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2009 DIGILAW 682 (KAR)

Saurashtra Ferrous (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

2009-08-28

P.D.DINAKARAN, V.G.SABHAHIT

body2009
ORDER V.G. Sabhahit, J.— These writ petitions are disposed of by this common order since they involve common question of law and fact and are filed by the same petitioner. 2. It is the case of the petitioner in both these writ petitions: (i) that writ petitioner is a registered Private Limited company and is engaged in the manufacture of low ash metallurgical coke (met coke) at Porbandar and Mundra of Kutch District, Gujarat; (ii) that in response to the notification dated 15.3.2003 application was filed by the petitioner in respect of the land described in Sl. No. 12 seeking for grant of mining lease over an area of 350 and 250 acres respectively; (iii) that the application was filed for grant of mining lease contending that iron ore will be used for captive mining; and (iv) that the power of affording opportunity under Rule 26(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') could not be delegated to the Officer subordinate to the Government as person who hears would not decide and priority ought to have been given to the application of the petitioner for recommending grant of mining lease. 3. The petition is resisted by the respondents. 4. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions and learned CGSC appearing for respondent No. 1, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 5 and the learned Government Advocate appearing for respondents 2 and 4. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the petitions reiterated the grounds urged in the writ petition and submitted: (i) that power of affording opportunity under Rule 26(1) of the Rules could not be delegated to the Officer subordinate to the State Government and State Government itself ought to have conferred opportunity and heard the writ petitioner; (ii) that the application of the petitioner ought to have been given priority; and (iii) that the order recommending grant of mining lease in Favour of the fifth respondent in both the writ petitions-M/s. JSW Steel Limited, is illegal and liable to be set aside. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents argued in support of the recommendation made in favour of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd. 7. We have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinised the material on record: 8. 1. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents argued in support of the recommendation made in favour of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd. 7. We have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinised the material on record: 8. 1. The material on record would clearly show that there is no merit, in the legal contention regarding the delegation of power raised by the writ petitioner. In this regard, it is relevant to extract Rule 26 of the MC Rules which deals with the power of delegation and the same reads thus: 26. Delegation of powers: 1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act may, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be. specified in the notification be exercisable also by: a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or b) such State Government or such Officer or authority subordinate to a State Government as may be specified in the notification. 2) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act may, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, be exercisable also by such Officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification. 3) Any rules made by the Central Government under this Act may confer powers and impose duties or authorise the conferring of powers and imposition of duties upon any State Government or any Officer or Authority subordinate thereto. 8.2. This Court in W.A. No. 1095/2008 and connected appeals, disposed of on 26.8,2009, had dealt with the Issues referred to by the learned single Judge regarding delegation of power. The issues read as follows: (i) Whether the State Government is bereft of power to authorize an authority, or officer subordinate to it to perform the function contemplated under Rule 26(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 - notwithstanding the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957? The issues read as follows: (i) Whether the State Government is bereft of power to authorize an authority, or officer subordinate to it to perform the function contemplated under Rule 26(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 - notwithstanding the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957? (ii) Whether the 'hearing' contemplated under Rule 26(1) of the above Rules, require the State Government alone to hear and decide without the assistance of any other authority or sub-ordinate officer and if there is a division of such responsibility, the proceedings stand vitiated? 8.3. After considering the issues in detail and the relevant provisions relating to the MMDR Act and the MC Rules, this Court, by order dated 26.8.2009 in W.A. No. 1045/2008 and connected appeals, held as hereunder: 19.1. It is clear from the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act that the said provision enables the State Government by notification in the official gazette delegate power to exercise right under the MMDR Act, which of course, would also include the Rules framed under the Act in relation to such matters and subject to such condition, if any, that may be specified under the notification be exercise able 'also' by such Officials or Authority subordinate to the State Government as may be prescribed in the notification. 19.2. In the notification also, the delegation of power of affording opportunity to the applicant under Rule 26(1) of the Rules has been delegated to the Director of Mines and Geology also and therefore, providing opportunity under Rule 26(1) of the Rules shall also be exercisable by the Director of Mines and Geology. 19.3. It is, therefore, clear that the State has not denuded itself of the power to afford opportunity to the applicants and to take decision as to whether the mining lease should be granted or rejected. Even otherwise, it is well settled that the mere fact that power has been delegated would not by itself mean that the State Government which has delegated power to the subordinate Officer would denude itself of the power exercisable and cannot exercise that power, it cannot be said that State Government cannot exercise that power which has been delegated to an Officer subordinate to it. 19.4. In Ishwar Singh Vs. 19.4. In Ishwar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 2005 SC 773 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the said question and has dealt with the concept of delegation and the effect of delegation and has held that the delegation of power by the State Government upon an Officer subordinate to it would not preclude the State Government to exercise the power which has been delegated. Ina the said Judgment, it is observed as follows in the said judgment: 8. It is an accepted position in law that to "delegate" to another is not to denude yourself. As was observed by Wilis J. in Huth v. Clarke2: In my opinion the word, in its general sense and as generally used, does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring of authority upon someone else. As observed by Lord Coleridge, C.J, in 25 QBD 304, the word "delegation" implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to resumption by the power delegating. The person delegating does not denude himself. (Per Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Edn. at P. 316) Delegation implies also the power to withdraw delegation. As indicated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, delegation is a sending away; a putting into commission; the assignment of a debt to another; the entrusting another with a general power to act for the good of those who. depute him. The word "delegate'' means little more than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his, principal. The observation in Huth case was referred to in Roop Chand case'. In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The delegating body will retain not only power to revoke the grant, but also power to act concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except insofar as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate. (See Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council.) 9. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.26, "delegate" has been described as follows: As a noun, a person sent and empowered to act for another, one deputed to represent another in a more popular but less accurate sense, a regularly selected member of a regular party convention. (See Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council.) 9. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.26, "delegate" has been described as follows: As a noun, a person sent and empowered to act for another, one deputed to represent another in a more popular but less accurate sense, a regularly selected member of a regular party convention. As a verb, in its general sense and as generally used, the term does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring authority upon someone else. At common law, it is the transfer of authority by one person to another, the act of making or commissioning a delegate. Expression 'delegation of authority of power' is a term which like the word 'delegate' does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. 10. In Collins English Dictionary the word "delegate" has been stated to be a person who is chosen to vote or make decisions on behalf of a group of other people. If you delegate duties, responsibilities or power to someone, you give them those duties, those responsibilities, or that power so that they can act on your behalf. If you are delegated to do something you are given the duty of acting on someone else's behalf by making decisions, voting, or doing some particular work. 11. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., the word "delegate" has been stated to mean a person who is appointed, authorised, delegated or commissioned to act in the stead of another. Transfer of authority from one to another. A person to whom affairs are committed by another. "Delegation" according to the said dictionary means, instructing another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him; transfer of authority by one person to another. 12. According to Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, "delegation" as the word generally used does not imply a parting with powers of the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to a conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise the person would have to do himself. 19.5.1. 12. According to Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, "delegation" as the word generally used does not imply a parting with powers of the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to a conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise the person would have to do himself. 19.5.1. That apart, in the case of Carlton a Ltd. v Commissioners OF WORKS (1943) 2 AII.ER 560 it is said: It cannot be supposed that this regulation meant that, in each case the Minister in person should direct his mind to the matter. The duties imposed upon Ministers and the powers given to the Ministers are normally exercised under the authority of Ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case. Constitutionally, the decision of such an official is, of course, the decision of the Minister. The Minister is responsible. It is he who must answer before Parliament for anything that his officials have done under his authority… 19.5.2. It is also apt to quote the text from Wade's Administrative Law, which reads thus: Consequently, many ministerial powers exercised by officials who recite, 'I am directed by the Minister', 'the Minister is of the opinion', and so forth, when in reality they are acting on their own initiative. If the proper official is acting in his capacity as such, the assumption of ministerial authority is lawful. This doctrine is assumed to extend equally to legislative powers, since it is common practice for officials to issue statutory regulations under powers vested in this ministers vide Lewisham BC v Robers (1949)2 KB 608 19.6. Having regard to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2005) 2 SCC 334 the wordings of Section 26(2) of the Act and the notification issued by the State Government delegating power of affording opportunity to the applicant under Rule 26(1) of the Rules upon the Commissioner and Director of Mines and Geology, we have no hesitation in holding that the State Government has not denuded itself of the power to consider the application and to afford an opportunity to the applicant under Rule 26(1) of the Rules as the Commissioner and Director of Mines and Geology has also been authorised to afford opportunity under Rule 26(1) of the Rules. xx xx xx 36. xx xx xx 36. The questions referred to the Bench are answered as follows: 1. The State Government is not bereft of power to authorize an authority, or officer sub-ordinate to it to perform the function contemplated under Rule 26(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960-notwithstanding the language of Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957. 2. The 'hearing' as contemplated under Rule 26(1) of the above Rules, does not require the State Government alone to hear and decide without assistance of any other authority or subordinate Officer, there is no division of responsibility of hearing and deciding while delegating the power of the State Government. 37. In view of our answer to the above questions, we hold that delegation of power of State under Section 26(2) of the MMDR Act to the Director of Mines and Geology by notification dated 18.11.2003 is valid in law... 8.4. In the instant case, the proceedings of hearing dated 12.9.2007 under Rule 26(1) of the MC Rules, conducted by the Additional Secretary to Government, Commerce and Industries Department, disclose that the Government has given an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and also to other applicants before recommending the grant in favour of the contesting respondent. Therefore, in view of the decision rendered in Writ Appeal No. 1095/2008 and connected appeals disposed of on 26.8.2009, the legal contention raised by the petitioner in this regard fails. 9.1. Therefore, in view of the decision rendered in Writ Appeal No. 1095/2008 and connected appeals disposed of on 26.8.2009, the legal contention raised by the petitioner in this regard fails. 9.1. With regard to the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that petitioner's application should have been given preference over the applications received pursuant to the notification dated 15.3.2003, this Court in Writ petition No. 17828/2007 while considering the question of giving any priority or preference in respect of the applications filed prior to the date of the notification and the same would be contrary to the provisions of proviso to Section 11(2) of the MMDR Act, has held that that once notification has been issued under Rule 59 of the Rules in view of Section 11(2) of the MMDR Act, all the applications received within the time specified in the notification as also the applications filed prior to the notification which are pending consideration shall be deemed to have been received on the same day for the purpose of priority and no preferential treatment can be given to the applications filed prior to amendment of Section 11(2) of MMDR Act in 1999. 9.2. The scrutiny of the material on record would clearly show that in both the writ petitions, petitioner's application for grant of mining lease in response to the notification dated 15.3.2003 are filed subsequent to the said notification, and therefore, question of giving any preference to the application of the petitioner over the applications already received, would not arise, as all the applications received in response to the notification within the time prescribed, has to be treated as having been received on the same day for the purpose of grant of mining lease. Hence, there is no merit in the contention of the writ petitioner in this regard. 10.1. With regard to evaluation of inter se merits of the applicants, it is settled law that the procedure prescribed in Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act and Rule 35 of the MC Rules has to be strictly adhered to. 10.2. For better appreciation, it is apt to refer to Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act and Rule 35 of the MC Rules. 10.3. 10.2. For better appreciation, it is apt to refer to Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act and Rule 35 of the MC Rules. 10.3. Section 11 of the MMDR Act reads: Section 11: Preferential right of certain persons.- (1) Where a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence has been granted in respect of any land, the permit holder or the licensee shall have a preferential right for obtaining a prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, in respect of that land over any other person: (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) The matters referred to in Sub-section (2) are the following: (a) any special knowledge of, or experience in, reconnaissance operations, prospecting operations or mining operations, as the case may be, possessed by the applicant; (b) the financial resources of the applicant; (c) the nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by the applicant; (d) the investment which the applicant proposes to make in the mines and in the industry based on the minerals; and (e) such other matters as may be prescribed. (4) xxx xxx. (5) xxx xx xxx. 10.4. Rule 35 of the M.C. Rules reads as hereunder: 35. Preferential rights of certain persons. - Where two or more persons have applied for a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the same land, the State Government shall, for the purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 11, consider besides the matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (3) of section 11, the end use of the mineral by the applicant. 10.5. The mandatory requirement of compliance of Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act and Rule 35 of the MC Rules has already been upheld by this Court in Writ Appeal No. 5026/2008, disposed of on 5th June, 2009, Writ petition No. 5022/2009 disposed of on 11th June, 2009 and Writ Petition No. 9261-66/2009 disposed of on 8th July, 2009. 10.6. In Writ Appeal No. 5026/2008 this Court has held as follows: 28.4. The words employed by the Parliament under Section 11(3)(e) viz., 'such other matters as may be prescribed' include the matters prescribed under Rule 35 of MC Rules also specifically refers to Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act. It is, therefore, mandatory for the State Government to consider the end-use of minerals by the applicants while evaluating their relative merits. The words employed by the Parliament under Section 11(3)(e) viz., 'such other matters as may be prescribed' include the matters prescribed under Rule 35 of MC Rules also specifically refers to Section 11(3) of the MMDR Act. It is, therefore, mandatory for the State Government to consider the end-use of minerals by the applicants while evaluating their relative merits. In the instant case, the appellants herein (respondents 4 and 5 in the writ petition) who have already established iron-ore based industry viz., iron and steel plant, weighed the State Government to prefer the appellants herein (respondents 4 and 5 in the writ petition) as against the first respondent herein (writ petitioner). When the appellants herein (respondents 4 and 5 in the writ petition) proposed to use the iron-ore mined as captive consumption for the existing industry which in turn generate more employment and span ancillary industries, the consideration and evaluation of relative merits of the appellants herein (respondents 4 and 5 in the writ petition) and the first respondent herein (writ petitioner) in terms of Rule 35 of MC Rules, would certainly fall within the matters specified under Section 11(3) of MMDR Act. 10.7. Further, in Writ Petition No. 5022/2009 disposed of on 11th June, 2009, this Court, approving the decision of the State Government and Central Government giving preference to captive consumption for the proposed industry or mining as a stand-alone industry, has observed as hereunder: 18. While mining as a stand-alone industry cannot be ignored, the contention of the petitioner based on the policy decision of the Central and State Government that preference should be given to captive mining while granting mining lease, also deserves due consideration. The schedule of time prescribed under Rule 63A of the MC Rules is also required to be strictly adhered to, as the State is bound by such time schedule in deciding the applications for grant of mining lease. It is true that no specific time limitation is given for granting approval by the Central Government, but that does not mean that the Central Government could take its own sweet time, which in our considered opinion would be unreasonable and arbitrary, because any such delay would affect the economic growth of the State. 19.1. It is true that no specific time limitation is given for granting approval by the Central Government, but that does not mean that the Central Government could take its own sweet time, which in our considered opinion would be unreasonable and arbitrary, because any such delay would affect the economic growth of the State. 19.1. Even though it is not proper for this Court to prescribe any time schedule, which is not provided under the statute, we are of the considered opinion that the Central Government should themselves come forward to exercise their power for clearing the applications for the approval contemplated under Section 5 of the MMDR Act and Section 2 of the FC Act within a reasonable time limit, which should not, in our considered opinion, be more than six months from the date of receipt of the application for such approval. 19.2. Mere want of provision as on date for passing orders in respect of the approval of the Central Government contemplated under Section 5 of the MMDR Act and Section 2 of the FC Act, would not be an excuse for the Central Government to take indefinite time for passing orders on the application for such approval and to cause undue delay in the matter, as it would defeat the very policy of the Central Government and the State Government in the matter of industrialization and economic development. Of course, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that it may not be proper for this Court to interfere with the policy decision of the Government. But we are unable to appreciate the said contention, because in the instant public interest litigation, the petitioner is neither making any allegation against the policy decision nor challenging the same, but all that the petitioner seeks is, only to give effect to the policy decision of the State which is admittedly implemented by the State. 19.3. The Apex Court, in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1991 SC 537 held that: 27. Unlike a private party whose acts uninformed by reason and influenced by personal predilections in contractual matters may result in adverse consequences to it alone without affecting the public interest, any such act of the State or a public body even in this field would adversely affect the public interest. Unlike a private party whose acts uninformed by reason and influenced by personal predilections in contractual matters may result in adverse consequences to it alone without affecting the public interest, any such act of the State or a public body even in this field would adversely affect the public interest. Every holder of a public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him are meant to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest. This is equally true of all actions even in the field of contract. Thus, every holder of a public office is a trustee whose highest duty is to the people of the country and, therefore, every act of the holder of a public office, irrespective of the label classifying that act, is in discharge of public duty meant ultimately for public good, With the diversification of State activity in a Welfare State requiring the State to discharge its wide ranging functions even through its several instrumentalities, which requires entering into contracts also, it would be unreal and not pragmatic, apart from being unjustified to exclude contractual matters from the sphere of State actions required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14. 19.4. Again, the Apex Court, in Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 has observed as hereunder: 7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its, instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This Imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is airplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its Instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its Instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. 8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate In the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates In our legal system in this manner and to this extent 19.5. In the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Others, JT (2008) 11 SC 467 the Apex Court while dealing with the doctrine of legitimate expectation observed that: 102. The concept of "due process of law" has played a major role In the development of administrative law. It ensures fairness in public administration. In the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Others, JT (2008) 11 SC 467 the Apex Court while dealing with the doctrine of legitimate expectation observed that: 102. The concept of "due process of law" has played a major role In the development of administrative law. It ensures fairness in public administration. The administrative authorities who are entrusted with the task of deciding lis between the parties or adjudicating upon the rights of the Individuals are duty-bound to comply with the rules of natural justice, which are multifaceted. The absence of bias in the decision-making process and compliance with audi alteram partem are two of these facets. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a nascent addition to the rules of natural justice. It goes beyond statutory rights by serving as another device for rendering justice. At the root of the principle of legitimate expectation is the constitutional principle of rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability and certainty in Government's dealings with the public-J. Raz, The Authority of Law 1(1979) Chapter 11 J. The "legal certainty" is also a basic principle of European community. European law is based upon the concept of vertrauensschutz (the honouring of a trust or confidence). It is for these reasons that the existence of a legitimate expectation may even in the absence of a right of private law, justify its recognition in public law. 103. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been described in the following words: A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. 104. A formal statement on the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be found in the judgment of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service. In that case the Government tried to forbid trade unionism among civil service. For this, the Civil Service Orders in the 1982 Council was issued. The Court of Appeal declared that the Minister had acted unlawfully in abridging the fundamental right of a citizen to become a member of the trade union. In that case the Government tried to forbid trade unionism among civil service. For this, the Civil Service Orders in the 1982 Council was issued. The Court of Appeal declared that the Minister had acted unlawfully in abridging the fundamental right of a citizen to become a member of the trade union. The House of Lords approved the judgment of the Court of Appeal and held that such a right could not be taken away without consulting the civil servant concerned. 105. In India, the courts have gradually recognised that while administering the affairs of the State, the Government and its departments are expected to honour the policy statements and treat the citizens without any discrimination. The theory of legitimate expectation first found its mention in Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India. In that case the right of a housing society for right to priority in the matter of registration was recognised in the following words: (SCC pp. 494-95, paras 15-16) 15. In the aforesaid facts, the Group Housing Societies were entitled to legitimate expectation' of following consistent past practice in the matter of allotment, even though they may not have any legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The existence of 'legitimate expectation' may have a number of different consequences and one of such consequences is that the authority ought not to act to defeat the 'legitimate expectation' without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so. In a case of 'legitimate expectation' if the authority proposes to defeat a person's 'legitimate expectation' it should afford him an opportunity to make representations in the matter. In this connection reference may be made to the discussions on 'legitimate expectation' at p. 151 of Vol. 1(1) of Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (re-issue). We may also refer to a decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service. It has been held in the said decision that an aggrieved person was entitled to judicial review if he could show that a decision of the public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on such reasons. 16. 16. It may be Indicated here that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking Into consideration all relevant factors relating to such 'legitimate expectation'. Within the conspectus of fair dealing in case of 'legitimate expectation', the reasonable opportunities to make representation by the parties likely to be affected by any change of consistent past policy, come in, We have not been shown any compelling reasons taken into consideration by the Central Government to make a departure from the existing policy of allotment with reference to seniority in registration by introducing a new guideline. 19.6. The Apex Court in Vs. Union of India and others, (1996) 5 AD SC 678, approving the view of the Committee appointed by the Central Government pursuant to the directions to the High Court of Orissa, consisting of senior officers from the Ministry of Mines, the Indian Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey of India, that the National Mineral Policy having been tabled before both the Houses of Parliament, is a guiding factor in the decision-making process of the Government and, both in the National Mineral Policy as well as the Industrial Policy of the State of Orissa, captive mining has been recognized as a fundamental guideline in determining the criteria for granting mining lease, held that the Committee made an estimate of the captive mining requirement of each of the parties appearing before it, after coming to the conclusion that captive mining is a fundamental guideline to be kept in mind while renewing the lease. 20. In that view of the matter, we do not see any error or illegality on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court for seeking appropriate direction to both Central and State Government to process the applications in accordance with the policy decision taken by them, as the petitioner is entitled to seek such relief based on legitimate expectation. 21. 21. Therefore, we are convinced that the petitioner is bonafide in approaching this Court with the above public interest litigation laying his hands on the very National Mineral Policy, 2006 and 2008 as well as the Karnataka Mineral Policy, 2008, which itself provide for promoting and encouraging scientific mining methods by employing advanced mining equipment and machineries with skilled and non-skilled manpower and actively encouraging value addition which should go hand-in-hand with the growth of the mineral sector as a stand-alone industrial activity and to give priority to the applicants, who propose to establish industries based on value addition making it clear that mining as a stand-alone industry needs to be encouraged as it provides large scale employment; new mineral based industries should be set up to match the available raw material resources;*existing and new industries should set up facilities to bring the available raw materials up to the required specifications by processes like beneficiation, pelletisation and sintering; and these, industries will generate more employment and spawn auxiliary industries. 22.1. We are, therefore, satisfied that (i) the proposed end use of the minerals by the applicant; and (ii) the captive consumption and value addition of minerals, should be the prime criteria for granting mining lease, because the steel plants coming up in a relatively underdeveloped areas, will ensure further employment generation in establishment of roads, ports, transportation, water resources, railway infrastructure, supply chain business domain and allied industries such as power plants, slag cement plants, ancillary units, etc., leading to improved infrastructure and overall development of the lifestyle of the public at large of the locality and region. 10.8. In so far as comparative merits of the petitioner and respondent No. 5 in both the writ petitions is concerned, it is clear that respondent No. 5 is running an integrated steel industry in Bellary District and petitioner is having industry in Mundra Taluk, Kutch district, Gujarat and having regard to the fact that respondent No. 5 is already having an integrated steel industry in Sandur Taluk, Bellary District. But, so far as petitioner is concerned, it is not having an industry in Karnataka and according to the averments made in the petition, petitioner is running pig iron plant at Mundra in Gujarat and because of non-availability of raw material-iron ore petitioner-company is running only at 56% of its installed capacity. But, so far as petitioner is concerned, it is not having an industry in Karnataka and according to the averments made in the petition, petitioner is running pig iron plant at Mundra in Gujarat and because of non-availability of raw material-iron ore petitioner-company is running only at 56% of its installed capacity. Thus, it is clear that the fifth respondent in both the petitions stand on a better footing than the writ petitioner to the averments made in the petition, petitioner is running pig iron plant at Mundra in Gujarat and because of non-availability of raw material-iron ore petitioner-company is running only at 56% of its installed capacity. Thus, it is clear that the fifth respondent in both the petitions stand on a better footing than the writ petitioner as they own factory in Lakhapur village, Mundra Taluk, Kutch District, Gujarat and therefore, recommendation made for grant of mining lease in favour of the fifth respondent-M/s. JSW Steel Ltd., is justified. 11. For the reasons stated supra and applying the ratio of the decision rendered by this Court in Writ Appeal No. 5026/2008, Writ Petition No. 5022/2009 and Writ Appeal No. 1095/2008 referred to above, we hold that there is no merit in both the writ petitions and accordingly, they are dismissed. No costs.