sections 113(d) and (i) of the Act and allowed redemption thereof on payment of fine of Rs.10,00,000/-. The appeals preferred thereagainst were allowed by the Tribunal on the ground that there was no power of confiscation and no material had been placed on record to suggest that the goods did not correspond to any material entry made in the bills. The appeal preferred thereagainst was allowed by the Supreme Court, following the earlier larger bench judgment in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra), and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for its fresh consideration keeping in view the principles set out in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra). 27. In Rajan Ghoshal v. Union of India (2002(148) E.L.T. 3) the Calcutta High Court held that, in cases where the shipping bill or the export bill included over-invoicing and the declaration was alleged to be incorrect, liability accrued at the stage of Sections 50 and 51, that the act or omission, at the stage of exportation, or at the stage of attempt to exportation, formed the basis of the liability, that, on account of this liability, the goods could be subjected to confiscation and penalty under Sections 113 and 114, even if the attempt to export was successful, and the goods were actually exported, that an attempt to export improperly did not become proper exportation merely on the basis of the clearance given, when it was really an improper exportation and, where there was reason to believe that the goods were liable for confiscation, Sections 113 could be resorted to. 28. In Vishal Exports Overseas Ltd (supra), the Supreme Court, while agreeing with the contention that Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) related to a draw-back scheme, and not a DEPB scheme, held that the factor of over-invoicing was found established in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) whereas in the case before it, on the factual aspect also, the FOB price could not be said to be inflated and, therefore, the said judgment was of no consequence and help to the revenue. 29. 29. In Suresh Jhunjhunwala (supra), two exporters filed shipping bills claiming post-export benefits under the DEPB scheme. The goods were intercepted on the suspicion that cheap garments were being exported by the said two firms grossly mis-declaring the description and heavily over-invoicing the value of the goods. On examination it was found that all the goods were ladies nightwear shaped garments small, uneven and unshaped which could not be worn even by children. A notice was issued to the said firms calling upon them to show cause why the exports should not be denied the benefits of the DEPB scheme, why DEPB credit covered, under the said Shipping Bills, should not be confiscated under Section 113(d), (h) and (i) of the Customs Act and a penalty under Section 114(i) should not be imposed. The Commissioner of Customs denied DEPB credit for the said exports, confiscated the goods and directed that they be released on payment of redemption fine. Penalty under Section 114(i) of the Act was also imposed. The appeal, preferred thereagainst, was allowed by CESTAT on the ground that the goods, not being “prohibited goods”, were not liable for confiscation, that over valuation had not been established as no expert evidence was let in and cross-examination of witnesses had not been permitted. In the appeal preferred thereagainst, by the Commissioner of Customs, the Supreme Court held that the definition of prohibited goods was broad and brought within its sweep not only import or export of goods which was subject to any “prohibition” under the Act but also under any other law for the time being in force and that the power of confiscation would arise under both the situations. The Supreme Court further held that, even though the decision in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) related to a matter concerning a drawback scheme, decisions of the Supreme Court could not be brushed aside and the question had to be considered having regard to the definition “prohibited goods”, and “export goods”. The order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter remanded back for its consideration afresh. 30. In R.A. International (supra) a show cause issued, and an order passed, by the DGFT stopping all exim benefits to the petitioner was under challenge on the ground that the DGFT had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. The order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter remanded back for its consideration afresh. 30. In R.A. International (supra) a show cause issued, and an order passed, by the DGFT stopping all exim benefits to the petitioner was under challenge on the ground that the DGFT had no jurisdiction to pass the said order. The Calcutta High Court held that the show cause notice was founded on allegations of fraudulent mis-representation of facts in the application filed for obtaining DEPB, that these DEPB licences were obtained after exports were effected and, if the information furnished by the applicant as to the factum of export was found not to be correct by the Customs authorities, the DGFT had no jurisdiction to decide whether or not there was fraudulent export. The Learned Judge held that the question whether the export was lawful or not could not be gone into by the DGFT and that, under the provisions of the Customs Act, the Customs Authorities were alone entitled to examine this aspect. 31. Taking the show cause notices at face value, and accepting the allegations made therein as true, the petitioner would not have been entitled to claim the benefit of DEPB credit i.e., import duty exemption but for the false declaration in the shipping bill. The DEPB scrips, fraudulently obtained by the petitioner, has resulted in the revenue being deprived of the Customs (Import) duty legitimately due to them. In Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that, as the clearance order, was obtained by fraudulent means, it would not bar issuance of a show cause notice for confiscation of the goods, that fraud, if established, unravelled all, that an order, when obtained by fraudulent means, did not have to be set aside before the ill-effects of the fraud could be set right by initiation of the process of confiscation of the fraudulently cleared goods. 32. Fraud unravels all. Questions regarding lack of jurisdiction of Customs officers to demand repayment of customs duty benefits, extended earlier to the petitioner by way of DEPB scrips, must be examined in the context of the allegations in the impugned show cause notice that the DEPB scrips were obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation. 33. 32. Fraud unravels all. Questions regarding lack of jurisdiction of Customs officers to demand repayment of customs duty benefits, extended earlier to the petitioner by way of DEPB scrips, must be examined in the context of the allegations in the impugned show cause notice that the DEPB scrips were obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation. 33. Section 3(2) of Act 22 of 1992 enables the Central Government to make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise regulating in all cases, or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions if any, the export of goods. Section 3(3) provides that all goods, to which any order under sub-section (2) applies, shall be deemed to be goods the export of which has been prohibited under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 2(33) of the Customs Act defines “prohibited goods” to mean any goods, the import or export of which is subject to any prohibition under the Act or any other law for the time being in force. ‘Prohibited goods’, as defined in Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, would bring within its ambit goods whose export is subject to any prohibition, if not under the Customs Act, under any other law for the time being in force. Section 2(16) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines “entry”, in relation to goods, to include an entry made in a shipping bill. Section 2(19) defines “export goods” to mean any goods which are to be taken out of India to a place outside India. Section 2(22) defines “goods” to include currency, negotiable instruments and any other kind of moveable property. Section 2(37) defines “shipping bill” to mean a shipping bill referred to in Section 50. Section 2(41) defines “value”, in relation to any goods, to mean the value thereof determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14. Section 11(1) of the Customs Act empowers the Central Government to prohibit, subject to such conditions to be fulfilled before or after clearance, the export of goods. Section 2(41) defines “value”, in relation to any goods, to mean the value thereof determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14. Section 11(1) of the Customs Act empowers the Central Government to prohibit, subject to such conditions to be fulfilled before or after clearance, the export of goods. Section 14 relates to “valuation of goods” and, under sub-section (1) thereof, for the purpose of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or any other law for the time being in force, the value of export goods shall be the price actually paid when sold for export from India for delivery at the time and place of importation, subject to such other conditions as may be specified in the rules made in that behalf. Rule 2(i) of the Foreign Trade Rules, 1993, made under Act 22 of 1992, defines “value” to have the meaning assigned to it in clause (41) of Section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 7(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 requires every exporter of goods to furnish a declaration, in such form and in such manner as may be specified, containing true and correct material particulars, including the amount representing the full export value which the exporter expects to receive on the sale of goods in the market outside India. Regulation 3(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2000 requires every exporter of goods to furnish to the specified authority a declaration in one of the forms set out in the Schedule, and supported by such evidence as may be specified, containing the true and material particulars representing the full export value of the goods. “Form (SDF)” is the form prescribed for declaration under Regulation 3(1). The said form requires the exporter to furnish the shipping bill number and its date, to declare that the particulars in the shipping bill are true, that the value, as contracted with the buyer, is the full export value declared in the shipping bill and that the exporter would tell the bank the full export value of the goods in the manner specified in the Foreign Exchange Management Act. Section 50(2) of the Customs Act requires the exporter, while presenting a shipping bill, to subscribe at the foot thereof a declaration as to the truth of its contents. 34. Section 50(2) of the Customs Act requires the exporter, while presenting a shipping bill, to subscribe at the foot thereof a declaration as to the truth of its contents. 34. Circular No.15/97 (Cus) dated 03.06.1997, on which strong reliance is placed by Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, prescribes the guidelines for determination/verification of the Present Market Value (PMV) under the DEPB scheme. It refers to the earlier Circular No.10/97 whereby detailed guidelines, for operation of the Duty Entitlement Pass-Book Scheme, were issued and notes that Circular No.10/97 provided for exporters to declare, in the Shipping Bill, the Serial No. of the export products in the Public Notice issued by the DGFT, the rate claimed and for the correctness of this declaration to be verified while processing the Shipping Bill and at the time of examination of the goods. Under Circular No.15 of 1997, while re-examining the matter, it was decided that the role of the Customs authorities should be confined to verification of the correctness of the exporter’s declaration regarding description, quantity and f.o.b value of the export product and that it would be for the Licensing authorities, granting credit, to ensure that credit was permitted by them at the correct rate as notified by the DGFT. Circular No.15/97 further provides that the declared PMV may also be verified, by the proper officers of Customs, at the time of examination of goods as was done in the case of drawback shipping bills, that, upon examination of the goods, where the Examining Officer finds that, in view of the quality or conditions of the goods, prima facie, the PMV declared, or the f.o.b. price, was unduly high, the matter may be referred to the Assistant Commissioner (Export) along with a sample of the goods wherever possible and, in such cases, the PMV may be verified/determined through market enquiries or by such process as the Assistant Commissioner (Customs) may direct. Circular No.15/97 dated 03.06.1997 recognises the similarity between DEPB and a duty draw back scheme when it provides that the declared PMV may also be verified by the proper officers of customs at the time of examination of goods as was done in the case of drawback shipping bills. 35. The law laid down in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in Gurucharan Singh (supra) and Brooks International (supra). 35. The law laid down in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in Gurucharan Singh (supra) and Brooks International (supra). The Supreme Court, in Suresh Jhunjhunwala (supra), applied the law laid down in Om Prakash Bhatia (supra) (which related to a duty draw back scheme) also to the DEPB scheme. 36. The impugned show cause notices allege that the petitioner had made a false declaration in the shipping bill and that the value of the goods mentioned therein did not reflect the actual price payable for the export goods as stipulated under Section 14 of the Customs Act. 37. While it is true that no notification of prohibition has been issued in this regard under Sections 3(2) and (3) of Act 22 of 1992, if the conditions to be fulfilled, before or after clearance of export goods, are not fulfilled, it may also amount to “prohibited goods” (Omprakash Bhatia (supra)). On a conjoint reading of Section 2(37), 2(41), Section 14 and 50 of the Customs Act with Section 7(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act and Regulation 3(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2000, it must be held that, in cases where the export value is not correctly stated in the shipping bill there is intentional over-invoicing by not mentioning the true sale consideration of the goods. It would then amount to violation of the conditions for export of goods and, as the conditions for a valid export as aforementioned have not been fulfilled, it would amount to “prohibited goods” in which event the provisions of the Customs Act would be attracted. 38. Under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, when any duty has not been levied, or has been short levied, the proper officer may serve a notice on the person chargeable with the said duty requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice. Section 28(1-A) relates to levy of interest under Section 28AB and levy of penalty equal to 25%. DEPB scrips are Customs duty exemption benefits in as much as they are utilized for import of goods and, to the extent of credit available in the DEPB scrips, goods can be imported without payment of import duty on such goods. Section 28(1-A) relates to levy of interest under Section 28AB and levy of penalty equal to 25%. DEPB scrips are Customs duty exemption benefits in as much as they are utilized for import of goods and, to the extent of credit available in the DEPB scrips, goods can be imported without payment of import duty on such goods. As Customs duty was not paid, to the extent of credit available in DEPB scrips issued on the basis of fraudulent over-invoicing of export goods, the Customs Officer is entitled, under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, to demand payment thereof. As the DEPB scrips have, admittedly, been sold to third parties, the only course open to the Customs Officers is to demand repayment of DEPB credit (i.e., Customs (Import) duty) from the petitioner. Exercise of power to make such a demand is referable to Section 28(1) of the Customs Act. The impugned show cause notices, which propose a demand for repayment of DEPB credit under Section 28(1) as it was availed by resort to fraudulent over-valuation of export consignments, cannot be said to have been issued without jurisdiction. 39. Section 113 relates to confiscation of goods attempted to be improperly exported and, under clause (i) thereof, any goods entered for exportation which do not correspond in respect of value, or in any material particulars, with the entry made under the Act, shall be liable to confiscation. Section 114 relates to penalty for attempt to export goods improperly. Under Section 114A, where duty has not been levied or has been short levied or interest has not been charged or paid by reason of collusion or any willful mis-statement or suppression of facts, the person who is liable to duty or interest as the case may be, as determined under Section 28(2), shall also be liable to pay penalty equal to the duty or interest so determined. The goods entered for exportation, which do not correspond in respect of value, or any material particulars with the entry made under the Act, are liable for confiscation. For a false entry made in the shipping bill Section 113 (i) of the Customs Act, read with Section 2(16) thereof, empowers Customs officers to confiscate the goods. The liability of fraudulently exported goods to confiscation arises, under Section 113, as soon as the goods are attempted to be exported which, necessarily, precedes its actual export. For a false entry made in the shipping bill Section 113 (i) of the Customs Act, read with Section 2(16) thereof, empowers Customs officers to confiscate the goods. The liability of fraudulently exported goods to confiscation arises, under Section 113, as soon as the goods are attempted to be exported which, necessarily, precedes its actual export. There is no provision in the Customs Act to suggest that this accrued liability is wiped out or is extinguished with the exportation of the goods. It may be that, after the goods are exported, the liability for confiscation may not be enforceable by physical confiscation of the goods. Personal penalty under Section 114 is attracted as soon as the goods incur liability to confiscation under Section 113 and such liability arises when the goods are attempted to be exported contrary to any “prohibition”. The liability of personal penalty provided in Section 114 of the Act, which arises with the accrual of the liability of the goods to confiscation under Section 113 of the Act at the stage of the attempt to export the said goods, clearly remains and the said liability is capable of enforcement. (Euresian Equipment and Chemicals Limited v. Collector of customs (1980 (Vol.6) ELT 38, (Calcutta High Court) ). 40. Section 2 (d) of Act 22 of 1992 defines “Director-General” to mean the person appointed under Section 6. Section 2(g) defines “licence” to mean a licence to import or export and includes a customs clearance permit and any other permission issued or granted under the Act. Section 6(1) of Act 22 of 1992 enables the Central Government to appoint any person to be the Director-General of Foreign Trade for the purposes of the Act. Section 9(2) empowers the Director General to grant or renew a licence to import such class or classes of goods as may be prescribed. Section 9(4) empowers him to suspend or cancel any licence granted under the Act. While Section 9(4), of Act 22 of 1992, enables the DGFT to cancel the DEPB licence/scrip, such cancellation can only be done prior to its utilization by the exporter as revocation of such a licence after its utilization would be an empty ritual and an exercise in futility. While Section 9(4), of Act 22 of 1992, enables the DGFT to cancel the DEPB licence/scrip, such cancellation can only be done prior to its utilization by the exporter as revocation of such a licence after its utilization would be an empty ritual and an exercise in futility. Mere cancellation of license, without anything more, would also result in immunity being conferred on exporters to make fraudulent exports which is not the purpose for which the DEPB scheme was made. Once the benefits, of the fraudulently obtained DEPB scrips, have been utilized by the exporters, or on its sale by third parties the only course open is to demand repayment of the credit (customs duty) under Section 28 of the Customs Act as, otherwise, the very purpose of framing the DEPB Scheme would be defeated. 41. Section 25 of the Customs Act relates to the power to grant exemption from duty. Under sub-section (1) thereof, if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt generally, either absolutely or subject to such conditions to be fulfilled before or after clearance as may be specified in the notification, goods of any description from the whole or any part of the customs duty leviable thereon. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, Customs Notification No. 45/2002 dated 22.04.2002 was issued i.e., “Customs Exemption notification for DEPB”. Under the said notification, the Central Government exempted certain goods from customs duty subject to the condition that the importer was issued a DEPB by the Licencing Authority at the rate notified by the Government of India for the products exported and that the DEPB is produced before the Customs officer for debit of the duties leviable on the goods but for the exemption contained in Notification No. 45 of 2002. Under the proviso, exemption of duty was not to be admissible if there was insufficient credit in the DEPB for debiting the duty leviable on the goods but for the exemption. It is evident that the DEPB Scheme, as covered by Customs Notifications dated 22.04.2002, is a customs duty exemption notification. The power to exempt would include within its ambit the power to demand duty in the event such exemption is misused. 42. It is evident that the DEPB Scheme, as covered by Customs Notifications dated 22.04.2002, is a customs duty exemption notification. The power to exempt would include within its ambit the power to demand duty in the event such exemption is misused. 42. Under Section 11(2) of Act 22 of 1992, where any person makes or abets or attempts to make any export or import, in contravention of any provision of the Act or the rules, he shall be liable to a penalty and under Section 11(5), in cases where the provisions of the Act or the rules are contravened, the goods are liable to confiscation by the Adjudicating authority. Section 12 of Act 22 of 1992 provides that no penalty imposed or confiscation made under the said Act shall prevent the imposition of any other punishment to which the person affected thereby is liable under any other law for the time being in force. While Section 11(5) of Act 22/92 makes the export goods liable for confiscation, by the DGFT (adjudicating authority), for contravention of the provisions of Act 22 of 1992 or the rules made thereunder, a similar power of confiscation is available under Section 113 (i) of the Customs Act also. The mere fact that Section 11 of Act 22 of 1992 empowers the DGFT to confiscate the goods or impose penalty would not, in view of Section 12 of Act 22 of 1992, denude Customs officers of the powers of confiscation under Section 113(i) of the Customs Act or to demand, under Section 28 of the Customs Act, repayment of the Customs duty benefits extended earlier to the petitioner on the erroneous premise that the fraudulently over-invoiced goods represented the true value of exports made by them. 43. The allegations in the show cause notice are also that the petitioner had fraudulently obtained DEPB licences/scrips from the DGFT by submitting Bank realization certificates, issued by the bankers, as proof of receipt of sale proceeds in the form of foreign remittances, even though the remittances were arranged by unconnected parties into the petitioner’s account. Section 111 of the Customs Act relates to confiscation of improperly imported goods and, under clause (d) thereof, any goods which are imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Act, or any other law for the time being in force, shall be liable for confiscation. Section 111 of the Customs Act relates to confiscation of improperly imported goods and, under clause (d) thereof, any goods which are imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Act, or any other law for the time being in force, shall be liable for confiscation. Section 112 relates to penalty for improper importation of goods. The show cause notices propose that the foreign currencies, remitted in contravention of Section 11 of Customs Act, 1962 into the account of the petitioner, should be confiscated in terms of Section 111(d) read with Section 120 of the Customs Act, 1962. As goods include currency, negotiable instruments and any kind of movable property, the amounts remitted into the petitioner’s account are “imported goods” within the said meaning. In as much as the petitioner had illegally brought foreign currency into their account, in the guise of sale proceeds, they have contravened the provisions of Section 11 of the Customs Act. Since the amounts remitted, though not relatable, were routed in the guise of sale proceeds with the sole purpose of getting DEPB benefits in a fraudulent manner, they were illegally imported into India. As foreign exchange has been remitted into India, in the guise of sale proceeds, the prohibition envisaged under Section 111(d) is attracted and, consequently, such illegal foreign exchange remittances into the petitioner's account is liable to be confiscated under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act. Except for a bare denial, there is no serious challenge to the jurisdiction of Customs authorities to pass an order of confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act. 44. The petitioners challenge to the jurisdiction of the Customs officials, to issue the impugned show cause notices, must fail. Consequently, the petitioners must be relegated to their statutory remedy of filing their reply/objections to the show cause notices. It is made clear that the observations made in this order are on the legal premise that the allegations in the show cause notices are true. The observations made by us herein shall not be construed as a finding recorded on merits or on the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the show cause notices. It is open to the petitioners to submit their reply/objections/additional objections, if any, to the show cause notices, both on issues of fact and law within four weeks from today. The observations made by us herein shall not be construed as a finding recorded on merits or on the truth or otherwise of the allegations in the show cause notices. It is open to the petitioners to submit their reply/objections/additional objections, if any, to the show cause notices, both on issues of fact and law within four weeks from today. The respondents shall, thereafter, consider such objections on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order other than on the question of jurisdiction, and pass orders in accordance with law. 45. The writ petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. After pronouncement of judgment Sri K.V.Satyanarayana, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, seeks our leave to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. As no substantial question of law, either on the interpretation of the Constitution or of general importance, which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arises for consideration in these writ petitions, we see no reason to grant leave as sought for. Oral application for leave is rejected.