JUDGMENT : 1. The appellants herein who were the petitioners in the respective three writ petitions filed by them, seek to assail the orders dismissing the petitions filed by them under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking mandamus challenging the correctness and validity of the acquisition proceedings in Award No.1 of 1998 dated 10-6-1998 on the file of the second respondent herein as being violative of Article 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. The claim of the appellants is that they are the absolute owners and possessors of different extents of land in T.S.No.1508 situate at Bheemunipatnam, Visakhapatnam district. An attempt was made in the year 1994 for acquisition of said lands, however for some other reasons those proceedings were ultimately dropped. Later by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, dated 6-5-1995 the Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority (for short VUDA) proposed to acquire the lands to an extent of Ac.7.17 cents in T.S.No.1508. 2. On a reading of the pleadings from both the sides, the relevant events and dates as took place and which are not seriously in dispute from either side are that in pursuance of the said notification dated 6-5-1995, the authorities have caused a publication of the notification in the local newspapers on 26-5-1995 and 27-5-1995 and the same was locally published on site on 13-6-1995. The notice purported under Section 5-A of the Act was issued on 24-8-1995 to which the petitioners say that they have filed comprehensive and detailed objections on 18-5-1996. Subsequently, the declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 1-6-1996 and same was published in the gazette on 11-6-1996. This later declaration was published in the local newspapers on 29-6-1996 and 30-6-1996 and published on site on 30-6-1996. 3. In regard to the award enquiry under Section 18 of the Act, authorities issued notice purported under Section 9(1) and (10) of the Act on 20-8-1996 and enquiry was held on 12-9-1996, 5-10-1996 and 26-12-1996, thereafter the impugned award is passed on 10-6-1998. From these checkered events, the main complaint of the appellants/petitioners was on the twin grounds; firstly that there was no proper enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and thus the objections raised by the petitioners which go to the root of the cause have remained unconsidered in a proper perspective. From these checkered events, the main complaint of the appellants/petitioners was on the twin grounds; firstly that there was no proper enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and thus the objections raised by the petitioners which go to the root of the cause have remained unconsidered in a proper perspective. Secondly since the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 1-6-1996 and ordered (sic. Published) on 11-6-1996 itself, beyond the prescribed period of one year and therefore the whole proceedings got vitiated and liable to be set aside. 4. With these and other contentions as urged on behalf of the petitioners and resisted on behalf of the respondents, the learned single Judge dismissed all the three writ petitions by a common order on the ground that since an award is already passed, therefore it is not open for this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interdict the same, following the decision in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Baig (1) AIR 2000 SC 671 = 2000 (2) ALT 1 .3 (DNSC). Further the learned single Judge also held that there has been a due publication of notices as contemplated and therefore there is no denial of opportunity. 5. Contending that the very declaration was made on 1-6-1996 and later published both locally and otherwise being beyond prescribed period of one year, the entire acquisition gets vitiated and liable to be set aside. Though on behalf of the respondents it is sought to be sustained, having regard to both the notification and declaration, passing the award and enquiry having been held under Section 5-A of the Act, the petitioners cannot make any grievance. 6. On consideration of these aspects, as addressed from both sides, the point which crops up for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances, the impugned acquisition proceedings and award are vitiated and liable to be set aside. No doubt, apart from the plea as to the proper enquiry not being held as contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act and there has been no due consideration of the various objections including the sustainability of the nature of the acquisition as being prohibited under G.O.Ms.No.911 dated 9-11-1987, it appears the main question as to the validity of the declaration beyond the prescribed time has not been given attention. Be that at it may, from the above facts as could be evident, irrespective of the factum of holding enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act where a notice was issued to the petitioners on 24-8-1995 and objections were called on 18-5-1996 and later passing of the award on 10-6-1998 by holding an enquiry on the dates as mentioned above, the tell tale story which emerges is that declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act seems to have been made on 1-6-1996 and it was published in the gazette on 1-6-1996. Admittedly as per the counter affidavit, the news paper publications were made for this declaration on 29-6-1996 and 30-6-1996 and local publication at the site was made on 30-6-1996, there fore it is this letter publication which has to be well within the period of one year as per the provisions of the Act, appears to be not adhered to. Even on the dates as stated above, the publication is much after the expiry of period of one year i.e., the date of issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which was made on 6-5-1995, therefore irrespective of the eagerness with which respondents proceeded to complete enquiry under Section 5-A and award enquiry, there is a clear violation of the mandate under the Act which is held to be mandatory one and non compliance of the same would vitiate the entire proceedings. Hence, we have no other to go hold that the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. The other aspects as to the sustainability of the acquisition of the petitioners’ land in view of the aforesaid G.O.Ms.No.911 dated 9-11-1987, since there is a prohibition, does not require any consideration in view of the findings given above. We make it clear that the effect of the declaration made in this case as stated above, does not find place in the orders under appeal. However, since it goes to the root of the matter and the proceedings are totally lapses as per the provisions of the Act. 7. In the circumstances, we hold that the appeals are allowed and consequently the entire acquisition proceedings including the Award dated 10-6-1998 are hereby set aside and the writ petitions filed by the appellants/petitioners stands allowed. No costs.