JUDGMENT M.Y.Eqbal,J. This second appeal by the defendants-appellants is against the judgment of affirmance. 2. Plaintiffs-respondents filed Title suit No.62/98 for declaration of title in respect of suit property and for recovery of possession and further for a declaration that the sale deed dated 29.8.96 executed by defendant no.1 Rojni Bibi in favour of her sons is null and void, illegal and inoperative. The suit was decreed by Subordinate Judge IV Jamshedpur in terms of judgment dated 21.1.2002. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the defendants-appellants preferred Title Appeal No.4/2002 and the same was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Jamshedur in terms of judgment and decree dated 21.6.2006 and the findings recorded by the trial Court has been affirmed. 3. The instant second appeal was admitted for hearing on 27.6.2008 on the following substantial question of law: (i) Whether the courts below have correctly decided title of the plaintiff over the suit property on the admitted position that defendant/appellant came into possession of the suit property since 1968 and thereby claims title by adverse possession. (ii) Whether judgment and decree passed by the two courts below are sustainable in law for non-consideration of the settled proposition of law while deciding the question of facts. 4. The plaintiffs’ case, as pleaded in the plaint, is that the house property standing on holding No.96, situated in B Block Dhatkidih within Bistupur P.S. in the town of Jamshedur belongs to TISCO Ltd. Originally the land was allotted by TISCO Ltd. in favour of Manal Khan, now deceased, on monthly tenancy basis and the said Mangal Khan constructed a house over the said land out of his own earning and was in peaceful possession over the same on payment of rent and other charges to Tisco Ltd. Said Mangal Khan had landed property of his in-laws’ house at Manoharpur and it was impossible for him to manage both the properties. Accordingly he had executed a registered power of attorney in favour of original defendant No.1 Mst. Rojni Bibi authorizing her to look after the house property and also to manage all affairs of the property. The plaintiffs’ case is that on the basis of power of attorney Rojni Bibi came in possession os the suit property and she had been residing there. Said Mangal Khan died on 2.9.1970 leaving behind widow, sons and daughter, who became absolute owner of the suit property. The plaintiffs’ case is that on the basis of power of attorney Rojni Bibi came in possession os the suit property and she had been residing there. Said Mangal Khan died on 2.9.1970 leaving behind widow, sons and daughter, who became absolute owner of the suit property. After the death of Mangal, Rojni continued possession as a licensee under the legal heirs of Mangal Khan . The plaintiffs’ further case is that defendant no.1 Rojni Bibi mischiefly and fraudulently executed a registered sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of her sons Iftekhar Ahmad Khan and Sarfaraz Ahmad Khan by registered sale deed dated 29.8.96 on the false pretext that she had purchased the suit property from Mangal Khan, who executed sale letter in 1968 in favour of the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that on the basis of forged and fabricated document the defendant executed sale deed in favour of her sons. Further case of the plaintiffs-respondents is that after the death of Mangal Khan his legal heirs and successors sold the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs vide registered sale deed dated 21.12.96 on a consideration of Rs.50,000/-and after purchased the plaintiffs became absolute owner of the suit property. The plaintiffs now required the suit property for their personal use and occupation. It is alleged that Mst. Rojni Bibi was requested to vacate the suit property. She denied title of the plaintiffs and informed that she had sold the property in favouir of her sons on the basis of sale letter executed by late Mangal Khan in her favour. 5. The defendant No.1 Most. Rojni Bibi and her two sons , defendant nos.2 and 3, contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendants’ case is that Mangal Khan transferred the entire suit property in favour of defendant no.1 on 28.10.68 for a valuable consideration of Rs.6200/-and got physical possession of the property . The transfer was affected by a sell letter and Mangal Khan put his LTI on the said document. It is alleged that Sahid Khan, one of the sons of Mangal also put his signature in the sale letter and acknowledged receipt of the consideration amount. The transfer was affected by a sell letter and Mangal Khan put his LTI on the said document. It is alleged that Sahid Khan, one of the sons of Mangal also put his signature in the sale letter and acknowledged receipt of the consideration amount. The case of the defendant no.1 is that she never resided in the suit property as a licensee of Mangal Khan rather in the capacity of owner from 28.10.68 on the basis of sale letter and thereafter perfected title by possessing the suit property for a period of more than 12 years adversely and to the knowledge of the true owner. It is alleged that Sahid Khan, one of sons of Mangal Khan, wrote a letter addressed to the Land Officer Tisco Ltd. on 29.8.95 and vide this letter, he admitted the transfer of the suit property on the basis of sale letter executed by Mangal Khan on 28.10.68. The defendants’ further case is that Rojni Bibi being the lawful owner, has full authority to transfer the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. The original owner of Tisco Ltd. defendant no.9 filed written statement stating, inter alia, that the suit is not maintainable against the Tisco Company. The company is not aware of any of the facts mentioned in para 5 to 12 in the plaint. 7. As per the record of defendant company, the suit property was allotted in the name of Mangal Khan on monthly tenancy on the terms and conditions for residential house. The registered tenant was only a monthly tenant under the company and the suit property is still continue in the name of Mangal Khan. It is further stated by the company that after the death of Mangal Khan only lease hold interest in the suit holding was vested in the legal heirs of registered tenant Mangal Khan and they cannot transfer the holding in any other person without the consent of this defendant in writing and any sale letter executed in respect of the suit holding is illegal and not binding on the defendant-company. 8. The trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: I. Is the suit as framed is maintainable in its present form? II. Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit property? IV. Is the registered sale deed no.3340 dt. 8. The trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: I. Is the suit as framed is maintainable in its present form? II. Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for the suit? III. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit property? IV. Is the registered sale deed no.3340 dt. 29.8.96 executed by Rojni Bibi in favour of her two sons (defendant nos.2 and 3) null void, illegal, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiff? V. Is Rojni Bibi purchased the suit land from Mangal Khan vide sale letter dt. 28.10.68? VI. Had Mangal Khan executed a power of attorney in favour of Rojni Bbi on 28.10.68 for the proper care of disputed land? VII. Whether the defendant no.1 Rojni Bibi became owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession? VIII. Is the plaintiff entitled for recovery of possession after evicting the defendant? IX. Is the plaintiff is entitled for any other relief or reliefs? 9. The trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, decided all the issues against the defendants and held that the defendants have not acquired any title over the suit property by way of averse possession. 10. The defendants-appellants aggrieved by the said jkudgment and decree of the trial Court, preferred appeal jbefore the District Judge, which was finally heard by Additional District Judge, Jamshedpur. The appellate court, after reappraisal of the entire evidence, has affirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court. The appellant Court held that by general power of attorney executed by Mangal Khan the defendant Rojni Bibi was put in possession for the purpose of looking after the suit property and she was in possession of the property and her possession was permissive possession. The appellate court further held that possession of Rojni Bibi being permissive possession, she has not perfected any right by way of adverse possession. 11. I have Mr. V. Shivnath, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. M.K.Habib, learned counsel for the respondents. 12. Admittedly the defendant Mst. Rojni Bibi claimed the suit property on the basis of sale letter, which document has been disbelieved by both the trial court and the appellate court as not a genuine document. The only question of law , therefore, formulated by this Court is as to whether the defendant Rojni Bibi acquired title by adverse possession. 13. Admittedly the defendant Mst. Rojni Bibi claimed the suit property on the basis of sale letter, which document has been disbelieved by both the trial court and the appellate court as not a genuine document. The only question of law , therefore, formulated by this Court is as to whether the defendant Rojni Bibi acquired title by adverse possession. 13. Before answering the question of law, I would like to discuss the law with regard to adverse possession. 14. Ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam ned percario. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It is equally well settled that in order to establish adverse possession it is not enough to show that one is in sole possession and enjoying the property. Ouster of the non-possessing party by the party in possession, who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. 15. In Mitra’s Tagore law Lectures on Limitation and prescription (6th Edn.)vol.1, Lecture VI,at p.159, quoting from Angell on Limitation, this Principle is stated in the following terms: “An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him, who was in possession. ( Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession.” 16. It is also well settled that limitation cannot begin to run against a person unless at the time when person is legally in a position to vindicate his title by action. 17. Commencement of adverse possession implies that person in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title so that true owner would then be in a possession to maintain an action. 18. The theory of adverse possession has been elaborately discussed by the Privy Council in the Case of “Secy.of State..Vs.Debendra Lal Khan”( A.I.R. 1934 Privy Council 23. 18. The theory of adverse possession has been elaborately discussed by the Privy Council in the Case of “Secy.of State..Vs.Debendra Lal Khan”( A.I.R. 1934 Privy Council 23. The classical judgment rendered by three Judges namely, Lord Macmillan, Sir John Wallis and Sir George Lowndes and the principle of law on this subject has been laid down. The Court observed : “As to what constitutes adverse possession, a subject which formed the topic of some discussion in the case, their Lordships adopt the language of Lord Robertson in delivering the judgment of the board in Badhamoni Debi.V Collector of Khulna (1) ( at p.140 of 27 I.A.) where his Lordship said that : “the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.” The classical requirement is that the possession should be ned ve ne clam nec precario. Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown, but in their Lordships opinion there is no authority for this requirement. It is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if be exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. If the rights of the Crown have been openly usurped it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice. The Limitation Act is indulgent to the Crown in one respect only, namely, in requiring a much longer period of adverse possession than in the case of a subject; otherwise there is no discrimination in the statute between the Crown and the subject as regards the requisites of adverse possession. It may be added that it is not necessary in order to establish adverse possession that the proof acts of possession should cover every moment of the requisite period. Though the possession, “be not proven to have continued every quarter, month or year, yet ordinary possession will be sufficient ad victeeiam causre, albeit it be proponed in the terms of a continual possession, quia probati extermis praeesumuntur media, if the distance be not great. Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 4,40.20.” The fact of possession may be continuous though the several acts of possession are at considerable intervals. Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 4,40.20.” The fact of possession may be continuous though the several acts of possession are at considerable intervals. How many acts will infer the fact is a question of proof and presumption independents of prescription: Millar on Prescription, p.36.” The nature of the requisite possession must necessarily vary with the nature of the subject possessed. The possession must be the kind of possession of which the particular subject is susceptible. The Crown in the case of a fishery belonging to it exercises its rights by granting leases or licenses to fish; it does not itself fish. Consequently, the granting by a person other than the Crown of leases or licenses to fish in the case of a fishery which prima facie belongs to the Crown is evidence of the usurpation by that person of the distinctive rights of the Crown and is thus most significant evidence of adverse possession. Where a fishery is claimed in a navigable river which is open to the public for the purposes of navigation, the observations of Lord Watson in Lord Advocate v. Young (2) should be borne in mind. The claimant there sought to establish a prescriptive right to foreshore and Lord Watson (at p.553) pointed out that “in estimating the character and extent of his possession it must always be kept in view that possession of the foreshore in its natural state can never be in the strict sense of the term exclusive. The proprietor cannot exclude the public from it at any time, and if is practically impossible to prevent occasional encroachments on his right.” 19. In the case of “Deva(Dead) Through LRS.Vs.Sajjan Kumar (dead) by LRS( 2003)7 SCC-481, the Supreme Court observed that mere long possession for a period of more that 12 years without intention to possess the suit property adversely to the title of the plaintiff and to his knowledge cannot result in acquisition of title by the defendant to the property in question. 20. In the instant case, ownership of original owner Mangal Khan has not been disputed by the defendants/appellants. It has also not been disputed that Mangal Khan executed power of attorney on 28.10.1968 authorizing original defendant-Most.Rojni to look after the house property. The original defendant-Most. Rojni made out a case that she purchased the house property from Mangal Khan on payment of Rs. It has also not been disputed that Mangal Khan executed power of attorney on 28.10.1968 authorizing original defendant-Most.Rojni to look after the house property. The original defendant-Most. Rojni made out a case that she purchased the house property from Mangal Khan on payment of Rs. 6200/-and a sale letter was executed by Mangal Khan in a sheet of paper on 28.10.1968, that is on the same day when registered power of attorney was executed by him. 21. There is no pleading of the defendants/appellants that sale letter was executed on the same day but after execution of registered power of attorney. Here interesting question that comes to my mind is that if Mangal Khan agreed to sale the house property in favour of Most. Rajni then there was no occasion for executing registered power of attorney instead of executing a registered sale deed. Be that as it may, admittedly, Mangal Khan died after two years from the date of alleged sale letter that is 02.9.1970. No evidence has been adduced by the defendants either orally or documentary to show that after the execution of sale letter any attempt was made by Most. Rojni to persuade Mangal Khan to execute a sale deed so long as he was alive. Even after the death of Mangal Khan his heirs and legal representatives were never informed by Most. Rojni about her continuation in possession on the basis of alleged transfer by virtue of a sale letter. Not a singlt chit of paper has been filed by the defendants/appellants to show that they were claiming hostile title in the suit property. 22. Mr. V.Shivnath, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants put reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of “Maria Colaco and another.Vs.Alba Flora Herminda D’Souza and others”(2008)5 SCC-268 and submitted that finding of both the courts on the issue of adverse possession is perverse in law. In my considered opinion, the courts below have recorded concurrent finding of fact after appreciation of entire evidence on record. Moreover, in the light of the admitted facts discussed by me in the preceding paragraph finding of the two courts cannot and shall not held to be perverse in law. In my considered opinion, the courts below have recorded concurrent finding of fact after appreciation of entire evidence on record. Moreover, in the light of the admitted facts discussed by me in the preceding paragraph finding of the two courts cannot and shall not held to be perverse in law. Accordingly, I answered the question of law by holding that the courts below have decided the title of the plaintiffs/respondents over the suit property and rightly held that defendants/appellants have not perfected their title by adverse possession. 23. For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed.