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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 710 (MP)

SUSHILA DEVI v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT OF M P

2009-06-19

DIPAK MISRA, R.K.GUPTA

body2009
Judgment ( 1. ) THE petitioners, legal representatives of Late Mahesh Singh jaudan, an Assistant Sub-Inspector, have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for grant of compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/- for his untimely death in the court premises at Gwalior which was earlier situated at Jayendra Ganj, Lashkar wherein the High Court and the District court were functioning in the same campus, the High Court in the first floor and the District judiciary on the ground floor. ( 2. ) THE expose of facts are that on 4-7-1998, late Mahesh Singh Jaudan had gone to the Court premises as he had to attend the Court duty in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior about 2:30 p. m. , while he was standing in front of the concerned Court, an iron pipe approximately 40 ft. in length and 5 inches in diameter fitted in the wall fell on his head as a consequence of which he sustained grievous injuries on his head, left shoulder and right leg and bled profusely. He was shifted to J. A. Hospital by Indraganj police where he was admitted in the Intensive Care Unit but eventually he succumbed to his injuries and breathed his last on 10-7-1998. It is averred that the death of said Mahesh Singh occurred due to the unfortunate accident which occurred due to improper fitting of the pipe and lapses in the maintenance of the building. ( 3. ) IT is pleaded that due to the death of the breadwinner of the family, the petitioners have become destitutes and have suffered tremendous mental agony. It is contended that he was getting monthly salary of Rs. 5,500/- in addition to other allowances and being a responsible husband and father, he was contributing extensively to the family. As he was about 47 years of age, there would have been hike in his salary component because of grant of increments and further he would have been promoted. It is urged that the petitioner No. 1 has been deprived of the love of her husband and the petitioners 2 to 5 have been untimely denied the love and affection of their father. It is set forth that the petitioners had demanded compensation from the respondents but when their request was not paid heed to, they were compelled to file the present writ petition. It is set forth that the petitioners had demanded compensation from the respondents but when their request was not paid heed to, they were compelled to file the present writ petition. The petitioners have prayed for a compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/- for loss of dependency, loss of consortium, loss of estate, love and affection and towards medical and funeral expenses. ( 4. ) IT is contended that the respondents are exclusively responsible to maintain the building and it was their obligation to see that the people who come to the Court campus are safe. It is urged that the long and thick iron pipe which had fallen on the deceased reflects gross negligence on the part of the respondents to maintain the building and, therefore, the petitioners as legal representatives are entitled to compensation. ( 5. ) A return has been filed by the respondent No. 1 contending, inter alia, that the averments made in the petition constitute a tortious liability and hence, the petitioners are required to take recourse to the remedy under the common law and no case is made out for invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is urged that though the building belongs to the High court, yet its maintenance is done under the supervision and control of the Public works Department of the State. After the death of the petitioner, a report was called for by the Registrar of the High Court, Bench at Gwalior from the Executive Engineer who reported that as per PWD manual, inspection of the building was made from time to time by the Sub-Engineer and Assistant Engineer and also the Executive Engineer on various dates. On the date of inspection, the building was found fit for occupation. The rain water pipes fixed on the walls of the high Court building were strong and fixed in place by iron clamps firmly and replacement of the same was not proposed in the inspection report of the Engineers. A Sub-engineer is posted in the campus of the High court building for maintenance works and he carries out the day-to-day repairing work as pointed out by the Assistant Protocol Officer of the High Court. In the report, it was stated that the pipe that had fallen on the head of the deceased was neither hanging nor was it shaky in any manner. In the report, it was stated that the pipe that had fallen on the head of the deceased was neither hanging nor was it shaky in any manner. Copy of the report has been brought on record as Annexure R-1. In essence, it is put forth that there was no negligence on the part of the answering respondent No. 1 and, therefore, it is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioners. ( 6. ) A preliminary objection has been filed by the respondent No. 2, Executive Engineer, PWD contending, inter alia, that the petitioners have directly rushed to this Court with a prayer to pay compensation without resorting to the alternative remedy which is available to them for redressal of their grievance. The allegations made in the petition have been specifically denied. ( 7. ) WE have heard Mr. Vivek Rusia, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V. S. Shroti, senior Advocate along with Mr. Vikram jauhari, Advocate for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Deepak Awasthy, learned Government Advocate for the State. ( 8. ) AT the very outset, it is seemly to state that Mr. Deepak Awasthy, learned Government Advocate for the State, raised a preliminary objection that the State Government should have been arrayed as a party instead of the Executive Engineer. The learned counsel has also submitted that they have taken a preliminary objection but not filed a detailed reply. However, the learned counsel for the State did not dispute the report that has been brought on record by the respondent No. 1, the Registrar of the high Court, Bench at Gwalior as per Annexure R-1. ( 9. ) IN our considered opinion, both the preliminary objections are of no substance as the Executive Engineer has filed an affidavit and the factum of the accident is not denied. The Registrar of the High Court of m. P. Bench at Gwalior had called for a report and the Executive Engineer had submitted the report as per Annexure R-1. It is appropriate to produce the relevant part of the said report : "for the soundness of the Govt. buildings located at Gwalior every year inspection as per provisions of PWD manual para 3. 063 (copy of the para enclosed) is made by the engineers. According to this provision High Court Building was also inspected by the Sub-Engineer and Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer or different dates. buildings located at Gwalior every year inspection as per provisions of PWD manual para 3. 063 (copy of the para enclosed) is made by the engineers. According to this provision High Court Building was also inspected by the Sub-Engineer and Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer or different dates. On the date of inspection this building was found fit for occupation. Copies of the inspection reports of last three years are also enclosed for perusal. From these reports it is clear that various special repair works were proposed for sanction every year as per requirement of the respective buildings. Since rain water pipes fixed on the stone walls of the High Court building are very strong and fixed in position by iron clamps firmly the replacement/refixing of the iron pipe was not proposed in the inspection report of the Engineers of the Public Works department. For the maintenance of the High Court building Sub-Engineer is working in the campus of this building. He is carrying out day-to-day repairing work pointed out by the concerned Assistant Protocol Officer of the department. After compliance of the repairing acknowledgment of the concerned where repairing is carried out is also taken. Photo copy of the repairing work carried out on receipt of complaint is also enclosed herewith and marked as. For replacement/refixing of rain water pipe no complaint had been received by the sub-Engineer working in the High Court campus. Thus, it is clear that the iron pipe which had fallen down was neither hanging nor it was looking out of the plumb before falling. Due to this reason it was never reported neither by the Engineers nor by the assistant Protocol Officer of the concerning section. Reports of the incident received from Sub-Engineer and Assistant Engineer reveals that the rain water pipe has fallen suddenly at the place where Shri Mahesh Singh jadoon, Police Sub-Inspector, was sitting on duty. It is the place where generally police man remains on duty. All rain water pipes of the High Court building are fixed on stone wall with iron clamps which are quite strong and are still intact and fixed well on all rain water pipes. So many criminals are attending Court daily in different trial cases and so many related persons having criminal approach are also appearing in the said premise. All rain water pipes of the High Court building are fixed on stone wall with iron clamps which are quite strong and are still intact and fixed well on all rain water pipes. So many criminals are attending Court daily in different trial cases and so many related persons having criminal approach are also appearing in the said premise. It is, therefore, also possible that the clamps holding rainy water pipe may have been cut by any person who may be interested to harm policeman working on duty at this place. On receipt by your letter I again inspected the building on 3-10-1998 and found that all rain water pipes are fixed in position very well. An estimate for replacement of iron pipe by P. V. C. pipe is prepared and enclosed herewith for obtaining sanction under m. O. W. from Honble High Court, Jabalpur. Looking to the circumstances and condition of the building it is quite clear that rain water pipe may have fallen due to any unforeseen reasons which has caused injury on the head of Shri Mahesh Singh Jadun for which P. W. D. is not responsible. " ( 10. ) THE question that emanates for consideration in obtaining factual matrix is whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation. It is not in dispute that the deceased had gone to Court to attend the Court duty in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior. It is also not disputed that he was standing where a policeman on duty is required to stay. The incident of falling of the iron pipe has been accepted. What has been stated in the report is that there is no negligence on the part of the Public Works department. It is averred in the report that criminals are attending Court in different trials and it is possible that the clamps holding rain water pipes may have been cut by any person who may be interested to harm the policemen on duty. Simultaneously, it is also set forth that the inspection was carried out on 3-10-1998 and it was found that the rain water pipe was found to be fixed in its position in good condition. Simultaneously, it is also set forth that the inspection was carried out on 3-10-1998 and it was found that the rain water pipe was found to be fixed in its position in good condition. Thereafter, it has been suggested that the rain water pipe may have fallen due to any unforeseen reasons which has caused injury on the head of Late Mahesh Singh Jaudan for which p. W. D. is not responsible. ( 11. ) IT is submitted by Mr. Rusia that in the case at hand, public law remedy comes into place as there is violation of right to life as well as the human rights of the petitioners and hence, the petitioners are entitled to get compensation, moreso, when there is no factual dispute in the remotest sense. ( 12. ) IN this context, we. may refer with profit to the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M. C. Mehta v. Union of india (1987) 1 SCC 395 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1086 )wherein their Lordships expressed the view that human rights jurisprudence cannot permitted to be thwarted by the status quoists. Their Lordships further ruled that award of compensation under Article 32 specifically in appropriate cases can be extended beyond the eases involving wrongful arrest or detention. In the said case, it was further held as follows "we must, therefore, hold that Article 32 is not powerless to assist a person when he finds that his fundamental right has been violated. He can, in that event, seek remedial assistance under Article 32. The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate cases. We are deliberately using the words "in appropriate cases" because we must make it clear that it is not in every case where there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by the violator that compensation would be awarded by the Court in a petition under Article 32. We are deliberately using the words "in appropriate cases" because we must make it clear that it is not in every case where there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by the violator that compensation would be awarded by the Court in a petition under Article 32. The infringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent, that is, incontroversible and ex facie glaring and either such infringement should be on a large scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of persons, or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or oppressive on account of their poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position to require the person or persons affected by such infringement to initiate and pursue act in the civil courts. Ordinarily, of course, a petition under Article 32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through the ordinary process of civil Court. It is only in exceptional cases of the nature indicated by us above, that compensation may be awarded in a petition under Article 32. . . . . . . . . . . . . . If we make a fact analysis of the cases where compensation has been awarded by this Court, we will find that in all the cases, the fact of infringement was patent and incontrovertible, the violation was gross and its magnitude was such as to shock the conscience of the Court and it would have been gravely unjust to the person whose fundamental right was violated, to require him to go to the civil Court for claiming compensation. " ( 13. " ( 13. ) IN this context, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Nilabati behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1960 ), wherein the Apex court ruled thus :- "a claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human right and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is distinct from, and in addition to the remedy private law for damages for the tort resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. " After so stating, their Lordships proceeded to observe as under :- "the defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justified award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. " ( 14. ) IN the said case, Justice A. S. Anand (as his Lordship then was), in his concurring opinion, expressed the view in the following terms : "the public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the Court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings under article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making monetary amends under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of exemplary damages awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. " ( 15. ) IN the aforesaid decision, their Lordships have clearly held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to grant relief to the victim or the heirs of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution are established have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the rights of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. It has been further expressed therein that in doing so, the courts take into account not only the interest of the applicant and the respondent but also the interest of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform public duties properly particularly where the fundamental rights of the citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court has laid that legal heirs of a victim have a right to get compensation and officials have to perform their public duties properly. Special emphasis has been laid where fundamental rights of the citizen under Article 21 are concerned. In said case, their Lordships have further rules as follows:- "if the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law, is to be real, the enforcement of the right in case of every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that which is appropriate in the facts of each case. This remedy in public law has to be more readily available when invoked by the have-nots, who are not possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law, even though its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restraint to avoid circumvention of private law remedies where more appropriate. " ( 16. ) IN Paschim Bangal Khet Mazdoor samity v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 sc 2426 , it has been expressed as follows:- "the Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare State at the federal level as well as at the State level. In a welfare state the primary duty of the Government is to secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate medical facilities to the people is an essential part of the obligations undertaken by the Government in a welfare state. The Government discharges this obligation by running hospitals and health centres which provide medical care to the person seeking to avail those facilities. Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount importance. The Government hospitals run by the State and the Medical officers employed therein are duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving human life. Failure on the part of a Government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21. The Government hospitals run by the State and the Medical officers employed therein are duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving human life. Failure on the part of a Government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21. In the instant case there was breach of the said right guaranteed under Article 21 when he was denied treatment at the various Government hospitals which were approached even though his condition was very serious at that time and he was in need of immediate medical attention. Since the said denial of the right of Hakim Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 was by officers of the State in hospitals run by the State, the State cannot avoid its responsibility for such denial of the constitutional right. In respect of deprivation of the constitutional rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution the position is well settled that adequate compensation can be awarded by the Court for such violation by way of redress in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. " ( 17. ) IN D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 : ( AIR 1997 SC 610 ), it has been held as under:- "9. The importance of affirmed rights of every human being need no emphasis and, therefore, to deter breaches thereof becomes a sacred duty of the Court, as the custodian and protector of the fundamental and the basic human rights of the citizens. . . . . . . . . . . " In the said case, it was further held as under:- "44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 is an exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrong doer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. " ( 18. ) IN Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) (2000) 2 SCC 465 : ( AIR 2000 SC 988 ), it has been held that when public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of fundamental rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the public law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under private law. In the said case, it has been held as follows:- "34. On this principle, even those who are not citizens of this country and come here merely as tourists or in any other capacity will be entitled to the protection of their lives in accordance with the Constitutional provisions. They also have a right to "life" in this country. Thus, they also have the right to live, so long as they are here, with human dignity, just as the State is under an obligation to protect the life of every citizen in this country, so also the State is under an obligation to protect the life of the persons who are not citizen. 35. The Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are not absolute in terms. They are subject to reasonable restrictions and, therefore, in case of non-citizen also, those Rights will be available subject to such restrictions as may be imposed in the interest of the security of the State or other important considerations. Interest of the Nation and security of the State is supreme. They are subject to reasonable restrictions and, therefore, in case of non-citizen also, those Rights will be available subject to such restrictions as may be imposed in the interest of the security of the State or other important considerations. Interest of the Nation and security of the State is supreme. Since 1948 when the Universal Declaration was adopted till this day, there have been many changes - political, social and economic while terrorism has disturbed the global scenario. Primary of the interest of Nation and the security of State will have to be read into the Universal Declaration as also in every Article dealing with Fundamental rights, including Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution. " Eventually, their Lordships in paragraph 42 have ruled thus:- "42. Running of Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing Yatri Niwas at various Railway Stations to provide lodging and boarding facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of Sovereign power. The employees of the Union of india who are deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, Including the Railway Stations and Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the Govt. machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt. of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. Kasturi Lals decision, therefore, cannot be pressed in aid. Moreover, we are dealing with this case under Public Law domain and not in a suit instituted under Private Law domain against persons who, utilising their official position, got a room in the Yatri Niwas booked in their own name where the act complained of was committed. " ( 19. ) IN Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi (2000) 4 SCC 543 : (AIR 2000 SC 1503), it has been held that where there art disputed questions of fact and an unequivocal denial of tortious liability, seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. Their Lordships noted the decision rendered in Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (1995)2 SCC 369 : (1995 AIR SCW 1436) wherein the petitioner was granted compensation of rs. Their Lordships noted the decision rendered in Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (1995)2 SCC 369 : (1995 AIR SCW 1436) wherein the petitioner was granted compensation of rs. 5 Lacs on account of death of her husband who got electrocuted by a live wire of electricity of the respondent therein. It is worth noting in the said case that there was no factual dispute. ( 20. ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa ramakrishna Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 2083 . it has been held as under:- "right to Life is one of the basic human rights. It is guaranteed to every person by article 21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that right. A prisoner, be he a convict or under-trial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his Fundamental rights including the Right to Life guaranteed to him under the Constitution. On being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law, prisoners still retail the residue of constitutional rights. " ( 21. ) IN the case of Mohammed Aynuddin alias Miyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 2511 , the Apex Court has held that the State is vicariously liable for negligence of its officers. ( 22. ) RECENTLY, in Pooran Singh v. State of m. P. 2009 (2) MPHT 435 : ( AIR 2009 MP 153 ) (DB), it has been held as under:- "8. The liability of the State to pay compensation for deprivation of the fundamental rights of life and personal liberty is a new liability in public law created by the Constitution and not vicarious liability or a liability in tort. For this reason, this new liability is not hedged in by the limitations, including the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which ordinarily apply to States liability in tort. This view is strongly supported by the decision of the Privy Council in Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, (1978) 2 All ER 670. Section 1 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago recognizes amongst other "the right of the individual of life, liberty, security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law". Section 1 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago recognizes amongst other "the right of the individual of life, liberty, security of person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law". Any person alleging contravention of this right and other human rights and freedoms recognized under Sections 1 and 2 can apply under Section 6 for redress to the High Court which is empowered to issue appropriate orders, writs and directions for enforcement or securing the protection of provisions of the aforesaid sections. The appellant in the case was a barrister and was committed to seven days imprisonment by a Judge of the High Court which committal was set aside by the Privy council in appeal on the ground that particulars of the specific nature of the contempt were not told to the appellant and the judge had thereby failed to observe a fundamental rule of natural justice. The appellant had in the meantime applied for redress under Section 6 on the ground that he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law. This application was dismissed by the High Court, but appellant again came up in appeal, to the Privy Council. The Privy council held that Section 6 of the Constitution impliedly allowed the High Court to award compensation as that may be the only practicable form of redress in some cases. The Privy Council also held that as the appellants committal was in violation of the rules of natural justice, he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law in contravention of Section 1 of the Constitution and was entitled to claim compensation from the State under Section 6 thereof. In meeting the argument that a Judge cannot be made personally liable for anything done or purporting to be done in the exercise or purported exercise of his judicial functions. Lord Diplock speaking for the majority observed. "the claim for redress under Section 6 (1) for what has been done by a Judge is a claim against the State for -what has been done in the exercise of judicial power by the State. This is not vicarious liability; it is liability of the State itself. It is not a liability in tort at all. "the claim for redress under Section 6 (1) for what has been done by a Judge is a claim against the State for -what has been done in the exercise of judicial power by the State. This is not vicarious liability; it is liability of the State itself. It is not a liability in tort at all. It is a liability in public law of the State, not of the judge, which has been created by Sections 6 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. " As to the measure of compensation Lord Diplock said : "the claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort of false imprisonment under which the damages recoverable are at large and would include damages for loss of reputation. It is a claim in public law for compensation for deprivation of liberty alone. Such compensation would include any loss of earnings consequent on the imprisonment and recompense for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the appellant during his incarceration. " ( 23. ) FROM the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is quite vivid that the law in this sphere has taken a marathon speed and marched ahead. In a democratic welfare set up, a citizen has a right to lead a life as permitted within the constitutional framework and the State cannot do anything that would curtail or abridge the protected rights of a citizen. A citizen has a right to live with dignity. In has been emphasised time and again that right to live does not mean to live a life which is sans substance. Thus, the substance of life has become the substratum of article 21 of the Constitution. The State has obligation under law to take care of the health of its citizens and cannot be allowed to do anything which would jeopardise the same. It is also settled in law that the State is vicariously liable if its officials do not perform the public duty in an apposite manner. It is also the settled proposition of law that for the tortious liability, compensation can be granted if there is no factual dispute and the State is vicariously liable when public duty is not properly performed. ( 24. ) PRESENTLY, to the obtaining factual matrix. It is also the settled proposition of law that for the tortious liability, compensation can be granted if there is no factual dispute and the State is vicariously liable when public duty is not properly performed. ( 24. ) PRESENTLY, to the obtaining factual matrix. From the factual scenario, it is perceptible that the maintenance of the building is to be done by the Public Works Department of the State Government. The petitioner was on duty and he was standing in the place where he was required to stand. He had not committed any kind of deviancy. The feeble explanation given that clamps might have been cut by any interested person to harm the police officer is absolutely unacceptable, moreso, in view of the fact that the same had been inspected by the competent authority on 3-10-1998 and found to be fixed in its position. It is further suggested that the accident or occurrence might have occurred due to any unforeseen reason. But, a pregnant one, the fact remains that the occurrence had taken place. The PWD is squarely responsible to maintain the building and it is their obligation to see that such a huge pipe does not fall on the head of the people. It is also their obligation to see that they are in complete order. The factual matrix does not exposed so. It is not a case where a plumber had gone to repair something and fallen due to his own negligence. It is not a case where an electrician had gone to repair and got electrocuted due to his own negligence and breathed his last. The aforesaid situations would have been in a different realm altogether. The factual matrix, as has been exposited, is that the deceased had gone to attend the duty in Court and was standing in the correct place and got injured due to fall of the pipe and eventually, he succumbed to the same. Thus, there is no factual dispute in the case at hand. It was an obligation on the part of the Public Works department to maintain the building. The suggestion in the report that somebody might have cut the clamps or it might have fallen due to unforeseen reasons do not commend any acceptance. In any case, the fact remains that the responsibility to maintain the building was that of the Public Works department. The petitioner was nowhere responsible. The suggestion in the report that somebody might have cut the clamps or it might have fallen due to unforeseen reasons do not commend any acceptance. In any case, the fact remains that the responsibility to maintain the building was that of the Public Works department. The petitioner was nowhere responsible. It is also not the case where there is denial about the occurrence of the incident. In the absence of any kind of dispute and regard being to the public duty to be performed by officers of the Public Works department to maintain the building of the high Court wherein both the High Court and the District Court functioned, we have no trace of doubt that the liability has to be mulcted on the State Government for the fault of its officers. ( 25. ) PRESENTLY, we shall deal with the quantum of compensation. The husband of the petitioner No. 1 and the father of other petitioners was an Assistant Sub Inspector in Police. As pleaded, he was earning Rs. 5,500/- as salary. He was 47 years of age. The age of retirement when the petitioner was in service was 60 years. Regards being had to the income of the deceased, his future prospects and keeping in view the mental agony, pain and suffering as also the date of the incident we are inclined to hold that the petitioners are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 3 lacs. The 2nd respondent, as the representative of the State, shall deposit the amount with the respondent No. 1, the registrar of the High Court of Madhya pradesh; Bench at Gwalior within a period of three months from today, failing which the said sum shall carry interest at the rate of 7. 5% per annum from the date of expiry of the period granted by this Court for payment of compensation. On such deposit of amount, 50% of the same shall be kept in a fixed deposit in a scheduled bank in the name of the petitioners and 50% shall be disbursed in their favour. Be it noted, we have passed the aforesaid direction keeping in view the directions contained in paragraph 24 of the decision rendered in Nilabati behera ( AIR 1993 SC 1960 (supra ). ( 26. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ petition is allowed in part. Be it noted, we have passed the aforesaid direction keeping in view the directions contained in paragraph 24 of the decision rendered in Nilabati behera ( AIR 1993 SC 1960 (supra ). ( 26. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ petition is allowed in part. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.