PANASONIC ENERGY INDIA CO. LTD. (NAVINO) v. MAKARPURA GIDC EMPLOYEES UNION
2009-11-09
JAYANT PATEL
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) RULE. Mr. Iyer waives service of rule for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. With the consent of the learned advocates appearing for both the sides, the matter is finally heard. ( 2 ) THE only question which arises for consideration is as to whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner for engaging the advocate or not by the impugned order. ( 3 ) THE short facts of the case are that the petitioner is a company and dispute came to be raised under I. D. Act through Union. The pertinent aspect is that the representative of the Union is a practising advocate. However, when the petitioner company made an application for appearance through advocate, the same was resisted by the respondent Union and its representative by raising the objections. The Tribunal ultimately by impugned order did not permit the engagement of the advocate to the petitioner company. The review application was also filed which came to be rejected. It is under these circumstances the present petition. ( 4 ) HEARD Mr. Naidu for the petitioner and Mr. Iyer for the respondent. ( 5 ) THIS matter was heard on 29. 10. 2009 and following order was passed: "mr. Naidu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon the decision of the High Court of Madras in the case of Management of Hindustan Motors Movable Equipments Division Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Chennai reported at 2007 (I)CLR 967 and more particularly the observations made at para 23 of the said decision holding that if the representative of the Union who is office bearer and practicing lawyer is pursuing the case and the objection raised by the Union for engagement of the lawyer to the employer is accepted, it would result into creating imbalance and it would also violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. I would have further considered the matter for interim order. However, Mr. Iyer, learned counsel states that he will get instructions of the respondents as to whether the engagement of the lawyer should be permitted and the matter may proceed before the Industrial Tribunal or not. S. O. to 04. 11. 2009. " ( 6 ) TODAY when the matter is further taken up for hearing, Mr. Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Court may pass appropriate order.
S. O. to 04. 11. 2009. " ( 6 ) TODAY when the matter is further taken up for hearing, Mr. Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Court may pass appropriate order. ( 7 ) IT is undisputed position that the Union who has initiated the proceedings of raising the dispute and who has to conduct the matter before the Industrial Tribunal is represented by a lawyer who is also office bearer of the Union. Therefore the workman is being represented by a lawyer though may be in capacity as the office bearer of the Union, in such circumstances, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have exercised the discretion of permitting engagement of lawyer to the petitioner company, otherwise, it may result into creating imbalance situation. It can also be said that the right of the petitioner under such circumstances for assistance through the legal practitioner may be substantially curtailed though the another party is already represented through a practising lawyer who is also office bearer of the union. At this stage, it would be profitable to make the reference to the decision of Madras High Court in case of Management, Hindustan Motors Earth Moving Equipment Division Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court reported at 2007 I CLR 967 in which exactly the identical situation came to be considered by Madras High Court and it was inter alia observed at para 23 as under: "23. In the present sets of writ petitions, it is seen that though the workmen were technically represented by a leader of the trade union to which they belong, but, however, the said representative (G. Muthu) is an advocate practising before the High Court and the other Subordinate Courts and who has rich experience in dealing with the labour laws for over 30 years. If the same benefits is denied to the management on the basis of the workmen not giving consent in terms of S. 36 (4) of the I. D. Act, certainly it will result in an imbalance being created in defending the case before a quasi-judicial body and it will violate Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
If the same benefits is denied to the management on the basis of the workmen not giving consent in terms of S. 36 (4) of the I. D. Act, certainly it will result in an imbalance being created in defending the case before a quasi-judicial body and it will violate Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. This type of withholding of consent by the workmen was never contemplated in a case where workmen have a trained lawyer whereas the management in the second set of cases, a public sector management is not being allowed to defend its case by a legal practitioner. This had resulted in an anomalous situation. In fact, in the garb of exercising their right of withholding consent in the first set of cases, the workman and his representative waited or 55 adjournments and had allowed the management to be represented by a lawyer including filing vakalat at an earlier point of time and have raised this issue after a period of five years. " ( 8 ) SAME is the position in the present case. Therefore it appears that the Industrial Tribunal committed apparent error in exercising discretion in not permitting the petitioner to engage the lawyer. As such the Industrial Tribunal considering the facts and circumstances and in view of the aforesaid legal position ought to have permitted engagement of the lawyer to the petitioner. ( 9 ) MR. Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Union by relying upon the decision of this Court in case of J. B. Transport Co. and Ors. v. Shankarlal @ Mavaram Nathuji Patel, reported at 1999 (3) GLR 2019 , contended that the company can employ the officer having qualification of law and get the case represented before the Industrial Tribunal and therefore the Industrial Tribunal has rightly rejected the application for engagement of the lawyer in the present case. ( 10 ) I am afraid such contention can be accepted. It is not a case where whether the company should be permitted to employ officer having qualification of law and get it represented through such officer of the company or not but is a case where Union or the workman is already represented through a practising lawyer who is also office bearer of the Union and the company is desirous to engage the advocate.
Therefore, the said decision is having no applicability to the facts of the present case. Therefore, such contention cannot be accepted. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid, the impugned decisions of the Industrial Tribunal denying engagement of the lawyer to the petitioner by the order dated 07. 02. 2009 read with the order dated 02. 03. 2009 are quashed and set aside and the petitioner shall be at the liberty to engage the lawyer of its choice and the matter shall be proceeded before the Industrial Tribunal in accordance with law. ( 12 ) RULE made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to cost.