Judgment : This Court issued Rule Nisi on 27.11.2008 and granted interim direction in W.P.M.P.No.33502 of 2008. Respondent No.8 was impleaded as per the order made by this Court on 03-8-2009 in W.P.M.P.No.35537 of 2008. 2. Respondents 3, 5 and 6 in the writ petition filed W.V.M.P.No.1764 of 2009. Respondent No.4 filed counter-affidavit. R-7 and R-8 also filed counter-affidavits. W.V.M.P.No.2455 of 2009 is filed by R-8, the party who was impleaded as aforesaid shown as R-9 in the vacate application to vacate the interim order. The writ petitioners filed reply affidavits to the counter-affidavit filed by R-4. 3. When these applications came up for hearing, the counsel on record made a request for final disposal of the writ petition and in view of the same the writ petition itself is being disposed of finally. 4. Heard Sri P. Venugopal, learned counsel representing the writ petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Mines and Geology, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue, Sri V.L. Surendra, learned counsel representing R-7 and Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel representing R-8. 5. Sri P. Venugopal, learned counsel representing the writ petitioners had taken this court through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and would maintain that the State having acquired the land, which had been furnished in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, under Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter in short referred to as “Act” for the purpose of convenience) for public purpose and without putting the said land for public purpose, the official respondents are contemplating to grant mining lease in respect of a portion of the said land in favour of respondent No.7. In such circumstances, the said property to be put to public auction and, in fact, certain representations were made by the petitioners in this regard. But, without considering such representations, the official respondents are contemplating to further proceed with the granting of mining lease in favour of respondent No.7 and the same being illegal, the said action is being challenged by way of present writ petition. The learned counsel also pointed out to the double standards adopted by the official respondents in the case of the writ petitioners and also in the case of the non-official contesting respondents. The learned counsel also pointed out to relevant portions of the reply affidavit as well. The learned counsel also pointed out to the double standards adopted by the official respondents in the case of the writ petitioners and also in the case of the non-official contesting respondents. The learned counsel also pointed out to relevant portions of the reply affidavit as well. The counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 6. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Mines and Geology had taken this Court through the counter-affidavit filed by R-4 and also had pointed out to the relevant portions of the counter-affidavits of the other respondents as well and would maintain that the official respondents would further proceed with only in accordance with law. 7. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue had pointed out to relevant portions of the counter-affidavits of the official respondents and would maintain that the Revenue Authorities may consider granting of No Objection Certificate in accordance with law in this regard. 8. Sri V.L. Surendra, learned counsel representing R-7 would maintain that R-7 being the first applicant, priority to be given to such first applicant. 9. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel representing R-8, who was impleaded as aforesaid, would maintain that the land acquired for a public purpose can be used for other purpose as well. The learned counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 16 of the Act and would maintain that granting the mining lease also would fall within the meaning of ‘public purpose’ for the reason that such grants would fetch revenue to the public exchequer. The contention that the same to be granted by public auction only cannot be a sustainable contention, especially, in the light of Section 16 of the Act. The learned counsel also relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 10. Heard the counsel on record, perused the respective stands taken by the parties in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, in the respective counter-affidavits and also the reply affidavit. 11. The learned counsel also relied on several decisions to substantiate his submissions. 10. Heard the counsel on record, perused the respective stands taken by the parties in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, in the respective counter-affidavits and also the reply affidavit. 11. The petitioners filed the present writ petition praying for issuance of a writ of Mandamus declaring the action of respondents 1 to 6 in leasing out the land admeasuring Ac.7-50 cents out of Ac.8-08 cents acquired by the Government in survey No.65/1 of R.L. Puram village, Cheemakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District, to respondent No.7 under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and also declare the action of respondents 1 to 6 in not passing orders on the petitioners’ representation, dated 12.8.2004, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and consequently direct respondents 1 to 6 not to grant any lease to anybody including respondent No.7, in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.7-50 cents out of Ac.8-08 cents acquired by the Government in survey No.65/1 of R.L. Puram village, Cheemakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District, and pass such other suitable orders. 12. The second petitioner had sworn to the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and it is stated that the cause of action of both the writ petitioners being one and the same, a common writ petition is being filed by both the writ petitioners. 13. It is the specific case of the writ petitioners that initially in the year 1980-81 the Government of Andhra Pradesh exercised its eminent domain power as per the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act, whereby and whereunder the Government acquired an extent of Ac.8-08 cents situate in survey No.65/1 of R.L. Puram village, Cheemakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District, out of the total extent of Ac.9-30 cents belonging to one Smt. Telikepalli Lakshmi Narasamma for construction of residential houses to the weaker sections of the society and also paid compensation to the original owner of the property. 14. 14. It is also the specificcase of the writ petitioners that subsequent thereto the State realized that the land, which was acquired for the purpose referred to above, had good potential, inasmuch as beneath the land there is tremendous amount of Black Galaxy Granite, and, hence, the Government cancelled the allotment of said piece of land in favour of 101 beneficiaries and had taken possession of the land. 15. It is also the case of the writ petitioners that when once the Government exercised its power of eminent domain for a public purpose and in the event of Government not utilizing the land acquired for such public purpose, the same can be utilized for any other public purpose, but such utilization should be only for public purpose and not otherwise. 16. It is also averred by the writ petitioners in para 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that while things stood thus, respondent No.7 herein made applications on 05.02.2004 and 16.7.2004 for grant of lease in respect of the said extent of land admeasuring Ac.7-50 cents out of Ac.8-08 cents acquired by the Government in survey No.65/1 of R.L. Puram Village, Cheemakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District, seeking mining lease. Incidentally, petitioners also made an application for grant of mining lease and also informed that they are willing to purchase the said property at market value as assessed by the Government. 17. It is also further averred that the State having exercised its eminent domain power and acquired the property for public purpose cannot now grant a lease to 7th respondent for mining operations, as such granting of lease for mining operation would not fall within the meaning of ‘public purpose’ under the provisions of the Act. 18. Further specific stand had been taken if really the Government wants to make money in respect of the said property, the only option left to the Government is to put the land for sale by way of public auction or in the alternative utilize the land for any other public purpose. The Government cannot grant lease in respect of the mineral lying beneath the said property. The Government cannot grant lease in respect of the mineral lying beneath the said property. The representations made by the writ petitioners in this regard also had been referred to and it is stated that the Government had not passed any orders on the said representations and on the contrary is proceeding further to make a grant in favour of 7th respondent and the same is evident on a reading of the proceedings in Rc.B.695/2005, dated 28.9.2007, of the 6th respondent and proceedings Rc.C/1611/2005, dated -8-2008, of the 5th respondent. The said proceedings also are placed before this Court. 19. In the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of respondents 3, 5 and 6, which was sworn to by 6th respondent, it is averred that the house site pattas granted for the land in question were cancelled as there is good potential of Black Galaxy Granite, 95 plots are vacant and as the land is not fit for habitation. In view of the orders of I Additional Civil Judge, Ongole, in I.A.No.1688 of 2000 in O.S.No.1220 of 2000 and I.A.No.221 of 2001 in O.S.No.176 of 2001, dated 28.4.2001, alternate land for house sites was provided for 43 beneficiaries after resumption of land of Ac.8-08 cents in S.No.65/1A of R.L. Puram by the Tahsildar, Chimakurthy, in Rc.B.695/2005, dated 03.11.2005. The surrounding lands had Black Galaxy Granite and quarrying operations are being made and thereby the beneficiaries could not take up habitation. 20. It is further stated that the Government in G.O.Ms.No.783, Revenue (T.A) Department, dated 09.10.1999, amended paragraph 32 of BSO90 as follows: “The land acquired for public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 8/94 shall be utilized for the same purpose for which it is acquired as far as possible. In case the land is not required for the purpose for which it is acquired due to any reason the land shall be utilized for any other purpose as deemed fit for including afforestation.” In the instant case, the land is not fit for habitation as it is covered by rocks and having Galaxy Granites. Hence, the house site pattas granted in this land were cancelled and resumed to Government with intention to lease out the land for quarrying operations, as several applications had come. Moreover, by leasing out of the land, the Government would get revenue besides seigniorage fees royalty etc. 21. Hence, the house site pattas granted in this land were cancelled and resumed to Government with intention to lease out the land for quarrying operations, as several applications had come. Moreover, by leasing out of the land, the Government would get revenue besides seigniorage fees royalty etc. 21. Further specific stand had been taken that as it was proposed to lease out to one of the applicants, the petitioners, out of frustration, had filed the present writ petition. It is also further averred that on acquisition of land under the provisions of the Act and on payment of compensation to the original land holders, the said land vests with the Government and the Government had power and right over the said land to utilize for any purpose as deem fit by the Government. 22. As stated supra, initially the land was acquired for providing house sites to the weaker sections and in fact after paying required compensation to the original land holders and on completion of the land acquisition proceedings, house site pattas were distributed to the identified beneficiaries and later as it was found that the said land is not fit for habitation, since there were mines in the land, the assignment pattas were cancelled and the assignees were provided alternative house sites, the land vests with the Government and it can be utilized for any purpose. Since there is potential for Black Galaxy Granite, several persons had submitted their applications for grant of mining including the writ petitioners and 7th respondent. The petitioner had no right to seek alienation of the land in his favour. 23. In the counter-affidavit filed by R-4 it is stated that Vaka Srinivasa Reddy, the first petitioner had filed an application on 23.7.2008 for grant of quarry lease for Black Galaxy Granite over an extent of 4.000 hectares in Sy.No.65/1A of R.L. Puram village, Chimakurthy Mandal, Prakasam District, in accordance with Rule 12 (5)(a)(1) of Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966. The applicant had filed it in his individual capacity and the second writ petitioner had not filed any application either in individual capacity or otherwise. 24. Further, it is averred that M/s. Venkateswara Granites, the 7th respondent herein, made an application for grant of lease on 18.02.1997 over the subject area, but not on 05.02.2004 and 16.7.2004 as stated by the petitioners. 24. Further, it is averred that M/s. Venkateswara Granites, the 7th respondent herein, made an application for grant of lease on 18.02.1997 over the subject area, but not on 05.02.2004 and 16.7.2004 as stated by the petitioners. Further specific stand had been taken that according to the information available on record no application was filed by M/s. Yashwanth Granites for the subject area. M/s. Yashwanth Granites is not on the rolls of 4th respondent even for trading of Granite. Several further particulars also had been furnished in para 5 of the counter-affidavit. It is stated that 9 applications, including that of petitioner, for the same survey number were received from 1997 onwards and all the applications are pending for want of report from revenue authorities. The application of the petitioner stands at S.No.7 in the list. The details are mentioned as hereunder. 25. Further it is stated that the Department could not take any further action for processing the applications depending upon the priorities, merits and demerits as per Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, in the absence of the report from the Tahsildar, Chimakurthy. However, as per the instructions of the Government in Industries and Commerce Department and the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, in Memo No.11362/M.II(1)/2008-1, dated 8.9.2008, and Memo No.30421/R3-1(CMP)/2008, dated 11.9.2008, the respondent had submitted combined proposals on all the pending applications, including the first petitioner, to the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, vide Lr.No.7472/Q/2008, dated 25.10.2008, subject to receipt of No Objection Certificate from the Revenue Department and the orders in the matter are awaited. 26. It is also stated that the subject area is within the world famous Black Galaxy Zone and as such it may also comprise good deposit of Black Galaxy Granite and from the above it is crystal clear that the application of the petitioner stands at serial No.8 and all the applications received are pending for want of No Objection Certificate from the Revenue Department. The order made in W.P.No.5164 of 2008 also had been referred to. 27. Further specific stand had been taken that the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, is the authority competent to grant quarry lease under Rule 12 (5)(a)(i) of Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, subject to the receipt of report from the Revenue Department as regards to the classification and availability of land. 28. 27. Further specific stand had been taken that the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, is the authority competent to grant quarry lease under Rule 12 (5)(a)(i) of Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, subject to the receipt of report from the Revenue Department as regards to the classification and availability of land. 28. The counter-affidavits of R-7 and R-8 also had been filed. R-7, in fact, had narrated several details in the counter-affidavit. It is averred in the counter-affidavit of 7th respondent that the 7th respondent filed application for grant of quarry lease for Black Galaxy Granite for a period of 15 years over an extent of 3.035 hectors in Sy.No.65/1A of R.L. Puram village, Cheemakurthy Mandal, Prakasam District, and the said application was received by the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, on 12.2.1997 and the same was forwarded to DDMG, Guntur, vide proceedings Memo No.5111/R3-2/97, dated 18.2.1997, for survey, inspection and report. The respondent filed original challans for Rs.5,000/- towards application fee and Rs.55/- survey charges vide challan No.1160, dated 11.2.1997, and demand draft of Rs.30,000/-. The respondent also filed a notarized affidavit stating that he does not hold any ML/QL/PL and not in mineral revenue arrears. The area was inspected by the DDMG, Guntur, on 26.3.1997 and reported that the area contains workable Galaxy Granite and covered with thatched houses. The area was surveyed for an extent of 3.035 hectors (7.50 acres) for which the applicant had given his consent. Rejection proposals were submitted by the DDMG, Guntur, vide letter No.1135/Q2/97, dated 21.9.1998 on the ground that the area is covered with number of thatched houses. The DMG issued SCNs vide notices Nos.511/R3-2/97, dated 16.11.1998, and dated 02.01.1999, since the Government wanted to reserve this area in favour of PSU. Thereafter, the respondent had given consent for conversion of QL into PL application to process under Granite Conservation and Development Rules, 1999. 29. Respondent No.7 also had averred that he had submitted his consent through a notarized affidavit for conversion of QL into PL application on 30.7.2001. Since the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.181, dated 28.5.1998, Ind & Com. Dept. delegated the powers of processing of the applications to the ADMG, the DDMG vide his Memo handed over the file to the ADMG, Ongole, through his Memo No.1135/Q2/97, dated 06.11.2000. Since the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.181, dated 28.5.1998, Ind & Com. Dept. delegated the powers of processing of the applications to the ADMG, the DDMG vide his Memo handed over the file to the ADMG, Ongole, through his Memo No.1135/Q2/97, dated 06.11.2000. Again the ADMG submitted proposals for rejection on the same ground that the area is covered with thatched houses vide his proceedings No.1135/Q/97, dated 14.8.2003. Again the Director of Mines and Geology had issued SCN 30.9.2003, for which the respondent gave a reply that the thatched houses were temporarily hutments and negotiating to show alternative and for rehabilitation of the hutments and as per the rules safety precautions will be taken for road safety. After perusing the reply, again the file was returned to the ADMG for further processing vide Memo No.511/R3-2/97, dated 22.10.2003. Thereafter, the respondent had filed W.P.No.17726 of 2004 before this Court seeking clearance from the revenue authority. This Court disposed of the writ petition directing the MRO to dispose of their request. Thereafter, the respondent gave consent to provide alternative land for residential purpose for providing house site pattas for which the respondent had handed over Ac.1-36 cents to the MRO, Cheemakurthy and thereafter the Tahsildar had provided and handed over the house site pattas to the beneficiaries and they had also taken possession. The application of the 7th respondent is still pending and it enjoys the priority over the other applications for grant of quarry lease. Since the area was found potential Black Galaxy Granite deposits, it is fit for mining. 30. Further specific stand had been taken that when once the land was taken possession after payment of compensation, such land vests wholly with the State free from all encumbrances. 31. In the counter-affidavit filed by 8th respondent also almost similar stand had been taken. 32. In Koppula Narasaiah and another v. Government of A.P. and others 2000 (6) ALD 299 the learned Judge of this Court after referring to the under noted decisions 1) C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to Govt. of T.N (1997 LACC 4 (SC) = (1997) SCC 627) 2) Chandragauda Ramagonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra ( (1996) 6 SCC 405 ) 3) E.D. Rama Rao v. Ongole Municipality ( 2000 (2) ALT 93 ) 4) Govt. of T.N (1997 LACC 4 (SC) = (1997) SCC 627) 2) Chandragauda Ramagonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra ( (1996) 6 SCC 405 ) 3) E.D. Rama Rao v. Ongole Municipality ( 2000 (2) ALT 93 ) 4) Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (1995 (5) ALD 391 = 1999 (5) ALT 202 (DB) 5 ) Indian Vegetarain Congress v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1999 Cal. 212 ). 6) S.M. Yahya Quadri v. District Collector (1996 (3) ALT 93) 7) State of A.P. v. Venkayya (1965 (1) An.WR 74) 8) State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai ( AIR 1997 SC 2703 ) 9) State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram (1996 LACC 478 (SC) = ( (1997) 9 SCC 544 ) observed at para 21 as hereunder: “The conspectus of various judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court is as follows: (a) The land acquired under the provisions of the Act for one public purpose, after putting it to the said public purpose partly or fully, if surplus land remains, can be utilised either partly or fully for any other public purpose; (b) When the land absolutely vests free from encumbrances, the same shall be treated as Government land subject to all legislations, rules and executive instructions touching upon the assignment of land for other purpose and for landless poor; (c) The owners of the land whose land is acquired have no right, legal entitlement or legitimate expectation in seeking re-conveyance of the land at the price at which compensation was paid under the award under Section 11 of the Act; (d) If the Government, as a policy decides that the land acquired is not partly or fully utilised for the public purpose for which it was acquired, is no more required for any public purpose, either because it is not suitable or because it has become waste land, the government is bound to deal the property like any other government property and dispose of the same in the manner which subserves public interest. The sale of Government land by public auction or by calling for tenders and disposing of the same to the highest bidder is the most transparent and best method of subserving public interest; (e) The power of the Government to dispose of the surplus land acquired by public auction also enables to permit original land owners to participate in the public auction and offer appropriate highest bid; (f) In any event, any claim by the original land owners or their legal heirs for re-conveying cannot be entertained after a long lapse of time, say, 10 years, 20 years or 30 years; (g) If the Government decides to assign the surplus acquired land to landless poor persons as a measure of poverty amelioration, the method of public auction need not be adopted;” 33. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in State of Kerala and others v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and another AIR 1997 SC 2703 wherein the Apex Court at para 4 observed as hereunder: “In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges; whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting higher value.” 34. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting higher value.” 34. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act reads as hereunder: “When the Collector had made an Award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.” 35. In Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and others AIR 2003 SC 234 while dealing with Section 16 of the Act held that after passing of Award land vests with Government, free from all encumbrances and the land owner thereafter cannot ask for restitution of possession even if land is not used for the purpose of which it was acquired. 36. In Govt. of A.P. and another v. Syed Akbar 2005 (1) ALT 36 (SC) the Apex Court held as hereunder. “It is neither debated nor disputed as regards the valid acquisition of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the possession of the land had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land acquisition Act, the acquired land has vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land acquisition Act, Government could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In the instant case, even under Section 48, the Government could not withdraw from acquisition or to re-convey the said land to the respondent as the possession of the land had already been taken. The position of law is well settled. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilized for any other public purpose; and (3)the acquired land which is vested in the government free from all encumbrances cannot be re-assigned or re-conveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order.” 37. Reliance also was placed on the decisions in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal and others AIR 2007 SC 1691 and Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 800 . 38. The decision of the Apex Court referred to in State of Kerala and others v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and another (2 supra) if carefully examined the same is distinguishable on facts. In the light of the clear language of Section 16 of the Act aforesaid, there cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, that the land acquired for public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act vests with the Government, free from all encumbrances. 39. Here it is not a case of sale at any rate and for the purpose of getting revenue to public exchequer may be that the Department of Mines and Geology thought it fit to consider certain applications in accordance with law to grant mining lease for the purpose of deriving some benefit i.e., revenue to the public exchequer, in the considered opinion of this Court this cannot be found fault, especially, in the light of the clear stands taken by the respective official respondents in their counter-affidavits. As already aforesaid, this is not a case concerned with sale as such. Granting mining lease in accordance with law is beneficial to the public exchequer. There cannot be any doubt, whatsoever, in this regard when such mining grant is beneficial to the public exchequer to say that such grant not to be made by the official respondents and the same to be put by way of public auction only would amount to doing violation to the clear language in Section 16 of the Act. 40. In such circumstances, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that the writ petitioners approached this Court only with a view to stall further proceedings in this regard out of frustration and this Court also is satisfied that the writ petition is not a bona fide one. 41. In the light of the views expressed supra, the writ petition being devoid of merit, the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.