JUDGMENT 1. If an innocent is punished as a wrongdoer, peoples' faith, in the rule of law, may get shaken. If, however, wrongdoers escape, as a matter of routine, peoples' faith, in the rule of law, may get completely eroded. If a wrongdoer has to be made accountable to law, the State must improve its law enforcement machinery. No less important is the role of the Judge, who conducts trial in criminal cases, for, he cannot be a mere tape recorder for recording evidence given by the witnesses nor can he be a silent spectator to the evidence produced by the parties. Though a trial Judge must not drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the role of a prosecutor or a defence counsel, the fact remains that his duty is to reach the truth and Section 165 of the Evidence Act gives the Judge adequate power and authority to put any question to any witness at any time - be it during the course of examination-in-chief or cross-examination or at the end of any such examination or re-examination -which, to the Judge, appears to be necessary for a just decision of the case and in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant fact. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal and such evidence becomes clear, complete and intelligible. A Judge, who merely sits at a trial and records evidence without caring to conduct examination of the witnesses in order to ensure that evidence on record becomes intelligible, must be held to have not performed his duty as warranted by law. A Judge is not merely an observer. It is his duty to explore, within permissible limits, the truth. If, therefore, a Judge finds that the examination of a witness is not being conducted in such a way as to unfold complete truth, it is not only right for the Judge, but his duty to intervene and put such questions as may be warranted and permissible within the ambit of Section 165. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to question the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to question the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials. A case cannot be allowed to suffer for failure of any of the parties to elicit relevant materials from a witness. It is to discover the truth and bring, on record, the relevant facts that a Judge has been vested with the power to put questions under Section 165. It is with this object in view that the Judge has been vested with the power to call any witness or recall any witness at any time suo motu or at the instance of any of the parties if it becomes necessary for a just decision of the case. If the prosecution omits to bring out any relevant fact or the defence elicits from a witness, in the cross-examination, a statement, which is obscure or incomplete, the defence does not acquire (the Judge must bear in mind) a vested right in such limited cross-examination. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question. In such a case, it is, rather, the duty of the Judge, conducting the trial, to elicit from the witness complete information so that the evidence given by him or her becomes clear and intelligible, though his putting of questions cannot be in a manner as if the witness is under cross-examination nor can such examination be aimed at destroying or diluting the effect of the cross-examination of the witness by the defence. It is for this reason that a court shall not put, in exercise of its powers under Section 165, leading question or put words into the mouth of the witness. 2. The present one is a case, wherein the fact, that the extremist abducted members of a particular linguistic community is not in dispute nor is it in dispute that the abductors demanded ransom and, having realized the ransom, the victims were released. What is in dispute, in the present appeal, is the question as to whether the present appellant was one amongst those, who were involved in the occurrence of abduction, raising of demand for ransom and realization of ransom. 3. What is in dispute, in the present appeal, is the question as to whether the present appellant was one amongst those, who were involved in the occurrence of abduction, raising of demand for ransom and realization of ransom. 3. By judgment and order, dated 30.7.2003, passed, in Sessions Case No. ST (WT/A) 162/2002, learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, has convicted the appellant under Section364A IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, and has sentenced the appellant, for his conviction under Section 364A IPC, to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 30,000 and, in default of payment of fine, suffer simple imprisonment for a period of 5 years and also to suffer, for his conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, rigorous imprisonment for five years, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. By the judgment and order aforementioned, it has been further directed that the fine shall, if realized, be paid to the victims of abduction in equal proportion. 4. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded, at the trial, may, in brief, be described thus: On 3.6.1999, at about 9:25 am, when a vehicle, bearing registration No. TR-01-3565, driven by the informant, Rakhal Acharjee, carrying passengers and goods, was on the way to Jampaijala and reached near a bridge at Udaijamadar Para, under Takarjala Police Station, seven or eight persons, armed with sophisticated fire-arms, stopped the vehicle, forced six of the passengers, who belonged to Bengali community, to come down from the bus by threatening them with sophisticated arms and took them away to the jungle. The driver, namely, Rakhal Acharjee, came to Takarjala Police Station and verbally informed the police, at Takarjala Police Station, about the occurrence. On the basis of the oral information received about the occurrence from the driver, the information was reduced into writing and treating the same as First Information Report, Takarjala Police Station Case No. 28/1999, under Section 148/149/364A, IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, came to be registered. Having, however, abducted six of the passengers, the abductors, who were suspected to be extremists, demanded Rs. 4,00,000, as ransom, from the relatives of five of the victims. Upon negotiation, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was agreed to be paid as ransom. The members of the family of the victims arranged the money and paid the ransom. Having, however, abducted six of the passengers, the abductors, who were suspected to be extremists, demanded Rs. 4,00,000, as ransom, from the relatives of five of the victims. Upon negotiation, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was agreed to be paid as ransom. The members of the family of the victims arranged the money and paid the ransom. Upon receiving the ransom, the victims were released. Amongst those, who had approached the members of the families of the victims, with the demand for ransom and had realized the ransom, accused Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma were present and, upon realizing the ransom as aforesaid, the victims were released. When the victims returned to their families, police came to know that the victims had returned home, some of the victims and also their relatives were examined by the police and, having come to learn as to who were involved in the occurrence, police arrested two of the persons, whose names had surfaced as the abductors, namely, accused Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma, and laid, on completion of investigation, charge-sheet against them accordingly. As accused Jyotish Deb Barma had absconded, the trial was commenced against the present appellant. However, on being re-arrested, accused Jyotish Deb Barma too was tried along with the present appellant, but before the trial could come to an end, he (accused Jyotish Deb Barma), once again, absconded. 5. At the trial, when charges, framed under Sections 364A, IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, were read over and explained to the two accused aforementioned, they pleaded not guilty thereto. In support of their case, prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses. The accused were, then, examined under Section 313, Cr.PC and, in their examination aforementioned, they denied that they had committed the offences alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that of total denial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. Having found the accused-appellant, Mangal Deb Barma, guilty of the charges framed against him, the learned trial court convicted him and passed sentences against him as mentioned hereinabove. The learned trial court, however, acquitted accused Jyotish Deb Barma of the charges levelled against him. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence passed against him, the convict, namely, Mangal Deb Barma, has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. The learned trial court, however, acquitted accused Jyotish Deb Barma of the charges levelled against him. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence passed against him, the convict, namely, Mangal Deb Barma, has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. P.K. Biswas, Learned Counsel for the accused-appellant, and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, Tripura. 7. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Biswas submits that in the present case, prosecution witnesses have made improvements, in their evidence, over their previous statements, recorded by police, and, on the basis of such improved evidence, the appellant has been convicted, though such evidence was not reliable and ought not to have been relied upon by the learned trial court. Mr. Biswas also submits that in the present case, the appellant has been identified as one of the persons, who had abducted and collected ransom, but no TIP had been held during investigation and, thus, the identification of the appellant, for the first time, at the trial, as one of the abductors, was valueless, unsafe and ought not to have been relied upon. It is the further case of the appellant, as presented by Mr. Biswas, that in the case at hand, important witnesses have not been examined by the prosecution and no explanation has been offered by the prosecution for their non-examination nor is any explanation discernible from the materials on record in this regard. Relying solely on the identification of the appellant, at the trial, the learned trial court, according to Mr. Biswas, ought not to have convicted the appellant. 8. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, submits that in the case at hand, the victims, who have identified the appellant as one of the abductors, had been in the custody of the abductors for fairly long period of time and it was, therefore, quite possible for them to have been able to identify the abductors, particularly, when the abduction took place in broad day light and the abductors were so confident that none would dare to speak against them and disclose their identity that they had not even taken care to cover their faces or conceal their identity. This apart, points out Mr. This apart, points out Mr. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor, the evidence on record clearly reveals that the present appellant was one, who had contacted the relatives of the victims and had collected ransom, and, thus, having dealt with the appellant in the manner as aforesaid, it was quite reasonable for the members of the family, who had negotiated with the abductors and paid the ransom, to be able to identify the person, who had negotiated and collected the ransom. The learned Public Prosecutor also points out that in the present case, one of the persons, who had negotiated, on behalf of the families of the victims and paid the ransom, has been examined as PW5. There is no reason to disbelieve him and if his evidence is believed, his evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant. This apart, having remained in custody of the abductors for fairly long period of time, it was quite natural, on the part of the victims, to be able to identify the appellant at the trial; so reiterates the learned Public Prosecutor. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the identification of the appellant, for the first time, at the trial, cannot, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, be said to be valueless; rather, such evidence, which has, otherwise, withstood the test of cross-examination, can be safely relied upon and was rightly relied upon by the learned trial court. The conviction of the appellant, therefore, submits the learned Public Prosecutor, needs no interference. 9. In the light of the rival submissions noted above, when we turn to the evidence of PW1, namely, Dipal Deb Barma, who was, admittedly, one of the passengers in whose presence some of the passengers were forcibly taken away by some young men, has deposed that on 3.6.1999, he was posted as a Fishery Inspector at Jampuijala and he used to, every day, commute to his office, at Jampuijala, from his house at Agartala. Describing the occurrence, PW1 has deposed that on 3.6.1999, at about 8/9 am, when the vehicle, wherein he was travelling, reached near a bridge, at Udai Jamadar Para, a tribal young man came out of the jungle, stopped the vehicle, snatched away the key of the vehicle from the driver and, at that very moment, some other persons came out from the jungle, they forcibly brought down some passengers belonging to Bengali community and took them away, whereupon the rest of the passengers went to Takarjala Police Station and reported the occurrence. 10. Close on the heels of the evidence of PW1, the investigating officer (PW4) has deposed that on 3.6.1999, at about 9:45 am, while he was on duty at Takarjala Police Station, one Rakhal Acharjee orally informed them about the occurrence, the information, so given, being as regards commission of offence, the information was recorded in the form of FIR, which is Ext. 1, and the signature of the informant is marked as Ext. 1(1). It is in the evidence of PW4 (Investigating Officer) that, on being entrusted with investigation, he examined the witnesses, visited the place of occurrence, drew sketch map and, then, went to Jampuijala market, examined some witnesses on 16.6.1999 and, later on, on receiving the information that the three of the abducted persons, namely, Jatan Roy, Kanu Lal Saha and Maran Saha, had returned from captivity, he examined them and, having come to know about the involvement of two persons, namely, Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma, he submitted charge sheet against them, showing them as absconders, for, he had raided their houses, but found them absconding. 11. Before proceeding further, it may be noted that in the present case, the learned Sessions Judge has merely recorded the Investigating Officer's evidence to the effect that oral information was received from one Rakhal Acharjee disclosing commission of a cognizable offence. This was highly improper on the part of the learned Sessions Judge inasmuch as he ought to have elicited, by putting appropriate questions in exercise of his powers under Section 155 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer, as to what was the information, which had been given to Takarjala Police Station by said Rakhal Acharjee, who was, according to the evidence on record, the driver of the vehicle, which had carried the passengers aforementioned. Be that as it may, the oral information, reduced into writing, at the said police station, has been proved by the Investigating Officer as Ext.1, reveals thus: Sri Rakhal Acharjee S/o Lt. Lal Mohan Acharjee of village Madhya Badharghat, P.S. Amtali, aged approx, 24 years. I know how to write the name, Indian by citizen, by profession-Driver of the Vehicle. Today, dated 3.1.1999 A.D., on Thursday, on being present at Takarjala Police Station at about 7:45 'O' clock morning and knowing you to be the Darogababu of Takarjala Police Station I do hereby lodge this ezahar to the following effects that I have started for Jampui Jala Bazar from Agartala Motor Stand by my Commander Jeep, No. TR-01-3565 carrying passengers and goods today around 8:00 'O' clock morning and at about 9:25 'O' clock when my vehicle was crossing the broken bridge at Udai Jamadar Para under Takarjala P.S. at that time some extremists belonging to Tribal community numbering 7/8 wearing civil dress had stopped my vehicle on showing weapons in their hands, and they had taken passengers numbering 6/7 from the vehicle by way of abduction. I think that the extremists had abducted the passengers of the vehicle for obtaining money. This is my ezahar. The ezahar is read over to me and have been written correctly as per my words, accordingly I put my signature on it. I pray for investigation and justice. 12. The question, now, is as to what was the value of the oral information, which stands reduced into writing. There can be no doubt that the information, which the said driver had given to the police, has been treated as the First Information Report. However, as the driver has not been examined as a witness at the trial, what would be the legal consequence and what value would remain attached to the information so received by the police? Ordinarily, when a person, who informs any other person about an occurrence, is not examined as a witness, the information given shall be treated to be hearsay unless the informant is examined as a witness. Should, therefore, the oral information, which stood reduced into writing and is proved as Ext.1, be treated as hearsay and shall remain wholly excluded from the purview of consideration of this Court? 13. Should, therefore, the oral information, which stood reduced into writing and is proved as Ext.1, be treated as hearsay and shall remain wholly excluded from the purview of consideration of this Court? 13. While dealing with a piece of evidence, which is regarded as hearsay, the courts must bear in mind that there is a difference, though subtle, between factum of an information and truthfulness/veracity of such information. In a given case, if the object is to merely establish that a statement was made, it may not be hearsay, but if the object is to prove that was started was true, then, it may become hearsay. Thus, when 'x' an eye witness of an occurrence of murder, comes to a police station and reports the occurrence to a police officer, the evidence given by the police officer, at the trial, that he was given such an information is not hearsay if the object is merely to prove that such a report was, indeed, received by the police officer; but if the object is to prove that what the police officer had been reported was true, then, the police officer's evidence as to what he was reported by 'x' would be hearsay unless 'x' appears as a witness at the trial and deposes not only that he had so reported the occurrence to the police officer, but also that what he had reported was true as he had witnessed the occurrence himself. See Biseswar Baori v. State of Assam 2002 (2) GLT 395. 14. In Biseswar Baori (supra), a Division Bench of the court, was confronted with a situation, where the female workers, according to PW1, (who was a witness in the said case), had heard, while working in a Tea Estate, shouting that Binti's husband had cut her. The question was as to whether the shouts of the female workers, heard by PW1, had any evidentiary value at all or the same must be kept wholly excluded from the court's purview of consideration as hearsay. Dealing with the situation, the Division Bench, in Biseswar Baori (supra), observed and held as under: 47. The question was as to whether the shouts of the female workers, heard by PW1, had any evidentiary value at all or the same must be kept wholly excluded from the court's purview of consideration as hearsay. Dealing with the situation, the Division Bench, in Biseswar Baori (supra), observed and held as under: 47. The evidence given by PW1 that female workers were shouting that Binti's husband had cut her may not be hearsay, if the court is to determine if PW1 had heard such utterances, but if the court is required to determine as to whether what PW1 had heard was true or not, then, the evidence given by PW1 is hearsay and ought to have been held as hearsay inasmuch as he has no personal knowledge if the accused had really hacked Binti and for proving that his information is correct, PW1 depend on the evidence of the female workers, none of whom have come forward to say that they had witnessed the occurrence of assault on Binti at the hands of the appellant and/or that they had reported the occurrence to PW1. 15. We may pause, at this stage, and refer to Subramamiam v. Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 WLR 965, wherein it has been held by the Privy Council that the state of mind of a man charged with possessing ammunition, contrary to certain regulations, could be proved by what had been told to him by certain terrorists into whose hands he had come. In Regina v. Willis (1960) 1 WLR 55, Lord Parker, CJ, referring to the case of Subramamiam (supra) and also to the advice given to the Board, pointed out that Mr. De Silva, giving the advice of the board, said: "In ruling out peremptorily the evidence of conversation between the terrorists and the appellant the trial judge was in error. Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible, when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible, when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. It is hearsay and inadmissible, when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible, when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that the statement was made' quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or of some other person in whose presence the statement was made." 16. Referring to the above statement of law, the court, in Regina (supra), speaking through Lord Parker, C.J, observed, "In the opinion of the court, that statement of the law is applicable to the present case. It is true that the Board were considering the state of mind and conduct of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offence, provided the evidence as to his state of mind and conduct is relevant, it matters not whether it was in regard to the conduct at the time of the commission of the offence or, as here, at a subsequent time, to explain his answers to the police and the conduct when charged. Accordingly, that evidence, in the present case, was wrongly excluded." 17. What transpires, thus, as the position of law, is that the court must always bear in mind that there is a difference between the factum of information and truthfulness or veracity of such information. If, in a given case, the object of bringing on record as to what a witness has heard is merely to establish that a statement was made, then, to such an extent, such a statement may not be hearsay; but if the object of bringing on record the information is to prove that the information given was true, then, such an information may become hearsay unless the Informant is examined. Considered in this light, it becomes clear that in the face of the fact that the informant, Rakhal Acharjee, has not been examined as a witness in the present case, the information given by him would be hearsay if the court is required to determine as to whether the information, which the said informant had given, was or was not true. If, however, the object is only to bring on record that the police was prompted to take action by the fact that such an information, as revealed by Ext.1, had been received by police, then, this factum is provable and cannot be treated as hearsay. Consequently, the information, which the police received from said Rakhal Acharjee and which stands reduced into writing in the form of Ext.1, cannot be kept wholly excluded from the purview of the court's consideration as hearsay. It is permissible to consider as to what information Rakhal Acharjee had given to the police at Takarjala police station. To put it a little differently, what had been heard by the Investigating Officer (PW4) can be brought in evidence, for, what is heard by a person is admissible in evidence, though what he had heard cannot be treated as true and admissible until the time the person, who was heard speaking, is examined and unless, on being examined, such a person admits or claims to have given such information. Thus, the information, which the police officer claims to have received from Rakhal Acharjee, can be taken into account by this Court, for the limited purpose of holding that such an information has been given to the said police station by Rakhal Acharjee. This information cannot, however, be used for the purpose of determining the truth of the information given. In other words, it can certainly be proved, with the help of the evidence of PW4 (Investigating Officer), as to what had mobilized the police and set the police machinery into motion. To this extent, the evidence of PW4, notwithstanding the fact the informant, Rakhal Acharjee, had not been examined, is admissible in law. 18. In consequence of what has been discussed above, we may point out that from the evidence of PW1 and PW4, what surfaces undisputed is that on 3.6.1999, at about 9:45 am, when the vehicle, carrying some passengers, reached near a bridge, at Udai Jamadar Para, one tribal young man stopped the vehicle, he snatched away the key of the vehicle from its driver and, at that moment, some other associates of the said tribal young man arrived there, they forcibly brought out some passengers, who belonged to Bengali community, and forcibly took them away. 19. Bearing in mind what has been indicated above, when we come to the evidence of PW5 (Jiban Ch. 19. Bearing in mind what has been indicated above, when we come to the evidence of PW5 (Jiban Ch. Saha), we notice that his evidence discloses that though he was a permanent resident of Jampuijala bazaar, he had left Jampuijala due to the problems, created by extremists, in the year 2000. It is in the evidence of PW5 that Maran Saha (PW10) is his younger brother and, on 3.6.1999, when his brother, Maran, was on way to Jampuijala, travelling in a jeep, his brother, Maran, along with four other passengers, was abducted by the extremists at gunpoint. 20. What is important to note, in the evidence of PW5, is that according to him, after his brother was abducted, accused Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma (since absconder) had contacted them and asked them to pay Rs. 4,00,000 if they were to obtain release of the abducted victims. It is in the evidence of PW5 that it was accused Mangal Deb Barma, who had, on maximum number of times, contacted them, while negotiating for the amount of ransom. It is also in the evidence of PW5 that after negotiation, they paid Rs. 2,00,000 for all the five abducted persons and that the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 was handed over to accused Mangal. PW5 has deposed that after the payment having been made, his brother, Maran, and others were released from their captivity, the other four persons being Anil Deb Nath, Babul Saha, Manik Lal Saha and Kanu Lal Saha. PW5 has identified, at the trial, the present appellant, Mangal Deb Barma, as one of those, who had contacted the victims' families with demand for ransom and, upon negotiation, collected the ransom. 21. In his cross-examination, PW5 has deposed that accused Mangal was known to them from before as accused Mangal was a visitor to Jampuidala bazaar. In his cross-examination, PW5 has clarified that after his brother returned from his captivity, police did not contact him and that he had not stated to the police about the amount paid through accused Mangal Deb Barma. The assertion of PW5 that after his brother, Maran, had returned home, police did not record his statement has gone wholly unchallenged by the defence. The assertion of PW5 that after his brother, Maran, had returned home, police did not record his statement has gone wholly unchallenged by the defence. We, therefore, have no option but to accept the assertion of PW5 as true that he (PW5) was not examined by police after the victims had returned from the captivity inasmuch as it was the duty of the Investigating Officer to examine PW5 after the victims had, according to the evidence of Investigating Officer, returned home. 22. The fact that the accused Mangal was known to PW5 was never disputed by the defence. In such circumstances, when the present appellant was known to PW5 his identification, at the trial, by PW5 cannot be said to be unsafe or unreliable. In the face of the admitted fact that accused Mangal was known to PW5, the only question, which remained to be determined, in the light of evidence of PW5, was as to whether Mangal was one of the persons, v/ho had contacted PW5 and others to obtain ransom. In this regard, we do not notice anything having been elicited from the cross-examination of PW5 by the defence to show that the evidence of PW5 that Mangal was one of the persons, who had contacted them and met them, on a number of occasions, for the purpose of realizing the ransom, is untrue or false. Though it was suggested by the defence to PW5 that the present appellant had been implicated due to previous political rivalry, this suggestion was denied and, at no stage of the trial, this suggestion was probablise by the defence either by eliciting anything from the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing any evidence. The suggestion, so offered to PW5, has; thus, remained as mere suggestion. Consequently, it becomes transparent that there was no political rivalry between PW5 and the present appellant. It is not even the case of the defence that PW5 and the appellant are political activists. In such circumstances, it becomes clear that the only reason, which had been assigned by the appellant, for being allegedly implicated in the case, was that there was political rivalry between PW5, on the one hand, and the appellant, on the other. It is not even the case of the defence that PW5 and the appellant are political activists. In such circumstances, it becomes clear that the only reason, which had been assigned by the appellant, for being allegedly implicated in the case, was that there was political rivalry between PW5, on the one hand, and the appellant, on the other. However, in the absence of any credible evidence, existing on record, that there was any political rivalry between PW5 and the accused-appellant and in view also of the fact that the evidence of PW5, as we have indicated above, has remained wholly unshaken, we see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW5 that the appellant was one of the persons, who had contacted them, asking them to pay Rs. 4,00,000 as ransom, and, on negotiation, took Rs. 2,00,000 as ransom and, then, the abducted victims were released. 23. It has been pointed out by Mr. Biswas, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that PW5 has deposed, in his cross-examination, that the elder brother of the victim, Anil Debnath, namely, Nikhil Debnath, and elder brother of the victim, Babul Saha, namely, Pankaj Saha, were with him (PW5), when the accused person (i.e., the appellant) along with accused Jyotish Deb Barma (since acquitted) had approached them for ransom, neither Nikhil Debnath nor Babul Saha has been examined by the prosecution as witness. Though it is true that the two persons aforementioned have not been examined, the fact remains that their non-examination would not discredit or wash off from the record the evidence of PW5 inasmuch as when the evidence of PW5 has, otherwise, remained wholly unshaken in cross-examination and when we find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW5 or not to give credence to his evidence, we hold that in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the fact that Nikhil Debnath and Babul Saha have not been examined cannot be treated as a ground to disbelieve, discard or ignore the evidence of PW5. 24. Similarly, though it has been elicited by the defence from the cross-examination of PW5 that he had not stated before police that the ransom was paid to accused Mangal, it is worth pointing out that PW5 has clearly deposed that after payments were made and his brother returned home, police did not examine him. 24. Similarly, though it has been elicited by the defence from the cross-examination of PW5 that he had not stated before police that the ransom was paid to accused Mangal, it is worth pointing out that PW5 has clearly deposed that after payments were made and his brother returned home, police did not examine him. In such circumstances, because of the fact that PW5 has not made any statement to the police that it was to accused Mangal that the money had been handed over, we cannot reject the evidence of PW5. The failure of the investigating officer to examine PW5 cannot, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, be made a basis for rejecting the evidence of PW5. His evidence, if believed, is sufficient to hold that the accused-appellant was, indeed, involved with those, who had abducted the passengers inasmuch as he is one of those, who had contacted the family of the victims, raising, on maximum number of occasions, demand for ransom and had collected the ransom. Whether the appellant was one of the persons, who was also present with the abductors, is a question, which we, now, need to look into and determine. 25. Our quest for an answer to the above question brings us to the evidence of PW10 (Maran Saha), younger brother of PW5 (Sri Jiban Ch. Saha). According to the evidence of PW10, at the time of the occurrence, he was a resident of Jampaijola, but due to extremist attack, he too has shifted to Jogendra Nagar. As regards the occurrence, PW10 has deposed that on 3.6.1999, at about 9:30 am, when the jeep, wherein he was travelling from Agartala to Jampoijala, happened to reach near Takarjola, at Amtali, a tribal young man, armed with fire arm, in his hands, stopped the vehicle and abducted him (PW10) and five other passengers of the said vehicle belonging to Bengali community, kept them in confinement, inside the forest, at different places, for about 14 days and realized Rs. 2,00,000 as ransom. 26. It is in the evidence of PW10 that he would be able to recognize the miscreants if he sees their faces and that none of the miscreants are present in the court. The learned trial court has recorded that the witness failed to identify accused Jyotish Deb Barma. 2,00,000 as ransom. 26. It is in the evidence of PW10 that he would be able to recognize the miscreants if he sees their faces and that none of the miscreants are present in the court. The learned trial court has recorded that the witness failed to identify accused Jyotish Deb Barma. There is nothing in the evidence on record, which we have discussed so far, to show that accused, Jyotish Deb Barma, was also present amongst those, who had abducted the passengers. In such circumstances, the fact that PW 10 had failed to identify accused Jyotish Deb Barma, as one of the abductors, even though accused Jyotish Deb Barma was present in the court, shows that PW10 is a truthful witness. His evidence supports the version of PW5 that the abductors had released the victims on receiving Rs. 2,00,000 as ransom. 27. Turning to the evidence of PW6, we notice that according to his evidence, he has a jewellery shop at Jampoijala market and, on 3.6.1999, when he was travelling in the vehicle aforementioned from Agartala to Jampoijala and their vehicle reached near a bridge, at Uday Jamadar Para, some extremists, armed with fire arms, stopped them and abducted him (PW6) and five others at gun point, the abducted persons were kept in confinement for ransom, at different places, after their abduction and, for about 14 days, they were kept in captivity. The categorical assertion of PW6 is that out of the miscreants, who had abducted him (PW6) and others, he (PW6) could recognize Mangal Deb Barma. This witness not only named Mangal Deb Barma as one of the abductors, but he also identified the accused-appellant, Mangal Deb Barma, when he (i.e., the accused-appellant) was in the dock. In fact, PW6 asserted that he would be able to recognize the miscreants if he sees their faces. The assertion of PW6 that he would be able to recognize even the other miscreants, if he sees their faces, was never challenged, doubted or disputed by the defence. 28. Thus, when PW6 was, admittedly, capable of recognizing those miscreants (including the accused-appellant), who had abducted him (PW6) and other passengers, there is no reason to doubt that PW6 could have identified even the appellant if the appellant was one of the persons, who had abducted the said passengers. 28. Thus, when PW6 was, admittedly, capable of recognizing those miscreants (including the accused-appellant), who had abducted him (PW6) and other passengers, there is no reason to doubt that PW6 could have identified even the appellant if the appellant was one of the persons, who had abducted the said passengers. The capacity and ability of PW6 to identify those, who had abducted the passengers, cannot, therefore, be doubted. 29. There is, admittedly, no animosity between PW6 and the accused-appellant and, apparently, there is no reason for PW6 to have falsely identified the accused-appellant. The only possibility, if any, was error, which PW6 might have committed, in this regard. Surprisingly enough, however, the defence neither suggested to PW6, nor elicited anything from the cross-examination of PW6, to show that he had committed or likely to have committed an error or mistake in identifying the accused-appellant as one of those, who had abducted the passengers. 30. Though PW6 has asserted, in his cross-examination, that he told the police that out of the miscreants, he could recognize Mangal Deb Barma, the investigating officer (PW4) has denied that such a statement had been made by PW6. Notwithstanding the fact that the Investigating Officer (PW4) has denied that such a statement has been made by PW6, what is curious to note, and cannot be ignored and must be pointed out, is that it has not been denied by the defence, while cross-examining PW6, that accused Mangal Deb Barma was not amongst those, who had abducted the passengers including PW6. Hence, the assertion of PW6 that the accused-appellant was present among those, who had abducted the passengers, has really gone unchallenged and undisputed by the defence. Situated thus, and, particularly, because of the fact that the evidence given by the PW6 is simple and natural and when defence does not challenge, while cross-examining PW6, that accused Mangal Deb Barma was present among those, who had abducted the passengers, we see no reason to discard his evidence as unbelievable or unsafe to rely upon. 31. Situated thus, and, particularly, because of the fact that the evidence given by the PW6 is simple and natural and when defence does not challenge, while cross-examining PW6, that accused Mangal Deb Barma was present among those, who had abducted the passengers, we see no reason to discard his evidence as unbelievable or unsafe to rely upon. 31. Broadly in tune with the evidence of PW6 is the evidence of PW7 inasmuch as his evidence is that on 3.6.1999, while travelling along, with other passengers in the vehicle aforementioned, when the vehicle reached near Uday Jamadar Para, some extremists, numbering 3/4, armed with firearms, stopped their vehicle and forcibly took him and five others, at gunpoint, inside the forest and kept them detained, at different places, for about 14/15 days and the passengers were released after their family members had paid ransom. PW7 has asserted that if he sees the faces of the miscreants, he would be able to identify them. This witness has identified the appellant in the dock as one of the miscreants. 32. What is, now, extremely important to note is that the assertion of PW7 that he would be able to identify the miscreants if he sees their faces has not been disputed or challenged by the defence. Hence, the ability and capacity of PW7 too (same as PW6) to identify the miscreants cannot, now, be doubted in this appeal. 33. The only question, therefore, is as to whether PW7 has falsely identified the accused-appellant at the trial? In this regard, what needs to be pointed out is that it is not the case of the defence that PW7 might have committed error in identifying the appellant as one of abductors; rather, what the defence had contended, as per suggestion offered by them to the witness, was that he had identified the present appellant, because he (PW7) was tutored. It was not even suggested to PW7 by the defence as to who was the person, who had tutored PW7. The defence has also not been able to bring on record anything to show as to why PW7, on being tutored by anyone, would identify the present appellant. The defence does not even make an attempt, howsoever faint, to show as to why the evidence of PW7 be doubted. The defence has also not been able to bring on record anything to show as to why PW7, on being tutored by anyone, would identify the present appellant. The defence does not even make an attempt, howsoever faint, to show as to why the evidence of PW7 be doubted. This apart, it is not the defence case that PW7 had any enmity with the accused-appellant nor is it the case of the defence, as already pointed out above, that PW7 has committed any error. In such circumstances and in the face of fragile cross-examination of PW7 by the defence, we see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW7 or refuse to rely on his evidence. The credibility of the evidence, given by PW7, gets further strengthened from the fact that on being recalled and re-examined (when accused Jyotish Deb Barma was re-arrested), PW7 did not identify the accused, Jyotish Deb Barma, as one of the abductors and even on being recalled, PW7 asserted that he had identified Mangal, in the dock, on 15-08-2002. Had PW7 been a witness designed to falsely implicate those, who had been named, in the charge sheet, by police, there was no reason why PW7 could not have implicated accused Jyotish Deb Barma too. This is yet another circumstance, which shows that PW7 is a truthful witness. 34. Close on the heels of the evidence of PW7 is the evidence of PW11 (Smt. Minati Rishi Das), who was, admittedly, one of the passengers in the said vehicle. While deposing, as other witnesses, that on 3.6.1999, at about 9:30 am, when the jeep, in which she was travelling to Jampoijala, reached Uday Jamadar Para, some extremists, armed with firearms, stopped the vehicle and abducted six persons of Bengali community, at gunpoint, for ransom, she has clarified that she could not recognize the faces of the miscreants. 35. We, now, turn to the evidence of PW8 (Sri Kanu Lal Saha). His evidence is that on the day of the occurrence, while travelling in the vehicle aforementioned, when the vehicle reached Jampoijala, some miscreants stopped their vehicle and took him (PW8) and five others at gunpoint and kept them confined, at different places, for a period of 17 days, for collecting ransom and his family had to pay Rs. 65,000 to the miscreants and, on receiving the said amount, he was released. 65,000 to the miscreants and, on receiving the said amount, he was released. PW8 has asserted that out of those, who had abducted them, he could recognize Mangal Deb Barma and this witness has accordingly identified, at the trial, accused Mangal Deb Barma (i.e., the accused-appellant) as one of those persons, who had abducted them. In his cross-examination, PW8 has asserted that he had stated before the police that he could recognize accused Mangal. The Investigating Officer has denied that any such statement was made before him. What is, however, curious is that even while cross-examining PW8, the defence did not assert, or suggest to PW8, that the accused-appellant was not present amongst the miscreants. In such circumstances, we find it wholly impossible to ignore or not to believe the evidence of PW8. 36. Coming to the evidence of PW9 (Sri Babul Saha), we find that his evidence is that while travelling, in the vehicle aforementioned, along with other passengers, a group of miscreants took him (PW9) and five other passengers away, at gunpoint, at Jampoijala, and kept them in confinement, at different places, inside the forest, for ransom, his family paid Rs. 35,000 as ransom and he was released after 14 days. It is in the evidence of PW9 that while the miscreants were talking, he heard the name of one Mangal Deb Barma. PW9 has asserted that Mangal Deb Barma is present in the dock and he accordingly identified the accused-appellant. PW9 has admitted that he had not stated before the police that while the miscreants were talking, he had heard the name of Mangal. PW9 asserted that he had not been examined by the police after he was released from the captivity. This assertion of PW9 has gone unchallenged. When PW9 was, admittedly, one of the passengers, who had been abducted, he was a natural witness and his assertion that accused, Mangal, was one of those, who has abducted them, cannot be brushed aside. In his cross-examination, PW9 has admitted that it is at the trial, in the court, that he had seen the accused Mangal after the incident. Was it possible that PW9 had committed a mistake or error in identifying the accused-appellant as one of the abductors? In his cross-examination, PW9 has admitted that it is at the trial, in the court, that he had seen the accused Mangal after the incident. Was it possible that PW9 had committed a mistake or error in identifying the accused-appellant as one of the abductors? In fact, the defence has not even suggested to PW9 that he might have had committed a mistake in identifying the accused-appellant; rather, what the defence suggested to PW9 was that he was tutored to falsely name the accused-appellant. Apart from the fact that PW9 denied the suggestion, what is indisputable is that there is nothing specific, on record, to show, nor was it even suggested to PW9 by the defence, as to who had tutored PW9 and why PW9 should falsely implicate the accused. 37. Thus, it has not been the case of the defence that PW9 might have committed mistake in identifying the accused-appellant, at the trial, for the first time; rather, the defence case is that the accused-appellant had been identified falsely. However, when no material exists on record to show that PW9 has any interest in falsely implicating the accused-appellant, his evidence, merely on the basis of the suggestion offered by the defence, cannot be ignored or brushed aside as unbelievable or unsafe. On arrest of accused Jyotish Deb Barma, when PW9 was recalled and re-examined, he did not identify accused Jyotish Deb Barma as one of the abductors. There is, in the face of the materials on record, no enmity existing between PW9 and the accused-appellant. Hence, PW9 could not have had any reason, in the absence of any material showing to the contrary, to falsely implicate the accused-appellant. Though, according to the charge sheet, accused Jyotish Deb Barma was also involved, PW9 did not identify him. Had he (PW9) been an untruthful witness or a witness procured by the police, he could have identified accused Jyotish Deb Barma too. In such circumstances, this Court, cannot but observe that PW9 is a truthful and reliable witness. 38. What emerges from the discussion of the evidence on record, as a whole, is that there is no dispute that as many as six passengers, while travelling in the vehicle aforementioned, had been abducted, at gunpoint, by some persons, who appeared to be of tribal community, and the passengers, who had been abducted, were all from Bengali speaking community. 38. What emerges from the discussion of the evidence on record, as a whole, is that there is no dispute that as many as six passengers, while travelling in the vehicle aforementioned, had been abducted, at gunpoint, by some persons, who appeared to be of tribal community, and the passengers, who had been abducted, were all from Bengali speaking community. It is also not in dispute that ransom was demanded for the release of the abducted victims and that PW5 (who is the elder brother of PW10) and family members of the victims were contacted by the abductors, a sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was demanded as ransom and, eventually, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 was collected by the miscreants and, thereafter, in consideration of the ransom paid, the abductors released the abducted passengers. 39. The question is as to whether the accused-appellant was one of those, who had abducted the passengers, in this regard, the evidence of PW5, which we have already discussed above, in our considered view, is safe and reliable and his evidence shows that it was the accused-appellant, who had contacted them on maximum number of occasions and had negotiated the deal. This apart, the accused-appellant has been identified by PW6, PW7 and PW9 as one of those, who had abducted them. It was not even whispered, while cross-examining these witnesses by the defence, that these witnesses might have committed error in identifying the accused-appellant. Hence, the possibility of PW5, 6, 7 and 9 having committed mistake or error, while identifying the accused-appellant, is ruled out by the defence itself. 40. What the defence, however, tried to project, while cross-examining PW5, was that the accused-appellants had been implicated due to political rivalry. The defence also tried to project, while cross-examining PW6, PW7 and PW9, that the accused-appellant had been identified, in the court, as tutored. We have already held that the defence has brought nothing on record to show as to who are the political rivals of the accused-appellant and at whose behest the accused-appellant had been identified by PW5. We have already discussed this aspect of the case in detail and we have concluded, for the reasons assigned above, that the evidence of PW5 that the accused-appellant was one of those, who had negotiated the deal of ransom, cannot be doubted and disbelieved. We have already discussed this aspect of the case in detail and we have concluded, for the reasons assigned above, that the evidence of PW5 that the accused-appellant was one of those, who had negotiated the deal of ransom, cannot be doubted and disbelieved. Turning to the evidence of PW6, PW7 and PW9, who have identified the accused-appellant, we have already pointed out that the defence has brought nothing on record to show as to who had tutored these witnesses and why should these witnesses falsely implicate the accused-appellant. Above all, it is not even whispered, while cross-examining these witnesses, that the accused-appellant was not present amongst the persons, who had abducted the passengers. Situated thus, and placed in the circumstances as discussed above, we see no reason, we may reiterate, to disbelieve the evidence of PW6, PW7 and PW9 or treat their evidence as unsafe 41. At the time of hearing of this appeal, as already indicated above, it has been contended, on behalf of the accused-appellant by Mr. P.K. Biswas, that the identification of the accused-appellant, for the first time, at the trial, is valueless. In this regard, reference has been made to the cases of Danna Yadav alia Dahu and Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 2002 SC 3325 , and Nibaran Bora v. State of Assam 2006 (SUPP.) 1 GLT 110. 42. In Danna Yadav (supra), which Mr. Biswas relies upon, the Apex Court, analyzing the law as regards identification of an accused at his trial, has summarized the position of law, at para 38, in the following words: 38. In view of the law analysed above, we conclude thus: (a) If an accused is well known to the prosecution witnesses from before, no test identification parade is called for and it would be meaningless and sheer waste of public time to hold the same. (b) In cases where according to the prosecution the accused is known to the prosecution witnesses from before, but the said fact is denied by him and he challenges his identity by the prosecution witnesses by filing a petition for holding test identification parade, a court while dealing with such a prayer, should consider without holding a mini enquiry as to whether the denial is bona fide and a mere pretence and or made with an ulterior motive to delay the investigation. In case court comes to the conclusion that the denial is bona fide, it may accede to the prayer, but if, however, it is of the view that the same is a mere pretence and or made with an ulterior motive to delay the investigation, question for grant of such a prayer would not arise. Unjustified grant or refusal of such a prayer would not necessarily ensure to the benefit of either party nor the same would be detrimental to their interest. In case, prayer is granted and test identification parade is held in which a witness fails to identify the accused, his so-called claim that the accused was known to him from before and the evidence of identification in court should not be accepted. But in case either prayer is not granted or granted but no test identification parade is held, the same ipso facto cannot be a ground for throwing out evidence of identification of an accused in court when evidence of the witness, on the question of identity of the accused from before, is found to be credible. The main thrust should be to the answer to the question as to whether evidence of a witness in court to the identity of an accused from before is trustworthy or not. In case the answer is in the affirmative, the fact that prayer for holding test identification parade was rejected or although granted, no such parade was held, would not in any manner affect the evidence adduced in court in relation to identity of the accused. But if, however, such an evidence is not free from doubt, the same may be relevant material while appreciating the evidence of identification adduced in court. (c) Evidence of identification of an accused in court by a witness is substantive evidence whereas that of identification in test identification parade is, though a primary evidence but not substantive one, and the same can be used only to corroborate identification of accused by a witness in court. (c) Evidence of identification of an accused in court by a witness is substantive evidence whereas that of identification in test identification parade is, though a primary evidence but not substantive one, and the same can be used only to corroborate identification of accused by a witness in court. (d) Identification parade are held during the course of investigation ordinarily at the instance of the investigating agencies and should be held with reasonable dispatch for the purpose of enabling the witnesses to identify either the properties which are subject matter of alleged offence or the accused persons involved in the offence so as to provide it with materials to assure itself if the investigation is proceeding on right lines and the persons whom it suspects to have committed the offence were the real culprits. (e) Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in court inadmissible rather the same is very much admissible in law, but ordinary identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in court should not form basis of conviction, the same being from its very nature inherently of a weak character unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous identification in the test identification parade is a check valve to the evidence of identification in court of an accused by a witness and the same is rule of prudence and not law. In exceptional circumstances only, as discussed above, evidence of identification for the first time in court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, can form the basis of conviction. (f) Ordinarily, even accused is not named in the First Information Report, his identification by witnesses in court, should not be relied upon, especially when they did not disclose name of the accused before the police, but to this general rule there may be exceptions as enumerated above. 43. From the position of law analysed in Danna Yadav (supra), there can be no two views that the identification of an accused inside the court-room, at a trial, is an admissible piece of evidence and because such identification of an accused is admissible in evidence, such evidence of identification is a substantive piece of evidence. 43. From the position of law analysed in Danna Yadav (supra), there can be no two views that the identification of an accused inside the court-room, at a trial, is an admissible piece of evidence and because such identification of an accused is admissible in evidence, such evidence of identification is a substantive piece of evidence. It is, therefore, permissible to rely on such piece of evidence as a rule of law ; but the rule of prudence demands that in the absence of a TIP having been held properly and in accordance with law, the conviction of an accused must not be based entirely on his being, identified, at the trial, by a witness, who did not know the accused. There is, however, no legal impediment in convicting an accused on the basis of his identification at the trial provided that the court has good reasons to believe the evidence of identification at the trial, particularly, when there is other corroborative evidence on record, direct or circumstantial. See also Baiju Baby and Ors. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh 2009 (1) GLT 405. 44. While dealing with the question of identification of an accused, at the trial, without such identification having been preceded by a Test identification Parade (in short, 'the TIP'), we may point out that in Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Administration AIR 1958 SC 350 , the Apex Court had made it clear that failure to hold a TIP would not make the evidence of identification, at the trial, inadmissible. However, the weight to be attached to such identification would be for the court of fact to decide and that it is prudent to hold TIP with respect to witnesses, who did not know the accused before the occurrence. The relevant observations, made in Kanta Prashad (supra), run as follows: It would no doubt have been prudent to hold a test identification parade with respect to witnesses who did not know the accused before the occurrence, but failure to hold such a parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification would be a matter for the courts of fact and it is not for this Court, to reassess the evidence unless exceptional grounds were established necessitating such a course. 45. The weight to be attached to such identification would be a matter for the courts of fact and it is not for this Court, to reassess the evidence unless exceptional grounds were established necessitating such a course. 45. Having taken into account the decisions in Kanta Prasad (supra), Harbhajan Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1975 SC 1814 , Jadunath Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1971 SC 363 and some other authorities, the Apex Court held, in George and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. AIR 1998 SC 1376 , as follows: It cannot be denied however that though not fatal, absence of the corroborative evidence of prior identification in a T.I. parade makes the substantive evidence of identification in court after a long lapse of time a weak piece of evidence and no reliance can be placed upon it unless sufficiently and satisfactorily corroborated by other evidence. 46. From what have been observed in George (supra), it is clear that though absence of identification parade does not make the evidence of identification, at the trial, inadmissible, the court has the duty to ascertain as to how far the evidence of identification of the accused, at the trial, can be safely relied upon. In short, while the evidence of identification of an accused, at a trial, is admissible and substantive piece of evidence, it will depend on the facts of a given case as to whether or not such a piece of evidence can be relied upon as the sole basis of conviction of an accused. The rule of prudence may urge a court, in a given case, to look for some corroborative piece of evidence. 47. During the stage of investigation of a crime, the investigating agency is required to hold identification parade for the purpose of, enabling the witness to identify the person alleged to have committed the offence, particularly, when such person was not previously known to the witness or the informant. The absence of test identification may not be fatal if the accused is known or sufficiently described in the complaint leaving no doubt in the mind of the court as regards the involvement of the accused. Identification parade may also not be necessary in a case, where the accused persons are arrested at the spot. The absence of test identification may not be fatal if the accused is known or sufficiently described in the complaint leaving no doubt in the mind of the court as regards the involvement of the accused. Identification parade may also not be necessary in a case, where the accused persons are arrested at the spot. The evidence of identification of an accused person, for the first time, at the trial, is, from its very nature, inherently of a weak character. The Supreme Court, in Budhsen v. State of U.P. (1970) 2 SCC 128 , held that the evidence of identification of an accused, at the trial, in order to carry conviction, should, ordinarily, clarify as to how and under what circumstances the complainant or the witness came to pick out the particular accused person and the details of the part, which the accused allegedly played in the crime, in question, with reasonable particularity. In such cases, test identification is considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused, who are strangers to them. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration. Though the holding of identification proceedings are not substantive evidence, yet they are used for corroboration and to enable the court to believe that the person, brought before the court, was the real person involved in the commission of the crime. The identification parade, even if held, cannot, in all cases, be considered as safe, sure and trustworthy evidence on which conviction of an accused can be sustained. It is a rule of prudence, which is required to be followed in the cases, where the accused is not known to the witness or the complainant. See State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj and Anr. 2000 (1) SCC 247 ). 48. In the case of Malkhan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2003) 5 SCC 746 , the Apex Court has clarified that the TIP is not substantive piece of evidence and to hold the TIP is not even the rule of law, but a rule of prudence so that the identification of the accused inside the court-room, at the trial, can be safely relied upon. v. State of M.P. (2003) 5 SCC 746 , the Apex Court has clarified that the TIP is not substantive piece of evidence and to hold the TIP is not even the rule of law, but a rule of prudence so that the identification of the accused inside the court-room, at the trial, can be safely relied upon. In Malkhan Singh (supra), the court, while observing that identification of an accused in a court should, as a rule of prudence, be preceded by a TIP, has, in no uncertain words, clarified that this rule of prudence is, however, subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can, without such TIP or other corroboration, safely rely. The Apex Court has also clarified, in Malkhan Singh (supra), that the identification parades belong to the stage of investigation and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade; the TIPs do not, points out the Apex Court in Malkhan Singh (supra), constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, hence, failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court, though the weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact to determine. Asserted the Apex Court, in Malkhan Singh (supra), that in appropriate cases, a court may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration. Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Administration AIR 1958 SC 350 : 1958 Cri. LJ 698; Vaikuntam Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1960 SC 1340 : 1960 Cri. LJ 1681; Budhsen and Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC 1321 : 1970 Cri. LJ 1149 and Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1971) 2 SCC 715 : AIR 1972 SC 102 : 1972 Cri. LJ 15. 49. LJ 698; Vaikuntam Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1960 SC 1340 : 1960 Cri. LJ 1681; Budhsen and Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC 1321 : 1970 Cri. LJ 1149 and Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1971) 2 SCC 715 : AIR 1972 SC 102 : 1972 Cri. LJ 15. 49. We may reiterate, as indicated in Boota Singh (supra), that the identification of an accused by a witness, at the trial, is really substantive piece of evidence and even if such identification has not been tested by a prior identification parade, a court may still rely on such a piece of evidence of identification if the court is satisfied that the witness had the time and the opportunity of seeing and noticing the features of the accused and, hence, when a witness had only fleeting glance of an accused or had not seen the accused due to darkness or dim light and not for sufficient period of time to have noticed the features of the accused, such a piece of evidence may be unsafe to rely upon; but there is no law that identification of an accused by a witness, for the first time, at the trial, cannot, or must not, in all circumstances, be relied upon. Therefore, the value of identification of an accused by a witness, at a trial, depends on the facts of a given case. 50. What emerges from the above discussion is that the identification of an accused inside the court-room, at a trial, is an admissible piece of evidence and because such identification of an accused is admissible in evidence, such evidence of identification is a substantive piece of evidence. It is, therefore, permissible to rely on such piece of evidence as a rule of law; but the rule of prudence demands that in the absence of a TIP having been held properly and in accordance with law, the conviction of an accused should not be based entirely on his being identified, at the trial, by a witness, who did not know the accused. 51. 51. In the backdrop of the position of law as regards identification of an accused, for the first time, at the trial, when we turn to the facts of the case at hand, what attracts our attention, most prominently, is that the identification of the accused-appellant, at the trial, by some of the passengers, who had been, admittedly, abducted, is not the lone evidence against the accused-appellant. Far from this, the unimpeachable evidence of PW5 is that the accused-appellant was one of the persons, who had negotiated the deal as regards ransom, and that the accused-appellant was known to him as he (i.e., the appellant) was a visitor to their local market. This assertion of PW5 has gone unchallenged by the defence. 52. What also cannot be ignored is that PW6, PW7 and PW9 had remained in captivity for about two weeks. There is nothing on record to show that the adductors had made any attempt to conceal their identity; rather, they appeared, without taking any precaution to conceal their identity, in broad day light, before the passengers and the driver of the said vehicle, took some of them away by intimidating them and others with their sophisticated arms and kept moving the victims from one place to another. Thus, the present one is not one of those cases, where a witness had a fleeting glance of a person as an assailant or otherwise. Here is a case wherein the victims' were moved from place to place inside the forest with apparently no precaution taken by the abductors to conceal their identity. In such circumstances, it was not impossible for the abducted victims to identify the miscreants, whom they had seen from time to time and that too, from close quarter. In such a situation, the substantive evidence of identification of the accused-appellant at the trial cannot be ignored, particularly, when the defence does not contend, even faintly, that there was possibility of error in identifying the accused-appellant at the trial; rather, the case of the defence is that the accused has been falsely implicated. This aspect of the defence case, we have already discarded as unworthy of any credence. 53. Above all, and as we have already pointed out above, at no stage of the trial, the defence even contended that the appellant was not present amongst the abductors. 54. This aspect of the defence case, we have already discarded as unworthy of any credence. 53. Above all, and as we have already pointed out above, at no stage of the trial, the defence even contended that the appellant was not present amongst the abductors. 54. Notwithstanding, therefore, the fact that the Investigating Officer had not held any TIP during the course of investigation, the fact remains that the evidence on record does not disclose that the witnesses, who have identified the accused, had any animosity with the accused-appellant. There is also nothing in the evidence on record to show that anyone had interest in falsely implicating the accused-appellant. The evidence of the victims of abduction, such as, PW6, PW7 and PW9, cannot be treated as evidence of accomplices. Their evidence would not, therefore, as a rule of law, require corroboration. No particular number of witnesses is required to prove a fact. See Marwadi Kishor Paramanand and Anr. v. State of Gujarat (1994) 4 SCC 549 and Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand (2003) 2 SCC 401 . It is really not the number of witnesses, but the quality of the evidence given by a witness, which determines the truth or falsity of a fact deposed to by the witness. There is no impediment in law in basing conviction of an accused on the sole testimony of a witness, more particularly, of a person, who claims to be a victim of abduction. In short, there is no legal impediment in upholding the conviction of the present appellant on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses provided that we have legally permissible reasons to believe and hold that the present appellant was one of the persons, who had abducted the passengers and/or had collected ransom. 55. Before proceeding further, we may point out that on examining the deposition of witnesses, we have noticed that when omissions were put to the witnesses, the learned Single Judge had recorded, in the deposition of the witnesses, to the effect that attention of the witnesses was drawn to the statement made under Section 161 Cr.PC, but no such statements were found, though the witnesses asserted that they had made such statements. In similar circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 12/1982 (Sri Mritunjay Chakma v. State of Tripura, decided on 3rd August, 1993), having noted the manner in which contradictions were sought to be proved, had remarked, observed and held, speaking through UL Bhat, CJ, as under: ...PWs 2, 4 and 5 deposed that the mother went near the injured and asked him what happened and he told her that Mritunjay (Appellant) stabbed him and he will not survive. It was suggested in cross-examination of PW4 that he did not mention about this dying declaration to the Investigating Officer. He denied the suggestion. We find a note made in the deposition by the learned Sessions Judge there was no reference to it in the case diary statement. Of course, it may be open to the learned Sessions Judge for the purpose of verifying whether, a correct suggestion was being put to look into the case diary statement. However, we do not think it was any part of the duty of the learned Sessions to make a note in the deposition either that the case diary statement contains reference to dying declaration or that it does not contain reference to it. We also find that the witness was not confronted with the case diary statement for the purpose of contradiction. Counsel who defend accused in criminal case would do well to appreciate the requirements of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act which postulates two different stages, namely, first stage of cross-examination of the witness as to previous statement made by him and the second stage of contradicting the witness by his previous statement. While, in the first stage, it is not necessary to call his attention to his previous statement, in the second stage, it is necessary to call his attention to those parts of the statement which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. If he admits the contradictory statement (affirmative or negative), the Sessions Judge may merely record it. If he denies the contradictory, statement the Sessions Judge will record the denial. The defence Counsel would be well advised in the case of a positive contradiction to get the relevant portion marked tentatively subject to proof of course, no part of the statement can be marked in the case of an omission. If he denies the contradictory, statement the Sessions Judge will record the denial. The defence Counsel would be well advised in the case of a positive contradiction to get the relevant portion marked tentatively subject to proof of course, no part of the statement can be marked in the case of an omission. Where the witness denies the contradictory previous statement, it requires proof through the Investigating Officer, who questioned him. No attempt was made to contradict PW4 with reference to omission in the previous statement. We find that no attempt was made to prove the omission, when the Investigating Officer was being examined. We would like to point out that even if the defence Counsel fails in the discharge of his duty, the learned Sessions Judge cannot be a silent spectator. Where it is obvious to him that there is a contradiction as asserted by a witness, he would do well to alert the defence Counsel so that requirements of Section 145 are satisfied. However, in the circumstances, we would not like to rely, on the dying declaration spoken to by PW4 but we find no uniformity in the dying declaration of P Ws 2 and 5. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the injured was not a position to speak a few words. (emphasis is added). 56. In a recent case, in Gautam Das v. State of Tripura 2008 (3) GLT 625, a Division Bench of this Court, has laid down, in the following words, the manner of recording of contradictions: 41. Contradiction with previous statement of a witness the manner:Noticing the wrong way the prosecution witnesses have been confronted during trial with their previous statements recorded during investigation, we take a break to focus on the correct procedure to be followed in a criminal trial. On this important aspect, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Tahsildar v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 still holds the field and must be followed by all concerned. Before proceeding further to describe the correct path culled out from the above citation, we would briefly see how the witnesses have been confronted with their previous police statements before the trial court. Ganesh Kol (PW2) was in the boat with the victim and others, while crossing the river. He has stated everything about the occurrence of murder except identification of the assailants. Ganesh Kol (PW2) was in the boat with the victim and others, while crossing the river. He has stated everything about the occurrence of murder except identification of the assailants. He has stated, in examination-in-chief, that he could not identify any of the miscreants. He was declared hostile by the learned Public Prosecutor, who confronted PW2 with the portion in his police statement, where the witness was claimed to have stated that he could identify Goutam Das, Tapan Das, Pradip Das and Asim Bhattacharjee. The learned trial court recorded thus: attention of the witness to his previous statement recorded by I.O., is drawn and such statement is found there. The said statement is marked Exbt. 2 subject to be proved by I.O., We take a pause here to say, at the outset, that it is not the function of the presiding officer to draw attention of the witnesses to any part of his statement before police and, then, record that such statement is found or not found. It is the function of the Public Prosecutor to draw attention of the witness to his statement before police and, then, the court shall record the answer exactly given by the witness. Only thereafter, the relevant portion should be provisionally marked for identification subject to confirmation by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, in our view, the matter should have been recorded in the following manner: "the learned Public Prosecutor has drawn the attention of the witness to the portion of his police statement, where he is shown to have claimed that he could identify Goutam Das, Tapan Das, Prabir dos and Asim Bhattacharjee; but the witness has denied to have made such statement as is claimed to have been recorded by the investigating officer. The relevant portion, in the police statement of this witness, is provisionally identified subject to confirmation by the Investigating Officer. If, on his appearance, at the trial, as a witness, the Investigating Officer asserted that the witness, in question, did make the statement put to him, the court should have, then, taken the statement, in question, as proved and marked the same as an Exhibit. As the case diary can not be handed over to the defence, such statement can be proved by noting down the statement on a piece of paper and marking the same 'as proved in original.' (emphasis is supplied) 57. As the case diary can not be handed over to the defence, such statement can be proved by noting down the statement on a piece of paper and marking the same 'as proved in original.' (emphasis is supplied) 57. We respectfully express our agreement with, and reiterate, the position of law with regard to the manner of proving contradictions as laid down in Sri Mritunjay Chakma (supra) and Gautam Das (supra). 58. In the light of the law as discussed above, it is clear that the learned Single Judge has not recorded the 'omissions' of the witnesses in the manner as were required to be done. Be that as it may, the failure to follow the correct procedure by the learned trial court has not caused, we notice, any prejudice to the accused-appellants inasmuch as the omissions, which have been put to the witnesses, were, eventually, confirmed and proved by the investigating officer. 59. What is, however, also disturbing is the manner of conducting investigation in the present case. The investigating officer has not conducted the investigation properly inasmuch as he did not even ask the witnesses as to whether they would be able to identify the miscreants if they happen to see the miscreants again. This becomes clear from the fact that none of the witnesses is proved to have told the Investigating Officer that he would not be able to identify the miscreants, who had abducted them. This apart, on return of the abducted victims, no attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to find but as to what the witnesses had reported to their relatives. In fact, none of the relatives of the victims, other than PW5, as rightly pointed out by the defence, who is the relative of PW10, was examined by the Investigating Officer as a witness. Notwithstanding, however, these infirmities with which the investigation suffers from, no prejudice has been caused, at least, to the defence inasmuch as these infirmities have not disturbed the substance of the prosecution's case, particularly, when the defects in investigation are not shown to have caused prejudice to the defence. The prejudice, if any, has been caused to the prosecution in presenting its case before the court. 60. The prejudice, if any, has been caused to the prosecution in presenting its case before the court. 60. In the face of the evidence, which we have already discussed, including the unshaken and credible evidence of PW5, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the evidence on record convincingly proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that the present appellant was one of the persons, who had abducted the passengers and had collected ransom. 61. Whoever, by force, compels, or by deceitful means, induces, any person to go from any place, is said to 'abduct' that person. (See Section 362 IPC), Whoever 'kidnaps' or 'abducts' any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or, by his conduct, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person, in order to compel the Government and other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, he commits an offence under Section 364A, IPC and shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 62. In the present case, the evidence on record speak loud and clear that the present appellant, along with his associates, had, at gunpoint, forced PW6, 7, and 9 three other passengers of a linguistic group to come down, from the vehicle, wherein they were travelling as passengers, and demanded ransom for their release. It, therefore, logically follows that such acts of the accused-appellant would give rise to reasonable apprehension in the mind of any person, so placed as the said passengers and their relatives were, that the said passengers might be put to death or hurt unless the demand for ransom, is met. In the face of such proven facts, the acts of the accused-appellant and his associates did, we hold, constitute an offence, which is punishable under Section 364A, IPC. 63. From what have been concluded above, we find no reason to hold that the conviction of the appellant under Section 364A, IPC needs interference by this Court, in appeal. In the face of such proven facts, the acts of the accused-appellant and his associates did, we hold, constitute an offence, which is punishable under Section 364A, IPC. 63. From what have been concluded above, we find no reason to hold that the conviction of the appellant under Section 364A, IPC needs interference by this Court, in appeal. The sentence, which has been passed as a result of the appellant's conviction under Section 364A, IPC, does not also require any interference inasmuch as the punishment for an offence under Section 364A, IPC is either death or imprisonment for life with liability to pay fine. In the present case, as the appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment for life with liability to pay fine, his sentence cannot be said to be illegal, harsh or unreasonable. The sentence, passed against the appellant for the offence committed by him under Section 364A, IPC, calls, therefore, for no interference. 64. As far as, however, conviction of the appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, is concerned, one needs to be examine the scheme of the Arms Act, 1959, as amended by the Act 45 of 1988, with effect from 27.5.1988. 65. Under the scheme of the Arms Act, 1959, the term, 'arms', appears as genus with 'firearms' and 'prohibited arms' as its species. Similarly, the term, 'ammunitions', appears, under the scheme of the Act, as the genus with 'prohibited ammunitions' as its species. While the term, 'arms', is defined by Section 2(c), 'firearms' and 'prohibited arms' are defined by Section 2(e) and 2(i) respectively. Similarly, while the term, 'ammunitions', is defined by Section 2(b), 'prohibited ammunitions' is defined by Section 2(h). The penal provisions, embodied in the Arms Act, are, therefore, required to be read keeping in view the definitions of the terms, such as, 'arms', 'firearms', 'prohibited arms', 'ammunitions' and 'prohibited ammunitions'. In the present case, since we are not concerned with 'ammunitions', we keep the discussion confined to 'arms', 'firearms' and 'prohibited arms'. 66. Before proceeding further, what also needs to be carefully noted is that Sections 3,, 5 and 7 deal with, inter alia, regulatory 'use' of arms, as a whole, including, obviously, therein 'firearms' and 'prohibited arms'. Contravention of these regulatory 'uses' have been made punishable, amongst others, by Sections 25 and 27 depending, of course, on the nature of contravention. 66. Before proceeding further, what also needs to be carefully noted is that Sections 3,, 5 and 7 deal with, inter alia, regulatory 'use' of arms, as a whole, including, obviously, therein 'firearms' and 'prohibited arms'. Contravention of these regulatory 'uses' have been made punishable, amongst others, by Sections 25 and 27 depending, of course, on the nature of contravention. A clear understanding of the regulatory, measures would make the penal consequences easier to follow. 67. The term, 'arms', has a very broad definition and, as defined by Section 2(c), 'arms', unless the context otherwise requires, means, inter alia, articles of any description, designed or adapted as a weapon for offence or defence, and includes 'firearms', sharp edged and other deadly weapon. 68. 'Firearms', as defined by Section 2(e), unless the context otherwise requires, means, inter alia, 'arms' of any description, designed or adapted, to discharge a projectile or projectiles of any kind by the action of any explosive or other forms of energy and includes, amongst others, artillery, hand-grenades, etc. 69. Coming to the term, 'prohibited arms', one may note that 'prohibited arms' are also 'firearms' within the meaning of Section 2(e), but the 'prohibited arms' have been categorised separately, because of certain features in them as mentioned in Section 2(i). The term 'prohibited arms', means, under Section 2(i)(i), 'firearms' so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine, containing the missiles, is empty. The 'prohibited arms' also mean, according to Section 2(i)(ii), weapons of any description, designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other such things, and includes artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-tank firearms and 'such other arms' as the Central Government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, specify to be 'prohibited arms'. The 'prohibited arms' also mean, according to Section 2(i)(ii), weapons of any description, designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other such things, and includes artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-tank firearms and 'such other arms' as the Central Government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, specify to be 'prohibited arms'. The expression, 'such other arms as the Central Government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, specify to be prohibited arms', would mean that those firearms', which are so designed or adapted that if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine, containing the missiles, is empty, would be regarded as 'prohibited arms' and if any other 'arms', which may not, otherwise, be automatic 'firearms', as indicated hereinbefore, is specified by the Central Government, by way of notification, in the official Gazette, as 'prohibited firearm', then, such 'arms', though not automatic, would nevertheless be regarded as 'prohibited arms' inasmuch as the Central Government has the authority to specify such non-automatic 'firearm' or any other 'firearm' as 'prohibited arm'. It is for those categories of 'firearms', which do not, otherwise, fall within the definition of 'prohibited arms', that the question of notification would arise. No particular 'firearm' need be specifically notified as 'prohibited arms' if the 'firearm', otherwise also, falls within the term, 'prohibited arms', as defined in Section 2(i)(i) or 2(i)(ii). For instance, whether notified or not, an AK 47 rifle, which is a self-loading rifle, would be regarded as 'prohibited arms', for, once triggered, it (AK 47 rifle) continues to fire bullets, until manually stopped or until the magazine is emptied. A.303 rifle is, on the other hand, not a self-loading rifle; hence, such a rifle cannot be included within the definition of 'prohibited arms' unless a notification is published by the Central Government as provided in Section 2(h)(ii). 70. Reverting to Section 3, it needs to be noted that Section 3 provides, inter alia, that a person shall not, except under the circumstances mentioned therein, acquire, have in his possession, or carry, any firearm or ammunition without a valid licence. 71. Contravention of Section 3 attracts penal provisions contained in Section 25(1B)(a). Penalty provided is minimum of one year, which may extend to three years. If committed in 'disturbed area', the penalty is higher as prescribed by Section 25(1C). 72. 71. Contravention of Section 3 attracts penal provisions contained in Section 25(1B)(a). Penalty provided is minimum of one year, which may extend to three years. If committed in 'disturbed area', the penalty is higher as prescribed by Section 25(1C). 72. An offence, under Section 25(1B)(a), is, thus, made out of the mere fact that without a valid licence, the person has acquired, or has been found possessing, or has been carrying, any 'firearms'. Therefore, Section 3 regulates the acquisition, possession and carrying of 'firearms' without a valid licence. 73. Section 5 regulates the use, manufacture, sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, or exposure or offer for sale or transfer or possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, any firearms or any other arms of such class or description as may be prescribed unless he holds, in this behalf, a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder. 74. The law does not, therefore, prohibit the business of manufacture, selling, transferring, etc., of any firearm or arms if the person has, for this purpose, valid licence granted under the said Act. However, the power to transfer is further regulated by the proviso to Section 5 [Clauses (a)and(b)]. 75. Now, if a person manufactures, sells, transfers, etc., a firearm, without having a valid licence and without complying with the conditions mentioned in the proviso to Section 5, particularly, Clauses (a) and (b) thereof, he attracts penalty under Section 25(1)(a) and Section 25(3) respectively. These penal provisions aim at regulating unlicenced business of arms. 76. Turning to Section 7, one may note that this Section (Section 7) regulates the acquisition, possession or carrying, or use, manufacture, sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof or exposure or offer for sale or transfer or possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair or test or proof, of 'prohibited arms' or 'prohibited ammunition' unless specifically authorized by the Central Government. These regulations are intended to prohibit the business and use of special category of 'firearms', which fall within the definition of the 'prohibited arms'. 77. The penal provisions for contravention of Section 7 have been classified as follows: (i) A contravention of the regulatory provisions, contained with respect to acquisition, possession or carrying of 'prohibited arms', is punishable under Section 25(1A). 77. The penal provisions for contravention of Section 7 have been classified as follows: (i) A contravention of the regulatory provisions, contained with respect to acquisition, possession or carrying of 'prohibited arms', is punishable under Section 25(1A). (ii) A contravention of the regulatory provisions, contained with respect to manufacture, sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, exposure or offer for sale or transfer or possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, of 'prohibited arms', is punishable under Section 25(1AA). 78. It can, thus, be seen from the provisions of Section 25(1)(a), 25(3), 25(1A) and 25(1AA) that these provisions have excluded the term "use", which appear in Section 5 and Section 7. The reason is that contravention of Sections 5 and 7, so far as "use" of 'firearms' or 'prohibited arms' is concerned, has been made punishable under Section 27 of the Act and not under Section 25 of the Act. This position would become clearer if the provisions contained in Section 27 are carefully taken note of Section 27 reads as under: 27. Punishment for using arms, etc. - (1) Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of Section 5 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition in contravention of Section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. (3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or does any act in contravention of Section 7 and such use or act results in the death of any other person, shall be punishable with death. 79. Since Section 5 deals with 'firearms' only, it clearly follows that when a person 'uses' any arms or firearms or ammunitions, in contravention of Section 5, he is punishable under Section 27(1); whereas, when he 'uses' 'prohibited arms' or prohibited ammunitions' in contravention of Section 7, his 'use' of the 'prohibited arms' or the 'prohibited ammunition' becomes punishable under Section27(2). Since Section 5 deals with 'firearms' only, it clearly follows that when a person 'uses' any arms or firearms or ammunitions, in contravention of Section 5, he is punishable under Section 27(1); whereas, when he 'uses' 'prohibited arms' or prohibited ammunitions' in contravention of Section 7, his 'use' of the 'prohibited arms' or the 'prohibited ammunition' becomes punishable under Section27(2). However, in the light of the provisions of Section 27(3), when a person 'uses' any 'prohibited arms' or 'ammunitions' or does any 'act' in contravention of Section 7 and such 'use' or 'act' results in death of any other person, such a person's 'use' or the 'act', as the case may be, shall be punishable with death. 80. In the case at hand, when there is no evidence to show as to what was the class of firearms, which the miscreants had used, the 'use' of the firearms, even if sophisticated arms, would not fall within the mischief of Section 27(2). In other words, when the firearms, used by the miscreants in the present case, have not been proved to be 'prohibited arms', it logically follows that the miscreants, having used the 'firearms', in the circumstances as discussed above, have contravened the provisions of Section 5 and their acts were, therefore, punishable under Section 27(1) and not Section 27(2). 81. A court, before founding its conviction, on a charge framed under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 27, must determine as to what was the kind of firearm or ammunitions, which had been 'used' by the accused, who faces the charge of having used 'firearm' or 'ammunition', and whether the firearm or ammunition, so used, is a prohibited arm or prohibited ammunition, or not. If the 'use' of firearm or ammunition falls within the ambit of Section 5, the offence is punishable by Section27(1) and if the firearm or ammunition used is a prohibited arm or prohibited ammunition, such 'use' would fall within the ambit of Section 7 and would be punishable under Section 27(2). 82. In the case at hand, the charge framed, against the appellant, alleges that the appellant had possessed and used arms and ammunitions, country-made gun, pistol, etc., with intent to use the same for unlawful purpose and thereby committed an offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 82. In the case at hand, the charge framed, against the appellant, alleges that the appellant had possessed and used arms and ammunitions, country-made gun, pistol, etc., with intent to use the same for unlawful purpose and thereby committed an offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. This was clearly not an appropriate charge for the purpose of attracting Section 27 inasmuch as the charge did not disclose that the arms or ammunitions, used by the miscreants, fell within the scope of Section 5 or Section 7. 83. In the absence of any evidence on record showing that the firearms, which the miscreants had used, in the present case, fell within the definition of 'prohibited arms', the 'use' of the 'firearms', in the present case, by the miscreants, was in contravention of Section 5 and such contravention is punishable under Section 27(1). The learned Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act, without indicating as to whether the 'use' was punishable under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 27. This was clearly impermissible in law inasmuch as Section 27prescribes, as already discussed above, punishments of three distinct offences. It was, therefore, necessary that the charge indicates as to which Sub-section of Section 27 was attracted. 84. Be that as it may, the omission to frame a specific charge, in the present case, did not, as we find, caused any prejudice to the accused-appellant inasmuch as the accused-appellant knew right from the beginning that he was accused to have used firearms, such use being in contravention of the law contained in that behalf. 85. We, therefore, hold the appellant guilty of offence under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act too and convict him accordingly. The appellant, as already indicated above, stands sentenced, for his conviction under Section 27, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. Under Section 27(1), the punishment is imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also liable to fine. In the present case, in the circumstances in which the appellant used the firearms, we are of the view that the sentence passed against him is not unreasonable. Under Section 27(1), the punishment is imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also liable to fine. In the present case, in the circumstances in which the appellant used the firearms, we are of the view that the sentence passed against him is not unreasonable. While clarifying that the appellant stands convicted under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, we uphold the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years passed by the learned trial court. 86. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal, as a whole, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 87. Send back the LCR. Appeal dismissed.