JUDGMENT S. PANDA, J. — In this writ application challenge has been made to the order dated 5.12.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Keonjhar in F.A.O. No.23 of 2007 setting aside the order dated 13.9.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Divi¬sion), Champua in C.M.A. No.6 of 2007 arising out of Civil Suit No.6 of 2007 allowing an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows : The present petitioner as plaintiff filed the suit against the opposite parties-defendants for restoration of the suit Crusher Unit by way of mandatory injunction, award of cost of the suit and other relief which the plaintiff was entitled to. In the plaint, the plaintiff pleaded that he was a licensee under the opposite parties-defendants in respect of the suit Crusher Unit and to that effect on 8.2.2006, an agreement was executed. The same was amended and extended on 31.8.2008 and was valid up to 31.9.2007. Accordingly, he operated the Crusher Unit on payment of monthly rent to the defendants and received several orders from different persons to convert lumps to different sized ores. 3. While the matter stood thus, suddenly on 9.2.2007 without prior notice, the opposite parties forcibly evicted the petitioner and his staff from the Crusher Unit and locked the same. Thereafter, the opposite parties started operating the Crusher Unit utilizing the materials received by the petitioner and his own materials lying in the plant premises and tried to convert those articles for their own use. He stated that the persons who had entrusted their articles to the petitioner for conversion, had gone after him to get back the same and threat¬ened the petitioner to take legal action as they did not receive their ores in time. Therefore, the petitioner filed the suit as he was a licensee and a prima facie case and balance of conven¬ience was in his favour as he received the orders from different persons to convert the lumps into different sized ores. In view of thereof, irreparable loss would be caused to him unless the suit Crusher Unit was restored to him and along with the suit, he filed a Misc. Case for temporary injunction against the oppo¬site parties. 4. The opposite parties filed their show cause also. In view of thereof, irreparable loss would be caused to him unless the suit Crusher Unit was restored to him and along with the suit, he filed a Misc. Case for temporary injunction against the oppo¬site parties. 4. The opposite parties filed their show cause also. They admitted the fact that the petitioner was a licensee and in pursuance of the agreement, he was permitted to operate the Crusher unit on payment of monthly rent and other dues. As he violated the terms and conditions of the agreement, one month notice was issued to him. The petitioner received the same. After completion of the notice period, the petitioner suo motu shifted all the materials to his site and orally terminated the services of his employees without payment of their claim. He did not pay the dues to the Government and other dues. They also filed a counter-claim to recover the dues from the petitioner for breach of trust. They admitted that they have been operating the Crusher Unit since 14.2.2007 with intimation to the concerned Deputy Director of Mines. Further, they stated that the persons who had entrusted ores to the petitioner for crushing also received back their materials from the opposite parties on payment of crushing charges. Since the petitioner was no more a licensee, he had no locus standi to file the suit for restoration of the Crusher Unit. He had no prima facie case and as such the balance of convenience was not in his favour and no irreparable loss would be caused to him. On these grounds, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. After hearing the parties the trial Court held that the petitioner had a prima facie case as notice was served on him terminating the licence and the opposite parties dispossessed him by putting lock to the Crusher Unit without taking recourse to law. As the petitioner was operating the Crusher Unit on the strength of the agreement and received orders from different persons for crushing the ores to different sizes, those ores which were lying at the Crusher Unit were used by the opposite parties. Such act caused irreparable damage to the petitioner and balance of convenience lay in his favour as he was dispossessed without effective service of notice. Such act caused irreparable damage to the petitioner and balance of convenience lay in his favour as he was dispossessed without effective service of notice. On these finding, he granted temporary mandatory injunction directing the opposite parties to restore status quo of the suit Crusher Unit to the petitioner as on the date of his dispossession therefrom by the opposite par¬ties. 6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present opposite parties filed F.A.O. No.23 of 2007 before the learned District Judge, Keonjhar. On 5.12.2007, the appellate Court reversed the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Champua on the finding that the opposite parties-defendants could terminate the licence and at best the plaintiff could claim compensation. Therefore, the Court below erred in holding that the plaintiff was entitled restoration of the possession. Chal¬lenging the said appellate order, the plaintiff-petitioner has filed the present writ application. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate Court without considering the matter in its proper perspective and without setting aside the findings of the trial Court with reasons should not have set aside the order passed by the trial Court. Law is well settled that the appellate Court normally should not interfere with the injunction order passed by the trial Court, if it considered the three ingredients, i.e., the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, before passing the order of injunction, coming to a conclu¬sion that the party who seeks injunction has a prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour, if injunction is not granted, will sustain irreparable loss. The appellate Court should have set aside those findings by assigning reasons. Thereafter, it could give its independent finding on those facts. He further stated that if a licensee was dispossessed unlawfully by the license or before expiry of the licence period then the licence is entitled to recovery of possession, notwithstanding that the period of licence had expired long back during pendency of legal proceedings. Forcible eviction of the licensee is not permissible even though the only remedy available to the licensee against the eviction is to recover compensation. In support of his contention, he cited the decisions reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 (Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. v. Ms. Forcible eviction of the licensee is not permissible even though the only remedy available to the licensee against the eviction is to recover compensation. In support of his contention, he cited the decisions reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 (Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. v. Ms. Shobha Venkat Rao), AIR 1996 SC 2102 (Samir Sobhan Sanayl v. Tracks Trade Pvt. Ltd. and others) and AIR 2002 SC 2051 (The Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan). 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the main suit is pending for hearing. The trial Court has not commenced the issues involved in the suit and hearing of the suit also has not yet commenced. Therefore, whether or not the notice for eviction was served on the petitioner can only be decided after conclusion of the trial and the trial Court, during pendency of the suit, should not have passed order to restore status quo of the suit Crusher Unit to the petitioner as on the date of his dispossession therefrom. As the petitioner-plaintiff was a defaulter, balance of convenience was not in his favour and licence was no more in force. Therefore, the plaintiff had no right to claim any relief. In support of his contention, he cited the decisions reported in (2006) 3 SCC 312 (Kishore Kumar Khaitan and another v. Praveen Kumar Singh) and 91 (2001) CLT 319 (Regis¬trar, Co-operative Societies, Orissa, Bhubaneswar v. Bhuban Behari Sahoo and others). 9. From the above rival submissions of the parties, it appears that the petitioner-plaintiff is the licensee and the opposite parties-defendants are the licensor and admittedly the plaintiff was in possession of the suit Crusher Unit by virtue of an agreement and he was forcibly dispossessed in the month of February, 2007 when the tenure of the licence was subsisting as admittedly the period of licence was extended up to 30.9.2007. The apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 867 (Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomit Sorab Warden and others) has elaborately discussed the circumstances under which the Court can pass mandatory injunction on interlocutory applications and observed as under : “On the test to be applied in granting mandatory injunctions on interlocutory applications in 24 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) para 948 it is stated : “A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing, but, in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, if the case is clear and one which the Court thinks ought to be decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one which can be easily remedied, or if the defendant attempts to steal a march on the plaintiff, such as where, on receipt of notice that an injunction is about to be applied for, the defend¬ant hurries on the work in respect of which complaint is made so that when he receives notice of an interim injunction it is com¬pleted, a mandatory injunction will be granted on an interlocuto¬ry application.” Therein, the apex Court held as under : “14. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to be party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are : (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. 15. Generally stated these guidelines are : (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. 15. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exer¬cised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive or complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances need¬ing action, applying them as pre-requisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judi¬cial discretion. 10. In view of the above settled position and the fact that the trial Court had exercised the judicial discretion on proper appreciation of facts and given the finding, the appellate Court should not have interfere with the said finding and set aside the same without assigning any reason. As such, the order passed by the appellate Court is an error apparent on the face of record as it approached the question in dispute in an improper manner. Hence, the said finding cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned order is amenable to cor¬rection under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Hence, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court corrects the aforesaid error by setting aside the order dated 5.12.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Keonjhar in FAO No. 23 of 2007 and confirms the order dated 13.9.2007 passed by the trial court. The writ application is accordingly allowed. No costs. Application allowed.