JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—The petitioners are Members of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Board’). The services of the petitioners are contractual in nature for a fixed period as available in the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act as amended from time to time. The petitioners have basically challenged the vires of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Third Amendment) Act, 2007 (U.P. Act No. 4 of 2008), in which the tenure of service of the Members remained two years as before in the erstwhile amended Act i.e. Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Second Amendment) Act, 2007 (U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007) but the tenure of the Chairman is enhanced from two years to five years. A plea has been taken by the petitioners that there is no intelligible differentia between the nature of service to be rendered by the Chairman and the respective Members of the concerned Board. Therefore, there is no occasion to enhance the tenure of the services of Chairman. The amendment of the Act, even by the legislative body, appears to be colourable exercise of power. 2. In support of the contentions of the petitioners Mr. Radha Kant Ojha, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has drawn our attention towards the earlier amendments. According to him, by the original Act being the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982) the tenure of the Members and Chairman of the Board was fixed for a term of six years. By the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 1992 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1993) the tenure was reduced from six years to three years. Further, by the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 1995 (U.P. Act No. 15 of 1995) the tenure of members was increased from three years to four years. By a further amendment, being the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Second Amendment) Act, 2006 (U.P. Act No. 40 of 2006) such tenure of four years was extended to six years. The petitioners were appointed on 1st November, 2006 as Members of the Board. In further, by U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007 the tenure of six years was reduced to two years for Chairman and Members both. The petitioners were appointed on 1st November, 2006 as Members of the Board. In further, by U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007 the tenure of six years was reduced to two years for Chairman and Members both. However, subsequently by the impugned amending Act, being U.P. Act No. 4 of 2008, the tenure of Chairman has been raised to five years from two years when the tenure of the Members for two years remained as it is. 3. Admittedly, the petitioners did not challenge the U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007, by which the tenure of the Members inclusive of Chairman was reduced from six years to two years. As a result whereof, the petitioners had admittedly no case but when various queries have been made by the Court, they sought amendment of the prayer challenging the vires of such Act i.e. U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007 without making any averment in the petition in that regard. Therefore, such amendment, which was allowed initially for the sake of convenience of the parties to argue on merits, is insufficient in nature for the appropriate purpose and outcome of afterthought. It is clear and categorical that all the arguments are poised down to a point that there is no basic difference between the nature of works of the Chairman and the Members of the Board and as such when in the earlier occasion the tenure was reduced to two years for both, there was no necessity to change the tenure of the Chairman and the Members under the impugned amendment. Therefore, the petitioners’ case is not for the purpose of reduction of their own tenure but increase of tenure of the Chairman. 4. Mr. Ojha has shown definition of ‘Chairman’ and ‘Member’ from the original Act i.e. U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982. The definitions of the Chairman and the Members as under Sections 2(b) and 2(g) therein are quoted hereunder : “(b) ‘Chairman’ means the Chairman of the Commission, and includes any other person performing in the absence of the Chairman, for the time being, the functions of the Chairman;” “(g) ‘Member’ means a member of the Commission and includes its Chairman;” 5. In further, he placed before us the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Procedure and Conduct of Business) (First) Regulations, 1998 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Regulations’) to establish that there is no basic difference between the nature of service between the Chairman and the Members. 6. We find from the Regulations 11 and 13 of the Regulations what are the powers and duties of the Chairman and Members respectively. Therefore, Regulations 11 and 13 are quoted hereunder : “11. Powers and duties of Chairman.—(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Chairman shall exercise administrative, disciplinary and financial powers of the Board, and shall— (a) preside over all the meetings of the committees of which he may be a member; (b) co-ordinate the working of the Board and its Vice-Chairman and members; (c) be the controlling officer of the members for the purposes of sanctioning casual leave and passing of travelling allowance bills; (d) have the power of supervision over the working of the officers and employees of the Board. (2) If the Chairman, by reason of his absence or any other reason, is unable to perform his duties, he may, by general or special order, authorise Vice-Chairman or any member to perform such duties : Provided that all the matters in which decisions or actions have been taken during the period of absence of the Chairman, shall be placed before him for information as soon as he resumes his office.” “13. Powers and duties of the members.—Subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder and the decisions of the Board, a member shall assist the Chairman in the selection of candidates for different categories of posts and shall discharge such other duties as may be assigned to him by the Chairman.” 7. From the statement of objects and reasons of the U.P. Act No. 4 of 2008, which is impugned herein, we find explanation about the duties of the Chairman and the necessity of increasing the tenure of the Chairman, which is as follows : “The Chairman of Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982, has to perform all the works regarding the selection of Principals, Headmasters, Lecturers and Trained Graduate Teachers in aided Schools and Intermediate Colleges of Uttar Pradesh. The present tenure of Chairman is two years, which is not sufficient to maintain the continuity of the selection process. It has, therefore, been decided to amend the said Act to provide for : (a) amending the definitions of the word “member” to exclude the Chairman therefrom; (b) amending the qualification of member to broaden the field of eligibility; (c) increasing the term of the Chairman from two years to five years; (d) increasing the maximum age to hold office of Chairman from sixty two years to sixty eight years; The Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Selection Board (Third Amendment) Bill, 2007 is introduced accordingly.” 8. From the statement of objects and reasons therein we find that the amendment is arising out of a policy decision made by the State of Uttar Pradesh upon observing the nature of the duties and sufficiency of tenure of the Chairman in discharging such duties. 9. According to us, there is no bar for the State in making intelligible differentia between the tenure of the Chairman and the Members in case it is supported by objects and reasons. Sufficiency of reasons is not the domain of the Court to consider. That apart, independently the Court cannot enquire about the legislative intent for making different tenure for the Chairman and the Members unless and until the cause is so apparently arbitrary that it shocks the conscience. Whatever may have been the wisdom that guided the legislature in enacting a provision, it is not for the Court to make surmises about it. A statute is not to be construed according to some notion of what the legislature might have been expected to have said, or what this Court might think it was the duty of the legislature to have said or done. The duty of the Court is to examine the language used, and to give effect to it, whether it approves or disapproves of what the legislature has provided or whether it thinks or not that the legislature might more properly have done or said something else. No Court can, therefore, proceed upon the assumption that the legislature has made a mistake. No Court can, therefore, proceed upon the assumption that the legislature has made a mistake. There is nothing more dangerous and fallacious in interpreting a statute, than first of all to assume that the legislature had a particular intention, and then having made up one’s mind what that intention was, to conclude that the intention must necessarily be expressed in the statute, and then proceed to find it. This view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1997 (8) SCC 522 , S.S. Bola and others v. B.D. Sardana and others. 10. The respondents have contended before this Court that it is well settled principle of law that the power of legislature to make amendment is not an executive power but legislative power and as such no restriction can be put on the power of the legislature to amend the law as provided in the Constitution. The Court can strike down such legislation only on the ground of lack of legislative competency or violation of fundamental rights. There is no lack of legislative competency. Further the right of the petitioners, if any, is flowing from the statute not from the Constitution and, therefore, no fundamental right of the Members can be said to be infringed. The petitioners are creature of the statute, therefore, they have only their limited right within the statute. Admittedly, the appointment was contractual appointment and the period of two years has already expired as per the amended Act. Therefore, the controversy is academic in nature. 11. Mr. Ojha relied upon a three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1985 (1) SCC 523 , K. Nagaraj and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, to establish that an age of retirement in public services is widely accepted as reasonable and rational. It has been argued that in reducing the age of retirement scientific investigation, material statistics, hardship and other social and economic consequences are to be taken into account. However, the contention of the petitioners was not accepted by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it has been held that besides the ordinance-making power being a legislative power, the argument of mala fides is misconceived. The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. However, the contention of the petitioners was not accepted by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it has been held that besides the ordinance-making power being a legislative power, the argument of mala fides is misconceived. The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Its reasons for passing a law are those that are stated in the objects and reasons. Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive can not render the passing of law malafide. This kind of “transferred malice” is unknown in the field of legislation. 12. From a five Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 SC 538 , Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and others v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others we find that it is now well established that while Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 13. In Dinnapati Sadasiva Reddi, Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University v. Chancellor, Osmania University and others, AIR 1967 SC 1305 , a five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court considered the cause that before a provision is accepted as valid, the Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face of the statute itself, or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge. If no such reasonable basis of classification appears on the face of the statute, or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances, the law will have to be struck down as an instance of naked discrimination. This observation was made when the Court found that the Vice-Chancellor, who was appointed under the Act, or the Vice-Chancellor, who was holding that post on the date of commencement of the second amendment of the Act (therein), form one single group or class unlike the factual circumstances herein. 14. This observation was made when the Court found that the Vice-Chancellor, who was appointed under the Act, or the Vice-Chancellor, who was holding that post on the date of commencement of the second amendment of the Act (therein), form one single group or class unlike the factual circumstances herein. 14. In contra to the words ‘naked discrimination’, is the language of 2004 (1) SCC 712 : AIR 2004 SC 1295 , Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court has diluted the words ‘intelligible differentia’ to that extent that laying down of ‘intelligible differentia’ does not, however, mean that the legislative classification should be scientifically perfect and logically complete. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners further submitted on the strength of the judgment reported in 2007 (6) SCC 276 , Union of India and another v. Shardindu, that contractual service of the petitioners for a limited period in the Board cannot be said to be purely on deputation basis. According to us, possibly the petitioners suffer from misconception of law. The fact is that the petitioners worked as Members of the Board for a limited period on the basis of the contractual right as per the statute, which cannot be held to be a constitutional right to claim relief to the extent of enhancement of the period. In Aashirwad Films v. Union of India and others, 2007 (6) SCC 624 , we find that the test of reasonableness, however, would vary from the statute to statute. The petitioners therein wanted to establish that a classification must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive and there must be a reasonable, natural and substantial distinction in the nature of the class or classes upon which the law operates. Therefore, when the Court found that there is a difference in the rate of tax held that the same is ex facie arbitrary by saying that the classification is only on the basis of language without anything more than the same. According to us, the judgement itself made a difference between the taxing statute with others and has no application in the instant case. In the instant case, neither there is any difference of period amongst the members nor there is any scope of interference with objects and reasons of the amended Act, which appears to be logical. According to us, the judgement itself made a difference between the taxing statute with others and has no application in the instant case. In the instant case, neither there is any difference of period amongst the members nor there is any scope of interference with objects and reasons of the amended Act, which appears to be logical. The Members are not being affected nor having any discrimination amongst themselves, we cannot interfere with the cause of enhancement of the tenure of the other i.e. Chairman, which has been excluded from the definition of members. From 2008 (5) SCC 1 , P. Venugopal v. Union of India we find that once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment to the said office begins when he joins and it comes to an end on the completion of the tenure unless curtailed on justifiable grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of the office on completion of his tenure. Concept of superannuation, which is well understood in the service jurisprudence, is alien to tenure appointments which have a fixed life span. We have no quarrel with the proposition. In the instant case, the fixation of tenure of the Members is not altered, therefore, the persons, who are not being subjected for curtailing the tenure, can not raise their voice in respect of enhancement of tenure of others for making difference. In further, it has been held by the Supreme Court that curtailment of tenure on justifiable grounds is not alien in the subject context. Hence, we do not find any such explanatory cause on the part of the petitioners to uphold. Moreover, it is not an impermissible overclassification, through a one-man legislation, which clearly falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution being an apparent case of naked discrimination in this democratic civilised society governed by the rule of law and renders the impugned proviso as void ab initio and unconstitutional in such case. The present case is not regarded as one-man legislation nor an executive action but purely a decision of legislative body which cannot be termed as malice. 16. Mr. D.K. Arora, learned Additional Advocate General, contended before this Court that U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 gives definition about the post of Chairman and Members distinctly as under Sections 2(b) and 2(g) respectively, as aforesaid. 16. Mr. D.K. Arora, learned Additional Advocate General, contended before this Court that U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 gives definition about the post of Chairman and Members distinctly as under Sections 2(b) and 2(g) respectively, as aforesaid. Section 4 of such Act gives qualification of Members, as follows : “4. (1) The Commission shall consist of a Chairman and not less than six and not more than eight other members to be appointed by the State Government. (2) Of the members— (a) one shall be a person who occupies or has occupied, in the opinion of the State Government, a position of eminence in Judicial Services; (b) two shall be persons who occupy or have occupied, in the opinion of such Government, a position of eminence in the State Education Services; and (c) others shall have teaching experiences as— (i) Professor of any University established by law in Uttar Pradesh; or (ii) Principal of any college recognised by or affiliated to any such University for a period of not less than ten years; or (iii) Principal of any institution recognised under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 for a period of not less than fifteen years. (3) Every appointment under this section shall take effect from the date on which it is notified by the State Government." 17. Thereafter he contended that the petitioners did not challenge the U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007, by which the tenure of the Chairman and the Members were fixed for a period of two years, but challenged the U.P. Act No. 4 of 2008 when the tenure of the Chairman was enhanced without disturbing the tenure of the Members. 18. According to us, sufficiency of the reason is as good as reasonableness of the reasons and as such, the Court cannot scrutinize as to what is the necessity of such amendment. A legislative body not being an individual cannot be held to have passed a law for an extraneous purpose, as already held by this Court. Fixing of tenure of service is statutory but not fundamental, therefore, the same cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. This point has also been considered by the Court making detailed discussion. Fixing of tenure of service is statutory but not fundamental, therefore, the same cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. This point has also been considered by the Court making detailed discussion. From a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1996 (3) SCC 709 , State of A.P. and others v. McDowell & Co. and others, we find that in India, the position is similar to the United States of America. The power of Parliament or for that matter, the State Legislature is restricted in two ways. A law made by Parliament or by the legislature can be struck down by the Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (i) lack of legislative competency, and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that the Court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and legislatures, composed as they are representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judicial review is limited to three grounds, viz., (i) unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This point i.e. the constitutional validity of the Act when can be challenged, has been again reiterated by a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2007 (6) SCC 236 , Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. and others, following the ratio of McDowell & Co. This point i.e. the constitutional validity of the Act when can be challenged, has been again reiterated by a three Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2007 (6) SCC 236 , Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd. and others, following the ratio of McDowell & Co. (supra) and it has been held that it is the duty of the constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when Parliament or the State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either for want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. For the purpose of sustaining the constitutionality of an Act, a Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, reports, preamble, history of the times, objection of the legislation and all other facts which are relevant. The objects and reasons of the Act impugned in this petition has given sufficient reasons for the purpose of enhancement of tenure of the Chairman without interfering with the tenure of the Members. As such the amendment cannot be said to be without any reason whatsoever or infringing any right of the petitioners herein. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ignored out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. In Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2008 (2) SCC 254 , the Supreme Court held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. Where validity of a statute is questioned and there are two interpretations, one of which would make the law valid and the other void, the former must be preferred and validity of law upheld. Where validity of a statute is questioned and there are two interpretations, one of which would make the law valid and the other void, the former must be preferred and validity of law upheld. In pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a statute, the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, justice or injustice of the law. If that which is passed into law is within the scope of power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a Court may think of it. A Full Bench of our High Court (Lucknow Bench) in the judgment reported in 2000 All CJ 840, Public Services Tribunal Bar Association and others v. State of U.P. and others held that the burden of proof, that the impugned legislation is unconstitutional, is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. Such judgment of the Full Bench was also upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003 (4) SCC 104 , Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and another. 19. In Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma Sharma etc. etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1985 SC 1367 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that a certain tenure of service for the purpose of absorption is made with an object to be achieved and this has a rational nexus with the object. Although the observation was made in respect of the Act therein but when we find that in this particular amended Act the objects and reasons are available, it would not be proper for us to interfere with it. In State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F. Desai and others, 2002 (2) SCC 318 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the statute shall have to be considered in its entirety and picking up of one word from one particular provision and thereby analysing it in a manner contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible nor warranted. True intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction but that by itself cannot be termed to be and by itself cannot be interpreted. True intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction but that by itself cannot be termed to be and by itself cannot be interpreted. It is a useful guide, but the interpretation and the intent shall have to be gathered from the entirety of the statute. In M/s. Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and others, AIR 1985 SC 1041 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that it is well settled that when the language of the statute is clear and admits of no ambiguity, recourse to the statement of objects and reasons for the purpose of construing a statutory provision is not permissible. According to us, in the instant case when the tenure of the members, being the petitioners, was unaltered in two consecutive amendments i.e. U.P. Act No. 22 of 2007 and U.P. Act No. 4 of 2008 and initially no challenge was thrown in respect of such fixation of tenure, in the garb of the writ petition the challenge of enhancement of tenure of the Chairman cannot be made. In Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar and others, 1963 SCR (Supp.) 112, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the statements of objects and reasons of a statute may and do often furnish valuable historical material in ascertaining the reasons which induced the legislature to enact a statute, but in interpreting the statute they must be ignored. 20. However, we are of the view that in the present case promulgation of the Act in question is not an administrative action but a legislative action and no case of lack of legislative competence is available to us. The remaining question is whether the action is violative of any fundamental right guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision or not. Since the right of the petitioners is statutory right and cannot be said to be a constitutional right and as such, fixation of tenure of service, which was not interfered with earlier enactment but tenure of Chairman has been increased, cannot at all be said to be violative of fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision, if any, available to the petitioners/Members. 21. 21. Hence, in totality we do not find any case on the part of the petitioners, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Honble Arun Tandon, J.—I agree. ————