Judgment : ORAL JUDGMENT: 1. This petition is directed against concurrent findings by the Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer and Revenue Tribunal that the petitioner’s claim to property in question as reversioner cannot be entertained. 2. The facts, which are not in dispute are as under: One Anusayabai was one of two wives of Chintamani who was son of Parashram. Since the male members i.e. Chintamani as well as Parashram had expired on 14.06.1921, one Bhupatrao, son of Parashram’s brother Raoji, executed a document styled as Vyavasthapatra which was duly registered. This document recited that field Survey No.86, 9 acres and 30 Gunthas of village Jasapur, had been placed in possession of Anusayabai for her maintenance. On the next day i.e. 15.06.1921, Anusayabai and other females who had received different properties under this deed, executed another document stating that they had received fields only for the purpose of enjoying usufruct during their lifetimes and that upon their death the property would revert back to Bhupatrao. Anusayabai inducted Ganeshrao and Shriram as tenants in respect of this field Survey No.86. Anusaya died on 2nd February, 1984, though, according to the tenants she died on 2nd February, 1983 itself i.e. one year earlier. 3. Heirs of Bhupatrao filed an application under Section 36(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act on 04.09.1984 for reclaiming the property upon death of Anusayabai, contending that since Anusayabai was a limited owner, tenancy came to an end upon death of Anusayabai. This application was rejected by the Tahsildar by his order dated 21st June, 1988. This order was left undisturbed by the Sub-Divisional Officer by his order dated 30th March, 1991 rejecting appeal by Bhupatrao’s heirs, and even the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejected their revision by impugned order dated 11th June, 1997. 4. I have heard Shri Chandurkar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Mardikar, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Without going into question as to whether application under Section 36(2) of the Tenancy Act was within limitation or not it would be possible to decide this petition. 6. In this case, document dated 14.06.1921 does not show that any right was created in Anusayabai which was non-existent. In fact, the property was given to Anusayabai for her maintenance i.e. recognizing her right to maintenance, or in lieu of her claim to maintenance. 6. In this case, document dated 14.06.1921 does not show that any right was created in Anusayabai which was non-existent. In fact, the property was given to Anusayabai for her maintenance i.e. recognizing her right to maintenance, or in lieu of her claim to maintenance. Therefore, upon coming into force of Hindu Succession Act of 1956, in view of the provisions of Section 14 thereof, Anusayabai became full owner of the property. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that she could not have become full owner in view of the provisions of Sub Section (2) of Section 14 which lays down that nothing contained in Sub-Section (1) shall apply to the property by way of gift or under will or any other instrument or under decree or order, which instrument, decree or order prescribes restricted rights in such property. He submitted that in this case, the document dated 14.06.1921 creates restricted rights. This contention could have been accepted, had property been given to Anusayabai gratuitously i.e. without her having any preexisting rights in the property. As female member of the family whose husband had expired, she was entitled to be maintained from property and therefore, had been given field Survey No.86 for her maintenance. This has been specifically written in the document dated 14.06.1921 and accepted by Anusayabai by document dated 15.06.1921. Therefore, it would have to be concluded that by operation of provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act she became full owner since subsection (2) of the said Section had no application to the case of possession of the property by Anusayabai. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to judgment to judgment in Ram Vishal Vs. Jagan Nath, reported at (2004) 9 SCC 302 ). In paragraph 16 the Court has observed as under: “16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case can be of no assistance to the respondent. As has been held by this Court, a preexisting right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property. As has been held by this Court, a preexisting right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property. Such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription. In the present matter, it is nobody’s case that Manki had got possession of the 1/4th share in lieu of maintenance or in arrears of maintenance. It was also not their case that there was a partition of the property and that in such partition, she had been given the property. A mere right of maintenance without actual acquisition in any manner is not sufficient to attract Section 14.” In this judgment on which the learned counsel placed reliance there was no actual acquisition and there was only a right of maintenance. From the facts of the case as narrated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgments it does not appear that any document creating right in Mankidevi existed. In that case, one Sarju had inherited the properties. The property was not given to Mankidevi in lieu of her right of maintenance. Her undefined right of maintenance was found to have not resulted in any actual acquisition. It may be seen that in the present case there is not only a recognition of right of maintenance, but also acquisition of property bearing Survey No.86 by Anusayabai by the document dated 14.06.1921 for her maintenance. In view of this, it cannot be state that Anusayabai was not entitled to become absolute owner of the property on coming into force of Hindu Succession Act of 1956. Therefore, the tenancy created by her could not come to an end automatically upon her demise. Her heirs can step into her shoes. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in V. Tulasamma Vs. V Sesha Reddi, reported at AIR 1977 SC 1944 the Supreme Court was considering the acquisition of property by female Hindu in lieu of satisfaction of her claim for maintenance in a compromise. Her heirs can step into her shoes. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in V. Tulasamma Vs. V Sesha Reddi, reported at AIR 1977 SC 1944 the Supreme Court was considering the acquisition of property by female Hindu in lieu of satisfaction of her claim for maintenance in a compromise. After considering the provisions of Section 14 the Court observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment as under: “4. Now, subsection (2) of Sec. 14 provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to subsection (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, (1970) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1963 ). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it must be constructed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1). The language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under an instrument or a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate for her in the property and this would apparently cover a case where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument, decree, order or award giving such property prescribes limited interest for her in the property. But that would virtually emasculate sub-section (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficent provision enacted in sub-section (1), since in most of such cases, where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to the enactment of the Act, there would be a provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law then prevailing, prescribing limited interest in the property and where property is given to the Hindu female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant male to provide that the Hindu female shall have only a restricted interest in the property and thus make a mockery of sub-section (1). The explanation to sub-section (1) which includes within the scope of that sub-section property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would also be rendered meaningless, because there would hardly be a few cases where the instrument, decree, order or award giving property to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and the reformist zeal underlying the statutory provision would be chilled. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature in enacting sub-section (2). It is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and in the light of other provisions of the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. This constructional approach finds support in the decision in Badri Prasad’s case (supra) where this Court observed that sub-section (2) “can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods enacted therein is made for the first time without there being any preexisting right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property”. It may also be noted that when the Hndu Succession Bill 1954, which ultimately culminated into the Act, was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha, CL. 18(2) of the Draft Bill, corresponding to the present sub-section (2) of Section 14, referred only to acquisition of property by a Hindu female under gift or will and it as subsequently that the other modes of acquisition were added so as to include acquisition of property under an instrument, decree, order or award. This circumstance would also seem to indicate that the legislative intendment was that sub-section (2) should be applicable only to cases where acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any preexisting right – a kind of acquisition akin to one under gift or will. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a preexisting right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property.” 9. In view of this, it cannot be said that the Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer or Revenue Tribunal were in error in rejecting the petitioner’s application under Section 36(2) of the Tenancy Act. 10. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that in the present case there is not only a recognition of right of maintenance but also acquisition of property bearing Survey No.86 by Anusayabai by the document dated 14.06.1921. In view of this, it cannot be state that Anusayabai was not entitled to become absolute owner of the property on coming into force of Hindu Succession Act of 1956. In the judgment on which the learned counsel placed reliance there was no actual acquisition and there was only a right of maintenance. In view of this, it cannot be state that Anusayabai was not entitled to become absolute owner of the property on coming into force of Hindu Succession Act of 1956. In the judgment on which the learned counsel placed reliance there was no actual acquisition and there was only a right of maintenance. From the facts of the case as narrated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgments it does not appear that any document creating right in Mankidevi existed. In that case, one Sarju had inherited the properties. The property was not given to Mankidevi in lieu of her right of maintenance she undefined right of maintenance which the Supreme Court had found to have not resulted in any actual acquisition. Thus, facts are altogether different in the case had not only deed document dated 14.06.1921 recognized rights of maintenance but also made over the property bearing Survey No.86 to Anusayabai towards that right. The acquisition having thus been completed upon coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Anusayabai became absolute owner and therefore, the tenancy created by her could not come to an end automatically upon her demise. Her heirs can step into her shoes.