R. Sundar @ Sundaramahalingam v. State through Inspector of Police, Thirumangalam
2009-03-11
G.M.AKBAR ALI
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : G.M. AKBAR ALI, J. 1. The appeal is preferred against the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge/Mahila Court/Magalir Neethimandram, Madurai for the offence under Section 450, 506(i) and 376 of I.P.C. 2. The case of the prosecution is that, on 19.1.2005 at about 6.30 p.m. when the victim was alone in her house at Alapalacheri village, the appellant, who is known to her tresspassed into the house and committed rape and also criminally intimidated her and thereby committing offence under Section 451, 376 and 506(i) of I.P.C. The Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Thirumangalam, registered a case in Crime No. 1 of 2005 and conducted the investigation. On completion of the investigation he laid a charge sheet for the said offence, which was taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Thirumangalam and later committed to the Sessions Court. 3. An appearance of the accused charges were framed and the accused pleaded not guilty and opted for trial. 4. To prove the guilty of the accused the prosecution has examined 14 witnesses and produced 19 exhibits and 4 material objects. 5. On perusal of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge has found that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt for the offence under Sections 450, 376 and 506(1) of I.P.C. and imposed sentence of seven-years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C, and two years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 450 of I.P.C. against which, the accused has preferred the present appeal on various grounds, more particularly on the ground that the prosecutrix is proved to be Schizophrenia with split mind and her sole evidence cannot be relied. 6. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the conviction and sentence passed on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix is sustainable. 7. Mr. Arulvadivel @ Sekar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecutrix is proved to be a patient of schizophrenia and on imbalanced mind. The learned counsel pointed out that the medical evidence would show that she has split mind and even during the examination her answers were irrational and not cogent. The learned counsel also pointed out that P.W.1, the husband of the prosecutrix and P.W.6 the brother of the prosecutrix would not support the case of the prosecution.
The learned counsel pointed out that the medical evidence would show that she has split mind and even during the examination her answers were irrational and not cogent. The learned counsel also pointed out that P.W.1, the husband of the prosecutrix and P.W.6 the brother of the prosecutrix would not support the case of the prosecution. He also pointed out that even according to the medical evidence, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant had committed the act of rape and the victim was subjected for sexual intercourse. The learned counsel further pointed out that the reliance placed on the evidence of the prosecutrix is not sustainable. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment in 2009 (7) Supreme 45 : (2010) 1 MLJ (Crl) 74 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, “It is true that in a case of rape, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and be lies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. We are of the opinion that story is indeed improbable. We note from the evidence that P.W.1 had narrated the sordid story to P.W.2 on his return from the market and he had very gracefully told the appellant that everything was forgiven and forgotten but had nevertheless lured him to the police station. If such statement had indeed been made by the P.W.2 there would have been no occasion to even go to the police Station. Assuming, however, that the appellant was naive and unaware that he was being led deceitfully to the police station, once having reached there he could not have failed to realize his predicament as ‘the trappings’ of a police station are familiar and distinctive. Even otherwise, the evidence shows that the appellant had been running a kirana shop in this area, and would, thus, have been aware of the location of the Police Station. In this view of the matter, some, supporting evidence was essential for the ‘prosecution’s case. As already mentioned above the medical evidence does not support the commission of rape.
Even otherwise, the evidence shows that the appellant had been running a kirana shop in this area, and would, thus, have been aware of the location of the Police Station. In this view of the matter, some, supporting evidence was essential for the ‘prosecution’s case. As already mentioned above the medical evidence does not support the commission of rape. Moreover, the two or three persons who were present in the factory premises when the rape had been committed were not examined in Court as witnesses though their statements had been recorded during the course of the investigation. In this background, merely because the vaginal swabs and the salwar had semen stains thereon would, at best, be evidence of the commission of sexual intercourse but not of rape. Significantly also, the semen found was not co-related to the appellant as his blood samples had not been taken. In this background the evidence of the defence witness Mohd. Zaki becomes very relevant. This witness testified that there was no occasion for P.W.2 to have come to the factory as no payment was due to him on any account. The Courts below were to our mind remiss in holding that as no written accounts had been maintained by Mohd. Zaki and no receipt relating to any earlier payment to P.W.2 had been produced by him, his testimony was not acceptable, the more so, as the factory, was a small one and Mohd. Zaki was a petty factory owner.” 8. He also relied upon another judgment (2004) 4 SCC 379 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, “Though the prosecutrix’s version in Court was of rape, when it is compared with the one given during investigation, certain irreconcilable discrepancies are noticed. The evidence regarding actual commission of rape is at variance from what was recorded by the police during investigation. The evidence of P.W.11, the father who according to the prosecution made a departure from what he allegedly stated during investigation is to the effect that his wife P.W.9 told her (sic him) that the prosecutrix was teased by the accused persons. Merely because he was termed as a hostile witness his entire evidence does not get affected. Significantly, the evidence of the prosecutrix and the doctor does not specifically refer to penetration which is sine qua non for the offence of rape.” 9. On the contrary, Mr.
Merely because he was termed as a hostile witness his entire evidence does not get affected. Significantly, the evidence of the prosecutrix and the doctor does not specifically refer to penetration which is sine qua non for the offence of rape.” 9. On the contrary, Mr. L. Murugan, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would submit that the conviction can be based on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix and it does not require any corroboration. The learned counsel pointed out that the prosecutrix has cogently spoken about the incident and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. 10. According to the prosecution, on 13.1.2005 at about 6.30 p.m. the appellant, who is aged about 24 years tresspassed into the house of the prosecutrix, who is aged about 44 years at the time of occurrence and has committed rape. It is proved by the medical evidence that the prosecutrix is a patient of Schizophrenia. Exhibit P-6 is the certificate issued by the Assistant Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Government Rajaji Hospital, Madurai. The doctor’s examination would reveal that the patient is suffering from split mind of schizophrenia. The external examination of the prosecutrix would reveal that she has not sustained any injury however, M.O.1, in-skirt would reveal some semenal stain. The chemical analysis report would show that it is a semenal stain however, it could not confirm the group to correlate with that of the accused. 11. The evidence of P.W.1 would show that when she returned home at 10.00 p.m., P.W.2 told him that some one had tried to commit rape and she did not say that it was the accused. He further stated that only on suspicion, a complaint was given against the accused. 12. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the entire evidence is based only on the evidence of the prosecutrix, who is of unsound mind. There is no other circumstances to implicate the accused with the evidence. Whether it is safe to convict the person on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, who is schizophrenia is to be decided. 13. In my considered view, the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is A not enough, her evidence was not cogent, under Section 376 of I.P.C., the presence of a semenal stain, which has not related to the accused, is also of any help to the prosecution.
13. In my considered view, the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is A not enough, her evidence was not cogent, under Section 376 of I.P.C., the presence of a semenal stain, which has not related to the accused, is also of any help to the prosecution. There are no other circumstances to implicate the accused with the evidence. 14. In 2009 (7) Supreme 45 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, merely because the vaginal swabs and the salwar had semen stains thereon would, at best, be evidence of the commission of sexual intercourse but not of rape. It is pertinent to note that the family of the prosecutrix are conducting prayer and it is also admitted that the prosecutrix will always be under sedative medicines. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant ia a young boy aged 24 years and the prosecutrix is having a split mind with illusive character under the circumstances. The evidence of the prosecutrix alone ia not enough to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. 15. Therefore, it is not safe to convict the accused only on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, who is having a split mind and without any corroboration. Therefore, the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge/Mahila Court/Magalir Neethimandram, Madurai, is not sustainable. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed.