JUDGEMENT Mihir Kr.Jha, J. 1. Heard counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the State. 2. Initially this writ application was fiied for a direction to the respondents that the petitioner should be allowed to continue to collect tolls for Ratwara Hat for the year 2008-09. By an interlocut ry application, I.A. No. 3265/2008, the petitioner had sought amendment of his prayer in the writ application for quashing an order dated 17.5.2008 whereby and whereunder the settlement made in favour of the petitioner for collection of tolls of Ratwara Hat had been cancelled and a direction had been issued for the fresh settlement through public auction on 23.5.2008. 3. Apparently the challenge of the petitioner to the impugned order dated 17.5.2008 cannot be sustained in view of the reasons given in the impugned order itself, wherein it has been said that the earlier settlement in favour of the petitioner was made on 12.4.2008 without following the prescribed procedure and in fact without giving notice to anyone. This part the statement in the impugned order in fact has not been assailed by the petitioner and it has not been even claimed that earlier settlement in favour of the petitioner on 12.4.2008 was made with him after issuing public notice. 4. Once this position becomes clear that the settlement of Ratwara Hat was made without public notice, it would be a case of a wholly illegal settlement in favour of the petitioner by the order dated 12.4.2008 and consequently the corrective action by the impugned order dated 17.5.2008 cannot be faulted. 5. The issue with regard to settlement of public property by auction is no longer res Integra. The Apex Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 1628 , has laid down that the discretion of the Government in the matter of settlement of Government property is not unlimited and that the Government cannot give largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will or on such terms it chooses in its absolute discretion. In fact the Apex Court in the subsequent case of M/s Kasturi Lal vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in AIR 1980 SC 1778 following the ratio of Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) has laid down the law that the Governmental action has to be examined by the court on the test of reasonableness and public interest. 6. If the case of the petitioner is examined on the parameters of the test of reasonableness and public interest, it would be difficult for this Court to uphold that the earlier settlement made with the petitioner on 12.4.2008 without issuance of notice to any person. Such settlement cannot be said to be justified so as to clothe the petitioner with any right to continue with the collection of tolls. The Government was definitely entitled to get the best offer for such settlement which was easily excluded on account of no notice to any other person and therefore, the settlement made in favour of the petitioner itself was wholly illegal. 7. Judged on the aforementioned parameters this Court would find hardly any reason to interfere with the impugned order and consequently the writ application is fit to be dismissed. 8. The plea of the petitioner of violation of principles of natural justice and the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dineshwar Bhagat Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 2006(4) PLJR 43 , is wholly misplaced. As a matter of fact there was no power vested in the Chairman of the Zila Parishad to make settlement and the manner in which the order of settlement was issued in favour of the petitioner from the confidential section of the Chairman would itself go to show that the petitioner had been settled with collection of tolls of Ratwara Hat in a surreptitious manner. Once the right of the petitioner is based on such illegal order of settlement, there would be no question of violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the order settlement being vested in the Zila Parishad and not in its Chairman was itself without jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter in fact becomes absolutely clear from the impugned order dated 17.5.2008 itself. 9. This aspect of the matter in fact becomes absolutely clear from the impugned order dated 17.5.2008 itself. 9. In any event the petitioner having been given an opportunity to participate in the proposed open public bid, as has been clearly stated in the impugned order itself, there was also no prejudice to the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner did not participate in the open bid held on 23.5.2008 would only go to show that the petitioner was not prepared to compete with others. Therefore the petitioner at best was entitled to only refund of his amount deposited by him on 12.4.2008 and if this amount has not been refunded the petitioner may file an application to Zila Parishad which would pass necessary orders for refund of the amount of Rs. 17,880/- within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 10. That being so, this Court would not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order and consequently the writ application being devoid of any merit subject to the aforesaid observation and direction, is hereby dismissed.