Judgment The petitioner is the management. Aggrieved by the award passed by the first respondent/Labour Court in I.D.No.8 of 1996 dated 17. 1999, the present writ petition has been filed. By the impugned award, the labour Court directed reinstatement of the second respondent with service continuity and backwages together with all other attendant benefits. 2. The writ petition was admitted on 210. 1999 and an interim order was granted. On 11.01.2001, when the matter came up for further orders, this Court directed the petitioner management to pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- in terms of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the I.D. Act) from 210. 1999 and continue to make monthly payments till the disposal of the writ petition. Subsequently, the interim stay was made absolute with the above condition by a further order dated 30.12.2002. 3. It is the case of the second respondent that he joined the services of the petitioner management on 6. 1993 as an apprentice. His services were abruptly terminated on 7. 1995 without assigning any reasons. Therefore, he raised an industrial dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Chennai. Since the officer could not bring about the mediation he submitted his failure report on 12. 1995. On the strength of the failure report, the petitioner filed his claim statement and it was taken on file by the first respondent as I.D.No.8 of 1996. On notice from the labour Court, the petitioner management filed a counter statement dated Nil (October 1996). The contention raised by the petitioner was that the second respondent, being an apprentice, is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act and therefore, the dispute was not maintainable. It is also stated that the second respondents appointment is based on the apprentice agreement signed by him and it comes to an end on its own after the period stated in the said agreement. 4. Before the first respondent/Labour Court, on behalf of the second respondent, he examined himself as W.W.1 and marked 5 documents as Exs.W.1 to W.5. On the side of the petitioner management, two witnesses were examined as M.W.1 and M.W.2 and 16 documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.M.1 to M.16. 4. Before the first respondent/Labour Court, on behalf of the second respondent, he examined himself as W.W.1 and marked 5 documents as Exs.W.1 to W.5. On the side of the petitioner management, two witnesses were examined as M.W.1 and M.W.2 and 16 documents were filed and they were marked as Exs.M.1 to M.16. The labour Court, on the basis of the evidence (both oral and documentary) held that since the second respondent was not an apprentice in terms of the Apprentice Scheme conceived under the Apprentices Act, 1961, he cannot be non-suited by the Court. He is the workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. It also disbelieved the evidence of M.W.2, who said that since the second respondents service were not satisfactory, he was not made permanent. Though an attempt was made to show that the second respondent, during his apprenticeship period, was given in-house training by M/s.Sivasubramaniam and Umapathy, but those persons have not given any report regarding the unsatisfactory nature of the second respondents work. The labour Court also found that Umapathy, though was very much in companys service, was not examined. Even the so-called short fall in the work of the second respondent was not intimated to him. Therefore, in that view of the matter, the labour Court held that there was an infraction of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act and as the management had not complied with the mandatory condition precedent, the termination of the second respondent was illegal and opposed to the principles of natural justice. It is in that view of the matter, it had ordered reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 5. Mr. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the petitioner management contended that the Companys certified standing order in para 3.5 provides for engagement of apprentice for the purpose of learning a trade on the terms of training as may be fixed by the Company for a period not exceeding three years. Therefore, they have a right to bring about the termination if the work was not satisfactory. He also attempted to state that persons, who were engaged similarly, have left the services on completion of their training period and gave a list of 11 workers. Therefore, they have a right to bring about the termination if the work was not satisfactory. He also attempted to state that persons, who were engaged similarly, have left the services on completion of their training period and gave a list of 11 workers. Such contentions cannot be entertained at this stage and the petitioner should have convinced the labour Court about the true nature of their contract and also the kind of training they have imparted to the workmen. 6. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Mgt., TI Diamond Chain Ltd. v. Presiding Officer reported in Vol.101 (2002) FJR 775) and placed reliance upon the following passage found in the said judgment:- "A perusal of clause 2 of the certified standing orders shows that there are five categories of workmen and apprentice being the last, casual worker is just above the apprentice and temporary workmen is above the casual workman and probationer is above the temporary workman and permanent workmen is to the highest of the cadre. Therefore, merely because, the certified standing orders apply to apprentice, the apprentices do not automatically get the status of permanent employee." 7. The learned counsel also submitted that the Supreme Court in National Small Inds. Corpn. Ltd. v. V. Lakshminarayanan reported in (2006 (4) L.L.N. 590) dealt with a case of an apprentice covered by the Apprentices Act and in terms of Section 18 of the Act, such a person cannot be held to be a workman within the meaning under the Industrial Disputes Act. 8. Per contra, Mr.Ravi, learned counsel for the second respondent/workman brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.P. Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Others reported in ( 1999 (1) L.L.J. 1054 ). In the light of the said judgment, he submitted that an order of termination will have to be construed in each case. The language or words employed in the order of termination will determine whether it was stigmatic or not. The learned counsel for the workman also placed reliance upon the observation made in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000 (2) L.L.N. 47), which reads as follows:- "7. The language or words employed in the order of termination will determine whether it was stigmatic or not. The learned counsel for the workman also placed reliance upon the observation made in paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000 (2) L.L.N. 47), which reads as follows:- "7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice." 9. Though in this case, this Court is inclined to accept the finding of the labour Court with reference to the status of the second respondent as a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is significant to refer to para 21 of the judgment in National Small Inds. Corpn. Ltd. v. V. Lakshminarayanans case, (cited supra), which may be usefully extracted below:- "21. Even if it is accepted that the respondent was a workman within the meaning of the 1947 Act, on account of his contractual tenure, his case would come within the exception of C1. (bb) of S.2 (oo) thereof. In such a case also, the provisions of S. 25F of the said Act would have no application to the respondents case." 10. The above aspect has not been gone into by the labour Court and it has totally misdirected itself on the question of construing the term of apprenticeship given to the second respondent as well as the effect of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act. 11. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in National Small Inds. Corpn. Ltd., v. V.Lakshminarayanans case, cited supra, the impugned Award will have to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. The writ petition is allowed. However, there is no order as to costs.