JUDGMENT Sham Sunder, J.:- This order, shall dispose of Criminal Misc. No. 251-M of 2001, titled as, ‘Steel Authority of India Limited and others Vs. State of Punjab and others’, and, Criminal Misc. No. 20331-M of 2002, titled as, ‘J.S. Charlu, the then Executive Director, Jindal Vijay Nagar, Steel Limited Vijay Nagar, Karnataka and another Vs. State of Punjab and others, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, in the complaints, filed by respondents No. 2 and 3, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amloh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab, under Sections 409, 418, 420, 468, and 477-A read with Section 34 and 120-B IPC, and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom. 2. The aforesaid complaints, were filed, by Jagdish Rai Bansal, Proprietor of M/s Ajit Cotton Ginning Pressing Dall & Steel Rolling Mills and M/s Raja Steel Works, on the allegations, that accused Nos. 2 to 29, were the office bearers of accused No. 1 i.e. Steel Authority of India Limited, which was registered, under the Companies Act. It was stated that the complainant firms, besides manufacturing iron and steel products, purchased from the Steel Authority of India Limited, were also converting the steel as its conversion agents. It was further stated that the complainant firms, being conversion agents of the Steel Authority of India Limited, accused No. 1, a huge amount, to the tune of crores of rupees, was misappropriated by it, from time to time. It was further stated that, as such, a huge amount, was due to the complainant firms, against the Steel Authority of India Limited. It was further stated that, on account of misappropriation of the huge amount, by the Steel Authority of India Limited, a great financial loss, was caused, to them. It was published, in the local press, that the complainant firms had become insolvent. It was further stated that, on account of the aforesaid publication, from time to time, about their insolvency, being the handi-work of the accused, their banking operations, were got stopped, on 30.01.96, and, as such, they were put in the state of complete financial paralysis. It was further stated that after causing a huge financial loss, to the complainant firms, the accused, illegally got their bank guarantee encashed, to the tune of Rs. It was further stated that after causing a huge financial loss, to the complainant firms, the accused, illegally got their bank guarantee encashed, to the tune of Rs. 1.37 crores, from the Central Bank of India, Mandi Gobindgarh, on account of their failure, to perform the obligations of some contract, and nonpayment of some dues. It was further stated that the accused, had wrongly mentioned, in their letters, from time to time, that the complainant firms, failed to pay some dues, to the Steel Authority of India Limited, just with a view to get the aforesaid bank guarantee, encashed. It was further stated that, in the year 1995-96, the accused, supplied 1100 metric tons of steel, to the complainant firms, amounting to Rs. 110 lacs, against the bank guarantee of Rs. 137 lacs. It was further stated that, on the basis of the delivery orders, for the aforesaid steel, the complainant firms, had to issue the delivery challans, on the directions of the accused, without giving any exact value of the material, on the challans. It was further stated that the price, to be charged, by the accused, for the supply of the aforesaid steel, to the complainant firms, was as per the market tools, meaning thereby, that the accused, used to sell the steel, according to market condition, ignoring the listed price. It was further stated that the accused, used to sell the good, at Jalandhar, below their listed price, on an average rebate of Rs. 1400/- per metric ton, i.e. much lower than the market price, at Mandi Gobindgarh, by allowing sufficient margin price. It was further stated that, even before buying the material, from the accused, the complainant firms, were required to give quotations, in the form of requisition letters i.e. dated 14.02.96 and 13.03.96, that they were ready to lift the same, as per the market tools, or rebate scheme. It was further stated that instead of charging the aforesaid rates, as per rebated price, the accused, charged much higher prices i.e. listed price, in the invoices, issued by them. It was further stated that, as such, the accused, charged an excess amount of Rs. 15 lacs, from the complainant firms, in respect of the supply of 1100 metric tons of steel. It was further stated that, as such, the accused, charged an excess amount of Rs. 15 lacs, from the complainant firms, in respect of the supply of 1100 metric tons of steel. It was further stated that, even the accused, got encashed an excess amount, through the Bank Guarantee, instead of the listed price, which came to be Rs. 12 lacs. It was further stated that, as such, the accused, got encashed bank guarantee, to the tune of Rs. 137 lacs, instead of Rs. 110 lacs. It was further stated that even the accused, could not get encashed the bank guarantee of Rs. 110 lacs, as they owed very huge amount, to the tune of crores of rupees, to the complainant firms. It was further stated that the complainant firms, submitted the bank guarantee, in advance, for 110 to 120 per cent of the value of goods. It was further stated that the complainant, vide different letters, requested the accused, to grant rebate, under the marketing tool of February/March, 1996, but, they failed to do so. It was further stated that when the complainant firms, came to know, that the accused, were going to get encashed the bank guarantee, with a view to cover the illegally charged price of Rs. 32 lacs, they requested them, not to do so, as the extended period thereof, had not yet lapsed, and, the total material supplied, by the latter, to the former, was of the value much lower than the value of the bank guarantee. It was further stated that, however, the accused, with a dishonest intention, got enchased the bank guarantee of Rs. 137 lacs, though, the same stood unutilized, by the complainant, to the tune of Rs. 27.00 lacs, as the price of the total material supplied, was less than the total bank guarantee. It was further stated that the accused, in connivance with each other, issued fictitious and fabricated invoices, just with a view to square up their accounts, for dishonestly depriving the complainant firms of the amount of rebate, as demanded, vide different letters. It was further stated that the accused, besides withdrawing the principal amount of Rs. 1.37 crores of the bank guarantee, pertaining to the complainant firms, were also enjoying the recurring interest and inventory’s profit thereon. It was further stated that the accused, besides withdrawing the principal amount of Rs. 1.37 crores of the bank guarantee, pertaining to the complainant firms, were also enjoying the recurring interest and inventory’s profit thereon. It was further stated that, as such, the accused, were bent upon causing financial loss, to the complainant firms, and tarnishing their reputation. It was further stated that the accused, were legally bound by the terms and conditions of the business dealings, agreements, entered into with the complainant firms, and to render full details of accounts, as asked for, vide different letters. It was further stated that, it was very much, in the knowledge of the accused, that they were entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 1.10 crores, on this account, and owed a huge amount, to the complainant firms, and inspite of that, they dishonestly misappropriated the amount, through the bank guarantee, lying with them. It was further stated that all the criminal acts, were committed, by the accused, within the jurisdiction of Jalandhar and Mandi Gobindgarh. It was further stated that the accused, with the common dishonest intention and criminal conspiracy, committed various offences, under Sections 409, 418, 420, 468, and 477-A read with Section 34 and 120-B IPC. Ultimately, the aforesaid complaints were filed, in which the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000 of the accused-petitioners, directing them to face trial for the aforesaid offences were passed, by the Courts of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Amloh. 3. I have heard the Counsel for the parties, and, have gone through the record of the case, carefully. 4. The Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, were filed, with a patently malafide intention, in order to browbeat and pressurize the Chairman, Members of the Board of Directors, and senior officers of petitioner No. 1, with the purpose of obtaining an unfair, but favourable settlement by the complainant firms. He further submitted that the complainants firms, even did not care to satisfy, as to how, the individual petitioners, were linked with the alleged acts of omission and commission. He further submitted that the complainants firms, even did not care to satisfy, as to how, the individual petitioners, were linked with the alleged acts of omission and commission. He further submitted that the complaints, were filed, by respondents No. 2 and 3, with a malicious intent, in furtherance of desire, to wreak vengeance, and to harass the petitioners, in one way or the other, and, as such, was a complete abuse of the process of law, as a weapon of pressure. He further submitted that the complainant firms, are the conversion agents of Steel Authority of India Limited. He further submitted that the steel, was being provided, to the complainant firms, and they used to convert the same. He further submitted that the commercial relationship, between the complainant firms and Steel Authority of India Limited, had been in existence, since 1989. He further submitted that except the Branch Manager of Steel Authority of India Limited, no other petitioner, was dealing with the complainant firms. He further submitted that there was only a dispute, with regard to the price of the steel, supplied to the complainant firms, for conversion thereof. He further submitted that price, charged by the Steel Authority of India Limited, from the complainant, was not higher than the one agreed to be paid. He further submitted that, had the rebate been given, to the complainant firms, then the petitioners, would have been entitled to lesser price. He further submitted that since huge amount, was due, to the Steel Authority of India Limited, against the complainants, the bank guarantee, which had been furnished, by the complainant firms, was invoked. He further submitted that, according to the provisions of law, such bank guarantee, could be invoked, by the Steel Authority of India Limited unilaterally. He further submitted that it was basically a dispute of civil nature, which was converted, into a dispute of criminal nature, just with a view to put pressure, upon the petitioners, to come to the dictated terms of the complainant firms. He further submitted that the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, and the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, including the subsequent proceedings, being the complete abuse of the process of Court, were liable to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, the Counsel for the respondents, submitted that the complaints, were not filed with malafide intention. He further submitted that the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, and the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, including the subsequent proceedings, being the complete abuse of the process of Court, were liable to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, the Counsel for the respondents, submitted that the complaints, were not filed with malafide intention. They further submitted that a number of documents, were produced alongwith the complaints. They further submitted that the preliminary evidence, was recorded, by the Court below, and, ultimately, on the basis thereof, it came to the conclusion, that there were sufficient grounds, to proceed, against the accused/petitioners, and, as such, the orders, summoning them, were passed. They further submitted that, at the time of filing the petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court, was not required to go deep into the merits of the case. They further submitted that the proceedings, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., could only be quashed, if the Court, comes to the conclusion, that the same, were attended by malafides or that no criminal offence, from the allegations, contained in the same, was made out. They further submitted that, even the documents, attached with the petition, could not be taken into consideration, for the purpose of coming to the conclusion, as to whether, the complaints and the summoning orders, as also the consequential proceedings, were liable, to be quashed. They further submitted that it was not purely a civil dispute. They further submitted that huge amount of the complainant firms, was dishonestly misappropriated, by the petitioners, and, as such, they were liable for the criminal offences, mentioned in the complaint. They further submitted that, no ground, for quashing the complaints, the summoning orders, and the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, was made out. 6. After giving my thoughtful consideration, to the rival contentions, raised by the Counsel for the parties, in my considered opinion, it is a fit case, in which the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, and the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, and the subsequent proceedings, arising therefrom, qua the petitioners, should be quashed, for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. It is trite that jurisdiction, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders, as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly, and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry, whether the allegations, in the complaint, are likely to be established, by the evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, when the evidence comes before him. Though, it is neither possible, nor advisable, to lay down any inflexible rules, to regulate such jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears to be clear that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction, to quash a proceeding, at the stage of the Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence, it is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out, in the complaint, or charge-sheet, do not, in law, constitute, or spell out any offence, and that resort to criminal proceedings, would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, or not. This Court, has inherent powers, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to act ex debito justitiae, to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 7. If any abuse of the process, leading to injustice, is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified, in preventing injustice, by invoking inherent powers, in the absence of specific provisions in the Statute. Before touching the allegations, contained in the complaints, it would be appropriate, to delineate the principle of law, on the point, laid down, by the Apex Court, as also of the Foreign Courts in some of the cases. Reference to the following cases, would reveal that the Courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power, to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English Courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. Reference to the following cases, would reveal that the Courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power, to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English Courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly Vs. DPP (1964), A.C. 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings, constitute an abuse of process, the Court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP Vs. Humphrys (1977), A.C. 1, stressed the importance of the inherent power, when he observed, that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, and is oppressive, and vexatious, that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the Court’s power to prevent such abuse, is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 8. In R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, AIR, 1960 (SC), 866, the Apex Court, summarized some categories of cases, where inherent power, can and should be exercised, to quash the proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations, in the first information report, or complaint taken at their face value, and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 9. The Apex Court, in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and others, (1977) 2, SCC, 699, observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court, to quash a proceeding, when it comes to the conclusion, that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding, ought not to be permitted, to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding, ought not to be permitted, to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in that case that ends of justice were higher than the ends of mere law, though justice must be administered, according to the laws framed by the Legislature. This case has been followed, in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court, and other Courts. 10. In Chandrapal Singh & others Vs. Maharaj Singh & another, (1982) 1, SCC, 466, in a landlord and tenant dispute where the criminal proceedings had been initiated, the Apex Court observed, in para 1 at page 467 as under:- “A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of Civil Courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous.” 11. The Apex Court noticed that the tendency of perjury was very much on the increase. Unless the Courts come down heavily, upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The Court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants, should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration, by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court. 12. The Apex Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & others Vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & others, 1988(1), RCR (Criminal), 565 : (1988) 1, SCC, 692, observed in para 7 as under:- “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak, and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 13. In State of Haryana & others Vs. Bhajan Lal & others, 1991(1), RCR (Criminal), 383 : 1992 Supp. (1), SCC, 335, the Apex Court, in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law, enunciated by it, in a series of decisions, relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases, by way of illustration, wherein, such power could be exercised, either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, the Apex Court, made it clear, that it may not be possible, to lay down, any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines, or rigid formulae, and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases, wherein such power should be exercised :- (i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if, they are taken at their face value, and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence, or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (iii)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iii)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code of the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 14. The Apex Court, in Janata Dal Vs. H.. Chowdhary & others, (1992)4, SCC, 305, observed thus:- “132. The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders, as may be necessary, for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration for which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.” 15. In G. Sagar Suri & another Vs. State of U.P. & others, 2000(1), RCR (Criminal), 707 : (2000) 2, SCC, 636, the Apex Court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the Criminal Court, to exercise a great deal of caution, in issuing the process, particularly, when the matters are essentially of civil nature. 16. In G. Sagar Suri & another Vs. State of U.P. & others, 2000(1), RCR (Criminal), 707 : (2000) 2, SCC, 636, the Apex Court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the Criminal Court, to exercise a great deal of caution, in issuing the process, particularly, when the matters are essentially of civil nature. 16. The Apex Court, in Roy V.D. Vs. State of Kerala, 2000(4), RCR (Criminal), 762 : (2000) 8, SCC, 590, observed thus:- “18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the Court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the Court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash proceedings in a case like the one one hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice.” 17. The Apex Court, in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & others Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & another, 2004(4), RCR (Criminal), 937 : 2005(1) Apex Criminal 74 : (2005) 1, SCC, 122, observed thus:- “It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 18. In Indian Oil Corporation Vs. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 18. In Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. & others, 2006(3), RCR (Criminal), 740 : 2006(2), Apex Criminal, 637 : (2006) 6, SCC, 736, the Apex Court, again cautioned about a growing tendency, in business circles, to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression, that civil law remedies are time consuming, and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure, through criminal prosecution, should be deprecated and discouraged. 19. In Inder Mohan Goswami & another Vs. State of Uttaranchal & others, [2007(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 3288] : 2007(4), RCR (Criminal), 548 : 2007(5), RAJ, 451 : AIR, 2008, SC, 251, the Apex Court, examined the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Apex Court in the said case, observed that inherent powers, under Section 482, should be exercised, for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process, leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the court would be fully justified, in preventing injustice, by invoking inherent powers. 20. In Anil Mahajan Vs. Bhor Industries Ltd. and another, (2005), 10, SCC, 228, the Apex Court, held that, if the dispute, is, with regard to the non-payment of price, and no dishonest intention, at the initial stage of transaction, was established, then it could be said, to be a dispute relating to the breach of contract, falling within the ambit of civil dispute, and not a criminal offence of cheating. The Apex Court, thus, quashed the proceedings. 21. In B. Suresh Yadav Vs. Sharifa Bee & another, AIR, 2008 (SC), 210, a criminal case, under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, was filed, on the ground, that the accused vendor, by dishonest concealment of facts, before execution of the sale deed, in favour of the complainant, surreptitiously demolished structure, standing on the land sold to him (complainant). In B. Suresh Yadav Vs. Sharifa Bee & another, AIR, 2008 (SC), 210, a criminal case, under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, was filed, on the ground, that the accused vendor, by dishonest concealment of facts, before execution of the sale deed, in favour of the complainant, surreptitiously demolished structure, standing on the land sold to him (complainant). Civil suit, with regard to the same matter, was already pending. Under these circumstances, it was held that, no criminal offence, was made out. The proceedings, were ultimately quashed. 22. In All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Dhane Badarmal Jain & another, AIR, 2008 (SC), 247, it was held, that the allegation, contained in the complaint, did not constitute any criminal offence, but, on the other hand, only gave rise to the civil dispute. Ultimately, the proceedings were set aside. 23. In S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, [2008(3) LAW HERALD (SC) 1828] : (2008) 5, SCC, 662, it was held, that under Sections 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to the offences of criminal breach of trust, vicarious liability, could not be fastened on the Managing Director, Directors or other officers of a Company, which was accused of the commission of offence, under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It was further held that, in that case, the allegations, contained in the complaint, even if, assumed to be correct, in its entirety, did not disclose the offence, punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Ultimately, the criminal proceedings were quashed. 24. In Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of Gujarat and others, [2007(4) LAW HERALD (SC) 3149] : (2008) 5, SCC, 668, the Magistrate ordered the Police investigation, under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., without applying mind, to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Magistrate, did not consider the bonafide mistake of the respondent Directors, in publishing the prospectus of the company. Thus, it was held, that no criminal offence, was made out, and the proceedings were quashed. 25. In Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Vs. Tarapore & Co. and another, (1996) 5, SCC, 34, it was held, that a bank guarantee, is an independent and distinct contract, between the bank and the beneficiary, and is not qualified by the underlying transaction, and the primary contract, between the person, at whose instance the bank guarantee, is given, and the beneficiary. Tarapore & Co. and another, (1996) 5, SCC, 34, it was held, that a bank guarantee, is an independent and distinct contract, between the bank and the beneficiary, and is not qualified by the underlying transaction, and the primary contract, between the person, at whose instance the bank guarantee, is given, and the beneficiary. 26. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, now let us see, as to whether, the allegations, contained in the complaints, in the instant case, constituted any criminal offence. The perusal of the allegations, contained in the criminal complaints, clearly goes to show, that there had been commercial relations, between the Steel Authority of India Limited, and the complainant firms, since 1989. The Steel Authority of India Limited, used to supply steel, to the complainant firms, being its conversion agents. They used to convert the steel and then re-supply the same, to the Steel Authority of India Limited. The allegations, in precise, contained in the complaints, were to the effect, that the price, charged by the Steel Authority of India Limited, from the complainants, was higher than the one agreed to be paid, and, had the rebate, claimed by the complainant firms, been given, by the Steel Authority of India Limited, they would have been liable to pay lesser price; that huge amount of the complainant firms, was due, against the Steel Authority of India Limited, on account of difference of price, and, as such, it (Steel Authority of India Limited), was not competent, to invoke the bank guarantee, furnished by them (complainant firms), in its favour, unilaterally, and, as such, by invoking the same dishonestly, it committed various offences and that fictitious invoices were prepared by the accused-petitioners. Even, in the year 1987, conversion agreement, was entered into, between the Steel Authority of India Limited, through its Jalandhar Branch, with the complainant firms. The terms and conditions of the said agreement, were amended, from time to time. If there was breach of the terms and conditions of the said conversion agreement, which was executed, between the parties, then it could not be said to be a case of criminal nature. The terms and conditions of the said agreement, were amended, from time to time. If there was breach of the terms and conditions of the said conversion agreement, which was executed, between the parties, then it could not be said to be a case of criminal nature. Charging of alleged higher price of the goods supplied; invocation of the bank guarantee, for the recovery of the amount, allegedly due to the Steel Authority of India Limited, against the complainant firms; and non-giving of rebate, to the complainant firms, on the goods supplied, by the Steel Authority of India Limited, did not amount to deceiving the complainant firms, nor did it amount to the commission of offence of cheating. The allegations, contained in the complaint also did not, in any way, constitute the dishonest misappropriation of any money, by the Steel Authority of India Limited. All these matters basically constituted civil dispute, between the parties, and civil suits, are already pending, between them. None of the allegations, contained in the complaint, constituted a criminal offence. The complainant firms, converted a dispute of civil nature, into a dispute of criminal nature, so as to put pressure, upon the Steel Authority of India Limited, and its officers, who could not be held to be liable vicariously, as per the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, to come to the terms. The criminal proceedings, in the instant case, are manifestly attended with malafides. These criminal proceedings, were maliciously instituted, with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, on the accused, so as to brow beat them, and make them to come, to the terms, under the pressure of the complainant firms. Since neither the allegations, contained in the complaint, constituted the criminal offences, nor the proceedings, are bonafide, but, on the other hand, attended with malafides, the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable, to the facts of the instant case. The continuation of the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, and the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, would amount to complete abuse of the process of law and the Court. With a view to prevent injustice, to the petitioners, the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, and the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, are liable to be quashed. 27. With a view to prevent injustice, to the petitioners, the Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, and the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, are liable to be quashed. 27. No doubt, the Counsel for the respondents, submitted that, this Court, at the time of deciding the petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing the criminal proceedings, is not required to go deep into the merits of the case, and even cannot look, into the documents, attached with the same (petition). He also submitted that the disputed facts, can only be decided, by the trial Court. This Court, is aware of the fact, that it cannot go deep, into the merits of the case, nor can it find out, as to whether, the evidence led, was sufficient or insufficient, warranting the summoning of the accused. However, in the instant case, as stated above, even if, the allegations, contained in the complaints, are assumed, to be correct in its entirety, only one and one conclusion, that can be arrived at, is that no criminal offence, is constituted therefrom, but, on the other hand, the same only give rise to a civil dispute. In these circumstances, with a view to prevent injustice, to the petitioners, the quashing of the proceedings, is warranted. The submission of the Counsel for the respondents, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, detailed above, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 28. For the reasons recorded above, Criminal Misc. No. 251-M of 2001, and, Criminal Misc. No. 20331-M of 2002, are accepted. Criminal Complaint No. 112/1999 and Criminal Complaint No. 37/2000, the summoning orders dated 30.10.2000, and all the consequential proceedings, arising out of the same, are quashed. 29. Attested to be true copy of the order be placed in Criminal Misc. No. 20331-M of 2002. 30. The Registry, is directed to comply with the order immediately. --------