Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—Rule. Ms. Parikh, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, waives service of notice of Rule. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for both the sides, the matter is finally heard today. 2. The only question, which arises for consideration in the present case is whether the Industrial Tribunal could exercise the power under Section 11-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short), in a case where the charges proved were of misappropriation and the punishment imposed was for putting the concerned respondent employee six stages down in the pay-scale. 3. The short facts of the case appear to be that on spot checking, it was found that certain tickets were reissued and the money was collected. Therefore, the charge-sheet was issued and ultimately the inquiry was held. The charges were proved before the Inquiry Officer. Ultimately the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal, against which the matter was carried in the First Appeal before the Appellate Authority, who modified the punishment and reinstated the respondent, but in the pay-scale of six stages down and it further ordered to treat the period during which the employee was on suspension as without wages. The said order was confirmed in the Second Appeal before the Competent Authority of the S.T. Corporation. 4. It appears that thereafter the dispute under the Act was raised, which ultimately, came to be referred to Industrial Tribunal being Reference (I.T.) No. 70/2002. The Industrial Tribunal found that the charges were proved and the findings of the Inquiry Officer were not perverse. However, on the aspect of punishment, it exercised the power ‘as of appellate power’ and modified the punishment to the effect that the increments be counted notionally at the time of retirement and for the retiral benefits, the payment should be made accordingly and the other part of the punishment was not interfered with. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by challenging the said award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 31.5.2007. It also deserves to be recorded that the employee concerned thereafter has retired on 31.12.2007. 5. I have heard Ms. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the petitioner Corporation and Ms. Parikh, learned Counsel for the respondent employee. 6. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by challenging the said award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 31.5.2007. It also deserves to be recorded that the employee concerned thereafter has retired on 31.12.2007. 5. I have heard Ms. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the petitioner Corporation and Ms. Parikh, learned Counsel for the respondent employee. 6. It is by now well settled that the power under Section 11-A of the Act is not as that of appellate power, but is to be exercised only when the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved in the Departmental Inquiry. If the facts of the present case are examined in light of the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal, it appears that the Tribunal in its judgement has concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and also of the Disciplinary Authority on the aspects of charges proved. The charge against the respondent was of misappropriation and once such a serious charge is found proved and if the punishment imposed ultimately is of reinstatement by putting him six stages down in the pay-scale, such cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. As such, when the serious charges are proved, the imposition of punishment in proportion thereof is to be left to the Disciplinary Authority. It is true that there are powers under Section 11A of the Act with the Labour Court or the Industrial Court to modify the punishment, but such modification is to be exercised only when the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. 7. It appears to the Court that considering the charges proved, the punishment imposed could not be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. Further, from the reasonings of the Tribunal, it appears that the Tribunal has exercised the power upon the aspects of punishment as if it is having the appellate power, therefore, has substituted the punishment. Such an exercise of the appellate power over the penalty imposed is not permissible under Section 11-A of the Act. 8. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal in Reference (I.T.) No. 70/2002 cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside, therefore, quashed and set aside. Such an exercise of the appellate power over the penalty imposed is not permissible under Section 11-A of the Act. 8. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal in Reference (I.T.) No. 70/2002 cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside, therefore, quashed and set aside. Consequently, the punishment imposed by the First Appellate Authority of reinstatement by putting the respondent six stages down in the salary - pay-scale would remain unaltered and the reference shall stand dismissed. 9. It is observed that if the retiral benefits are not paid to the respondent, the same shall be paid by the petitioner to the respondent preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. 10. The petition is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly.