JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The genesis of the present writ proceeding, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, lies in Aalo Police Station Case No. 5 of 2007, under Section 409 / 120B / 411, IPC, wherein the case of the prosecution briefly stated, was, thus: On 17.1.2007, an information was received from reliable source at Aalo Police Station that one Oil Tanker bearing registration No. AR-08/0401, loaded with HSD oil and meant for General Reserved Engineering Force ('GREF'), Tato, was being diverted to Aalo for disposal/sale of oil at Aalo. On receipt of the information, a police team, headed by Sub-Inspector, R. Yekker, on being entrusted by the Officer in-Charge of the said police station to take necessary action in the matter, traced the vehicle at the compound of Yomgo Automobiles Service ('YAS'), Aalo, on 18.1.2007, at about 5:30 hours. On query made by the police team, it was found that one Jahid Khan, driver of the said tanker, had brought 5400 litres of HSD oil to YAS from GREF, Tato, with the connivance of the GREF officials of Tato, 92 RCC, with intent to sell the same. The said vehicle, having 6,000 litres of HSD oil and with vehicle's documents, were seized and the driver, Jahid Khan, and the handyman, Abu Ali, were arrested. The seized documents also revealed that there were documents, issued by GREF personnel, showing receipt of the said 6,000 litres of HSD oil purporting thereby to have received the said 6,000 litres of HSD oil, though the HSD oil had been diverted, with the connivance personnel of GREF, Tato, to YAS for sale and delivery there. On completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet, against some of the GREF personnel, namely, K. Ashok, A.T. Singh, Ram Lagan, Rajeev B, C.V. Sivaji, Jahid Khan, Anil Choudhury and Jainath Rai, for their prosecution under Section 409 / 120B, IPC. 2. On completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet, against some of the GREF personnel, namely, K. Ashok, A.T. Singh, Ram Lagan, Rajeev B, C.V. Sivaji, Jahid Khan, Anil Choudhury and Jainath Rai, for their prosecution under Section 409 / 120B, IPC. 2. On coming to learn that the said 6,000 litres of HSD oil had not been decanted, at Dett Tato, by the GREF personnel and had been diverted for sale as aforesaid, some of the GREF personnel were placed under suspension, K. Ashok, Ram Lagan, A.T. Singh (i.e., the present petitioner) and Rajeev B, being some of those who were placed, under suspension, by taking recourse to the provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, the order of suspension having been passed, as against the present petitioner, on 30.4.2007. By order, dated 27.7.2009, the petitioner's suspension was extended by another 90 days with immediate effect. Thereafter, an order was made on 24.1.2008, whereby the period of suspension was extended for another 180 days. By yet another order, dated 29.7.2008, the petitioner's suspension was extended until further order, though the period of 180 days, as mentioned in the order, dated 24.1.2008, aforementioned, already stood expired on 22.7.2008. 3. In the meanwhile, pursuant to the charge sheet, submitted by the police, in Aalo Police Station Case No. 5/2007 aforementioned, the accused persons, including the present petitioner, appeared in the case and, at the time of framing of the charges, it was contended, on behalf of those accused persons, who were GREF employees, that their prosecution was without jurisdiction inasmuch as sanction, for their prosecution, was required under Section 197, Cr.PC and, as no sanction had been obtained, in this regard, their prosecution was without jurisdiction and may, therefore, be brought to an end. Accepting the submission, so made, learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Aalo, West Siang District, passed an order, on 6.6.2007, discharging the accused. The reason for coming to the conclusion that prosecution of the GREF personnel, in the case aforementioned, was not legally permissible was that the accused persons were allegedly entrusted to receive HSD oil by their employers, i.e., Union of India, and while discharging their duties, the accused persons had allegedly misappropriated the HSU oil. The reason for coming to the conclusion that prosecution of the GREF personnel, in the case aforementioned, was not legally permissible was that the accused persons were allegedly entrusted to receive HSD oil by their employers, i.e., Union of India, and while discharging their duties, the accused persons had allegedly misappropriated the HSU oil. Thus, the offence of dishonest misappropriation, criminal breach of trust or criminal conspiracy, in the case at hand, was, according to the learned court below, committed, while discharging their official duties, and, hence, in such circumstances, when the GREF personnel were members of the armed forces within the meaning of Section 197(2), their prosecution, without sanction, in terms of Section 197(1), Cr.PC, was without jurisdiction and impermissible in law. 4. Notwithstanding, however, the discharge of the GREF personnel, the departmental proceedings, drawn against the present petitioner and some other GREF personnel, have been continued and the present petitioner and some others have been continued to be kept under suspension, though in respect of one of such persons, namely, Rajeev B, who, too, was allegedly involved in the case, the suspension order was revoked by an order, dated 24.1.2008. 5. By making this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought to get set aside and quashed the orders of suspension passed against him. Before proceeding further, it may be noted that the petitioner has not challenged the drawing of the disciplinary proceeding and/or continuation thereof. What he has sought to get set aside and quashed is his suspension. Though the petitioner has, primarily, challenged his suspension on the ground that since suspension of Rajeev B, who was similarly situated as the petitioner, has been revoked, it is unjust and discriminatory to continue to keep the petitioner under suspension. 6. At the time of hearing of the writ petition, it has, however, been brought to the notice of this Court by Mr. K. Ete, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that in terms of the amended provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, the petitioner's suspension could not have been for a period longer than 90 days and, secondly, the third and last order of suspension was passed on 29.7.2008, though even 180 days' period of suspension stood, in terms of the order, dated 24.1.2008, expired, on 22.7.2008. In effect, what is being contended, on behalf of the petitioner, is that the suspension order for a period, longer than 90 days, is unauthorised and, secondly, even if the second suspension order was validly passed on 24.1.2008, its extension, with retrospective effect, by the order, dated 29.7.2008, is illegal and may, therefore, be interfered with. 7. Let me, first, deal with the question as to whether the petitioner's continued suspension, despite the fact that the suspension of one of the co-accused, namely, Rajeev B, has been revoked as aforesaid, is illegal and ought to have been also revoked. In this regard, it may be pointed out that the respondents have submitted, inter alia, thus: Rajeev B is a Group-D employee and his duties, by virtue of his grade and appointment, are very different from that of the petitioner, who is a Group C employee, and who, even according to the petitioner's own case, as set up in paragraph-2 of the writ petition, was responsible for over all control of Dett Tato and that the petitioner's duty, as Superintendent EM Grade-II, was to check the quantity and quality of HSD (Diesel), etc., received from Indian Oil Corporation, to ensure proper maintenance of entry and exit, at the gate register, of vehicles and also to ensure correct accounting and preparations of reports and returns of Dett Tato. The petitioner had been, thus, according to the respondents, performing supervisory role and his duties cannot be equated with the duties of Group-D employee like that of Rajeev B. This apart, Rajeev B, being a Group-D employees, the disciplinary proceeding, which was drawn against him, was under Rule 16 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, which is meant for imposition of minor penalty. The departmental inquiry against him was finalised and penalty has been imposed on him and there being no risk of tampering of records by Rajeev B, his suspension order has been revoked and he has been reinstated in service, whereas the petitioner has been proceeded under Rule 14 of CCS (CC&A) Rules, which is meant for imposition of major penalty The departmental inquiry, held against the petitioner, is likely to be completed shortly and till completion of the departmental proceeding, revocation of the suspension of the petitioner would not be proper and has not been deemed appropriate by the respondents/authorities concerned inasmuch as the petitioner would have access to the documents and would be able to temper and manipulate the records. 8. In the face of cogent, specific and rational reasons having been assigned by the respondents for revoking the suspension of Rajeev B, it becomes clear that in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, revocation of suspension of Rajeev B stands on a completely different footing and the revocation of his suspension and his reinstatement cannot automatically lead to revocation of suspension of the petitioner, particularly, when the departmental proceeding, against Rajeev B, has been finalised and penalty has been imposed, on him; whereas the disciplinary proceeding, against the present petitioner, is still in progress, though, according to the disciplinary authority, it is likely to be completed soon. 9. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that the petitioner's suspension cannot be interfered with on the ground that suspension of Rajeev B has been revoked in the circumstances as described hereinabove, what, now, needs to be noted is that in terms of amended provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965, the period of suspension cannot be, at a time, longer than 90 days. In the case at hand, the petitioner was, initially, placed under suspension, with effect from 30.4.2007, by an order, issued in this regard, as indicated above, on 30.4.2007. Upon review, the order of suspension was extended for a period of 180 days by an order, which was passed on 24.1.2008. Thus, though the second order of suspension, dated 24.1.2008, was passed before the expiry of 90 days, the fact remains that further period of suspension was for as long as 180 days. Upon review, the order of suspension was extended for a period of 180 days by an order, which was passed on 24.1.2008. Thus, though the second order of suspension, dated 24.1.2008, was passed before the expiry of 90 days, the fact remains that further period of suspension was for as long as 180 days. This apart, the 180 days' period of suspension, in terms of even the order, dated 24.1.2008, aforementioned, expired on 22.7.2008; but the third review of the order of suspension was made on 29.7.2008, i.e., after about a week of the suspension order, which had, by efflux of time, already expired on 22.7.2008. Thus, placing the petitioner under suspension for a period longer than 90 days and that too, with retrospective effect, as has been done, in the present case, cannot be said to be legal and sustainable in law. In similar circumstances, another co-accused, namely, K. Ashok had approached this Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226, which had given rise to WP(C) No. 2/2009. By order, dated 31.3.2009, passed in the said writ petition, the suspension order of K. Ashok has been declared as invalid, though the disciplinary proceeding has been allowed to be continued. 10. In the face of what have been indicated above, it becomes clear that the petitioner's suspension is not legal, valid and cannot be sustained and must, therefore, be set aside and quashed. The disciplinary proceedings, against the petitioner, shall, however, be continued and shall be completed expeditiously. 11. Before parting with the records of this case, it needs to be pointed out that as far as discharge of the present petitioner and his other co-accused by order, dated 6.6.2008, aforementioned, is concerned, the same needs to be examined in the light of the relevant provisions of law as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('the Code'). 12. While considering the order, dated 6.6.2008, it needs to be noted that when prosecution of a person, in respect of an offence, requires sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code, no cognizance can be taken by any court of such an offence, which requires sanction, without requisite sanction having been accorded by the appropriate Government. 12. While considering the order, dated 6.6.2008, it needs to be noted that when prosecution of a person, in respect of an offence, requires sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code, no cognizance can be taken by any court of such an offence, which requires sanction, without requisite sanction having been accorded by the appropriate Government. In the present case, therefore, the learned court below could not have taken cognizance of the offences aforementioned, against the present petitioner and others, without requisite sanction having been granted by the appropriate authority if such sanction for their prosecution was a legal necessity. 13. What is, now, of paramount importance to note is that when a court proceeds with a case, wherein no cognizance could have been taken without sanction, entire proceeding of such a case, held by the court, would be without jurisdiction. Consequently, in such a proceeding, the court will not have the power to frame charge and when a court does not have the power to frame charge, the question of the court discharging the accused, facing such a trial, would not arise. Discharge by a court is possible only when the court is competent to frame charge. The appropriate course, in such a case, would be that whenever a court finds that no cognizance can be taken by it of an offence, because of want of requisite sanction, the court must stop the proceeding forthwith making it clear that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and, then, return the report of the police, which he had received, under Section 173(2). The Magistrate must make it also clear to the Investigating Agency that the court would have no jurisdiction to try the accused unless sanction is obtained. If the appropriate authority grants sanction, and with the sanction, so granted, the investigating agency re-submits the police report, there would be no impediment in taking cognizance of the offence(s) unless the period of limitation, if any, bars taking of such cognizance. When the period of limitation sets in, the delay, if any, can be condoned by taking recourse to the provisions of the Code. Such condonation would, however, require issuing of a notice to show cause to the accused against proposed condonation of delay and it is upon hearing the accused that the delay can be condoned. (see State of Maharashtra v. Sharat Vinayak Dongre AIR 1995 SC 23). Such condonation would, however, require issuing of a notice to show cause to the accused against proposed condonation of delay and it is upon hearing the accused that the delay can be condoned. (see State of Maharashtra v. Sharat Vinayak Dongre AIR 1995 SC 23). If, however, the appropriate authority does not grant sanction and the police report is submitted with the information that the appropriate Government has declined to grant sanction, the Magistrate shall, after having issued notice to the informant and hearing him, pass such order(s) as may be deemed appropriate. [See Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537 and Rosendra Chandra Das v. State of Assam and Ors. 2008 (4) GLT 155]. 14. In the present case too, it was impermissible to discharge the accused-petitioner as has been done by the learned court below, for, whatever had been done by the learned court below, from the stage of taking of cognizance until the day of discharge, were without jurisdiction and must be treated as non est in law. Whatever had been brought on record would consequently stand washed off the record as being without jurisdiction. 15. I may have to point out that in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi v. State of Bhopal AIR 1957 SC 494 , the Apex Court has made it clear that when a court is not competent to try an accused, e.g., in a case, wherein the requisite sanction, under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, for prosecution of the accused, had not been obtained, the trial, as a whole, is null and void. In such a case, observed the Apex Court there was no conviction or acquittal in force and such a trial does not bar a subsequent trial of an accused on obtaining proper sanction. The earlier proceeding, according to the Apex Court, being null and void the accused cannot be said to have been prosecuted and punished. In yet another case, namely, Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 1531 , the Apex Court has pointed out that when a court had no jurisdiction to try and yet tried an accused, the trial stands vitiated and, in such a case, an order of re-trial would mean that the entire record of the earlier proceeding would stand washed out from the record. 16. 16. In the light of the law as indicated above, it clearly follows that in the present case too, when the Magistrate was barred from taking cognizance and yet it had taken cognizance, there was, in law, no cognizance taken and the prosecution of the accused, who were covered by the charge-sheet was not impermissible in law and all proceedings, recorded therein, were null and void and shall be treated as non est and washed off the record. 17. The order passed, on 6.0.2008. discharging the present petitioners is, thus, prima facie against the law and this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and also the powers conferred on it, under Section 482 as well as 483 of the Code, has the onus of correcting the record and all such orders, which need such correction. 18. This Court is, therefore, of the firm view that a revision suo motu needs to be taken against the order, dated 6.6.2008, aforementioned whereby the present petitioner and the co-accused had been discharged A suo motu revision, therefore, needs to be registered and placed before the court for further necessary order. 19. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, the impugned order of suspension is hereby set aside and quashed. The disciplinary proceeding, already in progress against the petitioner, shall, however, be continued and be completed expeditiously. A suo motu revision, as directed hereinabove, be registered and placed before the court for further necessary order. 20. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall stand disposed of. 21. No order as to costs.