ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The respondent Bank issued, on 25.1.2008, a notice, under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short, 'the said Act'), directing the petitioner to make payment of the outstanding dues of Rs. 2,08,92,754.97, within a period of 60 days, the liabilities having arisen as a result of the loan, which the respondent Bank had advanced to the petitioner company for development of the petitioner company's tea estate, which is run under the name and style of Longboi Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. The petitioner claims that subsequent to the notice, dated 25.1.2008, respondent No. 5, namely. General Manager (T Loan Recovery Department) of the respondent Bank made a request, on 1.12.2008, to the petitioner to meet him for discussion in order to find out viable ways and means for repayment of outstanding dues in respect of financial advances, which had been made to the petitioner by the respondent Bank. This, according to the petitioner, was followed by detailed discussion held on 11.1.2009 and, in this meeting, according to the petitioner, the respondent Bank passed by the petitioner to submit proposals for clearing the outstanding liabilities. By yet another letter, dated 27.1.2009, issued by respondent No. 4, namely, Managing Director, Assam Co-operative Apex Bank Limited, the Managing Director of the petitioner company was, claims the petitioner company, requested to submit proposal for liquidating the outstanding liabilities of the petitioner company. Thereafter, the petitioner company, on 17.2.2009, submitted a proposal to the respondent Bank, requesting the respondent Bank to sanction an additional amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- and to reduce interest by 50% in respect of the outstanding dues of the petitioner company. Thereafter, the respondent Bank issued a letter, dated 19.6.2009, requesting the petitioner company' s balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the last 13 (thirteen) years. The petitioner company submitted accordingly the balance sheets. However, notwithstanding the proposals, the balance sheets and the profit and loss account, which were submitted by the petitioner company towards settlement of the outstanding liabilities of the respondent Bank, the respondent Bank has issued, on 8.8.2009, a notice, in the newspaper, in terms of Section 15 of the said Act, whereby offers have been invited from interested parties for being appointed as Managing Agent for the purpose of managing the said tea estate of the petitioner company. 2. 2. By making this writ petition, the petitioner company has challenged the notice, dated 8.8.2009 seeking to get the same set aside and quashed. Pending disposal of the present writ petition, the petitioner company also applied for suspension of the operation of the impugned notice, dated 25.1.2008 aforementioned. 3. When the writ petition was moved on 19.8.2009 the respondent Bank (as the order dated 19.8.2009, passed in the writ petition, reflect) questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The Court, on 19.8.2009 passed an order granting suspension of the interim notice, until returnable date, making it, however, clear that the question of maintainability of the writ petition, raised by the respondent Bank, would be considered on the returnable date. The respondent Bank has accordingly filed their counter and the petitioner company has filed its reply thereto. 4. I have heard Mr. N.C. Das, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner company, and Ms. B.L. Singh, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1. I have also heard Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the remaining respondents. 5. While considering the present writ petition, what needs to be noted is that neither in this writ petition nor in the past, the petitioner company challenged the legality and validity of the notice, dated 25.1.2008, which was issued under Section 13(2) of the said Act. Though the petitioner company contends that in terms of the promises made by the respondent Bank, the petitioner company had submitted its proposal for settlement of its outstanding liability, the fact remains that according to the respondent Bank, the proposal given by the petitioner company is not viable inasmuch as the petitioner company, which owes about Rs. 2,10,00,000/- to the respondent Bank, has, instead coming forward to clear their dues, sought for further sanction of Rs. 40,00,000/- to be made in favour of the petitioner company and, thereafter, the petitioner company proposes to clear the outstanding dues, in instalments, with reduced rate of interest. 6. It deserves to be pointed out that in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a High Court, in the absence of anything else, would not enter into the question of correctness and viability of a proposal, which a loanee, such as the petitioner company, has submitted to the respondent Bank towards liquidating their loan. This apart, what is more important to note is that following a notice, issued under Section 13(2) of the said Act. a secured creditor, such as the respondent Bank, with the object of recovering its secured debt, has the right to proceed, in terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 to appoint any person to manage the secured assets, the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor. In order to effectuate its right, which is traceable to Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13, a Secured Creditor can publish a notice, in terms of Section 15. inviting applications from interested persons so as to find out suitable person(s), who can willingly manage the secured assets. One, who is aggrieved by an action, which is taken up by a Secured Creditor in exercise of its right under Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 has the remedy of preferring an appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 7. In the context of the facts of the present case too, when the respondent Bank, consequent to the notice, issued under Section 13(2) as far back as on 25.1.2008 (which has remained unchallenged till date) published the notice, on 8.8.2009, under Section 15 read with Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 (which stands impugned in the present writ petition), thereof publishing the impugned notice, cannot be said to be an act, which is without the authority of law. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent Bank should or should not have taken recourse to Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 13 read with Section 15 is a question, which would require, amongst others, examination of the disputed facts involved in the case and the viability of the proposals, which the petitioner company has submitted to the respondent Bank. Such questions are more effectively and comprehensively determinable in the appeal if preferred by the petitioner company in terms of Section 17. 8. Such questions are more effectively and comprehensively determinable in the appeal if preferred by the petitioner company in terms of Section 17. 8. Situated thus, it becomes clear that the present one is a fit case, wherein the petitioner company shall take recourse to the alternative remedy, which Section 17 provides, for, this remedy is more comprehensive inasmuch as in an appeal, all aspects of the various facts and issues can be examined by the Tribunal, which is constituted to deal with such cases, particularly, when the acts of the respondent Bank cannot be said to be acts without any authority of law. In fact, an appeal, under Section 17, would be more comprehensive in nature inasmuch as the Debts Recovery Tribunal would be able to enquire into, examine and determine all questions, which the petitioner has raised including the question as to whether the respondent Bank is bound to accept the proposal, submitted by the petitioner company, which proposal, according to the petitioner binding on the respondent Bank. 9. At the time when the maintainability of this writ petition was taken up, Mr. N.C. Das, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the impugned notice is bad in law inasmuch as it is in breach of the doctrine of promissory estoppels suffice it to point out, in this regard, that doctrine of promissory estoppel would come into play when one person invites another person to do certain things or perform certain acts and the person, who is so invited, does the act, thing or perform the act because of the inducement offered by the person, who tendered the invitation, and thereby the person induced changes his position to his detriment, who affirmed in the inducement or made the promise, the promisor is not allowed by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from resiling from the promise(s) which the promisee had made. In the present case, the petitioner too has not been able to show even, prima facie, that it has altered its position, because of any promise, which was allegedly made by the respondent Bank so as to attract the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This apart, even the question, as to whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel bars the respondent Bank from proceeding, in terms of Section 13(4)(1)(c), read with Section 15, is a question, which would still remain open, for the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to determine. 10. Mr. Das. This apart, even the question, as to whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel bars the respondent Bank from proceeding, in terms of Section 13(4)(1)(c), read with Section 15, is a question, which would still remain open, for the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to determine. 10. Mr. Das. learned Senior Counsel, has referred to the decision in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. in order to show that notwithstanding the alternative remedy, which is available to the petitioner company under Section 17, this writ petition can still be maintained. As a proposition of law, there can be no dispute that despite the fact that an alternative remedy is available to a person such a person can file a writ petition. However, it would depend on the facts of a given case, wherein the High Court should or should not exercise its writ jurisdiction. In the facts of the present case, as discussed above, this Court is clearly of the view that the recourse to Article 226 of the present case is not an appropriate remedy inasmuch as the grievance of the petitioner company are of such nature, which would require examination of not only disputed questions of fact, but also viability of financial proposals. In such cases, the appropriate remedy, which is available to the petitioner company is under Section 17. 11. In any view of the matter, therefore, the remedy, under Article 226, is not the appropriate resolving the grievances of the petitioner company. 12. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this writ petition is not admitted and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 13. The interim directions, passed in this writ petition, on 19.8.2009, shall accordingly stand vacated. Petition dismissed