NILKANTH S/o FAKIRAJI BHADAKE v. MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
2009-06-16
R.C.CHAVAN
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) THIS petition by an employee is directed against the orders of the learned Judge, Labour Court, Nagpur as well as the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur. ( 2 ) FACTS, which are material for deciding this petition, are as under : on 7-1-1990, the petitioner entered the cabin of his superior one Shri Ghatole, Traffic Inspector of Umrer Depot, in drunken condition and abused him. This led to filing of a criminal case as well as slapping a chargesheet upon the petitioner. In the departmental enquiry, which was held, the charge was held to have been proved and on 19-4-1991, the petitioner was dismissed from service. In the criminal complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, umrer, the petitioner was acquitted of offence punishable under Section 85 of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The petitioner, therefore, approached the Labour Court, Nagpur by filing complaint under Section 28 read with Section 30 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act complaining of unfair labour practice. The learned Judge, Labour Court, Nagpur, held that the enquiry was fairly held, it was conducted by a competent officer, the findings were not perverse and, therefore, held that the dismissal of the petitioner did not amount to unfair labour practice under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and pulp Act. ( 3 ) I have heard Shri A. H. Jamal, learned counsel for the petitioner-employee, and Shri R. S. Charpe, learned counsel for the respondent-employer. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the departmental enquiry and the criminal case were based on the same facts and the same witnesses were cited in the two proceedings. Therefore, acquittal in the criminal case would necessitate exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry. He further submitted that in the departmental enquiry, the Medical Officer was not examined and even the medical report was not tendered to show that the petitioner was in fact in a drunken state at the relevant time. Therefore, according to him, the charge was not at all proved and the Labour Court and the Industrial Court ought to have held accordingly. He relied on a judgment of the supreme Court in G. M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others, reported at (2006) 5 SCC 446 .
Therefore, according to him, the charge was not at all proved and the Labour Court and the Industrial Court ought to have held accordingly. He relied on a judgment of the supreme Court in G. M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others, reported at (2006) 5 SCC 446 . It may be useful to reproduce paragraphs 30 to 32 of the judgment, which have been read over to me by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellants residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V. B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31.
It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 32. In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8-2-1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs. 700 p. m. i. e. 50% of the salary. On 15-10-1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant had put in 26 years of service with the respondent i. e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the department passed an order of dismissal on 21-10-1982 whereas the criminal court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w. e. f. 30-1-2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation submitted that apart from the fact that the standard of proof in the two proceedings is different, even the facts constituting offence punishable under Section 85 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the misconduct for which the petitioner was chargesheeted are different.
The appellant would be entitled to pension. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation submitted that apart from the fact that the standard of proof in the two proceedings is different, even the facts constituting offence punishable under Section 85 of the Bombay Prohibition Act and the misconduct for which the petitioner was chargesheeted are different. It may be seen from the copy of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class that the charge was that the accused, i. e. the petitioner, was behaving in a disorderly manner under the influence of liquor at public place, which constituted the ingredients of the offence. The discussion in para 5 of the judgment of the Criminal Court shows that the petitioner had entered the cabin of Shri Ghatole and abused him under the influence of liquor. This had been stated by shri Ghatole before the learned Magistrate. In para 7 of his judgment, the learned Magistrate observed and rightly so that none of the witnesses had stated a single word in respect of disorderly behaviour by the petitioner at S. T. Stand, Umrer, which would have been a public place. Therefore, in fact, if the allegation was about drunken brawl in the cabin of Shri Ghatole, a criminal case for offence punishable under Section 85 of the Bombay Prohibition Act should not at all have been filed. Therefore, acquittal in that case, because the incident was not proved to have occurred at a public place, is insignificant and has absolutely no bearing on the departmental enquiry. In the departmental enquiry, Shri Ghatole had been examined and the charge of having abused Shri Ghatole in a drunken state was held as proved. It cannot be said that it was necessary for the department to examine the Medical Officer or to tender other evidence to show that the petitioner was under the influence of liquor. The evidence of Shri Ghatole is not shown to be tainted or unbelievable. It may be seen that even the criminal Court has not held that the evidence of Shri Ghatole was unreliable. Therefore, the finding of the learned Judge, labour Court, that the report of the Enquiry Officer was not perverse cannot be disturbed.
The evidence of Shri Ghatole is not shown to be tainted or unbelievable. It may be seen that even the criminal Court has not held that the evidence of Shri Ghatole was unreliable. Therefore, the finding of the learned Judge, labour Court, that the report of the Enquiry Officer was not perverse cannot be disturbed. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner would have retired on superannuation on 31-7-1994 and, therefore, pressed in aid the observations in para 32 of the judgment in G. M. Tanks case. In that case, the employee had been removed from service by order of dismissal dated 21-10-1982. It seems that the criminal court had acquitted him after 20 long years. In view of the fact that the Supreme Court held that this acquittal would affect the findings in the enquiry, the Court had held that the employee concerned was entitled to retiral benefits by setting aside the order of dismissal without back wages. In this case, it cannot be held that because of acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner would be entitled to exoneration in the departmental enquiry. At the cost of repetition, it has to be pointed out that the charge in the criminal case was disorderly behaviour at the public place, whereas the charge in the departmental enquiry was of misbehaving with and abusing the superior in his cabin under the influence of liquor. In view of this, it cannot be said that the impugned orders suffer from any illegality to warrant interference. ( 7 ) THE petition is, therefore, dismissed.