JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 27.4.1998 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Shahdol (Camp Beohari) in Civil Suit No. 8A/97, whereby the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Brief facts of the case are that an area of 1.537 hectare (3.80 acres) of Khasra No. 684 and 1.886 hectare (4.66 acres) of Khasra No. 686 situated at Village Vansukli, Tahsil Jaising Nagar of District Shahdol was Patta land of Bharosa and Dadan, sons of Charni. Ex. P-6 is Patta of Khasra No. 684 and 686, by which their names have been recorded as Bhumiswami over the said land. Appellant Rammilan is son of Bharosa. On 2.10.1975, the land was mutated in the name of Bharosa and Khillu S/o Dadan. As per the averments made in the plaint, the father of appellant Bharosa died somewhere in 1980. After the death of Bharosa, the land was divided in two shares. Half share had gone to the appellant and half share had gone to Khillu S/o Dadan. It is alleged that the partition between Bharosa and Dadan had taken place some 30 years back prior to the date of institution of the suit. Appellant's father Bharosa settled at Village Bhalu Mahuatola, Mauja Vansukli and Patta over an area of one acre in Khasra No. 685/1 and two acres in Khasra No. 770/2 was granted to him. He constructed his house and well over an area of one acre of Khasra No. 685/1. 3. The appellant filed a suit for declaration to declare him as the owner and title holder in respect of half portion of Khasra No. 684, area 4.66 acres and 4.66 acres of Khasra 686 and 0.30 acres of Khasra No. 685/1 alongwith house and well as per the plaint map (Schedule A) on the ground that sale deed dated 17.8.1977 (Ex. D-1) executed by his father Bharosa in favour of respondent No.2 Mahanta and one Shyamlal for a consideration of Rs.1,500/- be declared as void and ineffective on the allegations that the appellant's father deceased Bharosa was Bhumiswarni and after his death, the appellant-plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the said suit land. D-1) executed by his father Bharosa in favour of respondent No.2 Mahanta and one Shyamlal for a consideration of Rs.1,500/- be declared as void and ineffective on the allegations that the appellant's father deceased Bharosa was Bhumiswarni and after his death, the appellant-plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the said suit land. The appellant is "Panika" by caste, which is Aboriginal Tribe as per the Notification issued under section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter for short referred to as "the Code"). The respondent No.2 - Mahanta and Shyamlal are Scheduled Caste (Harijan) not included in the list of aboriginal tribes and suit land has been illegally usurped by them. The transfer has been made in contravention of section 165 (6) of the Code. The sale deed executed on 17.8.1997 in favour of defendant No.2 and Shyamlal is void ab initio as the same was executed without obtaining prior permission from Collector Shahdol and he be declared as the owner and title holder over the suit property and possession taken by the defendant be ordered to be restored. The appellant also prayed for mesne profit @ Rs.1,000/- per annum. 4. The defendants No.2, 4 to 8, filed their joint written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint. In Para 1, they admitted that they are Harijan by Caste. In Para 4, they admitted that the plaintiff is aboriginal. In Para 6 and 22, they admitted that Bharosa and Dadan were Bhumiswami of Khasra Numbers 684 and 686 and contended that Bharosa during the lifetime executed the sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 and Shyamlal. In Para 7, it is contended that Bharosa died in the year 1980. It is also contended that the defendant No. l-Khillu alias Raghunath filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer under section 170 (B) of the Code, which was dismissed on 29.8.1989. Thereafter, they filed a revision before the Collector vide Revision No. 11/90-91, which was also dismissed vide order dated 22.12.1992 on the ground that under section 170 (B) of the Code, the Revenue Officers are having jurisdiction to examine the matter and inquiry was made by the SDO and after inquiry, the SDO vide order dated 30.11.1984 rejected the application and therefore the second application will be hit by the principle of res judicata and dismissed the same. They also admitted the execution of sale deed dated 17.8.1977 in respect of an area of 3.423 hectares (8.46 acres) of Khasra Nos. 684 and 686 by Bharosa, the father of the appellant, in favour of defendant No.2 and Shyamlal. It is also contended that Shyamlal died somewhere in 1996, but he was not impleaded nor his legal heirs were brought on record and therefore the suit abates against Shyamlal. 5. Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the defendants No.2, 4 to 8 are Harijan by caste. The father of the plaintiff Bharosa and Dadan are aboriginal tribe and earlier inquiry was held by the Revenue Authority on an application filed under section 170 (B) of the Code, in which the Revenue Officer rejected the application vide order dated 29.8.1989 (Ex. D-4) and revision against the said order was also dismissed on 22.12.1992 (Ex. D- 3). The present suit is not maintainable under section 257 (I-1) of the Code. It is also held that the suit property is ancestral property of appellant -plaintiff, which is evident from Ex. P-1, the Patta granted in favour of Bharosa and Dadan. The trial Court also held that the sale deed was executed in favour of defendant No.2 and Shyamlal, but Shyamlal died during the pendency of the suit and he was not impleaded in the suit nor his legal heirs were brought on record and therefore the suit in respect of the share of Shyamlal would abate and the appellant-plaintiff is not entitled for any relief in respect of the half share of Shyamlal. In respect of the share of defendant No.2, it has been held that the suit is barred under section 257 (I-1) of the Code and therefore the validity of the sale deed cannot be examined by this Court. With the above finding, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellant. 6. By the Notification No. 3818-2050-70-71-VII-N-1, dated 8.12.1971 published in the M.P. Rajpatra dated 17.12.1971, Entry No. 39 has been omitted and it has been declared that the tribe "Panika" shall be an aboriginal tribe for the Districts Datia, Tikamgarh, Chhatarpur, Panna, Satna, Rewa, Shivpuriand Shahdol. It is also not disputed by the respondents No.2, 4 to 8 that "Panika" is an aboriginal tribe and the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are "Panika" by caste and they are aboriginal tribes. It is also not disputed by the respondents No.2, 4 to 8 that "Panika" is an aboriginal tribe and the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are "Panika" by caste and they are aboriginal tribes. Contesting respondents in their written statement very specifically admitted that they are Harijan by caste, which is Scheduled Caste. It is also not in dispute that no prior permission from the Collector was obtained and the sale deed is in contravention of subsection (6) of section 165 of the Code, the sale becomes void. The father of the appellant Bharosa and Dadan, who are real brothers, cannot transfer their land without prior permission of the Collector. On 17.8.1977 (Ex. D-1), transfer was made without the said permission. So the respondent No.2 Mahanta and Shyamlal will not get any legal rights because the sale deed executed on 17.8.1977 was in contravention of the provisions of section 165 of the Code and is void. It is also not in dispute that Patta over an area of8.46 acres of Khasra Nos. 684 and 686 was granted to Bharosa and Dadan belonging to Scheduled Tribe. The Code takes care of their economic interests, protection from social injustice and exploitation of the members belonging to the Schedule Tribes. 7. Section 170 of the Code provides for avoidance of transfer in contravention of section 165 of the Code. Under section 170 of the Code, where possession is transferred by a Bhumiswami in pursuance of a transfer which is in contravention of sub-section (6) of section 165 any person, who, if he survived the Bhumiswami without nearer heirs would inherit the holding, may apply to the Sub-Divisional Officer to be placed in possession subject so far as the Sub-Divisional Officer may, in accordance with the rules made in this behalf determine to his acceptance of the liabilities for arrears of land revenue or any other dues which form a charge on the holding, and the Sub-Divisional Officer shall dispose of such application in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed. 8. 8. Subsequently, by way of an Amendment Act No. 61 of 1976 (29.11.1976), section 170-A was inserted in the M.P. Land Revenue Code which empowers the SDO who, notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (No. 36 of 1963), may, on his own motion or on an application made by a transferrer of agricultural land belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of section 165 on or before the 31st December, 1978, inquire into a transfer effected by way of sale, or in pursuance of a decree of a Court of such land to a person not belonging to such tribe or transfer effected by way of accrual of right of occupancy tenant under section 169 at any time during the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Third Amendment) Act, 1976, to satisfy himself as to the bonafide nature of such transfer. If the SDO comes to a conclusion on an inquiry after giving a reasonable opportunity to the persons owning any interest in such land, that such transfer was not bonafide, he may set aside such transfer if made by a holder belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an oboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of section 165 and restore the land. 9. The provisions of section 170-A are enacted only to declare invalid those transactions which were invalid from the outset and had not conveyed any title to the non-tribal transferee. These provisions enabled declaration as nullity of transactions which were nullity from inception being unconscionable transactions between unequals in which the consent and the contract resulting in the transfer was void on account of absence of the essentials to make a valid contract. 10. The provision of section 170-A is attracted only when transfers are effected between the period commencing on 2.10.1959 and ending on 29th November, 1976. 11. The object behind these provisions is to provide social justice to members of the aboriginal tribe who are socially and economically backward and who are not able to look after their own interest. Their backwardness makes them an easy pray for others. They are ignorant of the laws made in their favour and cannot on their own, take recouse to legal proceedings for enforcing their rights. Their backwardness makes them an easy pray for others. They are ignorant of the laws made in their favour and cannot on their own, take recouse to legal proceedings for enforcing their rights. Thus, a suo motu action has been provided and the purchaser has to report the transfer if he wants to save the transaction. The burden of proof has been placed on the transferee. If the SDO finds that the transfer is not bonafide, he may take action under clause (a) and (b) of section 170A section 170B of the Code. 12. Section 170B of the Code provides for the reversion of land of members of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud. This provision has been inserted by M.P. Amendment Act No. 15 of 1980 (24.10.1980). By this similar provision, further rights of aboriginal tribes are protected who have been declared so under sub-section (6) of section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of the commencement of Amendment Act, 1980. Any person who is in possession of the agricultural land which belonged to a member of a scheduled tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe, shall, within two years of such commencement, notify to the SDO in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land. If any person fails to notify the information, it shall be presun1ed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the agricultura1land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid, revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs. Sub-section (3) of section 170B provides that on receipt of the information under sub-section (1), the SDO shall makes such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right, he shall declare the transaction null and void and pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferrer and, if he is dead, in his legal heirs. 13. The provision of section 257 (I-I) reads thus : "257. 13. The provision of section 257 (I-I) reads thus : "257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities -- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters : xxx xxx xxx (I-1) any matter covered under section 170-B." It entails special bar on the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a dispute which requires to be decided by the SDO U/S 170-B of the Code. 14. The apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, (2000) 3 SCC 689 has considered to what extent in a provision of exclusive jurisdiction any interference can be made by civil Court, wherein the decision of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [1968 RN 683] has been noticed. Para 5 of the said decision, which is relevant, reads thus : "5. The normal rule of law is that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of MP., it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." Their Lordships in the aforesaid case, held that the question whether the property is charitable or religious endowment is concluded by the order of Deputy Commissioner u/s 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and could not be questioned before the civil Court except on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner had acted contrary to the provisions of the Act or not having followed the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The order passed by the Deputy Commissioner could have been challenged as provided for under the Act. Hence, the order passed by the authority under special jurisdiction was held to be conclusive and final. 15. The scheme of the M.P. Land Revenue Code shows that jurisdiction of civil Court in examining and adjudicating upon the question of title is not taken away by section 257 of the Code. The present suit is one based on title. The civil Court has got jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to try all suites depends upon the allegations of the plaint and not upon what ultimately we found to be true. In the present case, according to the plaint allegations as shown above, the suit is based on title on the ground that the suit property is ancestral property of the appellant. The jurisdiction of the civil Court to try all suites depends upon the allegations of the plaint and not upon what ultimately we found to be true. In the present case, according to the plaint allegations as shown above, the suit is based on title on the ground that the suit property is ancestral property of the appellant. The appellant had obtained the suit property by survivorship after the death of his father and the suit property was the ancestral property and therefore could not be alienated by his father without prior permission of the Collector in violation to the provisions of section 165 of the Code. The appellant also challenged the sale deed on the ground that it is a forged document and does not bear the signatures of Bharosa and Dadan and they were not having any right to alienate the property. The sale deed was executed without any legal necessity and was without consideration and therefore the deed be declared as null and void. 16. Here in the present case, that suit was based on title on the ground that the suit property was ancestral property and the appellant is one of the co-sharer and the sale deed executed by his father, one of the coparcener without any legal necessity is void and therefore I am of the considered view that the jurisdiction of the civil Court in examining and adjudicating upon the question of title is not taken away by section 257 of the Code. The finding of the trial Court that the suit is barred is unsustainable and is therefore set aside by holding that the suit was maintainable before the civil Court. 17. Considering the facts as narrated hereinabove, the suit land was Patta land of Bharosa and Dadan sons of Charni and it is not the ancestral property of Charni, the grandfather of the appellant and therefore it cannot be said that it is an ancestral property and the plaintiff-appellant is one of the coparcener and Bharosa and Dadan had no right to alienate the coparcenery undivided interest without the consent of the appellant because the suit property was self-acquired property of Bharosa and Dadan and alienation. made by Bharosa and Dadan, without the consent of the plaintiff and without any legal necessity, the same cannot be held to be void and ineffective. made by Bharosa and Dadan, without the consent of the plaintiff and without any legal necessity, the same cannot be held to be void and ineffective. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandra Babu [ 1990 JLJ 569 ] and Bhagwandas v. State of M.P. and another, 2001 (1) MPU 248 will not be applicable in the present facts and circumstances 0 the case. 18. The land in question belongs to an aboriginal tribe. The sale deed dated 17.8.1977 by a member of aboriginal tribe in favour of non-aboriginal tribe without permission of the Collector as required under section 165 (6) 0 the Code, is void ab initio. The sale was in contravention of the provisions of section 165 (6) of the Code and is void ab initio. In the circumstances, the order of the SDO dated 29.8.1989 (Ex. D-4) and the order of Collector dated 22.12.1992 (Ex. D-4) are liable to be set aside and are hereby set aside. 19. For the abovementioned reasons, the impugned judgment and the decree passed by the trial Court is set aside. The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed with costs throughout. Counsel's fees Rs.3,000/-, if pre-certified.