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2009 DIGILAW 689 (BOM)

Zilda Bras De Sa Widow v. Narayan Kavlekar Major

2009-06-15

N.A.BRITTO

body2009
Judgment :- This appeal is directed against Judgment/Decree dated 8-7-2008 of the learned District Judge, Panaji. 2. The parties hereto shall be referred to in the names as they appear in the cause title of the suit. There is no dispute that the suit property surveyed under no.74/2 situated at Torda in Village Salvador do Mundo belonged to Adriano Ernest Couto. There is also no dispute that the family of Defendant No.1 (Defendant, for short) has a mundkarial house situated in the said property and which is shown on the survey plan. There is also no dispute that the suit structure admeasuring about 92 sq. meters is not shown on the said survey plan. 3. The Plaintiff claiming to be the grand-daughter of the said Adriano and as such a co-owner of the suit property filed the suit, further claiming that the Plaintiff had found on or about 31-8-2007 that the Defendant was carrying out the said illegal construction and as such she complained by letter dated 31-5-2007 to the Village Panchayat and also sent a notice dated 1-9-2007 to Defendant Nos.2, 3 and 4(who are public authorities). Plaintiff, therefore filed the suit claiming for a declaration that the said structure was illegal and further praying for mandatory injunction to direct the Defendant to remove the said structure. The Plaintiff also prayed for the reliefs of permanent injunction against the Defendant from carrying out any further illegal encroachment in the suit property and also prayed for a mandatory injunction to Defendant Nos.2 to 5 to exercise their statutory powers to remove the illegal construction put up by the Defendant. 4. The case of the Defendant was that the Plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit. The Defendant also denied that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of late Adriano. Further, it was the case of the Defendant that his late father Kashinath was in enjoyment of the suit property admeasuring about 5675 sq. meters as tenant and was a mundkar in respect of the dwelling house. The Defendant also denied that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of late Adriano. Further, it was the case of the Defendant that his late father Kashinath was in enjoyment of the suit property admeasuring about 5675 sq. meters as tenant and was a mundkar in respect of the dwelling house. The case of the Defendant was that the suit structure was occupied by the father of the Defendant for more than 70 years and as the father of Defendant No.1 was an agriculturist he had a cow shed in it which he had converted into a pan-biddi shop and as the said shop was in a dilapidated condition it was repaired/reconstructed and this was within the knowledge of the Plaintiff to which the Plaintiff did not object and only to harass the Defendant, the Plaintiff filed the suit. 5. The Defendants Nos.2 and 3 initially filed the written statement but thereafter did not lead any evidence in the suit. They have not contested this appeal. 6. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 stated that the Defendant was issued a notice dated 28-6-2007 directing him to stop the illegal construction and was further informed that the Village Panchayat would take action in terms of Section 66 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 in case he failed to stop the construction. The Defendant Nos.2 and 3 further stated that upon notice to the Defendant, the Panchayat inspected and carried out a panchanama of the suit structure and drew a sketch of illegal construction of the Defendant and by notice dated 22-9-2007 called upon the Defendant to produce documentary evidence as the Defendant had carried out illegal construction of the house and the Defendant by his reply dated 3-10-2007 showed his readiness to legalize the same by paying a fine but Defendant Nos.2 and 3 ordered a final notice of demolition dated 25-10-2007 calling upon the Defendant to demolish the said illegal construction within a period of fifteen days against which the Defendant filed an appeal before the Additional Director of Panchayats and who has stayed the operation of the Order dated 25-10-2007. It is informed that the said appeal is still pending before the said Additional Director of Panchayats. 7. The learned trial Court framed two issues. It is informed that the said appeal is still pending before the said Additional Director of Panchayats. 7. The learned trial Court framed two issues. The first was whether the Plaintiff proves that the Plaintiff was the co-owner of the suit property, and the second was whether the Plaintiff proves that the Defendant carried out the illegal construction of a RCC structure. The Plaintiff examined herself in support of her case and Architect Shri Bhobe who had carried out an inspection of the suit structure and submitted his report. The Defendant examined himself, and upon considering the evidence produced by both the parties the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the first issue was not proved by the Plaintiff and as regards the second issue the learned trial Court held that no finding was required to be given since the Plaintiff had failed to prove the first issue. 8. The Plaintiff filed an application dated 19-7-2008 to produce and rely upon the birth certificate of the Plaintiff. There is no dispute that the said birth certificate shows that the Plaintiff is the maternal grand daughter of the said Adriano and of Maria Rosa da Janeiro Lobo. The said birth certificate of the Plaintiff admittedly was produced by the Plaintiff in the suit but was not tendered in evidence when the Plaintiff was examined before the learned trial Court on 26-2-2008. 9. Shri J. E. Coelho Pereira, learned Senior Counsel has conceded, and in my view rightly and fairly that the Plaintiff would not adhere to the averments of the application dated 19-7-2008 but it is his contention that the said birth certificate ought to be looked into by this Court in terms of clause (b) of Rule 27, of Order 41, C.P.C. and in any event it will assist the Court to pronounce a Judgment in terms of the said sub-clause. The Plaintiff in addition to the certificate of inscription and description of the suit property in favour of the said Adriano, also relied upon a Will dated 2-12-1993 made by the Plaintiff's aunty Alda Menezes in favour of the Plaintiff and the finding given by the learned trial Court, regarding which there is no dispute, is that the said Will is not in respect of the suit property nor there was anything to show that the said Alda Menezes was a heir of the said Adriano. 10. 10. The production of the birth certificate is strongly resisted by Shri V. R. Tamba, learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant submitting that the said Plaintiff has failed to show any good reason as to why the said birth certificate was not produced in the trial Court. Both the learned Counsel on behalf of respective parties have relied on several decisions and both have also relied on the case of K. R. Mohan Reddy v. M/s. Net Work INC.( AIR 2008 SC 579 ). 11. Before going to the case law, it must be observed that the learned trial Court decided the first issue against the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff had not produced any document to show that she was in fact the grand daughter of the said Adriano and also because there was no suggestion put to the Defendant that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of the said Adriano. Shri Coelho Pereira, learned Senior Counsel, on behalf of the Plaintiff submits that the Plaintiff had averred in para 5 of the plaint that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of the said Adriano and was the co-owner of the property which was not partitioned. He further submits that in the affidavit in evidence of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had again stated in para 5 that she was the grand daughter of the said Adriano and as such was the co-owner of the property which was not partitioned. He further submits that the Plaintiff therefore had made a categorical statement both in the pleadings and the evidence that she was the grand daughter of the said Adriano and the co-owner of the suit property and the Defendant had not put any suggestion to the contrary and as such the learned trial Court had no other option but to accept the evidence of the Plaintiff and hold that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of the said Adriano and as such was the co-owner of the property. I am entirely in agreement with the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel. This is a case where the Plaintiff had clearly pleaded in para 5 of the plaint and consistently stated in the affidavit in evidence that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of late Adriano and was co-owner of the property. I am entirely in agreement with the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel. This is a case where the Plaintiff had clearly pleaded in para 5 of the plaint and consistently stated in the affidavit in evidence that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of late Adriano and was co-owner of the property. The Defendant when given an opportunity to cross-examine the Plaintiff chose not to cross-examine the Plaintiff, and, Shri Tamba, learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant submits that there was nothing in the evidence of the Plaintiff which required the Defendant to cross-examine the Plaintiff. Opportunity was also given to Defendant Nos.2 and 3 to cross-examine the Plaintiff and the only suggestion put to the Plaintiff on behalf of Defendant Nos.2 and 3 was that the contents of paras 7, 18 and 20 of the Plaintiff's affidavit were false, which, in the submission of Shri Coelho Pereira is that the said Defendants had accepted the other statements made on oath by the Plaintiff in the said affidavit as correct. In my view, the learned trial Court ought to have concluded that the Plaintiff was the co-owner of the suit property, the Plaintiff having been the maternal grand daughter of the said Adriano. The Plaintiff had pleaded the said fact and had proved the same by her own evidence. There was no contrary suggestion put to the Plaintiff by the Defendant that the Plaintiff was not the grand daughter of the said Adriano or the co-owner of the suit property and in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary there was no other option for the trial Court but to accept the unchallenged evidence of the Plaintiff and based on the pleadings and the evidence led by her, conclude that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of the said Adriano and after his death had become the co-owner of the property. In the absence of any cross-examination on the part of the Defendant there was no need for the Plaintiff to have put any suggestion to the Defendant to the effect that the Plaintiff was the grand daughter of the said Adriano. In this view of the matter alone, Issue No.1 ought to have been decided in favour of the Plaintiff, by the learned trial Court. 12. In this view of the matter alone, Issue No.1 ought to have been decided in favour of the Plaintiff, by the learned trial Court. 12. As already stated, the birth certificate now produced by the Plaintiff shows that the Plaintiff is the maternal grand daughter of the said Adriano. The said birth certificate is a public document and can be relied upon in support of the facts stated therein. It is undisputed that the said certificate produced before this Court was taken from the records of the trial Court and produced before this Court as stated by Shri Tamba, learned Counsel on behalf of the Defendant. Shri Coelho Pereira has not been able to give any answer as to why the said birth certificate of the Plaintiff was not tendered in evidence before the trial Court. 13. Production of additional evidence before the appellate Court is dealt with by the provisions of clauses (a)(aa) and (b) of Rule 27 of Order 41, C.P.C. and there can be no dispute that there are three situations, which are different from one another, in which additional documents can be produced. Additional documents can be produced when (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or (aa) the parties seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the existence of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence be produced by him, at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witnesses to be examined to enable it to pronounce Judgment, or for any other substantial cause. Sub-Section(2) of Rule 27 aforesaid also requires the Court to record reasons for its admission. It is therefore clear that Rule 27 of Order 41, has three limbs. 14. The observation that a good reason must be shown why evidence was not produced in the trial Court, in my view, could apply only in case of clause (aa) and not to clause(b) of Rule 27 of Order 41, C.P.C. The Plaintiff has pitched her case on sub-clause(b) alone. 14. The observation that a good reason must be shown why evidence was not produced in the trial Court, in my view, could apply only in case of clause (aa) and not to clause(b) of Rule 27 of Order 41, C.P.C. The Plaintiff has pitched her case on sub-clause(b) alone. The requirement under sub-clause(b) is that of the Court and must be confined to those cases where it is found necessary to obtain such evidence for pronouncing judgment but certainly not to fill any lacunae in the case of the Plaintiff or for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in particular way in favour of the Plaintiff. The submission that the provision of sub-clause (b) cannot be used at the instance of the Plaintiff needs to be rejected. It is always open to the Plaintiff to bring to the notice of the Court its powers and submit that circumstances justify the use of such power. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and others ( AIR 1963 SC 1526 ) was considering a case where two admission registers relating to the High School for the relevant period were in fact summoned and were produced before the Tribunal but the said registers were not proved and marked as exhibits and in fact it appears that both the parties had sought for their summoning, and the High Court had directed proof of those documents before the Election Tribunal, and, the Apex Court observed that it was clear to them that the High Court had thought, on a consideration of the evidence, in the light of the arguments, that had been addressed already before it that it would assist them to arrive at the truth on the question of Seetharam Reddy's age if the entries in the admission registers of the school were made available. It was urged before the Apex Court that there was such a volume of evidence before the High Court that it could not be seriously suggested that the Court required any additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” and the Apex Court observed that “the requirement, it has to be remembered , was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right for them to examine the evidence to find out whether they would have required such additional evidence to enable them to pronounce Judgment. The Apex Court further observed that “apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce Judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”. The Apex Court further observed that there may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce Judgment on the state of the record as it is, and, so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce Judgment”, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence “for any other substantial cause” under Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code. Referring to Sub-Rule(2) of Rule 27, the Apex Court noted that its object was to keep a clear record of what weighed with the appellate Court in allowing the additional evidence to be produced – whether it was done on the ground (i) that the Court appealed from had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, (ii) it allowed it because it required it to enable it to pronounce judgment in the appeal or (iii) it allowed this for any other substantial cause. Since where a further appeal lies from the decision of the appellate Court such recording of the reasons is necessary and also useful to the Court for further appeal for deciding whether the discretion under the rule has been judicially exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect but even so, the provision is not mandatory and the omission of the High Court to record reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate such admission and the word “shall” be used in Rule 27(2) does not make it mandatory. 15. The omission to record the reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect but even so, the provision is not mandatory and the omission of the High Court to record reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate such admission and the word “shall” be used in Rule 27(2) does not make it mandatory. 15. Again, in the case of K.R. Mohan Reddy v. M/s. Net Work INC (supra) the Apex Court referring to clause(b) of sub-rule(1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 observed that if the said clause was to be taken recourse to, the appellate Court is bound to consider the entire evidence on record and come to an independent finding for arriving at a just decision; adduction of additional evidence as is prayed by the appellant is necessary. This was a case where an application was filed to produce Additional documents in terms of clauses (aa) of sub-rule(1) of Order 41, C.P.C. and the High Court had allowed it observing that additional evidence should be allowed, the same being a requirement of Court and/or was otherwise for substantial cause. The said Order of the High Court was set aside and the case was remanded for a fresh decision. The Court also referred to its earlier case of State of Gujarat and another v. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desa ( (2006) 9 SCC 772 ) and observed that though the appellate Court has power for a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C., the requirement of the Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment but this provision did not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. The Apex Court also observed that the appellate Court should not pass an order so as to patch the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial Court but it will be different if the Court itself requires the evidence to do justice between the parties. The ability to pronounce judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce judgment satisfactorily to the mind of the Court. The ability to pronounce judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce judgment satisfactorily to the mind of the Court. In State of Gujarat and another v. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai (supra) the Apex Court upheld the order of the High Court rejecting an application under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) as the appellants had sufficient opportunity to bring the evidence on record and for best reasons known to the appellant, the appellant/State had not produced the entire evidence before the trial Court and only after 8 years after the dismissal of the suit that the applications were filed for adducing additional evidence in the appeal. 16. In the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. and others ( 2004(1) Bom.C.R. 479 ) a Division Bench of this Court after referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench referred to herein above allowed additional documents to be produced observing that “it would be desirable that the Respondents are permitted to produce these documents so that the entire material with respect to the prayers in the motion is before the Court and the Court can pronounce the judgment in a more satisfactory manner and no obscure elements remain. 17. In Mrs. Indira B. Gokhale v. Union of India (AIR 1990 Bombay 98) this Court observed that Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. is not to be taken recourse to merely because a party at the stage of appeal finds that some material which could have tilted the decision in its favour has not been produced but should have been. In my view, the facts of the case at hand are very close to the facts of the case decided by the Constitution Bench. There, the admission registers were summoned but remained without being proved or exhibited and therefore opportunity was given to prove the same. Here, the Plaintiff's birth certificate was produced on record of the case but remained without being tendered in evidence. It required no further proof as it was a public document. Since the birth certificate of the plaintiff was already produced by the Plaintiff in the trial Court but was not tendered in evidence the said birth certificate can be considered in the interest of justice to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner. The said birth certificate is a documentary proof that the Plaintiff is the grand daughter of the said Adriano. The said birth certificate is a documentary proof that the Plaintiff is the grand daughter of the said Adriano. It gives greater clarity to the oral evidence of the Plaintiff. 18. Coming to the second issue, the said structure is admittedly not shown on the survey plan and was under construction at the time when Plaintiff's witness Architect S. N. Bhobe inspected the same on 31-8-2007. The inference is that it was not in existence at the time of preparation of survey plan. He has given the dimensions of the structure as 11 x 7.8 meters and its area as 92 sq. meters, and according to him, the first coat of internal cement plaster was in progress and some grills for window frames were fixed. The structure had a basement and a ground storey, the plot being slopy. The Plaintiff produced various documents to support her case including the demolition notice dated 25-10-2007 which shows that the suit structure is of recent origin and as stated by the Plaintiff was constructed by the Defendant around May, 2007. Whether the said structure is constructed in accordance with Building Laws or not is a matter which will be examined now by the Deputy Director of Panchayats i.e. Respondent No.5. The Defendant in his cross-examination admitted that his name nor that of his father appeared in Form Nos. I and XIV of Survey No.74/2 and that on the plan of Survey No.74/1 and 2 the only house shown was their mundkarial house. He also admitted that the portion shaded in red shown in Survey No.74/2 was the house under construction which was the suit structure and further admitted that in survey plan of Survey No.74/2 no house was seen existing. He also admitted that he had not made any application at any time to the Survey Authorities to correct the survey records and show the suit structure in Survey No.74/2. The Defendant also admitted that he had not taken any permission from the Village Panchayat or from any other Department for constructing the house in Survey No.74/2. The Defendant admitted having received the said notice dated 25-10-2007 of the Village Panchayat. On further cross-examination, he stated that the suit structure was a cow shed and also admitted that his statement in his affidavit, that it was a cow shed, was a true statement. The Defendant admitted having received the said notice dated 25-10-2007 of the Village Panchayat. On further cross-examination, he stated that the suit structure was a cow shed and also admitted that his statement in his affidavit, that it was a cow shed, was a true statement. At the same time, he admitted that his statement in the Memo of Appeal that it was used for business activity is also correct. He denied the suggestion that there was no structure in Survey No.74/2 which was used as a cow shed or for business activity, by them. The Defendant did not examine any witness in support of his case as regards the existence of the suit structure. Shri Tamba submits that illegality of the structure could have been proved by the Plaintiff by examining any of Respondent-authorities. This submission cannot be accepted. There was no need for the Plaintiff to have examined either of the Defendant Nos.2 to 6 to show that the Defendant's suit structure was illegal. The absence of the suit structure on the survey plan, the evidence of the Plaintiff coupled with that of her expert Shri Bhobe and the demolition notice abundantly proves that the suit structure was of recent origin and was under construction when it was inspected by Shri Bhobe. The Defendant admitted that it was done without the permission of the Panchayat and it is not the case of Defendant that it was done with the consent of the Plaintiff who was a co-owner of the property or any other co-owner. Once, it is held that the Plaintiff is the co-owner of the property and the structure was being constructed without the consent of the Plaintiff, the Defendant could not be allowed to have his structure in the property of the Plaintiff. The learned trial Court ought to have answered the second issue in favour of the Plaintiff. In fact, it was expected of the learned trial Court to have given a finding on the said issue, as a Court is expected to give a finding, on all issues in terms of Rule 1 of Order 14, C.P.C. The Plaintiff had proved her title to the suit property namely that she was a co-owner of it. The Defendant had failed to prove, the plea set up by him or any right in his favour to construct on the land of another. The Defendant had failed to prove, the plea set up by him or any right in his favour to construct on the land of another. Once title was proved by the Plaintiff, the demolition had to follow. The principle that the weakness of Defendant's case, cannot strengthen the case of Plaintiff, has no application to the facts of this case. 19. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal deserves to succeed. The impugned Judgment and Order dated 8-7-2008 in Civil Suit No.59/2007 is hereby set aside and the suit filed by the Plaintiff is hereby decreed in terms of prayers (A), (B) and (C) of the plaint, with costs against the Defendant and in favour of the Plaintiff, throughout. It is made clear that this Judgment will not come in the way of Respondent Nos.2 to 6 in taking appropriate action in accordance with law pursuant to demolition order already passed against the Defendant by the Village Panchayat.