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2009 DIGILAW 692 (GUJ)

Bhagabhai Merakhbhai Deceased Thro Heirs Kanjibhai Bhagabhai v. Prabodh Prahladbhai Patel

2009-11-02

K.A.PUJ

body2009
Judgment K.A. Puj, J.—The appellant / ori. plaintiff has filed Appeal From Order No. 215 of 2009 under Order-43, Rule-1 of Civil Procedure Code challenging the order passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara below an Application Ex.5 in Special Civil Suit No. 38 of 2009 whereby the injunction application filed by the appellant / ori. plaintiff was rejected. 2. The appellant / ori. plaintiff has also filed Appeal From Order No. 216 of 2009 challenging the order passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara in Special Civil Suit No. 38 of 2009 rejecting application moved by the appellant / ori. plaintiff under Order-39, Rule-2A of the Civil Procedure Code on 22.5.2009. 3. This Court has passed an order on 29.6.2009 recording the consent of learned advocates appearing for the respective parties to adjourn the matter on 20.7.2009 and in the meantime directing the respective parties to maintain status-quo as on that day without further entering into the merits of the case. Even on 20.7.2009 the Court has adjourned the matter at the request of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent and status-quo order was continued. This order of status-quo is continued till the matter is finally heard by the Court. 4. Heard Mr. B.S. Patel, learned Advocate appearing with Mr. Chirag B. Patel for the appellant and Mr. S.B. Vakil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. D.D. Vyas, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Dhaval D. Vyas for Respondent No. 6 in both these Appeals From Order. 5. It is the case of the appellant / ori. plaintiff that the appellant is belonging to shepherd community and residing at Vadodara carrying on agricultural activities and animal husbandry business at Vadodara. The Appeal From Order No. 215 of 2009 pertains to the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 995 admeasuring 1 Acre 32 Are and 52 Sq.Mtrs. The Town Planning Scheme has been declared and not it has been given Final Plot No. 109 admeasruing 7750 Sq.Mtrs., and Final Plot No. 538 admeasuring 1285 Sq.Mtrs. Deceased father of the appellant was cultivating the land and in the record of right, his name has been introduced as a tenant since 1954-55. The Town Planning Scheme has been declared and not it has been given Final Plot No. 109 admeasruing 7750 Sq.Mtrs., and Final Plot No. 538 admeasuring 1285 Sq.Mtrs. Deceased father of the appellant was cultivating the land and in the record of right, his name has been introduced as a tenant since 1954-55. Even on the tillers day i.e. on 1.4.1957 name of deceased Bhagabhai Merakhbhai had been reflected in the record of right noting down ‘dan’ paid by him to the owner of the land to the extent of Rs. 48/-. Hence, because of enactment of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 the father of the appellant became deemed purchaser of the land and the said tenancy right has not been terminated by any of the competent authorities under the tenancy Act till the filing of the present Appeal From Order before this Court. 6. As per the stand of the appellant, the checkered history of the case is that deceased Prabodh Khusaldas was the owner of the land who had purchased the land from the trust and he had initiated the proceedings under Section70-b of the Tenancy Act. Before completion of the proceedings, he had expired and the Respondent No. 1 being the heir continued the proceedings. The owner of the land approached the learned Agricultural Lands tribunal and Mamlatdar, Vadodara by submitting the application under Section 70-b bearing Tenancy Case No. 5983 of 1988. The said proceedings were for two lands, one land bearing Revenue Survey No. 970 admeasruing 0 Acre, 90 Gunthas and Revenue Survey No. 995 admeasruing 3 Acres, 10 Gunthas in the sim of Village : Bapod, Taluka, District : Vadodara. The deceased father of the appellant had also been made party as a tenant. The learned Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Vadodara by order dated 19.6.1988 held that the names of deceased Bhagabhai Merakhbhai and one Laxmidas Narottam have been wrongly reflected in the record of rights as tenants and the application submitted by the owner of the land i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Respondent No. 4 as power of attorney holder of the Respondent No. 3 had been allowed by order dated 29.6.1988. 7. The Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Vadodara took the proceedings of Tenancy Case No. 5983 of 1988 in suo motu revision exercising the powers under Section 76-A of the Tenancy Act. 1 to 3 and Respondent No. 4 as power of attorney holder of the Respondent No. 3 had been allowed by order dated 29.6.1988. 7. The Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Vadodara took the proceedings of Tenancy Case No. 5983 of 1988 in suo motu revision exercising the powers under Section 76-A of the Tenancy Act. After considering the record, legality and propreity of the proceedings, the Deputy Collector held that, except the land which has been converted for N.A. purpose, the Mamlatdar has to proceed under the Tenancy Act and if the tenant is not prepared to purchase the land, necessary proceedings are required to be initiated under Section 32(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act. The said order has been passed by the Deputy Collector (Land reforms) Vadodara on 30.6.1990. 8. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Deputy Collector, the Respondents No. 1 to 5 preferred Revision Application bearing Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.641 of 1990 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad. The Tribunal by judgment and order dated 21.7.2007 dismissed the Revision Application on the ground of non-prosecution. Against the said order, the Respondents No. 1 to 5 preferred Restoration Application No. TEN.B.A.1 of 2008 on 17.6.2008. After considering the facts of the case, the Tribunal vide its order dated 17.6.2008 rejected the said Restoration Application. 9. It is the case of the appellant that after rejection of the Restoration Application on 17.6.2008 by the Tribunal, only with a view to over reach the process of law and by taking some influential persons in their hands, the Respondents No. 1 to 5 executed six registered sale deeds, the details of which are as under :— No. of registered document Date Amount 5984 20.6.2008 5211875=00 5985 20.6.2008 864170=00 6235 26.6.2008 432100=00 6236 26.6.2008 2605940=00 8976 30.9.2008 300000=00 8977 30.9.2008 1501000=00 Total Amount 10915085=00 10. All the above Sale Deeds had been executed with a view to defeat the proceedings initiated by the appellant. When the Revision Application before the Tribunal was pending, the learned Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal passed the order on 10.6.2002 directing the talati of Village : Bapod to draw panchnama for the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 995 in the sim of Village : Bapod. In pursuance of the same, the talati-cum-Secretary, Bapod drew the panchnama and it was found that the appellant is in possession of the property. In pursuance of the same, the talati-cum-Secretary, Bapod drew the panchnama and it was found that the appellant is in possession of the property. The appellant submitted that because of construction in the surrounding area for the last two to three years, the appellant has not cultivated the land, but the appellant was residing there. The registered sale deeds have been executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the Respondent No. 6. The sale deeds have been executed in the maiden name of the Respondent No. 6, while she has married to Ex-Mayor of Vadodara Municipal Corporation. 11. It is also the case of the appellant that when he came to know that the respondents are trying to snatch away the possession and to defeat the tenancy proceedings, the appellant approached the learned Principal Civil Judge, Senior Division, Vadodara by filing Special Civil Suit No. 38 of 2009 for cancellation of the sale deeds and also for permanent injunction as well as temporary injunction. Alongwith the suit, the appellant submitted Application Ex.5 for temporary injunction. Though the learned Civil Judge has initially granted ad-interim stay in the form of status-quo qua the possession on 20.1.2009 the injunction application Ex.5 was ultimately rejected on 22.5.2009 and it is this order which is under challenge in the Appeal From Order No. 215 of 2009. 12. When the ad-interim-stay was granted by the learned trial Judge in the form of status-quo qua possession on 20.1.2009 and notice was issued to the respondents they appeared before the learned Trial Judge and raised the contention that they were not aware about the death of the father of the appellant who expired on 27.7.1986. Despite there being ad-interim-stay the Respondent No. 6 after purchase of the property in question tried to put up compound wall. The appellant was, therefore, constrained to file application under Order-39, Rule 2-A of the Civil Procedure Code for breach of the order passed by the learned trial Judge and the learned Trial Judge passed another order restraining the respondent from disturbing the status-quo. However, the said application was also rejected by the learned Trial Judge on 22.5.2009 and it is this order which is under challenge in Appeal From Order No. 216 of 2009. 13. Mr. However, the said application was also rejected by the learned Trial Judge on 22.5.2009 and it is this order which is under challenge in Appeal From Order No. 216 of 2009. 13. Mr. B. S. Patel, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has seriously erred in not considering the mischief played by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 i.e. execution of the sale deeds within number of days from the date of the rejection of the Restoration Application dated 17.6.2008 by the Revenue Tribunal. He has further submitted that the appellant was the tenant and his interest is required to be protected under provisions of the Tenancy Act. He has further submitted that the Respondents No. 1 to 5 have submitted their application under Section 70-b of the Tenancy Act only in the year 1988. He has further submitted that the respondents have not filed any petition challenging the order of the Tribunal till 3.2.2009 and despite the fact that the deceased father of the appellant expired in the year 1986, in Special Civil Application filed before this Court, he was joined as a party respondent and order was obtained on the dead person. He has further submitted that the appellant has moved the review application before this Court which is still pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. It is further submitted that vital aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Trial Judge. The appellant was in possession in the year 2002 as per the panchnama drawn by Talati-cum-Secretary of Village : Bapod. He has further submitted that the tenancy rights of the appellant were yet to be decided by the Mamlatdar pursuant to the direction issued by the Dy. Collector which order has been confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal and yet the sale deeds were executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of Respondent No. 6 only with a view to frustrate the tenancy rights of the appellant. He has further submitted that the learned Trial Judge has ignored the settled principle of law to the effect that the contemners are not required to be heard before they purge the contempt. Here, in the present case instead of punishing the respondents they have been given premium by rejecting the injunction application of the appellant. He has further submitted that the learned Trial Judge has ignored the settled principle of law to the effect that the contemners are not required to be heard before they purge the contempt. Here, in the present case instead of punishing the respondents they have been given premium by rejecting the injunction application of the appellant. It is further submitted that despite there being documentary evidence in favour of the appellant the learned Trial Judge has rejected the injunction application without considering such documentary evidence produced by the appellant on record. Mr. Patel has, therefore, submitted that the order passed by the learned Trial Judge below an Application Ex.5 is required to be quashed and set aside and the order of status-quo which was granted earlier is required to be ordered to be restored during the pendency of the suit. He has also submitted that since the respondents have committed breach of the order of the Court they are to be punished accordingly. 14. Mr. D.D. Vyas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 6, on the other hand, strongly objected to this Appeal From Order. The Respondent No. 6 has filed a detailed affidavit-in-reply to the Civil Application opposing to grant any interim relief in the Appeal From Order. Mr. Vyas first of all submitted that the appellant has deliberately suppressed many material facts in Special Civil Suit No. 38 of 2009. He has submitted that a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 274 of 1959 was filed by Fatehchand Motichand, one of the trustees of Bai Jekor widow of Valabhram Ramchand against Bharwad Bhaga Merakh (father of the appellant) and Bharwad Vagha Vajekaran for possession of Revenue Survey No. 82, 995, 976 and 977 which included the suit land. The said suit came to be decreed and the trustee of the above referred trust also filed execution proceedings being Regular Darkhast No. 112 of 1961 and by virtue of the same, the possession of the suit land came to be taken by the Court Commissioner and handed over to the trustee of the trust. One Application No. 70 of 1961 was filed by the trustee of the aforesaid trust for obtaining permission under Section-36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 from the Charity Commissioner to sell the property, which was granted on 4.5.1961. One Application No. 70 of 1961 was filed by the trustee of the aforesaid trust for obtaining permission under Section-36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 from the Charity Commissioner to sell the property, which was granted on 4.5.1961. The sale deed came to be executed on 1.11.1961 in favour of one Prabhudas Khushalbhai Patel, who is father of Respondent No. 1 and hence by virtue of the said sale deed, the Respondents No. 1 to 5 / defendants became the owners of the suit property. 15. Mr. Vyas further submitted that proceedings under Section 32(1)(b) of Bombay Tenancy Act were initiated by the Mamlatdar & Krushi Panch, Vadodara. The appellant has also suppressed the fact that in 1988, the proceedings were initiated before the Mamlatdar’s Court wherein on 20.6.1988 the present appellant has given examination in chief wherein he has clearly stated that from 1955-57, he or his father were not in possession of the subject land. He has also stated that the father of the plaintiff had never cultivated the land and the plaintiff does not even know the original land owners. He has further stated that by an order, his father’s name was deleted from the revenue record, against which the plaintiff’s father has not filed any proceedings. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the appellant has also suppressed material fact before this Court as well as before the trial Court to the effect that once his father was dispossessed from the suit land in an execution proceedings No. 112 of 1961, then how the present appellant came into possession of the suit property is nowhere mentioned. He has, therefore, submitted that on the ground of suppression of material fact from the notice of this Court, the present Appeal From Order deserves to be dismissed. 16. Mr. Vyas has further submitted that the Respondent No. 6 is bona fide purchaser and has paid a huge consideration to the tune of more than Rs. 1 crore to the Respondents No. 1 to 5 and have got sale deeds executed from them. Hence, if any interim relief is granted, the same would affect her legal rights. He has further submitted that the sale deeds, which are executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6 are narrated in the form of table shown below Sr. 1 crore to the Respondents No. 1 to 5 and have got sale deeds executed from them. Hence, if any interim relief is granted, the same would affect her legal rights. He has further submitted that the sale deeds, which are executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6 are narrated in the form of table shown below Sr. Sale F. P. No. Admeasuring Amount of sale Date of No. Deed No. (Sq.Mtrs.) deed (in Rs.) sale deed 1 6236 109/P 1937.50 26,05.940 26.6.08 2 6235 538/P 321.25 4,31,100 26.6.08 3 5985 538/P 642.50 8,64,170 20.6.08 4 5984 109/P 3875 52,11,875 20.6.08 5 8976 583/P 321.25 3,00,000 30.9.08 6 8977 109/P 1937.50 15,01,000 30.9.08 17. He has further submitted that if the injunction is not granted to the present appellant, who admittedly is not and cannot be in possession of the suit land, the same would not cause any hardships to the appellant in as much as by virtue of decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 274 of 1959 and subsequently in Darkhast Application No. 112/1961, the possession of the suit land was taken from the father of the present appellant by the Civil Court and the trustee of the trust, namely, Fatehchand Motichand, one of the trustees of Bai Jekor widow of Valabhram Ramchand was put into possession of the suit land. It is nowhere mentioned by the appellant as to how after the possession was taken by Court Commissioner in the proceedings of Darkhast No. 112 of 1961, the appellant came back into possession of the suit land. 18. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the appellant is bound by admissions in the proceedings before the Mamlatdar, (which was first in time in the year 1988) and is estopped from taking a contrary stand as per the provisions of Section-115 of the Evidence Act. He has further submitted that in the proceedings before the Mamlatdar, the appellant had categorically stated that they were never in possession of the suit land. They are not the tenants of the suit land and that they had never cultivated the suit land. The said statement is recorded by the Mamlatdar on 20.6.1988. The appellant is estopped from taking any stand which is contrary to the above statement. 19. Mr. They are not the tenants of the suit land and that they had never cultivated the suit land. The said statement is recorded by the Mamlatdar on 20.6.1988. The appellant is estopped from taking any stand which is contrary to the above statement. 19. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the Revenue proceedings and the order which are placed on record by the appellant alongwith the Suit would not come to the rescue of the appellant as in none of the proceedings the present appellant has explained as to how the appellant came back into possession of the suit land once the possession was taken in the Regular Darkhast No. 112 of 1961. 20. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the appellant has filed present suit with malafide intention only with a view to harass the Respondent No. 6 and to extort money from her and that the suit is an abuse of process of the Court. The appellant has only prayed in the suit for cancellation of sale deeds executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6. The Respondents No. 1 to 5 who executed the sale deed in favour of the Respondent No. 6 have become owners of the suit land by virtue of registered sale deed dated 31.10.1961 executed by Fatehchand Motichand, one of the trustees of Bai Jekor widow of Valabhram Ramchand. The appellant had notice thereof. The appellant had not challenged the same or the title of any vendors. Any suit of the appellant challenging the sale deed dated 31.10.1961 became time barred. In an effort to get over the said bar, the appellant had not challenged the sale deed dated 31.10.1961 and confined the challenge to the sale deeds in favour of the Respondent No. 6. He has, therefore, submitted that what is challenged in the suit is the sale deed executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6. This is nothing but an intelligent attempt on the part of the appellant not to fall within the ambit of Limitation Act. He has further submitted that the appellant has slept over his right for almost 48 years and hence now it is not permissible to challenge the sale transaction which has been executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6. 21. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the Respondent No. 6 is lawful owner and in lawful possession of the suit land. He has further submitted that the appellant has slept over his right for almost 48 years and hence now it is not permissible to challenge the sale transaction which has been executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6. 21. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the Respondent No. 6 is lawful owner and in lawful possession of the suit land. Hence, as per the settled legal preposition of law no injunction can be granted against the lawful owner. In support of his submission he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Manumanthappa vs. Muninarayanappa. 22. Mr. Vyas further submitted that it is settled law that a person who claims to be in possession of the land is required to establish that he is in lawful possession, but in the present case, against the background of dispossession in a Court proceedings as far back as in 1961, the appellant has not uttered even a single word as to how he came into possession of the suit land even though the possession of the suit land was taken over by the Court Commissioner in the proceedings of Darkhast Application No. 112 of 1961 and handed over to Fatehchand Motichand, one of the trustees of the trust. 23. Mr. Vyas further submitted that the appellant does not fall within the definition of “deemed tenant”. Section-4 of the Tenancy Act defines the word ‘deemed tenant’ which says that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not (a) a member of the owner’s family, or (b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners, family, or (c) a mortgagee in possession. 24. Based on this definition Mr. Vyas submitted that the person should be lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another person but in the present case, the appellant himself has given statement before the Mamlatdar on 20.6.1988 that his father was neither a tenant nor was cultivating the suit land. 24. Based on this definition Mr. Vyas submitted that the person should be lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another person but in the present case, the appellant himself has given statement before the Mamlatdar on 20.6.1988 that his father was neither a tenant nor was cultivating the suit land. It is also admitted that since 1961 by virtue of sale deed executed by one trustee of the trust the Respondents No. 1 to 5 were in possession of the suit land till the sale deed came to be executed in favour of the Respondent No. 6 and hence the say of the appellant that he is the tenant of the suit land is false, incorrect and baseless. He has further submitted that even the say of the appellant that he is in possession of the suit land and he is tenant of the suit land get falsified from the act of the Mamlatdar, who has initiated the proceedings under Section 32(1)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act and the said proceedings can be initiated only if the tenant is not in possession of the suit land. It is, therefore, clearly established that the appellant who claims to be tenant and in possession of the suit land was not in fact in possession of the suit land. The appellant has failed to establish as to how he came into possession of the suit land after the proceedings were initiated by the Mamlatdar under Section 32(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act. 25. Considering all these submissions Mr. Vyas has strongly urged that the order passed by the learned trial Judge does not call for any interference and the Appeal From Order deserves to be dismissed with costs. 26. Mr. S.B. Vakil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents No. 1 and 2 - ori. owner of the land in question, has more or less adopted the arguments canvassed by Mr. Vyas, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 6 - purchaser. He has further submitted that the appellant has filed the Suit for cancellation of the sale deed executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the Respondent No. 6. owner of the land in question, has more or less adopted the arguments canvassed by Mr. Vyas, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 6 - purchaser. He has further submitted that the appellant has filed the Suit for cancellation of the sale deed executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the Respondent No. 6. However, the appellant has not prayed for cancellation of sale deed executed in favour of the father of the Respondent No. 1 by the original land owner after obtaining permission of the Charity Commissioner under Section-36 of the Bombay Public trust Act. He has further submitted that the original land owner has obtained decree in his favour and in the execution proceedings the possession was handed over by the Court Commissioner to the original owner. He has, therefore, submitted that the decree of the competent Civil Court which remains unchallenged till this date operates as res-judicata. He has further submitted that it is only because of the decree passed by the competent court the name of the deceased father of the appellant was deleted from the revenue record. Since the decree was passed in 1961 the name of the deceased father of the appellant was deleted from that year onwards. There is no question of deleting the previous entries from the revenue record and simply on that basis, the appellant cannot claim to be the deemed tenant as on the tillers date i.e. 1.4.1957. Even otherwise, the Bombay Tribunal has passed an order in Revision Application No. TEN/B/A/8191 dated 29.4.1959 wherein it is held that Bhagabhai Merakhbhai, deceased father of the appellant was not a tenant and he was a trespasser and hence the entry in revenue record treating him as a tenant was required to be deleted. He has further submitted that neither Bhagabhai Merakhbhai deceased father of the appellant nor the appellant has made any application from the date of their dispossession i.e. from 1961 till this date treating them as deemed purchaser. The deceased father of the appellant has expired in 1986. From 1961 to 1986 he has not moved any application and from 1986 onwards the appellant has also not made any such application till this date. The deceased father of the appellant has expired in 1986. From 1961 to 1986 he has not moved any application and from 1986 onwards the appellant has also not made any such application till this date. It is only for the first time in 2008 Civil Suit was filed by the appellant seeking cancellation of the sale deed executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the Respondent No. 6. Unless and until the original sale deed is challenged or it is cancelled by the competent Court, there is no question of cancellation of subsequent sale deed. He has, therefore, submitted that the learned Civil Judge has rightly rejected the injunction application and said order of the learned Civil Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. 27. Having heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties and having gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Civil Judge in light of the documents produced before the Court and the orders passed by the various authorities from time to time, the Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge while rejecting the injunction application moved by the appellant, does not call for any interference while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Order-43, Rule-1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no dispute about the fact that one of the trustees of Bai Jekor widow of Valabhram Ramchand Trust filed a Regular Civil Suit No. 274 of 1959 against late Bhagabhai Merakhbhai - deceased father of the appellant alogwith Bharwad Vagha Vajekaran for possession of Revenue Survey No. 82, 995, 976 and 977. The said suit came to be decreed in favour of the trust and in Regular Darkhast No. 112 of 1961 the possession was taken by the Court Commissioner and it was handed over to the said trustee of the trust. There is also no dispute about the fact that the trustee of the said trust has executed the sale deed in favour of one Prabhudas Khushalbhai Patel - father of the Respondent No. 1 on 1.11.1961 after obtaining permission from the Charity Commissioner under Section-36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. There is also no dispute about the fact that the trustee of the said trust has executed the sale deed in favour of one Prabhudas Khushalbhai Patel - father of the Respondent No. 1 on 1.11.1961 after obtaining permission from the Charity Commissioner under Section-36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. It is also an admitted position that the present appellant has himself given his statement before the Mamlatdar in the proceedings under Section 32(1)(b) of the Tenancy act to the effect that he or his father were not in possession of the subject land nor they were cultivating the said land as tenants. He has further stated that the name of his father was deleted from the revenue record which has not been challenged. From these admitted facts, it becomes crystal clear that during the life time of the deceased father of the appellant from 1961 to 1986 his dispossession from the disputed land was never challenged and from 1986 to 2008 the present appellant has also not challenged the said dispossession. The appellant has more or less relied on the panchnama drawn in the year 2002 by the Talati of the Village : Bapod certifying that he is in possession. However, the said panchnama was drawn in absence of the present respondent and it has not come on record on any proceeding that after the dispossession of the deceased father of the appellant from the disputed land in 1961, when the present appellant came to be in possession of the disputed land. Thus, as against plethora of evidence produced by the Respondents No. 1 to 6, the solitary evidence of the alleged panchnama drawn in 2002 does not inspire confidence of the Court. The arguments of Mr. Patel that the revenue entries indicate the name of the deceased father of the appellant on the tillers day i.e. 1.4.1957 and that he was cultivating the land and hence the appellant should be considered as the deemed purchaser of the land cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the present appellant has himself in the proceeding before the Mamlatdar admitted that neither he nor his deceased father were in possession of the disputed land nor they were cultivating the said land. Even otherwise, their dispossession from the suit land is not challenged till this date. Even otherwise, their dispossession from the suit land is not challenged till this date. The order of the Bombay Land Tribunal passed in 1959 declares the deceased father of the appellant as trespasser and he was not considered to be a tenant of the disputed land. The appellant has merely challenged the cancellation of the subsequent sale deed executed by the Respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the Respondent No. 6, without challenging the earlier sale deed executed by the trustee of the trust in favour of the deceased father of the Respondent No. 1. It is also important to note that the decision of the Gujarat Revenue tribunal rejecting the application of the Respondents No. 1 to 5 for restoration of their revision is challenged before this court in Special Civil Application and it is informed to the Court that the said Special Civil Application has been allowed and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for deciding it afresh. Though the present appellant has moved the Review Application for recalling the said order as the order was passed on dead person, the said application is however pending. Be that as it may, the same would not have much bearing on the issue involved in the present Appeal From Order. 28. In view of the submissions made before the Court on behalf of the respondents and the documents produced in support of those submissions and in view of the findings arrived at by the learned Civil Judge after appreciation of the evidence on record and discretion exercised by him while rejecting the injunction application, the Court does not see any justification to interfere in the said discretionary order. Since all the three ingredients i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are lacking in the present case, the Court is not inclined to grant any relief in the present Appeal From Order. Hence the Appeal From Order No. 215 of 2009 fails without any order as to costs. 29. Since the Appeal fails the Civil Application No. 6577 of 2009 no longer survives and it is accordingly disposed off. 30. Hence the Appeal From Order No. 215 of 2009 fails without any order as to costs. 29. Since the Appeal fails the Civil Application No. 6577 of 2009 no longer survives and it is accordingly disposed off. 30. So far as Appeal From Order No. 216 of 2009 is concerned, it is against the order of the learned Civil Judge rejecting the appellant’s application for taking action against the respondents for committing breach of ad-interim order passed by the learned Civil Judge in the pending suit. The learned Civil Judge has rejected the said application on the ground that ultimately Ex.5 application is rejected and hence there is no question of committing any breach of the order. It is a matter of record that when the ad-interim order was passed, the possession was undisputedly with the Respondent No. 6 and the Respondent No. 6 was lawful owner of the disputed land by virtue of the sale deed executed in her favour. At the time of the status-quo order passed by the learned Civil Judge, the work of putting up the compound wall was going on and hence she was of bona fide view that the order of status-quo would not prevent her from constructing the said compound wall. In any case, she was of the bona fide view and there was no breach, much less intentional breach, if any, and hence the Court does not find any justification in showing any indulgence in the order passed by the learned Civil Judge. Hence, Appeal From Order No. 216 of 2009 is also dismissed without any order as to costs. 31. Request to grant stay against the operation of this order and to continue the order of status-quo for some time is rejected.