JUDGEMENT 1. The petitioner through this application seeks the quashing of the order dated 17.6.1997 passed by Sri S.K. Pandey, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Naugachia, P.S. Case No. 300 of 1990, G.R. No. 637 of 1990, whereunder, he without issuing any notice to tho petitioner heroin recalled the order dated 23.9.1996 passed in the case earlier by his prcdecossor in-office, Sri Suniti Kumar Singh, whereby he had closed the case and discharged the petitioner. 2. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order dated 23.9.1996 was a reasoned judicial order and by closure of the case, the same had become final and the court became functus officio. It was also submitted that no revision having been filed, there was no provision in the whole of the Code of Criminal Procedure for review or recall of order suo motu by the Magisterial Court and any order to the contrary would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. 3. The order dated 23.9.1996 discharging the petitioner and closing the case roads thus: "The accused is absent. It appears from the perusal of the case record that on 7.2.1991 cognizance were taken against the accused for the offence under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304 and 201 I.P.C. and the accused summoned to appear in court. It further transpires that the trial of the case is yet to commence whereas the offences are of the nature "traffic offence". Considering the above stated facts of the case and taking into view the directions of the Honble Supreme Court passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1123 of 1986, I find that this case falls within tho purview of direction 2(a) of the said judgment. Accordingly, in compliance of the directions, this case stands closed and the accused is discharged. Officer Incharge to recall the processes, if any, issued against the accused. Let the case record be deposited in the record room." 4. The law is well settled that a Magistrate cannot review his own order which would mean that the same would apply to his successor-in-office. Officer Incharge to recall the processes, if any, issued against the accused. Let the case record be deposited in the record room." 4. The law is well settled that a Magistrate cannot review his own order which would mean that the same would apply to his successor-in-office. From the impugned order dated 17.6.1997 it would appear that the learned Magistrate in passing the said order was guided by the order dated 28.11.1996 passed in Writ Petition(C) No.1128 of 1996 from a reading whereof it appeared to the learned Magistrate that the offence mentioned in the instant case came within the purview of the added para graph (q) of para (IV) of the order and acting on the basis thereof suo motu restored the case and directed for issuance of summons to the accused and also to inform the learned counsel of the accused. 5. The judgments of the Apex Court in Writ Petition(C) No. 1123 of 1986 and Writ Petition(C) No. 1128 of 1996 are reported in AIR 1996 SC 1619 and AIR 1997 SC 1539 respectively. A perusal of the latter judgment reveals that the same was by way of modification/clarification of the earlier judgment ( AIR 1996 SC 1619 ) inasmuch as the time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal proceedings in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(f) would not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the proceedings was wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the concerned accused etc. Then again in paragraph-Ill of the latter judgment their Lordships desired to add to the list of cases contained in paragraph-IV of the earlier judgment to which the directions in paragraphs 1 and 2 would not apply and item (q) thereof mentions offences under Section 304A I.P.C. or any offence pertaining to rash and negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law for the time being in force. The judgment further directed that in cases pertaining to offences mentioned under the additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to the judgment in AIR 1996 SC 1619 they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as aforesaid. The judgment further directed that in cases pertaining to offences mentioned under the additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to the judgment in AIR 1996 SC 1619 they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as aforesaid. The concerned criminal court was directed to act suo motu or on an application by the concerned aggrieved party to issue summons/warrants to such discharged or acquitted accused and also restore the criminal case against them for being proceeded further. 6. It appears from the order sheet filed by the petitioner that the petitioner had surrendered in court on 28.1.1991 and since the offences of Sections 279, 337 and 304A I.P.C. whereunder the case was registered were all bailable, he was granted bail on the same day. Then on the submission of charge-sheet cognizance was taken on 7.2.1991 and summons and thereafter warrants were issued none of which appear to bo served or executed. Thereafter in pursuance of the first order of the Apex Court, the order dated 23.9.1996 was passed by the learned Magistrate. Then came the second order of the Supreme Court and in compliance thereof the order dated 17.6.1997 was passed by the successor-in-office. 7. To my mind both the learned Magistrates were justified in the orders respectively passed by them as they stood based on the directions of the Apex Court as was prevailing and was in force at the relevant time and neither of them can be faulted in any manner. 8. Apropos the matter does not end there. The petitioner sought to sleep over the matter of restoration of the criminal proceeding. In the meanwhile a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of the Apex Court by judgment dated 16.4.2002 passed in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2002 S.C. 1856 ) in categoric terms overruled alongwith other cases the decisions reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 and AIR 1997 S.C. 1539 primarily on amongst others on the twin grounds that courts can declare the law. they can remove obvious lacunae and fill in the gaps but they cannot entrench upon the field of legislators properly meant for the legislature and secondly, that they run counter to the doctrine of binding precedents, namely, the Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak ( AIR 1992 S.C. 1701 ) [: 1992(1) PLJR (SC)41] which specifically turned down the fervent plea of proponents right to speedy trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal proceedings or trial shall not proceed and expressly ruled that it was neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. The Bench further upholding and reaffirming the propositions in A.R. Antulays case (supra) observed that the guidelines laid down therein adequately take care of the right to speedy trial. One of the guidelines laid down by the Constitutional Bench in A.R. Antulays case (supra) was that an objection based on denial of right of speedy trial and relief on that account should first be addressed to the High Court. 9. Now coming to the instant case, the order dated 17.6.1997 is sought to be questioned through this application filed 81/2 years later on 4.1.2006 on the ground that the Magistrate is not empowered to recall, without issuing notice, either his own order or that of his predecessor. It was further submitted that to add fuel to the fire without any service of summons or execution of warrant issued after the restoration of the case he has been declared an absconder. 10. Admittedly, as would appear from perusal of the complete order sheet of the court below, as has been filed by the petitioner with his application, after having secured bail by order dated 28.1.1991 the petitioner neither cared to appear in court on any of the dates nor claims to have made any enquiry at any point of time and the situation continued even after cognizance was taken on 7.2.1991. It is true that no summons appears to have been served upon him nor were the warrants issued against him executed presumably by reason of his holding the post of Circle Inspector at Gopalpur (Bhagalpur). It is true that no summons appears to have been served upon him nor were the warrants issued against him executed presumably by reason of his holding the post of Circle Inspector at Gopalpur (Bhagalpur). It is evident from paragraph 12 of the application that he remained on that post till 14.10.1996 whereafter he got transferred but he never cared to inform the court in that regard notwithstanding the fact that he was on bail and he was leaving the jurisdiction of that court. 11. Then again, the order dated 23.9.1996 discharging him in pursuance of the decision of the Apex Court in AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 even as he continued to absent himself from the court and the order dated 17.6.1997 purporting to reopen the case and issuing summons to him was also passed in purported exercise of the directions issued by the Apex Court modifying its earlier order as reported in AIR 1997 S.C. 1589. It is another matter that no prior notice was issued to him. 12. The petitioner appears to have sat over the matter and eventually by order dated 10.5.2004 he was declared an absconder and a permanent order was issued against him. Even then, he waited till 4.1.2006 to approach this Court and the reason for such inordinate delay has not been disclosed. But by that time the Constitution Bench decision in P. Ramachandra Rao (supra) had come overruling both the judgments reported in AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 and AIR 1997 S.C. 1589 in categoric terms. The natural consequences and outcome of the judgment of the Constitution Bench was that the position of the case would revert back to the period prior to the passing of the order dated 23.9.1976 when warrants had been issued against him. 13. Today after such a long delay, the plea of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The plea could have been available to him had he come to this Court prior to the decision of the Constitution Bench. Moreover, just as AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 had authorized the courts to discharge the accused and close the case, the clarificatory later judgment in AIR 1997 S.C. 1589 had empowered the courts to act, suo motu or on an application filed by the aggrieved party. 14. Moreover, just as AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 had authorized the courts to discharge the accused and close the case, the clarificatory later judgment in AIR 1997 S.C. 1589 had empowered the courts to act, suo motu or on an application filed by the aggrieved party. 14. Since the impugned order was passed under the directions of the Apex Court and the judgments in AIR 1996 S.C. 1619 and A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1589 stand overruled by the Constitution Bench in categoric terms no relief can be given to the petitioner. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. 15. The petitioner will now surrender in the court below and face the trial as he now has knowledge of the position he stands in.