JUDGMENT C.R. Sarma, J. 1. This appeal under Section 378(1), Cr.PC, 1973, has been preferred by the State of Tripura challenging the judgment and order, dated 19.12.2001, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, in Sessions Trial No. 165 (WT/A) of 1996. 2. The material facts leading to the present appeal may, in brief, be set out as follows: On 21.6.1994, Smt. Pratima Roy (since deceased), W/o Sri Nripendra Chandra Roy (PW 5), sustained injury due to electric shock and she was admitted in the M/s. Paul Nursing Home, Shivnagar, Agartala, for undergoing medical treatment. As her condition had improved and on being assured by, Dr. Shankar Paul (one of the accused), the owner of the nursing home, not to worry about her, the husband (PW 5) of Smt. Pratima Roy and her other relatives left the nursing home keeping the said patient in the nursing home alone. At about 2 O'clock at night, Sri Bhupendra Roy (PW 2), elder brother of the husband of the patient, received a telephonic information from the nursing home that their patient, Smt. Pratima Roy, was missing from the nursing home. On being so informed, Sri Bhupendra Roy (PW 2) and the other family members including the husband (PW5) of the said patient rushed to the nursing home and searched for the said missing patient, but in spite of their best efforts, the patient could not be traced out. On 21.6.1994, at about 6 A.M., the dead body of the said patient was found floating, in a tank, opposite the Modern Club (near the nursing home). After recovery of the said dead body, Sri Bhupendra Roy (PW 2) lodged an FIR with the Police. On receipt of the FIR, Police registered a case and launched investigation into the matter. Police prepared the inquest report in respect of the dead body and forwarded the same for post mortem examination, which was, conducted in course of time, by a team of doctors. During the course of investigation, the Police examined as many as 109 witnesses, seized various documents, arrested the owner of the nursing home, Dr. Shankar Paul, and another doctor, namely, Dr. Kishalaya Datta and five other employees of the nursing home, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar, Smt. Tinku Gope, Smt. Bina Deb and Smt. Sobha Debnath. During the course of investigation, the Police examined as many as 109 witnesses, seized various documents, arrested the owner of the nursing home, Dr. Shankar Paul, and another doctor, namely, Dr. Kishalaya Datta and five other employees of the nursing home, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar, Smt. Tinku Gope, Smt. Bina Deb and Smt. Sobha Debnath. Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar were forwarded to the court for recording their confessional statement and accordingly, the learned Judicial Magistrate recorded their confessional statement. In their confessional statements, the said two accused persons stated that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had murdered the said patient after committing rape on her and that, they, on being asked by Dr. Datta, had removed and thrown the dead body into the nearby tank. At the close of the investigation, Police submitted charge-sheet against Dr. Kishalaya Datta for the offence under Sections 376 / 302 / 211 / 34, IPC, against Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar under Sections 118 / 302 / 201 / 34, IPC and against Dr. Shankar Paul under Sections 302 and 201, IPC. The other accused persons, namely, Sri Shankar Roy, Smt. Tinku Gope, Smt. Sobha Debnath and Ms. Bina Deb, were recommended for their discharge for want of evidence. The offence being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Addl. C.J.M. committed the case to the court of Sessions for trial. The learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, framed charges against Dr. Shankar Paul for offences under Section 304A / 201 / 34, IPC and against Dr. Kishalaya Datta under Sections 376 / 302 / 201, IPC. Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar were charged for the offences under Sections 302 / 118 / 201 / 34, IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the respective charges framed against them. Their plea was a denial one. Out of 109 witnesses, the prosecution examined as many as 45 witnesses and exhibited some documents including the FIR, Inquest report, seizure list, medical report, the dead body challan, forensic science laboratory report, hand-sketch map, the post mortem report, etc. During trial, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar retracted their earlier confessions on the plea that they were compelled to make the confessional statements due to torture and assurance of release from the liability of the offences. The accused persons were examined under Section313, Cr.PC. During trial, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar retracted their earlier confessions on the plea that they were compelled to make the confessional statements due to torture and assurance of release from the liability of the offences. The accused persons were examined under Section313, Cr.PC. They denied the allegations and declined to adduce any defence witness. The learned trial court held that prosecution failed to prove the cases against the accused persons and accordingly, acquitted the accused persons and set them at liberty. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said judgment of acquittal, the State has come up with this appeal. 4. We have heard Sri B. Das, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State-appellant. Also heard Sri S.D. Chowdhury, Learned Counsel appearing, for Dr. Shankar Paul and Dr. Kishalaya Datta and Mr. S. Sarkar, learned Counsel, appearing for Sri Pulin Debnath, and Mr. R. Datta, Learned Counsel appearing for Sri Shyamal Malakar. 5. Sri B. Das, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State-appellant, advanced the argument that in spite of availability of sufficient evidence on record, pointing to the guilt of the accused person's, the learned Sessions Judge committed error by acquitting them. The learned Senior Counsel contended that absence of rigor mortis in respect of the dead body at the time of its recovery, the presence of blood on the bed sheet and the pillow cover, sweeping of the room occupied by the deceased, and the corridor of the nursing home and the finding of the dead body in the nearby tank were sufficient circumstantial evidences indicating that the patient was assaulted, in the nursing home, causing her death and that the dead body was thrown into the tank. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the circumstantial evidence and the confessional statements, including extra-judicial confession, made by two of the accused persons, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar, were sufficient evidence to base the conviction. 6. Refuting the said contention, Sri S.D. Chowdhury, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused persons, namely. Dr. Shankar Paul and Dr. Kishalaya Datta, submitted that there was not an iota of evidence against the accused persons. Sri S. Sarkar and Sri R. Datta. 6. Refuting the said contention, Sri S.D. Chowdhury, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused persons, namely. Dr. Shankar Paul and Dr. Kishalaya Datta, submitted that there was not an iota of evidence against the accused persons. Sri S. Sarkar and Sri R. Datta. learned Counsels appearing for the accused persons, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar respectively, submitted that the said accused persons were falsely implicated in the case and that due to torture in the custody of the Police, they were compelled to make confessional statements, which were subsequently retracted. The learned Counsels further submitted that such retracted confession cannot be legally used as the evidence against the maker and the co-accused. The learned Counsels further submitted that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the case against the accused persons, beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, the learned Sessions Judge committed no illegality by acquitting the accused persons for want of substantive evidence. 7. Being called upon to examine the correctness of the impugned judgment of acquittal, we deem it proper to point out the parameters of the powers of a High Court in an appeal against acquittal and the principles relating to the interference by the High court in an appeal against acquittal filed under Section 378 of the Cr.PC. An appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal preferred under Section 378, Cr.PC, may, for want of such sufficient material, in exercise of its powers under Section 386(a), Cr.PC, refuse to interfere with the acquittal and dismiss the appeal or may reverse such order and direct further enquiry or re-trial as the case may be, or find the accused guilty and pass sentence against him according to law. In the case of Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 11 SCC 186 , hon'ble Supreme Court, while laying down the principles relating to the appeal against acquittal, observed as follows: While the High Court can review the entire evidence and reach its own conclusions, it will not interfere with the acquittal by the trial court unless there are strong reasons based on evidence which can dislodge the findings arrived at by the trial court, which were the basis for the acquittal. The High Court has to give due importance to the conclusions of the trial court, if they had been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High Court has to give due importance to the conclusions of the trial court, if they had been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High court will interfere in appeals against acquittals, only where the trial court makes wrong assumptions of material facts or fails to appreciate the evidence properly, If who views are reasonably possible from the evidence on record, one favouring the accused and one against the accused, the High Court is not expected to reverse the acquittal merely because it would have taken the view against the accused had it tried the case. The very fact that two views are possible makes it clear that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and consequently the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. In the case of Syed Peda Aowlia v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2008) 11 SCC 394 , the hon'ble Supreme Court observed as below: There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offences or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P). The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P). The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. In the case of Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 13 SCC 271 , the hon'ble Apex Court held that in an appeal against the order of acquittal, it is for the appellate court to keep in view the relevant principles of law to re-appreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. While deciding the case of Sonmoni alias Prasanta alias Sanatanu Bordoloi v. State of Assam (2002) 3 GLT 266, a Division Bench of this Court, referring to the observations of the Apex Court made in the case of Kaliram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1973 SC 2773 , held that the court has to hold the balance of justice evenly and ensure that a fair opportunity is afforded to the accused to have his say in the matter and the court has also to make a close and dispassionate scrutiny of the evidence on record before holding that the evidence given by prosecution is sufficiently trustworthy and reliable to hold that the case of the prosecution stands proved pointing to the guilt of the acquitted accused. The observations made by the hon'ble Apex Court, in the above referred case run as follows: It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system; much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocence, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice. Such a risk can be minimised but not rule out altogether. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocence, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice. Such a risk can be minimised but not rule out altogether. In the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 , the hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: A duty is cast upon the appellate court in such circumstances to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out if any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with. 8. Keeping in mind the well settled principles of law as discussed in the above stated decisions regarding interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal, we feel it appropriate to examine the evidence on record to see whether the findings and the conclusions of the trial court were based on evidence warranting interference by this Court For proper appreciation of the evidence and the rival contentions made by the parties, it would be convenient to briefly re-capitulate the evidence on record as below: PW 1 Smt. Sadhana Debnath could depose nothing due to here physical illness. PW 2 Sri Bhupendra Chandra Roy, who lodged the FIR, stated that Smt. Pratima Roy, who was the wife of his younger brother, Sri Nripendra Chandra Roy (PW 5), was hospitalized in the Paul Nursing Home due to electric shock. According to this witness, as the condition of the patient had improved and on being assured by Dr. Shankar Paul not to worry about her, they left the nursing home keeping the patient therein. At about 2 a.m., on the same night, he received the information, from the nursing home, that the said patient was missing, and on receipt of such information, he and other members of the family proceeded to the nursing home, but in spite of vigorous search, the patient could not be traced out till 21.6.1994, on which date, at about 6 a.m., the dead body of the patient aforesaid was found floating in a nearby tank. This witness did not state anything indicating that any role was played by the accused persons leading to the disappearance and the death of the said deceased. He also stated that at time of their arrival, on the said night, at the gate of nursing home, they found that the main gate of the nursing home was closed and that on being called, the small gate was opened, through which they entered the nursing home. He further stated that after entering into the room, occupied by the said patient, he noticed blood on the bed sheet and the pillow cover. PW 35 Sri Nidhu Bhusan Saha also supported the evidence of PW 2 regarding presence of blood on the bed sheet. According to this witness, on being asked as to how the patient could be missing, Dr. Shankar Paul had told him that due to death of a patient, the gate of the nursing home was lying opened and that the patient might have gone out through the said gate. From the evidence of this witness, it appears that he noticed blood on the bed sheet and the pillow cover. The sample of the said blood was not examined to find out if the same was human blood and if so, whether the same was the blood of the deceased. There is no evidence that the said blood was the blood of the deceased. Therefore, the presence of blood on the bed sheet and the pillow cover cannot be conclusive evidence to hold that the said blood, if any, occurred due to assault caused by the accused persons. 9. Smt. Anita Das, PW 4, who used to work in the nursing home, at the relevant time, supported the prosecution version regarding admission of the deceased and her subsequent disappearance and recovery of her dead body. PW 4 further stated that on the following morning, the nursing home was ransacked by people and that in spite of search, the missing patient could not be traced out. 10. Sri Nripendra Chandra Roy (PW 5), the husband of the deceased, deposing in the tune with PW 2, stated that in spite of vigorous search on the fateful night and on the following day, his wife could not be found and that, the dead body of his wife, i.e., the deceased, was found floating in a nearby tank. 10. Sri Nripendra Chandra Roy (PW 5), the husband of the deceased, deposing in the tune with PW 2, stated that in spite of vigorous search on the fateful night and on the following day, his wife could not be found and that, the dead body of his wife, i.e., the deceased, was found floating in a nearby tank. This witness (PW 5) denied the suggestion, put to him by the defence, that some of his colleagues, who went to the nursing home, had told him that his wife was noticed at 'Ashram Chowmuhani' by the driver of the vehicle of ONGC. Sri Biren Chandra Datta, deposing as PW 6, stated that the CID officer had searched a room situated by the side of the CT scan machine room of 'Paul Nursing home' and found a coloured and torn long pant and seized it in his presence. The said seized pant was neither proved to have been used by any of the accused persons nor it was established that the said pant had any nexus with the alleged crime. The seizure of the said coloured long pant does not lead to any inference regarding involvement of the accused persons in this case. 11. PW 7 Sri Sachindra Chandra Das, a guard at the office of the Fisheries department, situated at a distance of 2/3 furlong from the 'nursing home', stated that he had no idea about the incident. Sri Siba Prasad Bose PW 8, Sri Radharaman Goswami (PW 9), Sri Babul Deb (PW 10) and Dr. Jyotish Datta (PW 12) stated regarding seizure of some books, under garments, papers, identity cards and one packet of condom from the house of Dr. Kishlaya Datta. The said seizure does not reveal any incriminating evidence against Dr. Datta. 12. PW 11 Sri Tapan Datta stated regarding seizure of a blood stained bed cover and a pillow cover by the Police from the Pal 'Nursing Home'. He exhibited the said articles as Exts.6 and 7. According to PW 34 (Sri Ranabir Bhattacharjee), some human hairs and a blood stained bed sheet were seized by the Police at the Police headquarters. Be that as it may, we have already observed that the blood found in the seized bed sheet and the pillow cover has not been proved to be incriminating evidence against the accused persons. 13. According to PW 34 (Sri Ranabir Bhattacharjee), some human hairs and a blood stained bed sheet were seized by the Police at the Police headquarters. Be that as it may, we have already observed that the blood found in the seized bed sheet and the pillow cover has not been proved to be incriminating evidence against the accused persons. 13. Sri Pulin Biswas, PW 13, took the photographs of the dead body PW 14 Anirudhha Saha and PW 15 Smt. Kalyani Saha, who were neighbourers of the deceased's family, stated about the incident regarding electric shock sustained by the deceased. PW 16 Makhan Lal Roy, who retired as an IAS officer, stated about the finding of the dead body in the tank. PW 17 Sri Amit Roy, PW 18 Sushil Chandra Saha, PW 19, Ashoke Anand and PW 20, Sri Sunil Sur, stated about the electric shock injury suffered by Smt. Pratima Roy and her disappearance from the nursing home and subsequent recovery of her dead body, on 21.6.1994, at about 4-30 p.m. from the tank. Smt. Debi Chakraborty, a staff nurse, deposing as PW 21, stated that on 19.6.1994, at about 2 a.m., while she was performing her duty, another staff, namely, Mina masi, informed her that a patient, namely, Smt. Pratima Roy was missing. This witness too did not state anything regarding involvement of the accused persons. PW 22, Sri Jyoti Prasad Roy, stated regarding seizure of some papers from the house of Dr. Kishalaya Datta. He also did not state anything regarding involvement of the accused persons. 14. PW 25 Sri Tapas Banerjee stated that on being requested by the husband of the deceased, he proceeded to the nursing home and noticed that the floor of the room No. 9, which was occupied by the deceased, was washed by water. According to this witness, on being asked, as to how Smt. Pratima Roy could be missing, Dr. Paul did not give any answer. He further stated that they had searched the entire nursing home and that Dr. Paul had told them that he had seen her fleeing away from the nursing home at the time of taking out dead body of another patient around 1/1-30 a.m., from nursing home. Paul did not give any answer. He further stated that they had searched the entire nursing home and that Dr. Paul had told them that he had seen her fleeing away from the nursing home at the time of taking out dead body of another patient around 1/1-30 a.m., from nursing home. This witness further stated that about 14/15 days after the recovery of the dead body and on being asked by the CID Inspector, he went to the nursing home and that in the nursing home, one driver and one staff of the nursing home, namely, Polin Debnath and Shyamal Malakar, gave a demonstration narrating as to how on the fateful night, the dead body of a woman, covered by a bed sheet, was taken to the back side of the CT scan building as per instructions of Dr. Kishalaya Datta and as to how the said two accused persons, on the night of 20.6.1994, had taken the dead body from the back side of the CT scan building to the Fishery tank in a Maruti van. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that at the time of said demonstration, given by Sri Pulin Debnath, he was in the custody of the Police being tied with a rope and hand-cuff. This witness admitted the presence of some Police personnel at the time of demonstration given by the accused. From the evidence of this witness, it clearly appears that both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar were in the custody of the Police and they had made the said extra-judicial confession in presence and custody of the Police. We will separately deal with the value of such extra-judicial confessions made in this case. 15. PW 26 (Dr. Amlan Datta), PW 27 (Sri Shyamal Kanti Deb) and PW 28 (Sri Biswajit Chowdhury) stated regarding taking of blood samples, sample of hairs, saliva, pubic hair, etc., of Dr. Shankar Paul, Dr. Kishalaya Datta, Sri Shymal Malakar, but no incriminating evidence could be elicited from such seizure. PW 30, Sri Sunirmal Datta, stated regarding seizure of some papers regarding tariff rate of Pal Nursing Home as prescribed by the ONGC. PW 31, Sri Sunil Kumar Majumder, was a witness to the inquest report prepared by the Police. PW 35, Sri Nidhu Bhusan Saha, stated that the Police had brought under arrest one person, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath, who had disclosed that Dr. PW 31, Sri Sunil Kumar Majumder, was a witness to the inquest report prepared by the Police. PW 35, Sri Nidhu Bhusan Saha, stated that the Police had brought under arrest one person, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath, who had disclosed that Dr. Kishalaya Datta and one driver had asked him to take out the dead body of the deceased from room No. 9 and that, initially, though he declined to do so, subsequently, on being asked by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, they carried the dead body in a Maruti Van towards the front side and, thereafter, kept the dead body behind the CT scan building in a wet place and that on the following night, the dead body was thrown to the Fishery tank. According to this witness, the photograph of the demonstration, given by the said accused person, in presence of the Police, was taken. He clearly stated that, on being asked by the Police, the said accused, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath had disclosed in the said way. Therefore, it appears that the said demonstration/disclosure, in the nature of extra-judicial confession, were made by the accused at the instance and the period, when he was in the custody of the Police. In his cross-examination, this witness further stated that at the time of making the said demonstration/disclosure, accused Sri Pulin Debnath was tied with a rope and that the other end of the rope was held by the police, who were armed with Rifle. Therefore, it appears that the said disclosure/statement, if any, was made by the accused Sri Pulin Debnath while in the custody of the Police. PW 36, Sri Narayan Chandra Kar. also stated about the said demonstration given by accused Sri Pulin Debnath under Police custody. PW 38, Sri Ramesh Chandra Saha, too stated regarding the said disclosure by accused Sri Shymal Malakar, while in Police custody. We will shortly take up separately the evidentiary value of such extra-judicial confessional statement. 16. PW 37 Sri Haripada Jana stated regarding admission of the wife of Sri Nripendra Chandra Roy (PW 5) in the Pal Nursing Home and subsequent recovery of her dead body from the tank. PW 32, Sri B.K. Khilikdar, Judicial Magistrate and PW 40, Sri Subhash Sikdar, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, recorded confessional statements of Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar respectively. PW 32, Sri B.K. Khilikdar, Judicial Magistrate and PW 40, Sri Subhash Sikdar, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, recorded confessional statements of Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar respectively. We propose to discuss the relevancy and evidentiary value of the said confessional statements in the later part of this judgment. 17. PW 41 (Sri Shyama Prasad Biswas), who was the Officer-in-Charge, East Agartala PS, received the First Information Report (FIR) on 21.6.1994 at about 9.30 a.m. and he endorsed the same to the SI Bimal Deb for investigation. In his cross-examination, he stated that he recorded the FIR as East Agartala PS case No. 92 of 1994. PW 42 (Sri Pran Krishna Das), SI of Police, East Agartala PS, stated that on 20.6.1994 at 4.20 a.m., he received a letter from Pal Nursing Home indicating therein about the fact that a person, namely, Smt. Pratima Roy, was missing and accordingly, he, after making GD entry, issued wireless message to all the Officers-in-Charge of all the Police Stations in Tripura. PW 43 (Sri Bimal Deb), SI of Police, stated that, on being entrusted, he launched investigation regarding the disappearance of a person, namely, Smt. Pratima Roy (deceased) and that the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the tank. He prepared the Inquest report (Ext.2) in presence of the witnesses and sent the dead body by issuing challan for post mortem examination. According to this witness, he seized certain articles including the wearing apparels and ornaments of the deceased and visited the place of occurrence i.e the nursing home, recorded the statements of witnesses and of the accused persons. The Investigating officer received the post mortem report. He also seized the blood stained bed sheet and pillow cover and one saline bottle including aciloc tablets, calmpose injection pipe, etc., admission register of the hospital and recorded the statements of the witnesses and the statements of Dr. Kishalaya Datta, Dr. Shankar Paul and Sri Shankar Ray. He handed over the case record to the Inspector Pradip Bhadra, CID, as per instructions of the higher authority. 18. PW 44, Sri Arun Chandra Datta, a Police Constable, who worked in the dog squad, went to the nursing home with the snifter dog, namely, 'Hrishi'. Kishalaya Datta, Dr. Shankar Paul and Sri Shankar Ray. He handed over the case record to the Inspector Pradip Bhadra, CID, as per instructions of the higher authority. 18. PW 44, Sri Arun Chandra Datta, a Police Constable, who worked in the dog squad, went to the nursing home with the snifter dog, namely, 'Hrishi'. He stated that the dog moved towards the southern side, i.e., CT scan building and from there to the last end of the said building through its varandah and that after coming back to room No. 9, the dog had gone to the CT scan building and stopped in front of a door of the room of the CT scan building. He further stated that the dog had entered the room and gave a round into the room and jumped on a cot and brought out a blood stained bed sheet of brown colour kept under a pillow. According to this witness, dog finds it difficult to work properly if he gets the smell of phenyl, lysol, etc., and if there is movement of people prior to undertaking such process. From the evidence of PW 44, it appears that the said sniffer dog could not lead to the recovery of any incriminating material against the accused persons except the recovery of blood stained bed sheet, which, as discussed above, was not proved as substantive piece of evidence against the accused persons. PW 45 Sri Pradip Kr. Bhadra, Inspector of CID, stated that he took up the investigation and he forwarded Sri Polin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Debnath for recording their confessional statements and also recorded the statements of the witnesses including the statement of the accused persons and submitted the charge sheet, under Sections 376 / 302 / 201 / 34, IPC, against the accused Dr. Kishalaya Datta, under Sections 118 / 302 / 201 / 34, IPC against the accused Sri Polin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar and under Sections 302 / 118 / 201 / 34, IPC against Dr. Shankar Chandra Paul under Sections 302 / 201, IPC. 19. PW 23, Dr. Pijush Kanti Das, stated that on 21.6.1994, a Medical Board, consisting of himself and two other doctors, namely, Dr. Asim Datta and Dr. Shankar Chandra Paul under Sections 302 / 201, IPC. 19. PW 23, Dr. Pijush Kanti Das, stated that on 21.6.1994, a Medical Board, consisting of himself and two other doctors, namely, Dr. Asim Datta and Dr. N.N. Datta, conducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of Smt. Pratima Roy, on being identified by Sri Bhupendra Chandra Roy and Sri Gouranga Das (PW 29). PW 29, a Police constable, clearly stated that after the inquest report, he had escorted the dead body of Smt. Pratima Roy for the purpose of post mortem examination. PW 33 (Sri Ranjit Saha), elder brother of the deceased admitted the receipt of the dead body after such examination. Therefore, there is no dispute regarding identity of the dead body. As per the post mortem examination report, which was exhibited as Ext. 12 the following injuries were found: (1) Minor abrasion dorsal aspect of the right wrist measuring 1/2 x 1/2 x skin. (2) Minor abrasion dorsal aspect of the right hand measuring 1/2 x 1/2 x skin. (3) Lacerated injury right palm - 3 nos each 1" x 1/4 x skin. (4) Profuse blood from mouth and nose. (5) Depression in chest area. On internal examination of cranium and spinal canal were found healthy. Thorax- walls. Ribs and cartilages-healthy. Larynx and trachea - healthy. Right lung and left lung were found healthy but congested. Heart found healthy and empty. Blood was found in chest cavity. Abdomen walls and peritoneum were found healthy. Stomach and its content was found healthy but empty. All the organs of the abdomen were found healthy. Muscles, bone and joint- stated in the column No. 1. 20. The Medical officers opined that the cause of death was homicidal asphyxia. The post mortem report was marked as Ext. 12. Along with post mortem report, the team of the doctors also submitted Gynaecological report, and the report of pathological examination. According to the Medical officer, it was difficult to give the time of death of a healthy person if such dead body was kept under the shed of trees or on the wet land for 24 hours and, thereafter, for 5/6 hours under water. From his cross-examination, it appears that the Medical officer was an experienced person, who has been conducting post mortem examination for the last 17 years. From his cross-examination, it appears that the Medical officer was an experienced person, who has been conducting post mortem examination for the last 17 years. According to this witness, the decomposition of the dead bodies vary from season to season. He clearly stated that there was no decomposition of the said dead body. According to this Medical Officer, if the death had taken place between 24/30 hours prior to conducting autopsy, then, there was possibility of finding decomposition in the dead body. He opined that the death occurred around 15/20 hours prior to the post mortem examination. In his cross-examination, he further stated that injury Nos. 1 and 2 might have been caused due to dragging of the said dead body from one place to another or from the place of occurrence to the hospital morgue. He further opined that asphyxial death might be caused due to poison also. 21. Dr. Asim Datta, one of the members of the team of experts, constituted for the autopsy of the dead body, stated that on 21.6.1994, at about 10 p.m., they had performed the post mortem examination on the dead body and that the post mortem report was written by Dr. P.K. Das, and he and the other two doctors agreed with the report. The Medical officer opined that if the dead body was kept in water for 5/6 hours, then, there was no scope to make any opinion regarding rape and that the spermatozoa, if any, might have been washed out. He also opined that if the dead body was kept under the shade of trees on wet soil for 24 hours and, thereafter, under water for 5/6 hours, then, the death might have been caused more than 2.0 hours before the post mortem examination. He further opined that such time may vary from case to case depending upon differences in the circumstances. In his cross-examination, the Medical officer opined that it was a case of unnatural death. He also opined that during summer season, decomposition of a dead body starts from 12 to 24 hours and that the death, in the present case, occurred 15/20 hours prior to holding of the post mortem examination. He further stated that, while arriving at such an opinion, they had considered the weather condition and other circumstances relating to the condition of the dead body. He further stated that, while arriving at such an opinion, they had considered the weather condition and other circumstances relating to the condition of the dead body. He also opined that there was no sign of rape on the dead body. The said Medical evidence as well as the post mortem report have negated the story of rape. Therefore, we fail to find any substantive medical evidence regarding rape. The post mortem report (Ext. 12) reveals that the death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage and the viscera was preserved for chemical or forensic examination to ascertain the cause of death. The viscera was not sent for chemical examination and as such, there was no report regarding actual cause of death of the deceased. In the opinion of the said Medical officer, the cause of death was homicidal asphyxial death. 22. As indicated earlier, according to PW 23, the death might have been caused due to poisoning also. Therefore, for want of report of viceral examination, the correct cause of death of the deceased could not be ascertained. The learned trial Judge, in his judgment, recorded that the learned Special P.P. had clearly submitted that the prosecution could not make out a case under Sections 302 and376, IPC. Though the exact cause of death could not be ascertained, it was surprising as to how Smt. Pratima Roy, who was admitted in the hospital with the history of electric shock injury, could have congestion in respect of her both lungs, chest cavity filled with blood, depression in the chest, profuse bleeding from the mouth and nose. The above circumstances lead one to suspect that some external force had been applied leading to her death. 23. Now, in the light of the evidence on record, the question to he determined is as to who had caused the said injuries resulting in to the death of the said deceased. The second question to be examined is as to under what circumstances the dead body of the deceased, who was admitted in the room No. 9 of Pal Nursing Home, could be found in a tank after several hours, i.e., in the morning on 21.6.1994. According to prosecution, as revealed from the confessional statements, Dr. The second question to be examined is as to under what circumstances the dead body of the deceased, who was admitted in the room No. 9 of Pal Nursing Home, could be found in a tank after several hours, i.e., in the morning on 21.6.1994. According to prosecution, as revealed from the confessional statements, Dr. Kishalaya Datta had killed Smt. Pratima Roy after committing rape on her and he, with the help of Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Sriaymal Malakar, had removed the dead body, kept the same behind CT scan building throughout the night and the following day of 20.6.1994 and, then, disposed of the same, in the tank, in the night of 20.6.1994, leading to the discovery of the dead body in the morning of 21.6.1994. 24. In the backdrop of the above evidence on record and in the light of the established principles of law regarding interference with an appeal against acquittal, this Court is called up to scrutinize if there is cogent and substantive evidence pointing to guilt of the accused-persons. 25. Admittedly, in the present case, there is no eye witness. In support of its case, prosecution has relied on the circumstantial evidence elicited by the witnesses, the judicial confessions as well as extra-judicial confessions made by Sri Polin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar. 26. Before taking up the confessional statements of the said accused persons, we would like to examine the existence of incriminating circumstantial evidence, if any. In the present case, as argued by the Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State appellant, the following circumstantial evidences have emerged from the evidence on record: (i) Smt. Pratima Roy, the deceased, was admitted to Pal Nursing Home in the evening of 19.6.1994 and she was left alone there by her guardian and relatives. (ii) Information was received by the family members of the deceased at about 2 am (night of 19.6.1994) from Pal Nursing Home that the said patient was missing. (iii) When the family members of the deceased, more particularly, PW 2, PW 5, and PW 25, reached the nursing home, at about 2-30 am, they found that the main gate was closed, that there was no light on the front side of the nursing home and that on being called, someone had opened the small gate. (iii) When the family members of the deceased, more particularly, PW 2, PW 5, and PW 25, reached the nursing home, at about 2-30 am, they found that the main gate was closed, that there was no light on the front side of the nursing home and that on being called, someone had opened the small gate. (iv) A blood stained bed sheet and a blood stained pillow cover were found in the room occupied by the deceased. (v) The floor of the room No. 9 and its corridor were washed by water. (vi) In the morning of 21.6.1994, the dead body of the deceased was found, in the tank, situated near the nursing home. (vii) Two accused persons, namely, Sri Polin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Debnath made judicial confession implicating themselves and Dr. Kishalaya Datta. 27. The law and principles, regarding evidentiary value of circumstantial evidence and its relevancy, stand well settled by catena of decisions. In the case of Sarad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR. 1984 SC 1622, the Supreme Court, while discussing a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case, which rests on circumstantial evidence and referring to the most fundamental and basic decision of the Apex Court, in Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) SCR 1091, laid down the following golden principles, which were terms as Panchashil: (i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 : AIR 1973 5C 2622 where the following observations were made: certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (ii) The fact so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (ii) The fact so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 28. The above circumstances, as revealed from the evidence on records must form a complete, chain pointing to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of any other hypothesis. Keeping in mind the said principles of law, laid down by the Apex Court, we deem it appropriate to examine if the above mentioned circumstances constitute a complete chain leading to the conclusion not consistent with the innocence of the accused. 29. The circumstances that the deceased was admitted in the nursing home for undergoing medical treatment that the family members of the deceased received information about the fact that she was missing from the nursing home and that in spite of their best efforts, the deceased could not be traced out till the recovery of her dead body from a nearby tank in the morning of 21.6.1994 are all admitted facts. Though the said circumstances, prove the fact that the said deceased disappeared from the said nursing home, yet the recovery of the dead body do not lead to the conclusion that the accused had committed the alleged offences. The closure of the main gate and the opening of the small gate for the entry of the family members of the deceased do not suggest the involvement of the accused persons with the alleged offences. Because, it is not a case that the family members of the deceased were not informed by the nursing home authority or that they were not allowed to enter into the nursing home. The absence of the light towards the front side of the nursing home also does not indicate complicity of the accused persons. 30. Because, it is not a case that the family members of the deceased were not informed by the nursing home authority or that they were not allowed to enter into the nursing home. The absence of the light towards the front side of the nursing home also does not indicate complicity of the accused persons. 30. The circumstances regarding the fact that of the blood stains were found on bed sheet and pillow cover indicate, at best, that the said deceased had sustained bleeding injury due to assault caused on her. However, there is no conclusive evidence on record showing that the deceased was assaulted by all or anyone of the accused persons causing bleeding injury on her person. In view of absence of any substantive evidence in this regard, it cannot be, in fact, safely held that it was the blood of the deceased. Regarding washing of the room and corridor, PW 4 has clearly stated that the nursing home was regularly washed with lysol, dettol and phenyl. Therefore, the washing of the nursing home being a regular feature, the said circumstance does not constitute substantive legal evidence against the accused persons. There is no evidence to show that the washing of the room and the corridor was aimed at removing or destroying any evidence relating to the cause of disappearance of the said deceased or death of the deceased. There is no dispute as regards the fact that the dead body of said deceased was found in a tank opposite to the nursing home. Both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar, who were the employees of the nursing home, made inculpatory confessional statements involving Dr. Kishalaya Datta. Except the said confessional statements, which were subsequently retracted, there is no other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, pointing to the guilt of the accused persons. No other incriminating material connecting the accused persons with the disappearance and recovery of the deceased could be established. 31. Now, coming to the confessional statements made by the accused persons, we find that both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamat Malakar had made confessional statements before Judicial Magistrate, i.e., PW 32 and PW 40. In their confessional statements, the said accused persons stated that, on the fateful night, at about 2 O'clock, they, at the instance and direction of Dr. In their confessional statements, the said accused persons stated that, on the fateful night, at about 2 O'clock, they, at the instance and direction of Dr. Kishalaya Datta, had removed the dead body of the deceased from the room No. 9 to the back side of the CT scan building and kept the same throughout the night and the following day under the shade of the trees and that they had, again, on being asked by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, on the next night, removed and thrown the dead body into the nearby tank, Sri Pulin Debnath further stated that he was told by Smt. Bina Deb and Smt. Shobha Debnath that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had committed rape on the patient after pushing some injection and murdered her. The said confessional statement indicates that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had committed rape and killed the deceased and that he, with the help of Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shaymal Malakar, had concealed the dead body behind the CT scan building of the nursing home till the night of 20.6.1994 and, then, got the same thrown to the tank through Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamla Malakar. Except the said statements of the co-accused, there is not even an iota of cogent evidence against Dr. Datta. PW 35, PW 36, PW 38 and PW 39, in their evidence, stated that the Police had brought the said accused persons, namely, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar under arrest to the nursing home and that the said two accused persons had demonstrated as to how and in what manner the dead body of the deceased was carried from her room to the back side of the CT scan building and subsequently to the tank. 32. Both Sri Debnath and Sri Malakar, at the time of giving statement under Section 313, Cr.PC, retracted their earlier confessions on the plea that they were tortured and compelled by the Police to give such confessional statements. Hero, we feel inclined to examine the relevancy and evidentiary value of the said retracted confessional statement, extra-judicial confession and the confession of the co-accused. Under the provision of Sections 24 and 28 of the Evidence Act, a confessional statement, recorded as per the procedure prescribed by Section 164, Cr.PC, after removal of any inducement, threat or promise are relevant 33. Under the provision of Sections 24 and 28 of the Evidence Act, a confessional statement, recorded as per the procedure prescribed by Section 164, Cr.PC, after removal of any inducement, threat or promise are relevant 33. As provided in Section 25 of the Evidence Act, no confession made to a Police officer can be proved against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that no confession made by any person, whilst in the custody of a Police, shall be proved as against such person. Section 30 of the Evidence Act relates to confessional statement of co-accused. Section 30of the Evidence Act reads as follows: Section 30. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other or such persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. 34. Section 164, Cr.PC prescribes the procedure for recording of confession under Sub-section (1), (2), (3) and (4) requiring the Judicial Magistrate to give a certificate indicating therein that he had explained to the accused that he (accused) was not bound to make a confession, the same and that in the event of making such confession the same may be used against him and that to his belief, the confession was voluntarily made. Sub-section (3) provides that in the event of refusal to make confession, the Magistrate should not authorize detention of such person in Police custody. As required by law, a Judicial Magistrate, recording the confessional statement, must have reason to believe that the confession was true and that the same was made voluntarily and was also free from any inducement, threat or promise. In the case of Bakul Bora v. State of Assam (2004) 3 GLT 396, a Division Bench of this Court, while discussing evidentiary value of a retracted confessional statement of a co-accused and the probative value of confession of a co-accused held- That there is no impediment in law in conviction as accused solely on his own confession, even if retracted, provided that the court believes such a confession as true has been made clear, by the Apex Court in Khear Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1988 SC 1883 . That no court can throw away confession merely because the confession is retracted has been clearly laid down in State of Tamil Nadu v. Kutty alias Lakshmi Narasinhan 2001 Crl. LJ 4168, wherein the Apex Court has observed and held as follows: Learned Judges of the High Court declined to act on the said confession mainly for two reasons. First is that the confession was retracted by the maker thereof and second is that the recovery of articles was made prior to the confession. We may state at the outset itself that both reasons are too insufficient for overruling the confession. It is not the law that once a confession was retracted the court should presume that the confession is tainted. As a matter of practical knowledge we can say that non-retracted confession is a rarity in criminal cases. The retract from confession is the right of the confessor and all the accused against confessions were produced by the prosecution have invariably adopted that right. It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere premise that its maker has retracted from it. The court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession by looking at all aspects. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once these tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason, which stands in the way of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard. A co-accused, who confesses his guilt, stands on no better footing than an accomplice. The law insists that the accomplice's evidence be not used without corroboration. Prudence demands that when such an accomplice implicates another, then, the person, who is so implicated, has a right to test the evidence given against him by his co-accused; but no such opportunity is available in law to the person so implicated by his co-accused. The resultant effect is that the confession of a co-accused is used against another accused without giving him any opportunity of testing the veracity of the confession by cross-examining the maker thereof. The resultant effect is that the confession of a co-accused is used against another accused without giving him any opportunity of testing the veracity of the confession by cross-examining the maker thereof. No wonder, therefore, that the Apex Court has laid down that the confession of the co-accused is not really evidence in its strict sense and cannot be made foundation for conviction of the person, who did not make the confession, though such confession can be used as an additional reason for believing the evidence on record provided that the evidence on record, independent of the confession of the co-accused, convinces the court of the guilt of the accused against whom such a confession is relied upon, A reference, in this regard, may be made to Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhaya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159 , wherein the Apex Court observed and laid down as follows: The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in Section 8. It cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of believe independently of the confession, then, of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise, where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it should be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event, the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and, thus, fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept. 35. In the case of Paramananda Pegu v. State of Assam (2004) 3 GLT (SC) 2, the hon'ble Apex Court laying down the law and the principle regarding acceptability of extra-judicial confession, retracted confession held: In order to be assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a series of decisions, has evolved a rule of prudence that the court should look to corroboration from other evidence. However, there need not be corroboration in respect of each and every material particular. Broadly, they should be corroboration so that the confession taken as a whole fits into the facts proved by other evidence. In substance, the court should have assurance from all angles that the retracted confession was, in fact, voluntary and it must have been true. In the said case, it was also observed by the Apex Court as follows: the decision of this Court in Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat (1992) 1 SCC 473 has created some difficulty in understanding the law which is otherwise so well settled. The learned Judges imported the observations which were made in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159 in the context of evidentiary value of the confession of co-accused and applied them to the case of retracted confession. It appears that the learned Judges went by the head-note in the AIR which opens up with the sentence. The confession of an accused person...." However, in the text of the judgment it is crystal clear that the entire discussion and the statement of law was only with reference to the confession of the co-accused. While clarifying that the confession of the co-accused is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as pointed out by the Privy Council, this Court observed in Kashmira Singh's case that such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. 36. The Apex Court, referred to the following observations made in the case of Pyare Lal v. State of Rajasthan (1963) Supp 1 SCR 689: A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only, a rule of prudence. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only, a rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made without corroboration, for a court may, in a particular case, be convinced of the absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confessing, unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. 37. The Privy Council in the case of Bhubani Sahu v. the King AIR (36) 1949 PC 257 held- it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act upon the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as it implicate the accused; and further the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. The law in India, therefore, is substantially the same on the subject as the law in England, though the rule of prudence may be said to be based upon the Interpretation placed by the courts on the phrase "corroborated in material particulars" in illustration B to Section 114. 38. In the case of Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184 , a five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court examined the provisions contained in Section 30 of the Evidence Act and the evidentiary value of a co-accused and held- As we have already indicated, the question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been constantly held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkinsin Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chakraborty ILR 38 Col. 559 at p. 588 a confession can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused. In the case of Kashmira Singh (supra), the Apex Court held, A co-accused who confesses is naturally an accomplice and the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way lessened when the evidence is not on oath and cannot be tested by cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the same rule of caution in the case of a witness who though not an accomplice is regarded by the Judge as having no greater probative value. 39. A Division Bench of Patna High Court, in the case of Bamako Christian v. Emperor AIR 1934 Pat 586, observed as follows: The law relating to the use of retracted confessions may be conveniently summarized as follows: (i) A confession which has been retracted must be viewed with suspicion (ii) But if it is considered to have been (a) a voluntary confession and (b) substantially true, it can be admitted into evidence and used against its maker, (iii) and if it is considered to be such a confession as substantially implicates its maker in regard to the crime with which he and the co-accused are charged, it can be used also against the co-accused. (iv) But even then it can carry no weight except where it is substantially corroborated by good evidence from other sources. In the case of Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 56 , the Supreme Court, referring to the case of Kashmira Singh (supra), held that the confession of a co-accused can be used only for lending assurance to other independent evidence established against the other accused. In the case of Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 56 , the Supreme Court, referring to the case of Kashmira Singh (supra), held that the confession of a co-accused can be used only for lending assurance to other independent evidence established against the other accused. In the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 , the Apex Court held that in order to base conviction on the basis of confession, it must be established that the confession was voluntary and true and it would be necessary to examine the confession and compare it with the rest of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities of the case. If some material points mentioned in the confessional statement are not shown to be considered, then, it is not safe to rely on such confessional statement. Regarding retracted confession, the Apex Court held that conviction can be based on retracted confession if the same is found to be voluntary and true. In the case of Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1978 SC 1248 , the Apex Court held that while convicting a person on the basis of confession recorded under Section164, Cr.PC, the court must apply a double test, i.e., (1) whether the confession was perfectly voluntary ? (2) If so whether it is true and trustworthy ? Regarding acceptability of the retracted confession the Apex Court held that if the confessional statement is not retracted at the earliest opportunity and if the same is retracted at the time of recording statement under Section 313, Cr.PC. the said confessional statement, even if retracted at that belated stage. can be relied upon. In the case of Ghulam Mohammad alias Gama v. Emperor AIR (29) 1942 Lahore 271, it was held that confession must not be regarded as involuntary or unlawfully induced merely because it was retracted at the trial if it is found that the same was true and voluntarily made at the time of recording of such confession. With regard to use of confession of the co-accused it was held- As against the co-accused a retracted confession by an accused may be taken into consideration subject, however, to the rule that it cannot form the basis of a conviction without substantial and independent corroboration both as to the crime and the criminal. With regard to use of confession of the co-accused it was held- As against the co-accused a retracted confession by an accused may be taken into consideration subject, however, to the rule that it cannot form the basis of a conviction without substantial and independent corroboration both as to the crime and the criminal. Further, as against the co-accused a higher standard of corroboration in regard to the retracted confession must be demanded than in the case of the testimony of an approver because the testimony of an approver can be tested by cross-examination whereas the confession of an accused cannot be subjected to such a test. In the case of Purnananda Dasgupta v. Emperor AIR 1939 Cat. 65, it was held that if the confessional statement is retracted on the plea of Police torture, such allegation of torture must be supported by evidence and as such, accused cannot get rid of the statement merely by saying that what he stated was not true. It was also held that if the confession is retracted, it is desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that there should be some corroboration. 40. In respect of retracted confession, though there is no legal bar in basing the conviction of an accused on his own confession if the same is found to be voluntary and true, as a general practice and prudence, the court is required to seek some corroboration from other materials on record for arriving at a definite and satisfactory conclusion that such confession was voluntary and true. What the court is required to see is whether the confession was voluntary, i.e., if the same was obtained, after taking all necessary precautions as prescribed by Section 164, Cr.PC and by removing all sorts of threat, fear, inducement or other pressure, promise etc. Applying the required tests, if it is found that the statement was voluntarily made, then, the court is required to ascertain if the statement is true. Once such confession is found to be true, then, the same can be relied upon even if the statement is retracted at a later stage. 41. In the present case, both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar, at the time of giving statements under Section 313, Cr.PC, retracted their earlier confessional statements on the plea that they were tortured to make such statements. 41. In the present case, both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar, at the time of giving statements under Section 313, Cr.PC, retracted their earlier confessional statements on the plea that they were tortured to make such statements. As the confession was retracted at a belated stage, we would like to cautiously examine if the same was voluntary and true. 42. In the case of Sivappa v. State of Karnataka AIR 1995 SC 980 , the Apex Court held as follows: The law regarding recording of confessional statement and the precautions to be taken by the Magistrate while recording confessional statement, has been well settled by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. Section 164, Cr.PC provides safeguards for an accused. As such provision made therein are required to be strictly complied with, because conviction can be based on confessional statement, if the same is found to be true and voluntary. 43. In the case of Ranbir Singh v. Emperor AIR 1932 Lahore 204, it was held that- failure to put question to the accused to ascertain the voluntariness of the accused is a fatal defect, which cannot be cured," In the case of Punia Mullah v. Emperor AIR (33) 1946 Pat. 69, it was held - "failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 164, Cr.PC is a defect of substance and not merely of form. In the case before the Privy Council, it was noticed that the learned Magistrate before proceeding to record confessional statement failed to take care to see from what custody the accused person was brought to him. In the said case, the statement of the accused was partly recorded on 27th and the accused was again brought before the learned Magistrate on 28th. On 28th neither the learned Magistrate gave any warning to the accused nor put any question to him in order to ascertain that the statements were made voluntarily. Due to such defects, the confessional statement recorded by the learned Magistrate was not relied upon. 44. In the case of Devendra Prasad Tiwary v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1544 , it was held that- there should be record to show that the accused was told that he would not be remanded to Police lock up even if he did not confess the guilt. 44. In the case of Devendra Prasad Tiwary v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1544 , it was held that- there should be record to show that the accused was told that he would not be remanded to Police lock up even if he did not confess the guilt. In the case of State of Assam v. Jitu Pegu (2004) 3 GLT 383, a Division Bench of this Court held- The confession has to be recorded by observing all the formalities prescribed in Section 164 and 281, Cr.PC. The requirements may be summed up as below: (1) Where to record-the confessions should ordinarily be recorded in the open court and during court hours AIR 1954 SC 462 unless there are special reasons for recording at the Magistrate's chamber/residence, in Jail or at any other places. Such reasons must be noted. (2) Removal of police influence before recording confession: Police should be removed to allay fear or suspicion in the mind of the accused. The atmosphere should be free. (3) Warnings The accused should be told that he is before a Judicial Magistrate, independent from the police and, whether he made the statements or not, he will not be remanded to police custody. The accused should also be warned that he is not bound to confess, or make any statement and if he does so, whatever he will say will be recorded and it will be used against him in the trial. Referring to the case of Gendra Brahma v. State of Assam (1981) Crl. LJ 430, the Division Bench observed, "In the above case the hon'ble Lahiri, J, also suggested that the accused should also be provided legal aid by the Magistrate before recording confessional statement. In the case of Narengbam Shyamkanhai v. State of Manipur 2002 (3) GLT 395, indicating distinction between the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164, Cr.PC and confessional statement it was held: a Division Bench of this Court hold that while recording Judicial confession under Section 164, Cr.PC, the Magistrate is required to take all measures to make the accused feel that he is free from all sorts of threat, influence and interference and that he is at liberty to make confession and that the confession made by him would be used against him. In the above referred case, it was observed, "a confession, if voluntary, is made out of repentance and remorse for the act done. In such a mental State, a person will admit only what is true. If a person voluntarily confesses, he has no reason to confess facts, which are untrue or false. Hence, if the confession is found to have streaks of falsehood, then, it is no confession at all. In order to ensure that the confession is wholly voluntary. Section 24 of the Evidence Act lays down that if it appears to the court that the confession has been made out of inducement, threat or promise, such a confession will not be admissible in evidence. Thus, the court need not look for proof that the confession is voluntary. Even if probabilities exist that the confession is involuntary, the court is bound to reject the confession as unreliable. 45. In teeth of the above settled principles and law regarding evidentiary value of retracted confessional statement of co-accused, we, now, take up the confessional statements of the accused persons to ascertain as to whether the said confessional statements were voluntary and true and if those were made free from any inducement, threat or promise. A cumulative reading of the provisions of Section 164, Cr.PC and Sections 24, 25, 26 and 28 of the Evidence Act coupled with the principles laid down by the courts, as discussed above, it is found that the fundamental requirement of a Judicial Magistrate, in respect of recording of confessional statement, is to ascertain, by putting questions and giving assurance to the accused, that the confessional statement proposed to be made was true and that the same was voluntary. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, it must be ascertained that the maker was free from any threat, inducement, promise and such other extraneous forces. For this purpose, a Magistrate is required to instill so much of confidence in the mind of the maker of confessional statement, which can convince him that he was at liberty to make the statement and that in the event of his making such statement, the same would be used against him during trial even if retracted subsequently and that by refusing to make any confessional statement, he would not be required to go back to the custody of the Police/investigating agency, i.e., he will not land in trouble. Though under Section 164, Cr.PC, the types and nature of the questions to be put to the accused persons have not been laid down in so many words, as indicated in various judicial pronouncements, a duty is, indeed, cast upon the Magistrate to adopt such procedure as would enable the maker to feel free to make confession without being influenced by any extraneous force, if the accused chooses to make his confession. Sub-section (3) of Section164 requires that the Magistrate shall not authorize detention of such person in the Police custody even if he declines to make such confession. This provision of the statute implies that a duty is cast upon the Magistrate to inform the accused about availability of such protection. If the accused is not informed that in the event of his refusal to make confessional statement too, he would not be sent back to the police, then, it cannot be concluded that the fear or such other extraneous force, which might have already loomed large in his mind from the date of his arrest till the time of his production before the Magistrate stood removed. In order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion that the confessional statement, proposed to be made, was true and voluntary, free from any fear and extraneous process, the Magistrate is required, amongst others, to put questions and receive answers thereto. If the answers to such questions satisfy the Magistrate that the accused, knowing fully well about the consequences of making the statement, was willing to make the statement, then, he should give to the accused such sufficient time as may be considered appropriate depending upon the length of period of detention already undergone in the custody of the Police and he should be kept in the judicial custody to the exclusion of other persons involved in the case or such other persons, who may have some other interest in the case. The period of reflection should be in consonance with the period of detention in the Police custody so as to remove any influence that might have been applied on him during his custody with the Police. The period of reflection should be in consonance with the period of detention in the Police custody so as to remove any influence that might have been applied on him during his custody with the Police. During such question hours, if it is noticed that there were marks of injury on the person of the accused or he makes any complaint of harassment or ill-treatment during police custody, the Magistrate should enquire into the matter, take appropriate action and provide necessary medical treatment. The Magistrate should maintain a record of enquiry made by him. The Magistrate shall maintain a record of whatever he does for the purpose of ascertaining voluntariness of the confession, which an accused may offer to make and the same should be attached with the confessional statement to enable the trial court as well as the appellate court to properly appreciate the evidentiary value of the confessional statement. When an accused is, again, brought after the expiry of the reflection period, before the Magistrate for making confessional statement, the Magistrate should, again, record the date and time of the production indicating the place from where the accused is produced and explain the particulars of Section 164, Cr.PC and put all such questions, which are relevant to ascertain the truthfulness and voluntariness of the proposed confessional statement. After such exercise, if the Magistrate is satisfied, by putting the questions, that the accused is in a fit state of mind and prepared to make confessional statement voluntarily disclosing the truth, then, he should proceed to record the statement indicating the full particulars of the accused. The questions should be recorded with the answers given thereto. Each and every page of the confessional statement should bear the signature/thumb impression of the accused person along with the signature of the Magistrate at the foot of the certificate indicating that he was satisfied that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. 46. In the present case, accused persons were taken into police custody for seven days by order dated 4.7.1994, passed by the learned C.J.M., West Tripura district. On 7.7.1994, accused Pulin Debnath was produced before the learned C.J.M. for recording his confessional statement. The learned C.J.M. passed the following order on the said date. I have asked the accused if he is willing to make confessional statement and he expressed the willingness. On 7.7.1994, accused Pulin Debnath was produced before the learned C.J.M. for recording his confessional statement. The learned C.J.M. passed the following order on the said date. I have asked the accused if he is willing to make confessional statement and he expressed the willingness. I have explained to him that he is not bound to make confession and also explained the consequence of making confession and allowed time till tomorrow for reflection. Accordingly, accused Pulin Debnath is remanded J/C with direction to Superintendent, Central Jail to keep the accused in segregation in Jail strictly and produce him before this Court on 8.7.1994 at 10.30 a.m. along with the Jail staff On 8.7.1994, accused Pulin Debnath was, again, produced before the learned C.J.M. from the Jail custody and the learned C.J.M. referred him to Sri B.K. Khilikdar, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for recording his confessional statement. The accused was produced before the Magistrate at 2 p.m., and on such production, the learned Magistrate, after explaining the consequences of making confessional statement and giving caution, asked the accused if he was willing to make confession. As the accused wanted to make confession, the Magistrate allowed him one hour time for reflection by keeping him in his chamber. Thereafter, at 3 p.m., the Magistrate recorded the confessional statement. 47. Accused Shyamal Malakar was produced by the Police before the learned C.J.M., on 11.7.1994, for recording the confessional statement and the learned C.J.M. passed the following order: The accused is willing to make confessional statement. I have explained to him that he is not hound to make confession and allowed him time till next date. No prayer for bail. Accused person is remanded to judicial custody till 12.7.1994. Superintendent, Central Jail is hereby asked to keep the accused in segregation in Central Jail and to produce him on 12.7.1994 at 10.30 a.m. by the Jail staff. On 12.7.1994, accused Shymal Malakar was produced before the C.J.M and he passed the following order: Sri S. Sikdar, Judicial Magistrate will record the confessional statement of the accused. The accused was produced before Sri S. Sikdar on 12.7.1994 at 2.30 p.m. The Magistrate explained the consequences of making confessional statement and put certain questions. On 12.7.1994, accused Shymal Malakar was produced before the C.J.M and he passed the following order: Sri S. Sikdar, Judicial Magistrate will record the confessional statement of the accused. The accused was produced before Sri S. Sikdar on 12.7.1994 at 2.30 p.m. The Magistrate explained the consequences of making confessional statement and put certain questions. As the accused, in spite of caution wanted to make confessional statement, the Magistrate gave the accused one hour time for reflection by keeping him in the chamber and thereafter, recorded his statement at 3.30 p.m. 48. In view of the principles of law governing recording of confession, as discussed above, the statutory requirements of Section 164(3), Cr.PC coupled with the provisions prescribed by Sections24 to 28 of the Evidence Act, it was the duty of the C.J.M. to remand the accused persons for reflection after properly putting to them the required questions and explaining to them the consequences of making confessional statement and also to convey to the accused persons such information, instruction and assurances as were necessary in order to enable them to know that they were at liberty either to make or not to make confessional statement and that they should not make any confessional statement which was not true, nor should they make any confessional statement if somebody had applied force or pressure on them or put fear in them compelling them to make such confessional statement. In order to remove any fear of such extraneous force or influence from the mind of the accused persons and to ascertain the truthfulness and the voluntariness of the accused persons, both the C.J.M. as well as the Judicial Magistrates, First Class, who recorded the confessional statement, should have had, clearly and in unequivocal terms, explained to the accused persons that they were before a Judicial Magistrates and not before a Police officer and that they were neither connected with this case nor had any interest in the investigation. That apart, in order to remove any doubt from the mind of the accused persons, both the C.J.M. as well as Judicial Magistrates should have had clearly informed the accused persons that in the event:f their refusal to make confessional statements, they would not be sent back to the Police. That apart, in order to remove any doubt from the mind of the accused persons, both the C.J.M. as well as Judicial Magistrates should have had clearly informed the accused persons that in the event:f their refusal to make confessional statements, they would not be sent back to the Police. A careful perusal of the questions and the answers, recorded by the C.J.M. and the Judicial Magistrates, reveal that none of them had informed the accused persons that, in the event of their refusal to make confessional statement, they would not be sent back to the Police custody. The C.J.M. acted very perfunctorily. He did not maintain any records indicating as to what questions had been put by him to the accused and what were the answers given by the accused. In fact, the Magistrates recorded the confessions giving only one hour reflection time after putting same questions and recording answers thereto. This reflection time, in view of the length of the custodial detention of the accused, was wholly inadequate. Sri B.K. Khilikdar, Judicial Magistrate, First Class (PW 32) and Sri Subhas Sikdar, Judicial Magistrate, First Class (PW 40), who recorded the statements of Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar, admitted, in their cross-examination, that they did not tell the accused persons that they would not be given to the custody of Police even if they did not make any confession. Such lapse/failure on the part of the Magistrates amounted to recording the confessional statements in violation of the statutory provision of Section 164(3), CrPC. This also indicates that the Magistrates failed to inspire confidence in the accused to believe in themselves that they would not land in trouble even if they refused to make confessional statement. Clearly, therefore, one cannot confidently hold, now that the accused persons felt free not to make confession. It thus, cannot be held that the accused persons made the confessional statements with free mind and without any fear. As the accused had come from prolonged Police custody, the fear of going back to such custody was not duly removed. Therefore, the confessional statements, made by the accused persons, without knowing the consequences of refusal to make confessional statement, in our considered view, was not voluntary. As the accused had come from prolonged Police custody, the fear of going back to such custody was not duly removed. Therefore, the confessional statements, made by the accused persons, without knowing the consequences of refusal to make confessional statement, in our considered view, was not voluntary. That apart, as directed by the C.J.M., both the accused persons were brought from the Jail custody to the court and the accused Pulin Debnath was produced before the Magistrate at 2 p.m. while the accused Shyamal Sarkar was produced before him at 2.30 p.m. There is nothing to show as to under whose custody they were kept prior to such production. Also there is no record to show that they were directly brought from the Jail, under the custody of the Jail staff, to the Magistrates. Fact remains that, initially, they were produced before the C.J.M. and the C.J.M. had referred the accused persons to the other Judicial Magistrates for recording their confessional statements. The C.J.M. did not indicate in whose custody they were kept prior to their production before him. Therefore, there is nothing on record to rule out that the accused had no occasion to come in contact with Police officials, either in the court lock up or in the court room, wherever they might have been kept till their production before the Magistrates at the later part of the day. 49. In view of the above discussion, the said two confessional statement recorded by the Judicial Magistrates, First Class, being violative of Section 164, Cr.PC does not appear to be voluntarily made by the accused persons. Therefore, we are not inclined to rely on such confessional statements and base the conviction of the accused persons thereon. 50. As discussed above, it is also well settled law that confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be substantive evidence against the other. At best, such statement can be used only for lending assurance for the purpose of corroboration if any independent evidence is, otherwise, available against such accused persons. The confessional statement of the co-accused, made under Section30 of the Evidence Act, is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act. In the present case, except the above mentioned confession, which we decline to accept as substantive evidence, there is no other independent evidence against the accused persons, more particularly, against Dr. Shankar Paul and Dr. Kishalaya Datta. In the present case, except the above mentioned confession, which we decline to accept as substantive evidence, there is no other independent evidence against the accused persons, more particularly, against Dr. Shankar Paul and Dr. Kishalaya Datta. In view of absence of independent evidence against the said accused persons, we find no scope to draw any inference of guilt against the accused persons. There is no scope to use the said confessional statements against the above mentioned co-accused persons. Therefore, the said confessions do not help the prosecution. 51. That apart, a careful comparative reading of the confessional statements of accused Sri Shyamal malakar and Sri Pulin Debnath (Ext. 17 and Ext.33) raises suspicion about the truthfulness of their confessional statements. Sri Pulin Debnath, in his confession, stated that at about 11.30 p.m., after finishing the duty he went to his room in the nursing home itself for the purpose of sleeping and that on the same night, at about 2'O clock, one sweeper, namely, Sri Sukhmoy Chowdhury, alias Mina (not examined) informed him that the patient of the room No. 9 was missing and that she had to be searched out. On being so informed, he, straightway, went to room No. 9 and after reaching the room No. 9, he saw that Dr. Kishalaya Datta and the driver Sri Shyamal Malakar were coming out of the said room carrying with them a person covered with a saffron colour chadar (shawal) and that they were trying to lift the said person into the vehicle No. TRA-2641. This statement, that they were trying lift the said person in the above mentioned vehicle indicates that the said person was already carried to the vehicle, for the purpose of putting the said person into the vehicle. He further stated that Dr. Kishalaya Datta asked him to hold the body, and though, initially, he had refused to do so, but, on being rebuked by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, he also participated in lifting the corpse into the vehicle and that the vehicle was pushed to the nearby CT scan building. He further stated that, as directed by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, they had kept the said corpse in the jungle behind the CT scan building and, thereafter, came back to the nursing home. The other accused, namely, Shaymal Malakar stated that, while he was sleeping inside the vehicle No. TR-01-0509, in the nursing home campus. Dr. He further stated that, as directed by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, they had kept the said corpse in the jungle behind the CT scan building and, thereafter, came back to the nursing home. The other accused, namely, Shaymal Malakar stated that, while he was sleeping inside the vehicle No. TR-01-0509, in the nursing home campus. Dr. Kishalaya Datta, at late night, called him and took to room No. 9. After arriving at the room No. 9, he found that there was no light inside the room and that the patient, who had died, was lying on the bed. He further stated that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had asked him to throw the dead body into the Fishery tank situated in front of the Modern Club and that on his refusal to do so. DR. Kishalaya Datta had threatened him saying that he would not be able to go out of the nursing home. Therefore, on being directed and so threatened by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, he went to call Pulin and after proceeding a little distance, he could see that Pulin was coming towards them. According to this accused, Pulin also, initially, refused to obey Dr. Kishalaya Datta. He further stated that he found that the dead body was covered with an almond colour bed sheet and that, on being asked by, Dr. Kishalaya Datta, he had held the dead body by its waist, while Pulin caught hold of her legs and Dr. Kishalaya Datta caught hold of her head and, thus, they carried the dead body to vehicle No. 2641. He further stated that at the instruction of Dr. Kishalaya Datta, the dead body was kept under banana trees, behind the CT scan building, throughout the night and that, on the following night, at 2.30/3.0 a.m., he and Pulin had thrown the same into the Fishery tank. 52. Now, a careful scrutiny of the said two confessional statements reveal that, according to accused Shyamal, the dead body was lying on the bed of the room No. 9 till the same was lifted by all three of them but, according to accused Pulin, on being informed by the sweeper, Sri Sukhamoy Chowdhury, while he was proceeding towards room No. 9, he could see Dr. Kishalaya Datta and the driver, coming out with the dead body, covering the same with a saffron chadar (shwal), and the said persons were trying to put the same into the vehicle. Therefore, both Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar contradicted each other on material point. In our considered view, the said contradiction raises doubt about truthfulness of their statement. Hence, their statements cannot be safely belied as true. 53. According to both the said accused persons, Smt. Tinku Gope, the sister Bina Deb and Smt. Sobha Debnath were standing in front of the room and they saw the carrying of the dead body by them. Therefore, in our considered view, the said three witnesses were vital witnesses. But, for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the said throe witnesses were not examined as prosecution witnesses. Withholding of such material witnesses also raises doubt about the veracity of the prosecution version. From the evidence on record, more particularly, from the evidence of PW 4, Smt. Anita Das, it appears that on the next day i.e., on 20.6.1994, the entire nursing home was ransacked by the people and the back side jungle was also searched to find out the missing lady. If Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar had kept the i dead body under the trees (banana tree, etc.) behind the CT scan building, it is quite surprising as to how the said dead body could remain there without being noticed by anybody during such vigorous search. This aspect of the matter also raises doubt as to whether the dead body was actually carried by Dr. Kishalaya Datta, Sri Pulin Debnath and Sri Shyamal Malakar and kept behind the CT scan building till it was thrown to the pond on the next night. 54. The medical evidence about the appropriate time/hour of death of the deceased also raises doubt about the veracity of the confessional statements aforesaid. The patient was missing from the late night (2 a.m.) of 19.6.1994. From the evidence of the Medical officers, PWs 23 and 24, who performed the post mortem examination, it appears that post mortem was done on 21.6.1994 at about 1.10 p.m., i.e., after about 47 hours from the time of missing. According to the medical evidence, there was no decomposition of the dead body. The Medical officers, who conducted the post mortem examination, were experienced persons. According to the medical evidence, there was no decomposition of the dead body. The Medical officers, who conducted the post mortem examination, were experienced persons. They opined that during summer season, the decomposition starts between 12 hours to 24 hours of death. According to them, the death of the deceased occurred 15 to 20 hours prior to post mortem examination. Admittedly, as the occurrence took place in the third week of June, it was a summer season. Therefore, normally, decomposition should have been set in. The Medical officer, i.e., PW 24, further opined that if a dead body was kept under the shed of trees and on wet soil for about 24 hours and under water for 5/6 hours, then, the death might have occurred prior to 24 hours. He further opined that in that case, the death might have occurred 30 hours before the post mortem examination. There is no evidence on record to contradict the said opinion of the Medical officers. Therefore, though the said evidence is only the opinion of experts in the field, in view of failure to locate the dead body behind the C.T. scan building during the thorough search operation held immediately after the occurrence i.e., on the same night itself as well as on the next day, it is quite doubtful as to whether the death of the deceased was caused around 1 O'clock to 2 O'clock in the night of 19.6.1994 or i.e., on the night of admitting the deceased in the nursing home and if the dead body was kept behind the CT scan building. Therefore, it is quite doubtful if the deceased died on the night of 19.6.1994 itself. In the light of the above, it does not inspire confidence to accept the said contentions to be true. Therefore, we do not find it safe to rely on such retracted confession, which is not free from doubt. 55. Sri Pulin Debnath, in his confessional statement, disclosed, for the first time, that he came to know from Smt. Bina Deb and Smt. Sobha Debnath that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had pushed injection and murdered the deceased after committing rape on her. Therefore, it appears that Sri Pulin Debnath had no personal knowledge about the pushing of injection, commission of rape and murder. His statement was nothing more than hearsay which cannot be the basis for conviction. Kishalaya Datta had pushed injection and murdered the deceased after committing rape on her. Therefore, it appears that Sri Pulin Debnath had no personal knowledge about the pushing of injection, commission of rape and murder. His statement was nothing more than hearsay which cannot be the basis for conviction. Therefore, in view of our earlier discussion, there is no substantive evidence to believe that Dr. Kishalaya Datta had committed rape and murdered the deceased. None of the witnesses stated anything incriminating against the accused Dr. Shankar Paul, indicating his involvement in the commission of the alleged offences. 56. In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any clinching, trustworthy and reliable evidence against the accused persons to hold that they committed the alleged offences. In our considered opinion, the circumstantial evidence, which surfaced from the evidence on record, as discussed above, does not form a complete chain leading to irresistible conclusion pointing to the guilt of the accused persons, who faced the trial, to the exclusion of others. Consequently, we find that it is quite doubtful if the accused persons had committed the alleged offences. Therefore, we do not find sufficient force in the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State-appellant, to conclude that the circumstantial evidence coupled with the said confessional statements made by the accused persons, are sufficient to base conviction of the accused person thereon. We are inclined to hold that the prosecution failed to establish the case against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt by adducing cogent and substantive evidence. Therefore, in our considered view, the learned trial Judge committed no error in acquitting the accused persons. 57. In view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. 58. Return the lower court records. Appeal dismissed.