JUDGMENT : D.G.R. Patnaik, J.- Heard Shri Rajiv Ranjan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 2. Challenge in this writ application is to the Award dated. 12.6.1995 (Annexure-3), passed by the Presiding Officer, labour Court, Bokaro in M.J. Case No. 5/1.991, whereby the claim made by the respondent no. 2 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been allowed in his favour and against the petitioner-SAIL. 2. The case before the Labour Court filed by the respondent no. 2 under Section 33C(2) of the to. Act, against the petitioner/SAIL, BSL, was for computation of money/benefits due on account of nonpayment of construction allowance/personal pay, with effect from 30.11.1970 and for payment of the amount which was deducted from his wages, and also for payment of promotional benefits, details whereof has been stated in Annexures-A, Band C to the claim application. 3. The claim, as advanced by the respondent no. 2, was on the following grounds:- He was appointed under the respondent-SAIL in the Bokaro Steel Plant as Construction Supervisor on 14.6.1969. As per the terms of his employment, he was paid construction allowance/personal pay. When payment of such allowance was withheld by the Management, an Industrial Dispute was raised through the Union. The dispute was referred for adjudication before the Labour Court vide Reference Case No. 39 of 1972. The Award dated 30.9.1985 was rendered by the Labour Court in favour of the respondent no. 2. Pursuant to the Award, the Management brought out an office order dated 22/23.9.1986 fixing payment of construction allowance to him. Being not satisfied with the amount paid to him, the respondent no. 2 filed a representation before the Management claiming that the amount of construction allowance/personal pay as paid to him, was less than what was actually due. In response, respondents/Management by issuing another office order dated 31.3.1988/ 14.4.1988 reduced his basic wages as on 1.9.1974 from Rs. 595/. to Rs. 574/- and upon such reduction, the management deducted a sum of Rs. 6,271.21 from his wages in four installments. Furthermore, he was superceded by his junior Sri L.N. Ojha who was promoted to the post of Assistant Planning Engineer on 21.10.1976 and further promotion to the post of Planning Engineer (Construction) on 30.8.1980 and later to the post of Dy. Manager on 30.6.1987. Being aggrieved, the respondent no. 6,271.21 from his wages in four installments. Furthermore, he was superceded by his junior Sri L.N. Ojha who was promoted to the post of Assistant Planning Engineer on 21.10.1976 and further promotion to the post of Planning Engineer (Construction) on 30.8.1980 and later to the post of Dy. Manager on 30.6.1987. Being aggrieved, the respondent no. 2 filed a writ petition before this court vide CWJC No. 1380 of 1982(R). Two other employees namely, Surendra Singh and Dr. Deepak Kumar Das had also filed two separate writ petitions vide CWJC No. 1379 of 1982(R) and 1966 of 1987(R) respectively. While disposing of the writ applications, this court had directed that the respondent no. 2 be placed above Sri L.N. Ojha in seniority. Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court in the aforesaid writ applications, the respondent no. 2 filed his representation before the Management, claiming payment of the difference of amount by granting him promotion from the date when it fell due. When his representation was not acceded, he filed his claim under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act before the Labour Court, claiming construction allowance of Rs. 15,000/- with effect from 30.11.1970, refund of the wages which were deducted from his salary amounting to Rs. 6,271.21 and promotional benefits of Rs. 44,100/- together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum besides, payment of compensation under the provisions of payment of wages Act, for withholding the payment of his dues. 4. The petitioner/Management contested the claim of the respondent no. 2 before the Labour Court on the following grounds:- 1. That the respondent no. 2 was not a 'Workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, since at the time of filing of his application, he was holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the Network Planning Department under the Project Division in the pay scale of Rs. 4600-6700, performing managerial and supervisory functions and therefore, application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was not maintainable. 2. That the respondent no. 2 was not entitled to receive any money or benefit capable of being computed in terms of money. 3. In compliance with the direction contained in the Award passed in Reference Case No. 33 of 1973, pay of all the employees including the respondent no. 2, together with Construction Allowance was fixed and declared vide office order dated 22.9.1986. 4. 2 was not entitled to receive any money or benefit capable of being computed in terms of money. 3. In compliance with the direction contained in the Award passed in Reference Case No. 33 of 1973, pay of all the employees including the respondent no. 2, together with Construction Allowance was fixed and declared vide office order dated 22.9.1986. 4. Since the pay of the respondent no. 2 was wrongly fixed on 12.3.1987 at Rs. 595/- instead of the payable sale of Rs. 574/-, the error in the pay fixation was corrected and the excess amount drawn by him was adjusted from his subsequent salary through salary slip. 5. In compliance with the order of the High Court passed in the CWJC No. 1380 of 1982(R), the Management had granted promotion to the respondent no. 2 to the post of Senior Planning Engineer, placing him above Shri L.N. Ojha. The date from which promotion was made effective, was in accordance with the direction contained in the order of the High Court and as such, the respondent no. 2 was not entitled to claim and receive any benefit of promotion from 30.6.1987. Such claim of the respondent no. 2 could not be entertained also on account of the fact that the High Court in its order passed in the aforesaid writ application, did not contemplate protection of pay of the respondent no 2, over Shri L.N.Ojha. 5. Upon considering the evidences adduced before it, the learned Labour Court (Respondent NO.1) had framed relevant issues for determination. By observing that the claim of the respondent no. 2 for the money benefit relates to the period when he was admittedly a workman, as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned court below had proceeded to decide upon the other is sues and, by rejecting 1he Management's objection on the point of jurisdiction, had declared its impugned Award, allowing the claim of the respondent no. 2. 6. Assailing the impugned Award, the petitioner/Management has raised the following issues:- 1. The learned labour Court could not have decided the claim of the respondent no. 2 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act since the respondent no. 2 was not a workman and neither could the court below venture to decide upon this issue as to whether the respondent no. 2 was a workman or not. The learned labour Court could not have decided the claim of the respondent no. 2 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act since the respondent no. 2 was not a workman and neither could the court below venture to decide upon this issue as to whether the respondent no. 2 was a workman or not. Such claim was also disputed and contested by the Management. 2. Since there was no prior adjudication on the point of pay ability or with respect to the issues regarding wrong deduction of the wages of Rs. 6,271.21, the reamed court below could not have undertaken to decide this issue afresh. 7. Shri Rajiv Ranjan, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that it is a settled principle of law that proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act is a execution proceeding. Such proceeding presupposes some adjudication leading to some right which has to be enforced. There being. no prior adjudication in respect of the claim nos. 2 and 3 as well as on the question as to whether the applicant is the workman or not, the learned Labour Court could not have exercised its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims of the respondent no. 2 under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act. To buttress his argument relating to the scope and jurisdiction of the court below under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act, learned counsel would refer to and rely upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court:- i. D. Krishnan and Another vs. Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and Another (2008)7 Supreme Court Cases 22 . ii. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Birendra Bhandari, (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 211. iii. H.P. State Electricity Board and Another vs. Ranjeet Singh and Others, (2008)4 Supreme Court Cases 241. iv. Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, (2007)5 SCC 281 . v. State of U.P. and Another vs. Brijpal Singh, (2005)8 Supreme Court Cases 58. Inviting attention to the order dated 16.2.1996 passed by this court in the present writ application, Shri Rajiv Ranjan' would inform that by the order dated 16.2.1996, execution of the Award was stayed with a direction to the petitioner/ Management to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent no. 2. In compliance with the direction, the petitioner had served an A/c Payee cheque of a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent no. 10,000/- to the respondent no. 2. In compliance with the direction, the petitioner had served an A/c Payee cheque of a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondent no. 2, but instead of depositing the cheque in his bank account, the respondent no. 2 had presented the cheque at the bank demanding cash payment across the counter which was refused by the bank. Upon the cheque being returned, it was again reissued and given to the respondent no. 2. Inviting further attention to the order dated 9.1.1997, learned counsel explains that by the aforesaid order, direction was given by the court to the parties for an out of court settlement. Thereafter a sincere attempt was made by the petitioner, but on account of the adamant and obstinate attitude of the respondent no. 2, the dispute could not be settled out of court. 8. Countering the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Shri V.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, would argue that the claim of the respondent no. 2 as preferred by him before the court below under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is very much maintainable for the following reasons:- 1. The respondent no. 2 had an existing right for computation of money/ benefits claimed by him, since such benefits had accrued to him by virtue of the earlier Award passed in Reference Case No. 39 of 1973, treating him to be a "workman". 2. The claim for refund of the amount deducted from his wages was on account of the fact that the Management had made a wrong fixation of the salary of the respot1dent no. 2. 3. The claim for non-payment of promotional benefits arose from the judgment passed by this court in CWJC No. 1380 of 1982(R) where by the petitioner/Management was directed that the respondents be given promotion from the due date keeping him above Shri LN. Ojha. It is the promotional benefits, which has been computed at Rs.44,100/-. The promotional benefits, according to the learned counsel, had accrued to the respondent no. 2 from 1.9.1974 i.e. the date when his junior L.N. Ojha. was granted promotion, Learned counsel adds further that by invoking the writ jurisdiction, of this court, the petitioner/Management cannot expect this court to interfere with the Award of the Labour Court on hyper-technical grounds. The promotional benefits, according to the learned counsel, had accrued to the respondent no. 2 from 1.9.1974 i.e. the date when his junior L.N. Ojha. was granted promotion, Learned counsel adds further that by invoking the writ jurisdiction, of this court, the petitioner/Management cannot expect this court to interfere with the Award of the Labour Court on hyper-technical grounds. The Award passed by this Labour Court and the findings recorded therein, was on the basis of the evidences placed before it including the findings that the respondent no. 2 was a .workman" during the period for which the arrears of payment of the construction allowance/personal pay has been claimed under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act and therefore, such findings, on the basis of the facts, cannot be judicially reviewed by this court. To buttress his argument, learned counsel would refer to and rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the following cases:- i A.M. Allison vs. B.L. Sen. ( AIR 1957 S.C. 227 ). ii. Calcutta Port Shramik Union vs. The Calcutta River Transport Association and Other (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2168). iii. Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. vs. The Workman, (1970)3 Supreme Court Cases 248. iv. Jesseo and Co. Vs. M. Mukherjee and Others (1975 Lab. LC. 1307). 9. From the rival submissions, question which arises for consideration is, whether In the nature of the claim• made by the respondent no. 2, the learned Labour Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims in the proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 10. The scope of Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act is well defined and has been elaborately explained by the Supreme Court in the several judgments. 11. In the case of D. Krishnan and Another (supra), the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "12. The fact that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings is in no doubt, and such proceedings presuppose some adjudication leading to the determination of a right, which has to be enforced......" 12. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of H.P. State Electricity Board and Another (supra) in the following terms:"8. The same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of H.P. State Electricity Board and Another (supra) in the following terms:"8. Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C(2) of the Act while the latter does not............... 13. It is on the anvil of these principles that the facts of the present case have to be considered in order to find out the answer to the question, as to whether the learned labour Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act to adjudicate upon the claim of the respondent no. 2. 14. The claim for monetary benefits, as raised by the respondent no. 2 before the court below, were on the following Heads. Payment of a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards the arrears of Construction Allowance/Personal Pay which was withheld by the Management. ii. Refund of Rs. 6,271.21 which was deducted from his wages. iii. Payment of promotional benefits of Rs. 44,100/- computed as promotional benefit from the date when his promotion was due. 15. Admittedly, the dispute was raised by the Union on behalf of the respondent no. 2 for payment of his construction allowance/personal pay vide Reference case no. 39 of 1973. The dispute was resolved by the labour Court acknowledging the fact that the respondent no. 2 at the relevant time when payment was withheld by the Management, was a "workman", as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that he was entitled for payment of construction allowance/personal pay and direction was accordingly given in the Award dated 30.9.1985 to the Management to pay the amount of arrears of construction allowance to the respondent no. 2. 2. The direction issued in the Award was complied with by the Management by re-fixing the salary of the respondent no. 2: However, the respondent no. 2 had maintained a grievance that the fixation of his basic salary was not correctly made inasmuch as, the said fixation ought to have been done with effect from 1.9.1974 i.e. the date on which pay of his juniors Surendra Prasad Singh and L.N. Ojha was fixed and not from 1.9.1974 as declared by the Management. It is these difference of arrears of pay, which the respondent no. 2 had demanded. The Management appears to have conceded the demand by allowing re-fixation of the basic pay of the respondent no. 2 from 1.9.1974, but in the process, had reduced the basic pay, on the ground that the earlier scale fixed for him was incorrect and thus, had recovered the excess payment of Rs. 6,271.21 from the salary of the respondent no. 2. The second item of the claim of the respondent no. 2 relates to this recovered amount. From the above facts, it is apparent that the source of right to claim the arrears of construction allowance/personal pay, was the adjudication of the dispute raised by the respondent no. 2 through the Union in the earlier Industrial Disputes vide Reference Case No. 39 of 1973. Such adjudication having been made by the court concerned on the premise that he was a "workman" as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As such, it was within the competence of the learned court below to enforce the right which was awarded and declared in favour of the respondent the issue as to whether on the date of filing of the application under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act, the respondent no. 2 was a workman or not, becomes redundant since the monetary claim was admittedly derived from the earlier Award in the Industrial Disputes acknowledging him as being a workman. Even otherwise, when called upon to adjudicate upon the claims raised by the applicant under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act, it would be necessary for the concerned court to find out from the facts of the case and from the pleadings as to whether the claim of the applicant is based upon his being a workman or not? Even otherwise, when called upon to adjudicate upon the claims raised by the applicant under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act, it would be necessary for the concerned court to find out from the facts of the case and from the pleadings as to whether the claim of the applicant is based upon his being a workman or not? By accepting the Award passed in the Industrial Dispute vide Reference Case No. 39 of 1973 and by proceeding to comply with the direction contained therein, the petitioner/Management is deemed to have acknowledged the fact that the monetary claim of the respondent no. 2 relates to the period when he was admittedly a workman. 16. However, as it would appear, the Management by re-fixing the salary of the respondent no. 2 from the due date i.e. 1.9.1974, has claimed to have paid off the entire payable arrears to the respondent no. 2. The dispute as raised by the respondent no. 2 is in respect of the amount which the Management had fixed by way of his basic pay. The issue therefore was, what should be the basic pay of the respondent no. 2 as on 1.9.1974. In other words, the respondent no. 2 had wanted the court below to first resolve the dispute as to what should be' his basic pay from 1.9.1974 and then to compute the balance amount of arrears of construction allowance. It is obvious therefore that this was a fresh dispute which was not adjudicated upon earlier and therefore, it called for a fresh adjudication., Since the court below under Section 33C(2) of the I.O. Act being the executing court, could have computed the amount only on the basis of the undisputed amount of basic pay, it could not have taken up the responsibility to decide upon this disputed issue and yet, it had proceeded to compute the amount payable by the Management by deciding upon the dispute as to what should be the basic pay. In this view of the matter, the Award of the learned court below directing the petitioner Management to pay the claim of the respondent no. 2 both in respect of the difference of the amount of construction allowance and the deducted amount of Rs. 6,271.21, is beyond its jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 17. In this view of the matter, the Award of the learned court below directing the petitioner Management to pay the claim of the respondent no. 2 both in respect of the difference of the amount of construction allowance and the deducted amount of Rs. 6,271.21, is beyond its jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 17. As regards his claim towards arrears of consequential benefits accrued upon his promotion from the due date, the respondent no. 2 appears to have advanced his claim on the basis of the judgment of this court passed in the earlier CWJC No. 1380 of 1982(R), a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-5-A. The writ petition was filed by the respondent no. 2 as, also by his colleagues namely, Surendra Prasad Singh and Dr. Deepak Kumar Das claiming their promotion to the post to, which the persons junior to them, were promoted. It appears that in the writ application, this court had issued the following direction to the petitioner/Management. "10. It is therefore ordered that SAIL shall promote Ashok Kumar Singh to the rank of Deputy Manager and shall place him above respondent no. 3. The appropriate order in this regard must be passed by 15th February, 1989 so that petitioner Ashok Kumar Singh at least gets his salary and other' benefits as Deputy Manager with effect from 16th February, 1989." 18. In compliance to the aforesaid direction, the petitioner/Management had granted promotion to the respondent no. 2 with effect from 30.6.1987 placing him above his junior Shri L.N. Ojha and allowing him the benefits of salary payable on the post of Deputy Manager from 30.6.1987 which was' the date indicated in the order of this court, though with stipulation that seniority in Grade-1II will be counted notionally with effect from 30.6.1987, but enhancement of the pay and allowance would' be payable with effect from 16.2.1989. It is apparent-therefore that while issuing the direction in the earlier writ application, this court had granted relief to the respondent no. 2 only in respect, of his claim for promotion and to place him above his colleague Shri L.N. Ojha. There was no adjudication as to payment of consequential monetary benefits from the date of promotion. The learned, court below should not therefore have proceeded to decide upon this issue as to whether the respondent no. 2 only in respect, of his claim for promotion and to place him above his colleague Shri L.N. Ojha. There was no adjudication as to payment of consequential monetary benefits from the date of promotion. The learned, court below should not therefore have proceeded to decide upon this issue as to whether the respondent no. 2 should be paid the consequential monetary benefits from the date of his promotion or not, since this issue could not fall within the scope of the jurisdiction of the court below under Section 33C(2) of the 10. Act. The direction in the impugned Award to the petitioner/Management to pay to the respondent no. 2 the claimed amount of Rs. 44,100/- being beyond the jurisdiction of the court below, cannot be allowed. 19. For .the reasons discussed above, I find merit in this application and. the same is hereby allowed. The impugned Award dated 16.6.1995 (Annexure-3) passed by the, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro in M.J. Case No. 5 of 1991, is hereby quashed.