Girishbhai Prahladbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, Thro P. Panneervel or his Successor
2009-11-06
K.M.THAKER, MOHIT S.SHAH
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Mohit S. Shah, J. Leave to make correction in the cause title for showing the correct designation of Respondent No. 7 as Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General with Mr. Pranav Dave, learned Assistant Government Pleader appears for respondents No. 1 and 3 to 8. Mr. J.B. Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel appears for respondent No. 2 – High Court and Mr. Adil Mirza, learned advocate appears for respondent No. 9. 2. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners, a large number of persons who are owners of various parcels of land in Sola, Ahmedabad have challenged that part of State Government Notification dated 4th February, 2009, by which the State Government has invoked powers under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The notification was published in the Newspaper dated 6th February, 2009. 3. The said notification declares that it appears to the State Government that additional land is required for the public purpose of expansion of the Gujarat High Court Complex at Sola, Ahmedabad, and therefore, a declaration is made under Section 4 of the Act that the lands in question are required for public purpose. By the said notification, the State Government cautioned all the persons having interest in the lands in question not to put up any obstruction or interfere with the survey of the lands in question by the surveyors for the public purpose of acquisition, and that any transfer, disposal or encumbrance of the lands in any manner without permission of the Collector after the date of the notification shall not be taken into consideration at the time of acquisition and determination of compensation. The notification further reads as under: "Since the lands are required to be acquired urgently, the Government of Gujarat further directs under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply in respect of the lands in question." The Government also appointed the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad (respondent no. 7) to discharge the duties of the Collector under the Act. 4. The petitioners have also filed another petition being Special Civil Application No. 3889 of 2009 challenging the rest of the above notification.
7) to discharge the duties of the Collector under the Act. 4. The petitioners have also filed another petition being Special Civil Application No. 3889 of 2009 challenging the rest of the above notification. The present petition is confined to challenge to invocation of powers under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. 5. The facts leading to filing of this petition briefly stated are as under: 5.1 At present the High Court Complex at Sola, Ahmedabad, is situated on the land ad-measuring about 34 Acres. After acquisition of the land in Village Sola in 1990-1991, the present complex was constructed and was inaugurated and became functional on 16th January, 1999, with 33 Court Rooms and 200 Chambers for lawyers and a separate block for Administrative Offices. 5.2 On 4th May, 2001, the High Court sent a proposal for acquisition of about 61,816 sq.mtrs of land immediately adjacent to the present High Court Complex on the southern side and partly on the western side [for the sake of convenience, hereafter referred to as southern side]. On the basis of the said proposal, the State Government issued Section 4 notification dated 17th August, 2004, and Section 6 notification dated 19th August, 2005. That acquisition came to be challenged in a writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 1689 of 2006 which came to be dismissed by another Bench of this Court on 11th April, 2008. The decision in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai and another v. State of Gujarat is reported in 2008(3) GLR 2602 . The matter was carried before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the SLP has also been dismissed. The possession of the said land was thereafter taken over and also handed over to the High Court. 5.3 The High Court also sent another proposal dated 18th December, 2003, to the State Government for acquiring another 1,04,935 sq.mtrs of land immediately adjacent to the High Court on the western side.
The possession of the said land was thereafter taken over and also handed over to the High Court. 5.3 The High Court also sent another proposal dated 18th December, 2003, to the State Government for acquiring another 1,04,935 sq.mtrs of land immediately adjacent to the High Court on the western side. It was pointed out in the proposal that the High Court requires additional 25 Court Rooms, Chambers for the Judges, 200 Additional Chambers for the Advocates, Additional space for Administrative Offices with 1000 officers and staff members and also buildings for Gujarat Judicial Academy, Gujarat State Legal Services Authority and also for Central Government Standing Counsel and Standing Counsel representing various departments of the Central Government and also for offices of the Advocate General, Additional Advocate General, Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleader and that immediate parking space is required to accommodate about 1000 four wheelers and more than 2000 two wheelers coming to the Court every working day, and therefore, large area of land is required for parking vehicles also. 5.4 A High Level Committee was constituted and a meeting of the said Committee was held on 5th May, 2004, where the need to have additional lands for the High Court Complex was discussed and the Committee took, inter alia, the following decisions at the said meeting:- "1. The ongoing acquisition proceedings be expedited by resorting to the urgency clause. 2. Acquisition of additional land on the western side as proposed by the High Court be done by invoking urgency clause." Thereafter another meeting of the High Level Committee was held on 8th August, 2008, and it was decided at the said meeting that, if necessary urgency clause could also be invoked for acquisition of the lands ad-measuring 1,04,935 sq.mtrs on the western side. At the said meeting the Committee took note of completion of acquisition of lands ad-measuring 61,816 sq.mtrs and completion of wire fencing. 5.5 Thereafter the impugned notification came to be issued on 04th February, 2009, under Section 4 and also invoking powers under sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 Section 17(4) of the Act in respect of 99,423 sq.mtrs of lands immediately adjacent to the High Court Complex on the western side. 6. Mr.
5.5 Thereafter the impugned notification came to be issued on 04th February, 2009, under Section 4 and also invoking powers under sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 Section 17(4) of the Act in respect of 99,423 sq.mtrs of lands immediately adjacent to the High Court Complex on the western side. 6. Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that since the proposal was made as far back as in the year 2003, there was no justification at all for invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) of the Act and dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 and in Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 , it is contended that even if there is any urgency for invoking the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, there is no satisfaction on the part of the concerned authority that the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act is required to be dispensed with. It is submitted that there is no material produced on the record of these proceedings to show that any such satisfaction was arrived at that it was necessary to dispense with inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is also contended that the valuable right of the persons under Section 5A of the Act cannot be taken away without full justification. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General for the State Government and various officers of the State Government who are joined as party-respondents as well as Mr. J.B. Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 2 – High Court of Gujarat and Mr. Adil Mirza, learned counsel for respondent No. 9 – Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority have opposed the petition and submitted that in the present premises of the High Court Complex there is acute shortage of space. Apart from the fact that the existing Court Rooms are small and not spacious enough to accommodate more lawyers and litigants, the space in the administrative building is also not sufficient. 8. Mr. Pardiwala, learned Counsel for the High Court has further submitted as under:- (i) The situation in the Administrative Building is also getting from bad to worse.
Apart from the fact that the existing Court Rooms are small and not spacious enough to accommodate more lawyers and litigants, the space in the administrative building is also not sufficient. 8. Mr. Pardiwala, learned Counsel for the High Court has further submitted as under:- (i) The situation in the Administrative Building is also getting from bad to worse. There is acute shortage of space for accommodating about 1000 Officers and staff of the High Court and also for maintaining the records of pending cases. Construction of a spacious administrative building is the urgent need of the hour. As on today, in the Administrative Building cupboards and racks are placed on the path-ways on both the sides. It is submitted that the Government Pleader's office is now reported to be not able to function effectively due to lack of sufficient space for keeping the case files and for accommodating the Assistant Government Pleaders and other staff members. Central Government Departments like Income-Tax, Customs, Central Excise etc., are also pressing hard for some accommodation for their counsel. The representations of all these Departments are also placed on record. (ii) At present the Gujarat State Judicial Academy is functioning in the Computer Building. Training programs for the whole year are scheduled. As on date, training for two batches of Judicial Officers is going on simultaneously. The State Government is not in a position to accommodate, in the Circuit House as well as in the Vishram Gruh, the trainee Judicial Officers coming from various districts. The lecture rooms are too small and congested and it is absolutely necessary to immediately start the construction of a new Complex for the Gujarat State Judicial Academy in the campus of the High Court with class rooms, auditorium, office premises and hostels for 200 trainee Judicial Officers. (iii) The office of the Official Liquidator attached to the High Court is functioning from rented premises and the Official Liquidator is pressing very hard for providing adequate space in the campus for shifting his office to the High Court. (iv) As on today the parking facility is proving to be completely inadequate and immediate steps are required to be taken for expanding the parking area to accommodate about 1000 four wheelers and 2000 two wheelers visiting the Court complex on every working day.
(iv) As on today the parking facility is proving to be completely inadequate and immediate steps are required to be taken for expanding the parking area to accommodate about 1000 four wheelers and 2000 two wheelers visiting the Court complex on every working day. (v) Today four lawyers are sharing one chamber and, having regard to the size of the chambers, it is virtually impossible for four learned advocates to operate from one chamber. The Bar Association is pressing very hard for a large number of additional chambers for advocates. Their representations are placed on record. In one of the representations of the Bar Association it is, stated, inter alia, as under:- "Ladies and Infant facility room : There is no reserved place where lady litigants accompanied by infants can have their moments of needed privacy and care. Some suitable arrangement can be made to ensure that a place is earmarked for the same and adequate signage boards are placed at prominent places indicating the same." (vi) About 150 SRP personnel are posted in the High Court for security of the Campus. As on today, there are no barracks for their accommodation in the campus. The additional land has to be now utilised immediately for the purpose of constructing barracks for the accommodation of the security staff. (vii) The present complex and 61,837 sq.mtrs of land acquired on the southern side of the High Court is not sufficient for all the above projects and about 99,423 sq.mtrs of additional land on the western side is required for the above expansion purposes. (viii) At the request of the High Court, the State Government has sanctioned Rs.50 crores by Government Resolution dated 26th March, 2009, for acquisition of additional land for the High Court and has also placed the funds at the disposal of the High Court for being transmitted to the Special Land Acquisition Officer. These funds are required to be utilised during the Financial Year 2009-2010 and any hindrance or any obstruction in the way of acquisition proceedings at this stage would lead to serious problems for the High Court and probably the provision of Rs.50 crores would also lapse.
These funds are required to be utilised during the Financial Year 2009-2010 and any hindrance or any obstruction in the way of acquisition proceedings at this stage would lead to serious problems for the High Court and probably the provision of Rs.50 crores would also lapse. (ix) It is submitted that having regard to the above aspects, this is a fit case in which the State Government has invoked urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and has dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 9. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 14 SCC 716 has submitted that Section 5A of the Act is only a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power by the State. But one should also not lose sight of the fact that invocation of such a provision is also sometimes imperative as in order to meet the urgency of the situation it needs to be invoked in public interest. It depends upon case to case. It is submitted that the satisfaction of the authority invoking urgency clause is a subjective satisfaction and this Court would not interfere with such exercise of discretionary powers. It is also submitted that about 2 years' time was lost in the litigation challenging acquisition of land on the southern side of the High Court and this Court has finally upheld the acquisition of about 15½ acres of land on the southern side of the High Court and therefore also no useful purpose would be served by holding an inquiry under Section 5A of the Act, for another 25 acres of lands on the western side of the High Court. 10.
10. It is also submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that since the present petition was filed very soon after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act also containing the declaration under Section 17(4) of the Act, the State Government did not take any further action on the basis of the said notification, but as held in First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Ganguli, AIR 2002 SC 1314 , any post notification delay subsequent to decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5A by invoking powers under Section 17(4) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself, specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. The question of dispensing with hearing and invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act and whether in a given situation there is urgency or not is left to discretion of appropriate authority and that satisfaction of authority as to urgency can be challenged before Court only if it could be shown that State Government never applied its mind or took mala fide action. The satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated. 11. The learned Additional Advocate General has also placed reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court :- (a) In Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 12 SCC 418 , the Apex Court has held that Section 17 of the Act confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in cases of exceptional urgency. (b) In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and another, (2005) 7 SCC 627 , the Apex Court has held that the opportunity under Section 5A of the Act is to be given to the landholder to show that the purpose for which the acquisition proceedings is sought to be made is not a public purpose as also the suitability of land therefor. On this count it is submitted that since both these issues were considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra), the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act is not required to be held in the present case.
On this count it is submitted that since both these issues were considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra), the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act is not required to be held in the present case. (c) In Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, (2008) 9 SCC 552 in support of the contention that in deciding whether the acquisition is for the public purpose or not, prima facie the Government is the best judge and that normally in such matters Writ Court will not interfere with the decision of the Government. (d) Strong reliance is placed on the observation of the Apex Court in paragraph 38 of the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 in support of the submission that Section 17(4) can also be invoked in situation in which an inquiry under Section 5A will serve no useful purpose or for some overriding reason it should be dispensed with. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions. 13. Section 17 and Section 5A of the Act read as under: "Sec.17 Special powers in cases of urgency – (1) In cases of urgency, whenever appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose.
Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." (2) Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (3) In every case under either of the preceding subsections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested, compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained.
(3A) Before taking possession of any land under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3),- (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (3B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of subsection (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1)." "Sec.5A Hearing of objections – (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. (3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act." 14. Having regard to the affidavits filed on behalf of the High Court and the State Government and the need for additional lands for expansion of the High Court Complex, we are satisfied that the respondents have shown urgency for acquisition of the lands admeasuring 99,423 sq.mtrs of land on the western side of the High Court, over and above the acquisition of 61,837 sq.mtrs of land on the southern side of the High Court which part of the acquisition proceedings is already completed. 15. In Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, 2004 (8) SCC 14 , a three Judge-Bench of the Apex Court has held that Section 17(4) of the Act is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act. The Apex Court examined the scheme of Section 17 and Section 5A of the Act, and in para 32 and 33 has held as under: "32 A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5A inquiry.
It requires an opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section 5A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the appropriate Government to apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5A inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by itself by sufficient for dispensing with Section 5A inquiry. If that was not the intention of the legislature then the latter part of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been necessary and the legislature in Sections 17(1) and (2) itself could have incorporated that in such situation of existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency automatically Section 5A inquiry will be dispensed with. But then that is not the language of the section which in our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further consider the need for dispensing with Section 5A inquiry in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with Section 5A inquiry does not mean that in each and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with Section 5A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5A but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of the Section 5A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Sections 17(1) and (2) of the Act. "33.
"33. At argument was sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants that once the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that there is an urgency or unforeseen emergency under Sections 17(1) and (2), the dispensation with inquiry under Section 5A becomes automatic and the same can be done by a composite order meaning thereby that there is no need for the appropriate Government to separately apply its mind for any further emergency for dispensation with an inquiry under Section 5A. We are unable to agree with the above argument because subsection (4) of Section 17 itself indicates that the "Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply" (emphasis supplied) which makes it clear that not in every case where the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there is urgency and under sub-section (1) or unforeseen emergency under sub-section (2) of Section 17, the Government will ipso facto have to direct the dispensation of the inquiry. For this we do find support from a judgment of this Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of UP, AIR 1964 SC 1217 wherein considering the language of section 17 of the Act which was then referable to waste or arable land and the U.P.Amendment to the said section, this Court held thus: (SCR pp.436-37) In the above decision the Apex Court further held that the right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property should not be made, and that therefore if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on materials on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5A. 16. In the same vein the Apex Court has made the following observations in Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 :- "16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency.
16. In the same vein the Apex Court has made the following observations in Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453 :- "16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a landowner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the landowners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility." [emphasis supplied] 17.
While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility." [emphasis supplied] 17. Turning to the facts of this case, we find considerable material from the record of this proceeding to justify the claim of the respondents that there is urgency to acquire additional lands on the western side of the High Court for expansion of the existing Court complex. Upon considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the averments made in the reply affidavits along with several representations received by High Court from the Gujarat High Court Advocates Association, Bar Council of Gujarat, the Official Liquidator, the Commissioner of Central Excise, the Joint Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad etc., the need for additional parking area, all these materials are sufficient to justify invocation of urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act. 18. On the question of satisfaction or justification for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5, the relevant portion of the affidavit dated 29th August, 2009, filed by Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat in the Legal Department reads as under: "Without repeating the reasons of urgency, as imminent requirement for the land in question is dealt with in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 and High Court of Gujarat, considering the letter dated 3.2.2009 address to the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department by the Legal Department along with the certificate issued by the Legal Department for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, State of Gujarat having subjectively satisfied for invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act, decided to issue and publish notification under Section 4 of the Act invoking urgency clause. Therefore, notification came to be published on 6.2.2009 in Sandesh Daily Newspaper. After considering the requirement for the public purpose of expansion of High Court complex, the decision by the State is taken after reaching subjective satisfaction, to invoke urgency clause for the acquisition of lands in the present case." 19.
Therefore, notification came to be published on 6.2.2009 in Sandesh Daily Newspaper. After considering the requirement for the public purpose of expansion of High Court complex, the decision by the State is taken after reaching subjective satisfaction, to invoke urgency clause for the acquisition of lands in the present case." 19. It is necessary to quote the certificate dated 3.2.2009 issued by the Secretary, Legal Department on the basis of which the Revenue Department issued the impugned notification dated 4.2.2009 under Section 4 of the Act for the lands in question on the western side of the High Court reads as under:- CERTIFICATE This is to certify that it is necessary to invoke urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the lands in Sola, Taluka Dascroi, District Ahmedabad (details given in the attached statement) admeasuring 99,423 sq. mtrs. for the public purpose of expansion of the Gujarat High Court Complex. Sd/- Secretary, Legal Department. 20. Having carefully perused the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government and the certificate dated 3.2.2009 of the Secretary, Legal Department, and the letter of even date from Legal Department to the Revenue Department, we do not find any satisfaction recorded that there was necessity to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Having regard to the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and having regard to the fact that the process for the second acquisition was started in December 2003 and the High Court on the Administrative Side also sent the proposal on 16th October, 2007, but the notification was issued on 4th February, 2009, even after making concession for loss of 2 years in the previous litigation challenging acquisition of land on southern side of the High Court, it is not possible to hold that there was such pressing urgency that it was necessary to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 21. The next question is whether the Court should accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that dispensation with inquiry under Section 5A should be upheld on the ground that no useful purpose would be served by holding such inquiry in view of decision of another Division Bench of this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra).
21. The next question is whether the Court should accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that dispensation with inquiry under Section 5A should be upheld on the ground that no useful purpose would be served by holding such inquiry in view of decision of another Division Bench of this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra). The learned Additional Advocate General has heavily relied on the observations made in para 38 of the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 in support of the submission that Section 17(4) can also be invoked in situation in which an inquiry under Section 5A will serve no useful purpose or for some overriding reason it should be dispensed with. 22. Mr. Mangukiya, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present petitioners having lands on the western side of the High Court were not owners of land on the southern side of the High Court and that they were not parties to the writ petition in which acquisition of lands on the southern side was challenged and also that acquisition of lands on the southern side was made after holding inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Hence the decision in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra) cannot be treated as a precedent upholding dispensing with inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 23. We do find some substance in the above submission on behalf of the petitioners. It is true that the Apex Court has observed in para 38 of the judgment in Narayan Govind Gavate's case (supra) that Section 17(4) can be invoked in a situation where Section 5-A inquiry will not serve any useful purpose. However, in the very next paragraph of the said decision the Apex Court has observed that Section 17(2) deals with a case in which an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act could not possibly serve any useful purpose. The pressing urgency to acquire land for restoring means of communication disrupted by sudden change in the course of a river was given as one such illustration, but it was further observed that other cases may raise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned, and if they do not discharge their special burden, imposed by Section 106, Evidence Act, they have to take the consequences.
In other words the Apex Court has held that a case falling under sub-section (2) of Section 17 will easily qualify for invocation of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, but in a case where urgency is invoked under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, the authorities will have to discharge their special burden. As recently as on 7th October, 2009, in Babu Ram and Another v. State of Haryana and Another (Civil Appeal No. 6864 of 2009), the Apex Court taken the same view :- "The observations made in Gurdial Singh's case (1980) 2 SCC 471 and in Om Prakash's case (1998) 6 SCC 1 assign a great deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections under Section 5A of the L.A.Act when his lands are being taken over under the provisions of the said Act. That in the said decisions, such right was elevated to the status of a fundamental right, is in itself sufficient to indicate that great care had to be taken by the authorities before resorting to Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act and that they had to satisfy themselves that there was an urgency of such nature as indicated in Section 17(2) of the Act, which could brook no delay whatsoever." [emphasis supplied] 24. In view of the above discussion and the material on record, it is not possible to accept the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that invocation of urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 will also justify invocation of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act. At the same time, the apprehension voiced on behalf of the respondent authorities that sometimes the proceedings under Section 5A are unduly prolonged, cannot be said to be without any basis. The present petition has also remained pending for the last about 8 months and as on today only 3 months' time is left for issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act and thereafter less than 2 months' time will be available with the respondents for utilisation of the sanctioned grant of Rs.50 crores being the amount of compensation proposed to be paid for acquisition of lands in question by 31.3.2010. 25.
25. At this stage it is also necessary to refer to the following observations by Three Judge-Bench of the Apex Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 particularly para 37 which reads as under: "37. We think that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and 5A of the Act. The immediate purpose of a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is to enable those who may have any objections to make to lodge them for purposes of an inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is true that, although only 30 days from the notification under Section 4(1) are given for the filing of these objections under Section 5A of the Act, yet, sometimes the proceedings under Section 5A are unduly prolonged. But, considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under Section 5A, it is difficult to see why the summary inquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously. In view of the authorities of this Court, the existence of what are prima facie public purposes, such as the one present in the cases before us, cannot be successfully challenged at all by objectors. It is rare to find a case in which objections to the validity of a public purpose of an acquisition can even be stated in a form in which the challenge could succeed. Indeed, questions relating to validity of the notification on the ground of mala fides do not seem to us to be ordinarily open in a summary inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. Hence, there seems to us to be little difficulty in completing enquiries contemplated by Section 5A of the Act very expeditiously." (emphasis supplied) 26. The learned counsel for the respondents further submit that the petitioners are likely adopt dilatory tactics. Our attention is invited to the fact that along with memo of petition, the petitioners have produced copies of several applications seeking information on various aspects such as measurement of the buildings proposed to be constructed. It is submitted that a detailed planning is to be done after the lands are acquired and that at present only the broad requirements have been considered. We do find considerable substance in the submission that this issue was also considered by this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra).
It is submitted that a detailed planning is to be done after the lands are acquired and that at present only the broad requirements have been considered. We do find considerable substance in the submission that this issue was also considered by this Court in Ramnikbhai Ramjibhai's case (supra). This Court has held that the authorities are not required to give such information while taking a decision whether to acquire the lands in question for expansion of the High Court. The petitioners' contention was negatived by observing that at the time of sending proposal and at the time of acquisition, only broad requirements are to be considered and it is after acquisition of lands that all the other aspects are to be considered by the acquiring body such as design and areas of Court rooms etc. This Court also held that subjective satisfaction that the lands were required for expansion of the High Court was not vitiated on account of non-supply of such information. We fully concur with the above view. 27. In view of the above, Mr. Mangukiya, learned counsel for the petitioners states that the memo of writ petition and the affidavit in rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioners contain most of the objections against the proposed acquisition, and that if any further objections are to be lodged, the petitioners shall do so by 20.11.2009 and that no notice or intimation will be required from the concerned respondent authorities and that the representative of the petitioners will appear before the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad (respondent No. 7) on 21.11.2009 at 11.00 a.m. and that the petitioners shall not pray for any extension of time for lodging objections, nor shall they pray for adjournment of hearing. 28. In view of the above statements coming from Mr.
28. In view of the above statements coming from Mr. Mangukiya, learned counsel for the petitioners agreeing that the petitioners will co-operate for expeditious completion of inquiry under Section 5A by not requiring any notice or intimation for lodging objections and that the objections will be lodged by 20.11.2009 and that the representative of the petitioners will appear before respondent No. 7 on 21.11.2009 at 11.00 a.m., while holding that the respondents have shown both satisfaction and justification for invoking urgency clause under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, but there was no satisfaction and justification about dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A, we direct that notwithstanding the invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act, upon the petitioners submitting their objections by 20.11.2009 (in one set and not separate objections to be lodged by each petitioner), respondent No. 7 shall receive such objections till 20.11.2009 and shall grant an opportunity of hearing to the representative of the petitioners on 21.11.2009 at 11.00 a.m. The time for lodging objections shall not be extended, nor shall the date of hearing be postponed. Respondent No. 7 shall consider such written and oral objections and submit his report to the State Government by 30.11.2009 and thereafter, the State Government shall take the decision by 10.12.2009. Stand Over to 14th December, 2009. 29. A copy of this order shall be made available to learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Pranav Dave and the learned counsel for the petitioners. Petition allowed.