JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. 1. Original Application being OA No. 5/96 was filed before the erstwhile H.P. Administrative Tribunal at Shimla, inter alia, praying for following reliefs: It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that: (i) the impugned dismissal order dated 15.6.1995 may kindly be quashed and set aside. After quashing the impugned order, the respondent be directed to work out and pay the terminal benefits after his retirement; (ii) that an appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be issued/passed and justice be done; (iii) that record of this case may also kindly be summoned and perused at the time of hearing of this writ petition. The Original Application was transferred to this Court and re-numbered as CWP (T) No. 2953 of 2008. 2. The facts relevant for determination of the present petition are as under: The petitioner was employed temporarily with H.P. Khadi and Village Industries Board (hereinafter referred to as the Khadi Board) in October, 1972 as "Technician (Bamboo)". He was subsequently confirmed and with the passage of time assigned different duties at different places. In 1994 the petitioner was posted as Incharge, Sales Shop at Hamirpur. The respondent-Board issued a Circular dated 30.6.1989 clarifying that "all the Incharges who do not have any imprest money, can retain upto a sum of Rs. 500/- (Five hundred only) as imprest money with them under intimation to this office. 3. Some time in December, 1993 the inspection of the sales shop was carried out by the Senior Auditor and on checking it was found that cash balance of the sales shop, Hamirpur, was short as only Rs. 285 were found in the safe/chest. The sale proceeds and stocks were checked upto 30.12.1993 and it was so discovered that the amount of Rs. 41483.65 was short in cash; the sale proceeds entered in the sale book were not entered in the cash book and the cash deposited and drawn from the Bank was also not entered in the cash book. The inspection committee/audit committee also found that goods worth Rs. 1,470/- had been sold by the petitioner on credit basis for which no action for recovery was taken. Thus a sum of Rs. 41,483.65 was recommended to be recovered from the petitioner. The inspection committee/audit committee also found that goods worth Rs. 1,470/- had been sold by the petitioner on credit basis for which no action for recovery was taken. Thus a sum of Rs. 41,483.65 was recommended to be recovered from the petitioner. The Khadi Board, vide orders dated 31.1.1995 (Annexure A-1), put the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect. 4. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated and as such a memorandum dated 29.4.1995 containing the following Article of Charges was served upon the petitioner: (i) during the period 1993-94 petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in as much as he embezzled an amount of Rs. 41,483.65 p. w.e.f. 24.11.1993 to 30.12.1993 out of the sale proceeds of the Sale Shop, Hamirpur, for his personal use; (ii) the cash book of the Sale Shop was not written after 24.11.1993, the Sale Book of the shop was not written after 14.12.1993 and the stock registers were incomplete and not maintained properly, inspite of the fact that it was his duty to daily write the sale book and cash book of the shop; and (iii) failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in as much as the petitioner effected bogus credit purchases in his own name being himself Incharge of the Sale Shop worth Rs. 69,538.43 paise thereby causing financial loss to the Board and thus violated the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 5. In response to the memorandum, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 15.5.1995 clearly admitting the charges and requesting for a lenient and sympathetic action in the matter. Since the interpretation of this letter is in issue in the present proceedings, therefore, the same is reproduced as under in toto: Sir, Kindly refer to your office Memo No. cited above, I beg to submit the following few lines for favourable and sympathetic consideration. I. An amount of Rs. 41,483.65 p in account of sale proceeds w.e.f. 24.11.1993 to 30.12.1993 was not deposited in account of Khadi Board daily due to rush of work during rebate period. This fact was actually in the knowledge of the Board authorities accordingly an amount of Rs. 26,000/- was deposited by me on 9.3.1994 vide receipt No. 69711 dated 9.3.1994. Besides this an amount of Rs. 15,504/- was deducted from my pay from the month of January 1994 to July 1994 bringing the total amount so recovered Rs. 41,504. This fact was actually in the knowledge of the Board authorities accordingly an amount of Rs. 26,000/- was deposited by me on 9.3.1994 vide receipt No. 69711 dated 9.3.1994. Besides this an amount of Rs. 15,504/- was deducted from my pay from the month of January 1994 to July 1994 bringing the total amount so recovered Rs. 41,504. Thus the entire amount of Rs. 41,483.64 p. stands recovered and nothing is due to be recovered on account of sale proceeds. II. Being single hand in the shop and due to the rush of work the daily cash book as well as sale book of the shop could not be written which has now been completed upto date. III. Admitted to the extent that during the period 1992 to 1994 credit sale worth Rs. 69,538.43 p. was made in my name. This is due to the reason that shortfall of Khadi and Woolen cloths. In fact the shop and store room are in separate rooms of the shop. This short fall accrued mostly in woolen and khadi cloths which were kept in separate room for which off and on daily wages peon of the shop used to bring the same from the store room to the shop. An amount of Rs. 7682.85 p. shown and S. Nos. 1 to 9 has since been recovered. The recovery of the remaining amount is due to the shortfall of khadi/woolen cloths which has been credited in my name to avoid any financial loss to the Board as well as to myself. The remaining amount may kindly be recovered from my gratuity/leave incashment (sic). Since I am going to attain the age of superannuation on 30.6.1995 after putting in 35 years service during which I remained faithful, punctual to my duties. During the entire service I performed the duties to the entire satisfaction of my superiors. Keeping in view my superannuation on 30.6.1995 and facts explained above I may kindly be exonerated from the charge levelled against me and charge-sheet may kindly be dropped in the interest of natural justice and avoid any financial hardship. It is further requested that before passing final orders in the matter I may kindly be heard in person. In view of the admission made by the delinquent official the Khadi Board passed an order dated 15.6.1995 and imposed a major penalty of dismissal from service. It is further requested that before passing final orders in the matter I may kindly be heard in person. In view of the admission made by the delinquent official the Khadi Board passed an order dated 15.6.1995 and imposed a major penalty of dismissal from service. It is this action, which is assailed in the present petition. 6. Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner while challenging the order has urged as under: 1. The charges in the memorandum of articles did not form part of the audit/inspection report, hence, inquiry into charge other than based on the audit/inspection report could not have been initiated. 2. The petitioner's letter dated 15.5.1995 was merely an explanation and not an unequivocal admission. In the absence of unqualified admission the disciplinary authority, without holding any inquiry in terms of the CCS and CCA Rules could not have taken action in terms of order dated 15.6.1995. 3. Against the very same cause of action the Board had registered an FIR in which the petitioner was acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, in terms of judgment dated 19.6.2004. In view of Governmental instructions dated 7.6.1955 and 4.9.1964 no administrative inquiry could have been carried out simultaneously in view of pendency of criminal proceedings. 4. The petitioner has not been afforded effective hearing which has violated his fundamental right. 5. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, in any event considering the fact that the petitioner had unblemished record of 35 years of service the penalty imposed is harsh and disproportionate to the charge. Per contra, Ms. Goswami, learned Counsel for the Board has supported the order for the reasons set out therein. 7. It is settled law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. (State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723. 8. It is also settled law that this Court would not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. (State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723. 8. It is also settled law that this Court would not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. As long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding, the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. 9. No doubt that in the inspection report, Annexure R-3 dated 4.1.1994, there is no reference of charge mentioned in Article III, but fact of the matter is that audit objection was carried out in December, 1993 and memorandum was issued in April, 1995. It was only after the matter was thoroughly investigated it came to light that in addition to what was found at the time of audit inspection, the petitioner had been guilty of misconduct pertaining to other charges. The disciplinary proceedings may have been initiated on the basis of inspection report, but, however, from the Article of Charges it is evident that in addition to the inspection report there was other material to support the charge against the delinquent official, hence the variation in inspection report and the memorandum of Article of Charges has no bearing on the disciplinary action taken against the delinquent official. 10. Perusal of petitioner's letter reproduced hereinabove would only show that the same is not an explanation as is sought to be argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In so far as Charge-I is concerned, the delinquent official clearly admitted his guilt. According to him a sum of Rs. 41,483.65 paise could not be deposited due to rush of work during rebate period. He admitted that an amount of Rs. 26,000/- was deposited on 9.3.1994 and the remaining amount was recovered before July, 1994. 11. While impliedly admitting, Charge-II was sought to be explained with an excuse that since the petitioner had no help and there was heavy rush of work, daily cash book and sale book could not be written. 12. He admitted that an amount of Rs. 26,000/- was deposited on 9.3.1994 and the remaining amount was recovered before July, 1994. 11. While impliedly admitting, Charge-II was sought to be explained with an excuse that since the petitioner had no help and there was heavy rush of work, daily cash book and sale book could not be written. 12. Article-Ill importantly disclosed that the credit sale made by the petitioner in his own name amounting to Rs. 69,538.43 was ranging for a period from 20.1.1992 to 19.1.1994 and the delinquent official categorically stated as under: Admitted to the extent that during the period 1992 to 1994 credit sale worth Rs. 69,538.43 paise was made in my name. 13. It was only after admitting the charges that an attempt was made to explain the same. No doubt in the said letter he requested for dropping of the charges and prayed for a lenient view, but, however, the fact of the matter is that charges against him stood unequivocally admitted by him. Therefore, in my view, it cannot be said that the admission is only an explanation and is not unequivocal. 14. In Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. The State of Mysore AIR 1972 SC 32, the Apex Court held as under: Where the delinquent official has admitted all the relevant facts which the decision could be given against him, it could not be said that the inquiry was in any breach of the principles of natural justice. 15. The Apex Court in Chairman & Managing Director V.S.P. and Ors. v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu 2008(5) SCC 569, while dealing with almost similar circumstances where upon voluntary admission of the charges, the inquiry was closed and penalty of removal from service was imposed by passing a reasoned order, held that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior Courts only in some cases may invoke doctrine of proportionality. If decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when misconduct stands proved. 16. The superior Courts only in some cases may invoke doctrine of proportionality. If decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when misconduct stands proved. 16. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. Shyam Lal 2004(8) SCC 88, the Apex Court while dealing with a case of a conductor who had admitted the charges of misconduct held that it is a fairly settled position of law that admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making the admission. 17. Reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh) AIR 1961 SC 1070, by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is of not much relevance. The Apex Court was dealing with a case where the statement made by the delinquent officer was not found to be clear and unambiguous admission of his guilt. It was in these circumstances, the Court held that the disciplinary action initiated against the delinquent official was in contravention of the then existing Rules and the principles of natural justice. 18. However, it is pertinent to point out that there is change in the position of law and the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India have been amended in terms of 46th Amendment Act, 1976. 19. In terms of letter dated 15.5.1995 the delinquent official had prayed for personal hearing. From the impugned order dated 15.6.1995 it is evident that the official was afforded opportunity of hearing. In fact the Chairman of the respondent-Khadi Board had "heard him in detail" and only thereafter looking to the graveity of the misconduct taken a strict view in the matter. Therefore, it cannot be held that no adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded to the delinquent and the impugned action cannot be faulted on that ground. 20. It is a settled law that reasonable opportunity would mean an opportunity of the delinquent official knowing the charges, affording hearing and making him aware of the consequences of the contemplated action. In the present case there is nothing on record to show that there is infraction of any of the principles of natural justice. 20. It is a settled law that reasonable opportunity would mean an opportunity of the delinquent official knowing the charges, affording hearing and making him aware of the consequences of the contemplated action. In the present case there is nothing on record to show that there is infraction of any of the principles of natural justice. Bare perusal of Rule 14 of CCS & CCA Rules makes it clear that where the delinquent officer admits the guilt and the charges the disciplinary authority can take disciplinary action without holding an inquiry. In my view, reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner. 21. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda AIR 1989 SC 1185, the Apex Court held as under: It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the provisions to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an inquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 22. Reliance on the decisions of Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84 and Joginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1999) 7 SCC 739, in my considered view is misplaced. In the aforesaid cases, the Apex Court was dealing with the facts where the disciplinary authority had differed with the inquiry officer and contemplated taking further action in accordance with the Rules for which no notice and opportunity of hearing was afforded to the delinquent officer. It was under these circumstances, the Apex Court intervened and set aside the disciplinary action for want of non-compliance of principles of natural justice. Such is not the case here. 23. It is no doubt true that the instructions dated 7.6.1955 and 4.9.1964 do contemplate that departmental action should not precede prosecution. These Governmental instructions are not rules which are not justiciable. They are mere guidelines and having no binding force in law. 24. Further against the order of acquittal in a criminal case it is an admitted case of the parties that Criminal Appeal No. 545 of 2004 is pending adjudication before this Court. These Governmental instructions are not rules which are not justiciable. They are mere guidelines and having no binding force in law. 24. Further against the order of acquittal in a criminal case it is an admitted case of the parties that Criminal Appeal No. 545 of 2004 is pending adjudication before this Court. In this view of the matter, the action cannot be faulted on any ground. In any event it is a settled law that disciplinary proceedings and criminal inquiry can carry out simultaneously. 25. The Apex Court in Uttranchal Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mansaram Nainwal AIR 2006 SC 2840, held: 13. ...Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates- (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. [See State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. AIR 1968 SC 647 and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. 1996(6) SCC 44. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. AIR 1968 SC 647 and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. 1996(6) SCC 44. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495 , Earl of Halsbury LC, observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. [Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764 and 'Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 699]. 26. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal Court is concerned, in my opinion, the said order does not preclude the respondent from taking disciplinary action if it is otherwise permissible. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a Court of law. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a Court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the delinquent official by the Court, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the respondent. 27. On the issue of punishment being disproportionate to the charged misconduct of the petitioner, the following ratio of law laid down of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Ors. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 276, is relevant: 22. It is now well settled that principles of law that the High Court or the Tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment. Doctrine of proportionality can be invoked only under certain situations. It is now well settled that the High Court shall be very slow in interfering with the quantum of punishment, unless it is found to be shocking to one's conscience. 28. In Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364, it has been held as under: 12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 15. ...It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law.... 29. 15. ...It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law.... 29. While dealing with a case of financial embezzlement, where the employee of the bank had misappropriated customers' money whereby no loss was caused to the bank, the Apex Court in Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce 2006(10) SCC 572, held that if the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is must and unexceptionable. 30. The Court further reiterated its earlier decision taken in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik 1996 (9) SCC 69, that it is no defence available to the delinquent officer to say that no loss was caused to the employer. 31. It is no doubt true that from the record, it is evident that the petitioner had long service record of 35 years and there was nothing adverse against him till the initiation of the instant disciplinary action. It is also true that the petitioner was to retire on 30.6.1995, but the fact of the matter is that the charge of embezzlement is very serious and grave. The petitioner was found to have embezzled not only Rs. 41,483.65 paise between the period 25.11.1993 to 30.12.1993 but also found to have issued bills of sales in his own name amounting to Rs. 69,538.43, As is evident from the memorandum of Article of Charges (Annexure A-3), the same relates to the period 20.1.1992 to 19.1.1994. It was not an isolated aberration but there is a continuous pattern spread over a period of more than 2 years. The embezzlement is admitted by the petitioner, however, the explanation given did not find favour with the disciplinary authority as the delinquent official was not authorized to make any credit sale in his own name even if there had been short fall in the stocks. The embezzlement is admitted by the petitioner, however, the explanation given did not find favour with the disciplinary authority as the delinquent official was not authorized to make any credit sale in his own name even if there had been short fall in the stocks. The official was responsible for all the stocks in his charge and could not have escaped his responsibility by giving an explanation that he had been negligent in maintaining the same. 32. There is no doubt that the delinquent official had been pocketing the sale proceeds by showing the sales in his own name. It is so evident from the record. He violated Governmental instructions and caused heavy financial loss to the Khadi-Board and all this proved that he was not a man of integrity and honesty. The fact that the petitioner had not been maintaining the accounts and the books stands admitted by him. 33. It was in his background that a stern action was taken against the delinquent official. 34. On the issue of penalty being disproportionate to the charges, Mr. Sharma has referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in Colour-Chem Limited v. A.L. Alaspurkar and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 948 and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1151. 35. In Colour-Chem Limited (supra) the Court was dealing with the case where the delinquent officials were found sleeping in the wee hours of the night shift of the plant which resulted into the running of the machine without insertion of raw-material therein. The Court, in the facts and circumstances found that delinquent officials had been victimized and the management of the private concern had adopted unfair labour practice in getting rid of some of its employees. The victimization of the employees in the facts was borne out from the record and in these facts and circumstances the Court found that the punishment of removal was shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved against the delinquents. 36. In Mahesh Kumar Mishra (supra), the Court was dealing with a case where the services of the delinquent official were terminated on the basis of report of the Transport Inspector, which was also signed by the delinquent official. However, the statement of the passengers to prove the fact that tickets issued by the delinquent official, conductor, were in fact were issued for short distance. However, the statement of the passengers to prove the fact that tickets issued by the delinquent official, conductor, were in fact were issued for short distance. The Court found that it was not a case where the passengers had been allowed to either travel free or that the fare charged from the passengers was pocketed by the delinquent official by issuing tickets for short distances. It was in this background that the order passed by the High Court, setting aside the order of termination and reinstating the delinquent official with 25% back wages was upheld by the Apex Court. 37. To my mind, there is no doubt that the conduct of the petitioner is totally unbecoming of a Government servant. He has not only caused the great financial loss to the Khadi-Board but also breached the confidence reposed in him to look after the sales of the shop at Hamirpur. He has violated all Governmental instructions. The financial embezzlement necessarily leads to loss of confidence by the employer in the employee. 38. The employee, in the present case, was duty bound to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. He breached the confidence reposed in him and, therefore, no lenient view can be taken. 39. Further, it is not a case of the petitioner that the action of the Khadi Board is mala fide. Therefore, in my view no fault can be found with the disciplinary authority in taking a stern action against the delinquent official. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is dismissed.