JUDGMENT Hon’ble Janardan Sahai, J.—This is a bunch of 30 connected appeals against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 8.12.2008. By that judgment the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions of the respondents against the order of the State Government dated 11.9.2007, 18.9.2007 and 30.9.2007 cancelling the selection/appointments of the writ petitioners. A massive recruitment drive of constables of the civil police, PAC and on several posts in the Wireless Wing of the police department was made in the year 2005-06. The recruitments were made by 51 Recruitment Boards at different places in the State of Uttar Pradesh. As a result of the drive some 18 thousand and odd constables were selected. It is stated by the respondents that about 6 thousand of them were given appointment and some of them had put in service of about 2-3 years while the remaining of the selected candidates were sent for training and were receiving a stipend of about Rs. 3 thousand per month. The recruitments were made at the time when the Mulayam Singh Govt. was in power in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Shortly after the new Govt. of Km. Mayawati was inducted on 13.5.2007 three complaints of sitting MLAs of the ruling party were addressed to the Chief Minister in which allegations relating to irregularities in the selection and corruption in recruitment were highlighted. The Secretary of the Chief Minister forwarded the complaints to the Principal Secretary, Home Deptt. and the Principal Secretary, Home Deptt in turn sent the complaints to the DGP. The DGP by letter dated 13.6.2007 constituted a committee of 4 members headed by Sri Sailja Kant Misra as Chairman to investigate into the complaints. It also appears that looking into the enormity of the exercise that was to be conducted by the Committee the DGP passed an order that the committee may take assistance of certain officers. The committee fragmented into separate sub committees to enquire into the irregularity of the selections at the various recruitment centres. As a result of the exercise conducted by the sub-Committees some 51 reports were submitted. The committee recommended the cancellation of the selection in 42 recruitment centres and cleared selections made by 9 Recruitment Boards. The reports were submitted by the Director General of Police to the State Government. As a result of the exercise conducted by the sub-Committees some 51 reports were submitted. The committee recommended the cancellation of the selection in 42 recruitment centres and cleared selections made by 9 Recruitment Boards. The reports were submitted by the Director General of Police to the State Government. Out of the nine reports clearing the selections one has been accepted by the State Government, namely report No. 25 in respect of Saharanpur Recruitment Centre and one pertaining to Sitapur is pending reconsideration by another committee. It has been stated at the Bar by Sri R.N. Singh Senior Advocate learned counsel for the the respondents that Saharanpur happens to be the constituency of Km. Mayawati. The remaining of the seven reports in which selections were cleared are pending consideration of the State Government. 2. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions holding that the constitution of the four member Misra Committee itself was invalid as two of its members Shailja Kant Misra Chairman and Javed Akhtar suffered from the vice of official bias; that certain officers had been permitted by the Director General of Police to assist the Misra Committee and though these officers had never been inducted as members of the Misra Committee were included in the sub committees into which the Misra Committee under orders of its Chairman had fragmented itself and the enquiry was actually conducted by the sub committees and the enquiry reports were submitted under the signatures of such officers who were to assist the Committee along with signatures of Shailja Kant Misra or one other member of the Misra Committee and the reports were therefore invalid; that the reports of the Misra Committee lacked fairness being vitiated by the fact that the same standards which were applied by the committee for clearing the selections in respect of some recruitment centres such as Deoria report No. 23 were not applied to the selections, which have been found by the Committee to be tainted; that the entire selections made by a recruitment centre could not have been cancelled whole hog by the State Government and an exercise ought to have been made to segregate the selections tainted from the untainted ones. As regards the approval of the reports by the DGP and the order of the State Government cancelling the selections impugned in the writ petitions the learned Single Judge found that neither the DGP nor the State Government had applied mind to the facts of the case and the decision of the State Government in respect of the reports was taken in a hasty manner. The learned Single Judge also took serious note of the fact that although the officers who had conducted the recruitment were also in the dock no punishment had been given them nor any effort has been made by the State to complete the disciplinary proceedings against them while the writ petitioners have been fastened with the consequence of cancellation of their selections/appointments. This order of the learned Single Judge has been challenged by the State in all these appeals. 3. We have heard S/Sri P.P. Rao and P.S. Patwaliya learned Senior Advocates on behalf of the State assisted by Chief Standing Counsel and Sri Piyush Shukla Standing Counsel. On behalf of the writ petitioners respondents in these appeals we have heard Sarva Sri R.N. Singh Senior Advocate and Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri A.K. Rai. 4. A large number of submissions were made by Sri P.P. Rao. I shall begin with the attack made against the finding of the learned Single Judge that on account of the inclusion of Shailja Kant Mishra as Chairman of the committee and of Javed Akhtar as a member, the constitution of the Misra Committee was invalid as these officers were biased. To appreciate the submission it is necessary to notice the role of Sailja Kant Misra and Javed Akhtar in the recruitment process; for the learned Single Judge has found their inclusion in the committee vitiated on the ground that they were involved in the recruitment process and would have had prior knowledge of facts they were required to enquire into and in such circumstances their prior deposition towards certain views could not be ruled out leading to an inference of official bias. They were also found disqualified by the learned Single Judge as there were instructions issued by the DGP himself not to include even for the assistance of the committee any officer who was involved in the recruitment process in the past three years whereas Sailja Kant Misra was the I.G. Eastern Zone PAC and Javed Akhtar was the Chairman of the II Recruitment Board, Sitapur in the year 2006 and were both connected with the recruitment process. A circular dated 2.7.2006 of the PAC Head quarters has been annexed with the paper book of the special appeal in Pawan Kumar Singh’s case as Annexure 11 to the stay application. This circular confers a duty upon the IG PAC Eastern Zone to scrutinize all the PAC recruitments after the declaration of the results and to report to the ADGP, PAC by 16.9.2006. Under this circular it was the duty of the IG to scrutinize the marks obtained by the candidates in different items of the examination i.e. Physical ability, written examination and interview etc. and to check whether other formalities required to be performed under the instructions given such as preparation of a broad sheet had been complied with. By the letter dated 1.9.2006 of R.N. Yadav, DIG, Chairman PAC Recruitment Board, Ballia the records in respect of Ballia PAC selection were sent to Shailja Kant Misra, IG PAC, Eastern Zone, U.P. Lucknow for scrutiny in view of the directions in the circular letter dated 2.7.2006. By a subsequent letter dated 18.9.2006 Sri R.N. Yadav wrote to the IG, PAC, Eastern Zone U.P. Lucknow requesting for return of the records, which were required for the preparation of the main register. According to the writ petitioners who are the respondents in these appeals the records of the selections remained with Sri Sailja Kant Misra and were scrutinized by him between the period 1.9.2006 and 18.9.2006. A letter dated 3.11.2007 of Sulkhan Singh, which was sent to the DIG (Lok Shiyakat) has been filed along with the counter affidavit in Writ Petition No. 48717 of 2007. The letter states that the records relating to PAC Ballia Recruitment were sent to Sailja Kant Misra but were recalled on 19.9.2006. A letter dated 3.11.2007 of Sulkhan Singh, which was sent to the DIG (Lok Shiyakat) has been filed along with the counter affidavit in Writ Petition No. 48717 of 2007. The letter states that the records relating to PAC Ballia Recruitment were sent to Sailja Kant Misra but were recalled on 19.9.2006. In para 33 of the affidavit of D.K. Gupta filed in support of the stay application in the Special Appeal No. 244 of 2009 against Pawan Kumar Singh it is stated that Shailja Kant Misra was never a member of any of the selection committees but he was required to send under the instructions dated 2.7.2006 issued by the PAC Head quarters his report on certain points in respect of the selection. From this material it appears that while Shailja Kant Misra may have been under duty to scrutinise the recruitment records after the declaration of the results and that the records in respect of Ballia PAC recruitment were in his custody from 4.9.2006 to 18.9.2006 but it has not been proved that he had actually scrutinized the records at least of other recruitment centres. 5. It was submitted by counsel for the respondents that even if the averment that Sailja Kant Misra did not scrutinise the records is accepted he was still disqualified to be included in the committee constituted to examine the complaints about corruption and other irregularities in the selection or if he did not scrutinise the records he had evidently failed in his duties under the circular and his own conduct would have been a subject matter of the enquiry and as a member Chairman of the committee his position was that of a Judge of his own cause. Reliance has been placed upon AIR 1993 SC 2155 , R.L. Sharma v. Managing Committee Dr. Hari Ram Higher Secondary School and others. 6. Mr. P.P. Rao however submitted that the true test to determine bias is to examine whether there is any conflict between the interest of the enquiry officer in the subject of enquiry and his duty and that if there be no such conflict no inference of bias can be drawn. Hari Ram Higher Secondary School and others. 6. Mr. P.P. Rao however submitted that the true test to determine bias is to examine whether there is any conflict between the interest of the enquiry officer in the subject of enquiry and his duty and that if there be no such conflict no inference of bias can be drawn. In support of his contention Sri P.P. Rao placed reliance upon Sarju Prasad Singh v. South Bihar Regional Transport Authority Patna and others, AIR 1957 Pat, 73; J.Y. Kondala Rao v. APSRTC, AIR 1961 SC 82 ; T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1973 SC 974 ; Dr. G. Sharma v. Lucknow University, (1976) 3 SCC 585 , 591 (para 14); Sunil Kumar Banerji v. State of W.B., (1980) 3 SCC 304 (para 5); State of M.P. v. Ganekar Motghare, (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 703; M/s Lakshmi Motor Service v. RTA Goa, AIR 1985 Bom. 436 ; Secretary to Government Transport Deptt. Madras v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and another, (1988) Supp. SCC 651 (paras 12,13) and State of U.P. v. R.K. Bhargava, (1992) Supp.2 SCC 92 (para 2). In these cases it has been held that there must be real likelihood of bias. Sri P.P. Rao also tried to distinguish the decision of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge. In Kraipak’s case one of the members of the selection Board was also a candidate in the selection and although he had abstained when his own selection was under consideration but had participated in the selection of the other candidates and therefore there was a conflict between his interest and duty. We find that in the case of Shailja Kant Misra there is no direct conflict between interest and duty. The duty of Sailja Kant Misra in the recruitment was to scrutinise the records after the declaration of the result and it is the duty of the same nature which he was required to perform as a Chairman of the four member committee. Moreover the selection of PAC Ballia, the records of which were sent for scrutiny to Sri Shailja Kant Misra have been found to be tainted. Bias if any would have operated in favour of upholding the PAC Ballia selections whereas these selections have been found by the Misra Committee to be tainted. Moreover the selection of PAC Ballia, the records of which were sent for scrutiny to Sri Shailja Kant Misra have been found to be tainted. Bias if any would have operated in favour of upholding the PAC Ballia selections whereas these selections have been found by the Misra Committee to be tainted. But as IG PAC Eastern Zone Shailja Kant Misra was obliged under the circular to scrutinize the result of Ballia PAC and other Recruitment Centres in the zone also. In the case of Javed Akhtar there would have been a conflict between interest and duty were he as a member of the Misra Committee required to enquire into the Sitapur selections. He was the Chairman of the Sitapur II Recruitment Board and as a member of the Misra Committee his interest would have been to uphold the selections made. But the undisputed position on facts is that Javed Akhtar under instructions from the DGP was dissociated from making enquiry into the Sitapur selections. 7. The conflict of duty and interest situation however is not the only situation in which bias can be inferred. From the plethora of judicial decisions cited two principles emerge (1) that official bias can be inferred where there is a conflict between duty and interest and (ii) where a person has a firm commitment to certain beliefs on account of his prior knowledge of facts he is required to enquire into. Linked to this proposition is the principle that justice should not only be done but must also appear to have been done. In R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, exp Pinochet Ugrate, (1999) 1 All ER 577, the principle has been thus stated : “However, I am of opinion that there could be cases where the interest of the judge in the subject matter of the proceedings arising from his strong commitment to some cause or belief or his association with a person or body involved in the proceedings could shake public confidence in the administration of justice as much as shareholding (which might be small) in a public company involved in the litigation.” 8. The law upon this aspect has been dealt with in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 (4) SCC 417 . The law upon this aspect has been dealt with in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 1985 (4) SCC 417 . It has been held there that justice should not only be done but must also appear to have been done is a principle not applicable to the judicial process alone. It has application even to administrative bodies. The relevant passage in Ashok Yadav v. State of Haryana has been extracted and quoted in the decision of the apex Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, 2006 (11) SCC 356 . We are extracting the said passage which is quoted below : “The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the Courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner.” 9. The aspect of official bias arising in a case where the enquiry officer has prior knowledge of certain facts may now be considered. An integral part of the issue is the effect of certain instructions issued by the DGP not to associate even for the purpose of assistance to the enquiry committee such officers who were involved even remotely in the recruitment process. We have seen that Shailja Kant Misra as IG PAC Eastern Zone was required under instructions to scrutinize the selection papers after the declaration of result. Some records were also sent to him. Whether Shailja Kant Misra had in fact scrutinized the records is not quite clear. We have seen that Shailja Kant Misra as IG PAC Eastern Zone was required under instructions to scrutinize the selection papers after the declaration of result. Some records were also sent to him. Whether Shailja Kant Misra had in fact scrutinized the records is not quite clear. But being involved in the recruitment process an inference can be drawn that he would have had knowledge of facts relating to the selection. The counsel for the respondents drew our attention to the letter dated 31.7.2007 issued by the DGP by which he had nominated certain persons to assist the Misra Committee in the enquiry. This letter contains a clear prohibition against inclusion of officials even to assist the Misra committee if such official has in the past three years been in any capacity associated with the recruitment process. The learned Single Judge has taken the view that the DGP was oblivious of the fact that Sailja Kant Misra and Javed Akhtar were involved in the recruitment process and they could not have been included in the committee. It is clear from the directions contained in the letter dated 31.7.2007 that the DGP had laid down the standards to be adopted in associating persons in the enquiry committee and in excluding officials involved in the recruitment process in the past three years. The purpose for such prohibition obviously was that the enquiry be conducted by unbiased minds so that public confidence and more particularly that of the persons whose conduct was to be enquired into or who would be affected as a result of the enquiry is not shaken. If the standard laid down in the circular dated 31.7.2007 had been observed and none of the persons who had been involved in the recruitment process were included in the committee the test of fairness and that laid down in Ashok Yadav and the Pinochet’s case would have been cleared. Administrative action involving civil consequences has to pass the test of fairness. It is in this context that it has been said that an executive agency which lays down certain standards which it professes to follow is bound by those standards. Administrative action involving civil consequences has to pass the test of fairness. It is in this context that it has been said that an executive agency which lays down certain standards which it professes to follow is bound by those standards. This proposition of law has been succinctly stated by Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 45 535 as follows : “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged......Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed...... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” 10. These words have been quoted with approval by the apex Court in B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others, (1983) 4 SCC 582 . The principle has the backing of high authority and its infraction would be an act of arbitrariness constituting a breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In my view the inclusion and continuance of S.K. Misra and Javed Akhtar in the four member committee was vitiated by the fact that it does not conform to the standards laid down in the letter dated 31.7.2007. Although the letter dated 31.7.2007 was issued after the Constitution of the four member Misra committee but it is clear that the standard for eligibility for association in the enquiry were set out by the DGP in that letter and when an officer even associated with the recruitment process in any capacity was disqualified even for rendering assistance to the Committee there appears to be no justification for the inclusion of Shailja Kant Misra and Javed Akhtar or for their continuance as Chairman/member of the Committee when they had been involved in the recruitment process and as Chairman/member of the enquiry committee were expected to discharge higher responsibilities than an officer appointed merely to assist the Committee. 11. We now come to the question of addition of some members in the Misra committee who had also signed the reports upon which the impugned action was taken by the State Government. 11. We now come to the question of addition of some members in the Misra committee who had also signed the reports upon which the impugned action was taken by the State Government. The learned Single Judge has found that out of 51 reports only reports 1 and 2 have been signed by all the Members of the Misra Committee. The other reports were signed by Shailja Kant Misra along with one or more of the members of the committee or along with some of the officials nominated to assist the Misra Committee. A supplementary counter affidavit was filed on 5.2.2008 on behalf of the State to which reference has been made in the order of the learned single Judge that in view of the enormity of the exercise entrusted to the Misra committee orders were passed enlarging the membership of the committee. The learned Single Judge found that those orders did not direct enlargement of the committee but only made available services of certain additional officers to give assistance to the committee and that these officers were never made members of the Misra Committee. By the order dated 14.6.2007 the DGP nominated Sulkhan Singh to assist the Misra Committee. The learned Single Judge found that Shailja Kant Misra by order dated 14.7.2007 had fragmented the Misra Committee into different sub committees and had selected one of the members of the Misra Committee to head the sub committee and it was the sub committee headed by an officer merely of DIG rank which conducted the enquiry which was entrusted by the DGP to the high level four member committee headed by Shailja Kant Mishra an officer of ADGP rank. Sri P.P. Rao submitted that the mere fact that certain officers had signed the reports in addition to the Chairman or other members would not invalidate the reports. The finding of the single Judge however is that the sub committees did not merely collect evidence. They conducted the enquiry itself and it was their report which was forwarded to the DGP. The finding that the Misra Committee was fragmented into sub committees and the sub committees conducted the enquiries is supported by material and there is nothing to demonstrate that the finding is erroneous. 12. We shall now see how Sri P.P. Rao has challenged the finding on grounds of law. The finding that the Misra Committee was fragmented into sub committees and the sub committees conducted the enquiries is supported by material and there is nothing to demonstrate that the finding is erroneous. 12. We shall now see how Sri P.P. Rao has challenged the finding on grounds of law. He submitted that the power of addition of a member in an administrative committee as the Misra Committee was, is an incidental power which every administrative committee is possessed of and the Misra Committee could legitimately include additional members. It is not in dispute that the Misra committee was constituted by an administrative order. The powers conferred upon the committee it is submitted included all implied ancillary and incidental powers. In support of his contention reliance has been placed by the learned counsel upon the decision of the apex Court in M.S.Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 (para 89). The learned Judges quoted Black’s Law Dictionary to describe the nature of implied powers. In the context of certain statutory provisions conferring wide powers upon the election Court it was held by the apex Court that the election Court has incidental power to order repoll of a particular polling station and report the result to the Court although that power was not specifically conferred. In the present case the incidental power being relied upon is of a different nature. It is the power of the enlargement of the committee itself which is being claimed and not the power of the committee to carry out certain ancillary functions. The reason for spelling out an incidental power in a statutory provision is that the Legislature frequently does not legislate in respect of minor details; for doing so would be impracticable and would require a continuous exercise of the tedious legislative process. This is the reason for the rule given in Sutherland—a reason which is not applicable in respect of administrative conferment of power where the grantor is available to confer additional powers. Paras 89 and 90 in which Black’s Law Dictionary and Sutherland have been quoted in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case are extracted below : “89. This is the reason for the rule given in Sutherland—a reason which is not applicable in respect of administrative conferment of power where the grantor is available to confer additional powers. Paras 89 and 90 in which Black’s Law Dictionary and Sutherland have been quoted in Mohinder Singh Gill’s case are extracted below : “89. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the proposition thus : Implied powers are such as are necessary to make available and carry into effect those powers which are expressly granted or conferred, and which must therefore be presumed to have been within the intention of the constitutional or legislative grant. “90. This understanding accords with justice and reason and has the support of Sutherland. The learned Addl. Solicitor General also cited the cases in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. R.S. Jhaver to substantiate his thesis that the doctrine of implied powers clothes the Commissioner with vast incidental powers. He illustrated his point by quoting from Sutherland (Frank E. Horack Jr., Vo. 3) : Necessary implications.—Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. Thus it has been stated, “An express statutory grant of power or the imposition of a definite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty..........That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed”. The reason behind the rule is to be found in the fact that legislation is enacted to establish broad or general standards. Matters of minor detail are frequently omitted from legislative enactments, and ‘if these could not be supplied by implication the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the true intent of the Legislature likely to be defeated.” The rule whereby a statute, is by necessary implication extended has been most frequently applied in the construction of laws delegating powers to public officers and administrative agencies. The powers thus granted involve a multitude of functions that are discoverable only through practical experience.” 13. The powers thus granted involve a multitude of functions that are discoverable only through practical experience.” 13. In Union of India v. Paras Laminates ( P) Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 453 it was held that there was an incidental power in the President of the Tribunal to refer the matter to a larger Bench in case of disagreement of a bench of the Tribunal with a previous decision. Such an incidental power was culled out although the statutory provision relating to the power of the President of the Tribunal was confined to referring matters in the case of disagreement between the members of the Bench and not to a disagreement with a previous decision. It was clarified however that implied powers are subject to express grant. 14. It was submitted by Sri Khare that incidental power relates to the exercise of statutory power and in the State of U.P. this power has been expressly conferred by Section 19-A of the U.P. General Clauses Act. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel upon the decision in Meerut Collegiate Association, Meerut and others v. Sri Arvind Nath Seth and others, 1982 UPLBEC 82 , paragraphs 6 and 10. It was held in this case that incidental power can be spelled out from the provisions of the statute if the exercise of such power is absolutely necessary. In that case the question was whether the power under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act includes the power of granting an interim order of stay. Repelling the contention it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that such incidental power can be read into the statute only if it is absolutely necessary to cull out the existence of such a power. In this regard reliance has also been placed by Sri Khare upon a decision of the Apex Court in Kharagram Panchayat Samiti and another v. State of West Bengal and others, (1987) 3 SCC 82 in which the learned Judges of the Apex Court referred to and quoted a passage from the celebrated Judicial Review by De. Smith. In this regard reliance has also been placed by Sri Khare upon a decision of the Apex Court in Kharagram Panchayat Samiti and another v. State of West Bengal and others, (1987) 3 SCC 82 in which the learned Judges of the Apex Court referred to and quoted a passage from the celebrated Judicial Review by De. Smith. That passage is being extracted and being quoted below : “The House of Lords has laid down the principle that “whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequent upon, those things which the legislature has authorised, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held, by judicial construction, to be ultra vires.” 15. The passage in Sutherland and the cases cited by Sri Rao relate to the existence of incidental powers in a statutory or constitutional conferment of powers. In the cases before us however the conferment of power was made by an administrative order. 16. Sri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that what has to be seen in the case of an administrative conferment of power is the intention of the granter of the power. He relied upon S. Parthasarthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 3 SCC 459 . In that case the statute provided that an enquiry officer could be appointed by the head of the office, the appointing authority or any higher authority. The Director who happened to be the head of the office was appointed as an enquiry officer by the State Government. At that time there was an In-charge Director who started the enquiry. Later on it appears that when the Director joined, the In-charge Director was reverted to his post of Deputy Director. The Director as head of the office then passed an order authorizing the Deputy Director who was earlier the in charge Director to continue with the enquiry. The Deputy Director continued with the enquiry. Subsequently, the State Government also passed an order that the In-charge Director could continue with the enquiry but in the meantime the Deputy Director had already submitted his report. The Deputy Director continued with the enquiry. Subsequently, the State Government also passed an order that the In-charge Director could continue with the enquiry but in the meantime the Deputy Director had already submitted his report. It was held that the intention of Government in this case was to have the enquiry done by the Director himself and the Deputy Director could continue to hold the enquiry only so long as he continued to be the Incharge Director and it was not the intention of the Government to allow him to continue as enquiry officer after he had ceased to be the In-charge Director. The subsequent conferment of power of enquiry officer by the State Government upon the Deputy Director was held to be of no avail as the enquiry had already been completed by the Deputy Director and there could have been no retrospective conferment of power. 17. From the cases cited by the parties it appears that incidental or implied powers can be spelled out in a conferment of powers only when the exercise of such an incidental power is necessary to give effect to the express grant; that implied powers are subject to express grant; and that the intention of the legislature in the case of a statutory conferment and that of the grantor in the case of an administrative conferment has to be given effect to and in case the scheme of the statute or the language of the order of the grant suggests otherwise no incidental power can be culled out. In the present case the intention of the Director General of Police in defining the role of the officers in the enquiry was clear. The enquiry was to be conducted by the Misra Committee. Other officers had been permitted only to assist the committee and not to function as members of the Committee. Moreover, there is no decision of the Misra Committee itself brought to our notice enlarging the strength of the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee by himself could not have enlarged the Committee. Other officers had been permitted only to assist the committee and not to function as members of the Committee. Moreover, there is no decision of the Misra Committee itself brought to our notice enlarging the strength of the Committee. The Chairman of the Committee by himself could not have enlarged the Committee. In view of the legal position discussed above it appears that if the task of the Misra Committee was big the Committee could on the ground of necessity take assistance of persons in the discharge of its functions but the Committee could not have co-opted members or enlarged its strength by reference to any incidental power vested in the committee. The single Judge is right in holding that the matter could have been different had the report of the sub committees been considered and approved after application of mind by a separate report of the Misra Committee. 18. Sri P.P. Rao then submitted that an administrative committee can sub delegate its powers and that the maxim Delegatus Non-potest Delegare relied upon by the learned single Judge to invalidate inclusion of additional members is a maxim, which is applicable to the judicial process and is not applicable to administrative action. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 . In that case it was held that the enquiry judge appointed by the Chief Justice could hold the enquiry and the order of punishment passed by the Chief Justice on the foundation of such report was not an invalid order. It was observed that where a statutory functionary exercises such a power it cannot be said that he has delegated the functions merely by appointing an official to collect the material. The other case relied upon by Sri P.P. Rao is Sahni Silk Mills v. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346 : AIR 1994 SC 346. In that case the statutory provision, which was involved for consideration authorized the Corporation to delegate power to a subordinate officer. The resolution empowered the Director General or any other officer authorized by him. The other case relied upon by Sri P.P. Rao is Sahni Silk Mills v. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346 : AIR 1994 SC 346. In that case the statutory provision, which was involved for consideration authorized the Corporation to delegate power to a subordinate officer. The resolution empowered the Director General or any other officer authorized by him. It was held that while it is essential that a delegated power is to be exercised by the authority upon whom that power is conferred and by none-else but judicial aversion against such delegation cannot be carried to the extreme; for a public functionary is at liberty to employ agents to exercise its power. The learned Judges observed that the maxim is not being followed strictly where there is a discretionary administrative power. Sri P.P. Rao also placed reliance upon Thakker’s Administrative Law in which the proposition of law stated is that administrative functions may be delegated and sub-delegated unless there is a specific bar or prohibition in the statute. 19. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 had occasion to consider exhaustively the question of validity of sub delegation in the context of Section 237 (b) of the Companies Act which authorized the Central Government to appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company. The Central Government in exercise of powers under Sections 637 and 10-E of the Companies Act delegated the power to the Company Law Board. The Chairman of the Company Law Board passed an order for inspection under Section 237 of the Act. The order was challenged on the ground that the power had been delegated to the Board and the Board consisting of all its members alone could pass the order and not the Chairman individually and that the power of the Board could not be sub delegated. The defence to the challenge was that Rule 3 of the Rules framed by the Central Government empowered the Chairman to distribute the business of the Board amongst himself and other members and to specify the cases or class of cases which shall be considered jointly by the Board and that in exercise of this power the Chairman had allocated to himself the power under Section 237 to direct investigation of the affairs of the Company. The power conferred by Section 237 (b) was described as being an administrative one. It was held by a majority (Hidayatulla, Bachawat and Shelat, JJ.) that the sub delegation was invalid. Bachawat J. observed as follows : “34-A. As a general rule, whatever a person has power to do himself, he may do by means of an agent. This broad rule is limited by the operation of the principle that a delegated authority cannot be re-delegated, delegatus non potest delegare. The naming of a delegate to do an act involving a discretion indicates that the delegate was selected because of his peculiar skill and the confidence reposed in him, and there is a presumption that he is required to do the act himself and cannot re-delegate his authority. As a general rule, “if the statute directs that certain acts shall be done in a specified manner or by certain persons, their performance in any other manner than that specified or by any other person than one of those named is impliedly prohibited.” [See Crawford on Statutory Construction, 1940 Edn., Art. 195, p. 335]. Normally, a discretion entrusted by Parliament to an administrative organ must be exercised by that organ itself. If a statute entrusts an administrative function involving the exercise of a discretion to a Board consisting of two or more persons it is to be presumed that each member of the Board should exercise his individual judgment on the matter and all the members of the Board should act together and arrive at a joint decision. Prima facie, the Board must act as a whole and cannot delegate its function to one of its members. 35. The learned Attorney-General submitted that a distribution of business among the members of the Company Law Board is not a delegation of its authority, and the maxim has no application in such a case. I cannot accept this submission. In Cook v. Ward, (1877) 2 CPD 255, the Court held that where a drainage board constituted by an Act of Parliament was authorised by it to delegate its powers to a committee, the powers so delegated to the committee must be exercised by them acting in concert and it was not competent to them to apportion those powers amongst themselves and one of them acting alone, pursuant to such apportionment, could not justify his acts under the statute. Lord Coleridge, C.J. said at p. 262 : “It was not competent to them to delegate powers, which required the united action of the three, to be exercised according to the unaided judgment of one of them." 20. The situation in the present case is quite similar to that in Barium Chemicals (supra) except that an administrative power was there being exercised under a statutory provision unlike the present case where the power was being exercised under an administrative order. The question was again considered in Marathwada University case (supra) in the following manner : “... ... It is a settled principle that when the Act prescribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. I, 4th Ed., para 32) summarises these principles as follows : “32. Sub-delegation of powers. In accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegate, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication. There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind.” 21. The enquiry in the present cases resulted in civil consequences to the writ petitioners. It was also an enquiry which would have required the committee to apply mind. In view of the proposition of law stated in the passages above quoted there would be no presumption of authorization of delegation. 22. In this case the Director General of Police had entrusted the task of the enquiry to the four member committee and the other members were appointed only to assist the committee. Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any delegation of power by the Director General of Police. There is also no material on the record to indicate that the Misra Committee had as a body inducted the officers appointed to assist it as members of the committee. Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any delegation of power by the Director General of Police. There is also no material on the record to indicate that the Misra Committee had as a body inducted the officers appointed to assist it as members of the committee. The Chairman of the Committee on his own could not have inducted other persons into the committee when the Director General of Police had permitted them merely to assist the Misra Committee. In the circumstances the cases cited by Sri P.P. Rao are distinguishable and I am of the view that the sub delegation was invalid. 23. To justify the enlargement of the Misra Committee and to save the reports from the invalidity found by the single Judge that these reports were really not the reports of the Misra Committee but of certain sub committees, Sri P.P. Rao also invoked the doctrine of Ratification. He submitted that the Director General of Police had accepted the reports of the enquiry committee and therefore had ratified the inclusion of the additional members also. The law upon the subject of Ratification was exhaustively considered by the apex Court in Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, AIR 1989 SC 1582 . The following extracts from the said decision may be usefully quoted : “... ... ... Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. In Friedman’s Law of Agency (Fifth Edition) Chapter 5 at p. 73, the principle of ratification has been explained : “What the ‘agent’ does on behalf of the ‘principal’ is done at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist : ... ... ...” ... ... ... 26. These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.” 24. Reliance was placed by Sri P.P. Rao upon Jugraj Singh and another v. Jaswant Singh and others, 1970 (2) SCC 386 in which a sale made under an unauthenticated power of attorney was held to be valid by ratification under a subsequent power of attorney. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.” 24. Reliance was placed by Sri P.P. Rao upon Jugraj Singh and another v. Jaswant Singh and others, 1970 (2) SCC 386 in which a sale made under an unauthenticated power of attorney was held to be valid by ratification under a subsequent power of attorney. It was also held therein that the ratification would relate back to the date of the original grant. That was a case of ratification of the act of an agent by the principal. In Punjab University v. V.N. Tripathi, 2001 (8) SCC 179 it was held that the Registrar who was empowered under a statutory provision to represent the University in all legal proceedings was not competent under that power to initiate proceedings on his own but his act of filing an appeal could be ratified by the Senate. The Marathwada University case was referred to and was distinguished on facts but not dissented from. In High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh and another, (2003) 4 SCC 239 cited by Mr. Rao it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that the preparation of the merit criteria by a committee appointed by the Chief Justice, which was subsequently approved by the Full Court was valid. The challenge to the constitution of the Committee was repelled on merits. Alternatively it was held that even if the initial action was illegal it could be ratified by a body competent. The learned Judges relied upon Parmeshwar Prasad Gupta v. Union of India, 1973 (2) SCC 543 where an action of termination of the services of an employee of a company by the Chairman of the Board of Directors on the basis of an invalid resolution of the Board of Directors was up held on the basis of ratification by a resolution in a properly convened meeting of the Board. Parmeshwar Gupta’s case was considered in Marathwada University case and it was said in para 28 that principles governing ratification of transactions of a company cannot be extended to other cases because the general body of a company is a repository of all powers. 25. Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel for the respondents on the other hand relied upon two decisions of the apex Court. 25. Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel for the respondents on the other hand relied upon two decisions of the apex Court. In Tej Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1986 SC 1814 the State Government submitted a proposal for premature retirement of an official and sought opinion of the High Court. Under the rules important matters on which government could seek opinion of the High Court were required to be placed before the Administrative Committee. The Administrative Judge, however, before whom the papers were placed agreed with the proposal. Acting upon the opinion of the Administrative Judge the State Government passed an order of premature retirement. Subsequently the Administrative Committee of the High Court also approved the opinion given by the Administrative Judge. It was held that the subsequent approval granted by the Administrative Committee did not validate the opinion given by the Administrative Judge as the illegality was incurable and no ex post facto sanction could be granted. This decision is in line with the Marathwada University case. Again in S. Parthasarthi (supra) it was held that subsequent authorization to the Deputy Director to continue as the enquiry officer when the enquiry was already over could not validate the enquiry. In V.N. Tripathi and P.P. Singh actions in excess of statutory authority were sustained by ratification and some problem has therefore arisen in reconciling these cases with the Maradhwada case. But the present is a case of administrative conferment of power and the case of S. Parthasarthy cited by the counsel for the respondents appears to be nearer the facts of the present case and in my opinion the DGP could not have validated the reports by ratification. Moreover, ratification has also not been proved on facts. In the present case ratification is being inferred from the acceptance of the enquiry report. It however appears as found by the learned single Judge that only one report namely Report No. 44 was specifically approved by a one sentence order of acceptance passed by the Director General of Police (D.G.P). In respect of other reports there is no specific order even of acceptance passed by the D.G.P. The Single Judge has recorded a finding that the D.G.P. had forwarded the reports to the State Government without application of mind. In respect of other reports there is no specific order even of acceptance passed by the D.G.P. The Single Judge has recorded a finding that the D.G.P. had forwarded the reports to the State Government without application of mind. No ratification by the D.G.P. who had constituted the Misra Committee can however be inferred from the mere fact that the reports were forwarded to the State Government by the D.G.P. The submission regarding ratification therefore fails. 26. Sri P.P. Rao then submitted that the inclusion of additional members and the reports submitted were valid on the strength of the doctrine of de facto. The report of the Committee having been approved by the Director General of Police, so it is contended, cannot be invalidated on the ground that the reports were not of the Misra Committee but of persons appointed to assist the Misra Committee. In support of his contention reliance has been placed by the learned counsel upon the decision of Gokaraju Rangaraju, (1981) 3 SCC 132 . It was held therein that a judge de facto is not a mere usurper but one who holds office under colour of lawful authority even though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be so. The doctrine is now firmly established and protects acts of officers de facto performed in the interest of the public or of third persons as valid and binding as those of officers de jure. The principles laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Pulin Behari v. King Empero, 16 Indian Cases 257 were applied in the case. In Gokaraju’s case collateral challenge to the appointment was held to be impermissible. On the other hand reliance has been placed by Sri Ashok Khare upon a decision of the apex Court in Central Bank of India v. C. Bernard, (1991) 1 SCC 319 wherein it was held that the doctrine of de facto is applicable to the holder of a public office performing functions in the public interest. It is urged and in my opinion rightly so that an enquiry committee of the nature of the Misra Committee appointed under a non statutory administrative order to report about irregularities in a recruitment drive does not hold public office. Moreover, the Director General of Police had appointed the additional officers only to assist the committee. It is urged and in my opinion rightly so that an enquiry committee of the nature of the Misra Committee appointed under a non statutory administrative order to report about irregularities in a recruitment drive does not hold public office. Moreover, the Director General of Police had appointed the additional officers only to assist the committee. They had never been appointed as members of the Misra Committee. The question of protecting their acts under the colour of lawful authority therefore does not arise in their case for it did not lie within the scope of the duties entrusted to them to prepare and submit the report. The inclusion in the report of additional members was invalid and cannot be saved by the de facto doctrine. 27. A Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Lucknow in Brij Bhushan Bakshi and others v. State of U.P., 2009 (1) ADJ 362 has held the constitution of the Misra Committee as invalid on the ground amongst others that inclusion of Shailja Kant Mishra and Javed Akhtar who were involved in the recruitment process was invalid. It however appears that a Special Leave to Appeal Petition has been filed against the order before the Apex Court. Sri R.N. Singh, who appeared for the respondents relied upon a decision in Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 2000 SC 2587 wherein it has been held that the mere filing of an SLP would not render the judgment of the High Court under jeopardy. In that case the effect of the orders passed at various stages of the SLP was considered by the Apex Court and principles to test when the judgment of an inferior Court has been put under jeopardy as to make applicable the principle of res judicata have been laid down. It was held in that case that mere issuance of notice would not put the judgment challenged under jeopardy and it is only when leave is granted that the judgment challenged ceases to be final. The terms in which the notice on the SLP has been issued in this case are clear from the order passed by the Apex Court, a copy whereof has been produced by Sri R.N. Singh at the Bar. It reads : “Learned counsel for respondents 1, 4 and 5 appear and accept notice. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. The terms in which the notice on the SLP has been issued in this case are clear from the order passed by the Apex Court, a copy whereof has been produced by Sri R.N. Singh at the Bar. It reads : “Learned counsel for respondents 1, 4 and 5 appear and accept notice. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. Counter affidavits on behalf of respondents shall be filled within a period of four weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if necessary, may be filed within two weeks thereafter. We have been informed that certain matters pertaining to the recruitment of the constables are pending at various Courts. We clarify that all the pending matters shall be dealt with in accordance with law on their own merits uninfluenced by the issue of notice in the present petition.” 28. In my opinion the decision of the Division Bench in Brij Bhushan’s case being that of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction is binding and at least of much relevance in this case. 29. Sri P.P. Rao, counsel for the appellant then took us through the report of the Misra Committee in respect of the selections made by the Recruitment Centre, Allahabad which the learned Single Judge has made the lead case. Sri Rao placed before us also the conclusions drawn by the committee that on account of large scale irregularities in the recruitment process which the committee found, it could be smoothly inferred that corruption prevailed in the selection. The finding about corruption is not based upon any direct evidence, which may have been referred to by the Committee but is an inference drawn by the committee from the irregularities found by it. It appears that it was in view of this nature of its finding that the committee has recommended that the allegations of corruption be investigated into in a regular enquiry by the CBI. We may now refer to the irregularities in the selection which have been pointed out by Sri P.P. Rao as having been found by the Mishra Committee on the basis of which the committee has drawn its conclusion that corruption had prevailed in the selection. Sri Rao drew our attention to the departmental instructions that in case of overwriting, the countersignature of the Chairman of the Selection Board were required. This instruction, it is submitted was not followed. Sri Rao drew our attention to the departmental instructions that in case of overwriting, the countersignature of the Chairman of the Selection Board were required. This instruction, it is submitted was not followed. Reference has been made to the names of seven candidates in respect of whom it was found there were cuttings and overwriting and change of marks. The committee found that answer sheets of 29 candidates contain identity marks and according to the instructions these answer books were required to be examined by the Chairman but that was not done. The Misra Committee has also found that 16 candidates who did their graduation were awarded only four marks out of 20 in the interview whereas under the instructions issued a candidate who had a graduation degree was entitled to five marks in the interview for the educational qualifications alone and thus the award of 4 marks in the interview was a proof of serious irregularity by the Selection Board. The submission of the counsel for the respondent is that these instructions regarding minimum marks for educational qualifications were done away with by a subsequent circular dated 13.3.2005 which gave full discretion to the interview board to award whatever marks they found the candidates deserved. A copy of the circular has been filed with the Fifth Supplementary affidavit in the Special Appeal of Pawan Kumar Singh. It is difficult to believe that this circular dated 13.3.2005 was not available with the Misra Committee. The Misra Committee did not refer to this circular for the reasons best known to it but the attempt to show an irregularity in the selections where none existed by referring to a circular which had been superseded, casts doubt about the fairness of the Misra Committee itself. The Misra Committee has also found that in breach of the instructions each page of the answer sheets was not signed by the selection committee. Breach of the instructions requiring the mark sheet to be signed by the examiners and put in sealed cover has also been noticed by the Committee. It has also been found by the Misra Committee that a broad sheet was not prepared. A broad sheet it has been explained to us at the Bar is a paper which contains the performance of each candidate in respect of the physical test, written test, interview and also the result. It has also been found by the Misra Committee that a broad sheet was not prepared. A broad sheet it has been explained to us at the Bar is a paper which contains the performance of each candidate in respect of the physical test, written test, interview and also the result. Learned Standing Counsel in fact has produced before us a spirally bound computer printed sheet prepared by the Selection Board and it is conceded by the Standing Counsel that in the computer printed sheet marks for the physical test, written test and interview have been shown but not the total. It was however not disputed that from the marks available in the main register or in the spirally bound computer sheet itself, a broad sheet can be constructed. That could also be done on the basis of the mark sheets of the physical and written tests and interview. Another irregularity pointed out by the counsel for the appellant is that in the model answer of the mathematics questions only answers have been given to the questions without mentioning the formula and therefore full marks had to be awarded in the mathematics questions if the answers were found correct. In this regard statements made before the Misra Committee have been referred to in the report. The Misra Committee also found that answer books of 25 candidates which appeared to be in a handwriting different from that of the candidates were sent to the expert who found that 24 answer books were indeed in different hand writing. Another irregularity pointed out by the Misra Committee is that no date was put by the members of the selection committee under their signatures and that the main register was not signed. The committee however found that the main register contains the names of candidates, their qualifications, physical measurement, performance in physical test, written test and interview. The Misra Committee has adversely commented upon the pattern of marks awarded to the candidates in the physical test and the interview and has referred to it as some design on the part of the selection board to manipulate the marks. The dissimilarity pointed out in the pattern of marks is that candidates securing higher marks in physical test were awarded lower marks in interview and vice versa. The dissimilarity pointed out in the pattern of marks is that candidates securing higher marks in physical test were awarded lower marks in interview and vice versa. It is difficult to appreciate how this dissimilarity could form the basis of any rational finding of irregularity in the selections. While a dissimilarity in the pattern of marks obtained in the written examination with those in the interview could have some relevance to arouse suspicion but surely the fact that the marks in the physical examination do not correspond with those in the interview appears to have hardly any relevance. The adverse inference drawn by the Misra Committee from the pattern of marks aforesaid is irrational. 30. The learned Single Judge has also found that uniform norms were not followed by the Misra Committee to adjudge all the recruitments and different standards were applied for clearing or rejecting the selections made by the various Recruitment Boards. To demonstrate the glaring instances where the Misra Committee has discriminated in making recommendations whether the selection be cleared a comprehensive chart has been prepared by the learned Single Judge showing the percentage of discrepancies found in the various enquiry reports relating to the selection made by various recruitment centers. The percentage of the irregularities found in the Report No. 23 pertaining to Deoria selection is 53.4%. The Deoria selection is at the top of the list in the matter of the percentage of irregularities found but the Misra Committee has recommended the clearance of the selections of this center. We are not quoting the entire chart prepared by the learned Single Judge in extenso but the correctness of the figures depicting percentage of irregularities arrived at by the learned Single Judge has not been challenged by the appellant. No arguments were pressed by the counsel for the appellant upon the correctness of the figures. The figures are revealing. The percentage of irregularities in the following recruitment centres where the selections have been recommended to be cancelled are as follows : 31. Report No. 3 Allahabad 18%, Report No. 4 Varanasi 27.6%, Report No. 5 Bareilly 17.5%, Report No. 7 Kannauj 24%, Report No. 9 Jhansi 35.4%, Report No. 12 Mainpuri 34.4%, Report No. 16 Etah 38.43%, Report No. 35 Bulandshahr 20.7% and Report No. 47 Budaun 19.4% etc. Report No. 3 Allahabad 18%, Report No. 4 Varanasi 27.6%, Report No. 5 Bareilly 17.5%, Report No. 7 Kannauj 24%, Report No. 9 Jhansi 35.4%, Report No. 12 Mainpuri 34.4%, Report No. 16 Etah 38.43%, Report No. 35 Bulandshahr 20.7% and Report No. 47 Budaun 19.4% etc. The fact that the Mishra Committee has recommended for the clearance of the selection in respect of Deoria where the percentage of irregularities were far in excess of the irregularities found by it in respect of other recruitment centers for which recommendation for cancellation of the selections has been made casts serious doubt upon the fairness of the Misra Committee and indeed it is difficult to justify the recommendations made by it. What is to be taken note of from these figures is that different standards have been adopted by the Misra Committee in rejecting or clearing the selections—a breach of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The facts and figures given in paras 108 to 116 of the judgment of the learned single Judge clearly demonstrate the discriminatory standards applied by the Misra Committee. Irregularities such as cuttings and overwriting, change of handwriting, dissimilarity in the pattern of marks in physical test and interview considered serious flaws in the Allahabad selections have been conveniently ignored or explained away as human error in the selections cleared. I am in agreement with the single Judge that the report of the Misra Committee does not appear to be fair. 32. Sri Patwaliya who appeared for the appellant submitted that interviews were held in groups and not individually. The learned Single Judge has considered in the interview this aspect and has held that in the selections to the rank of constable after the physical and written test a mere glance at the candidate in the interview was sufficient to assess his worth. Reliance has been placed by the Single Judge upon the decision in Sadanand Halo v. Mumtaz Ali Sheikh, 2008 (3) JT 74 where a similar contention that interviews of a large number of candidates within a short time was not possible was repelled by the Apex Court. 33. Two serious infirmities have been found by the learned Single Judge in the procedure adopted by the Misra Committee and one of these infirmities even casts doubt upon the fairness of the enquiry made. 33. Two serious infirmities have been found by the learned Single Judge in the procedure adopted by the Misra Committee and one of these infirmities even casts doubt upon the fairness of the enquiry made. Firstly that tainted and untainted selections could be separated and that in this case it was possible to do so in view of the nature of irregularities found by the Misra Committee and that it was not necessary to set aside the entire selections and second : that the same standards were not adopted by the committee while rejecting selection of some centres as were applied by it in clearing selection of other centres. In my opinion both these findings are justified. 34. The learned Single Judge found that the irregularities alleged by the State with regard to overwriting, award of more than prescribed marks etc., to certain selectees or group of them are peculiar and unique to those selectees or group of them and as such although the exercise for segregating them would have been an enormous one but such an exercise could have been performed. The learned Single Judge has noticed the fact that it was not the case of the State that relevant records were not available. It has also been found that the Misra Committee had summoned three fourth (3/4) of the records in respect of the selections made at the various recruitment centres and there appeared to be no such difficulty on account of which all the records could not have been scrutinized. The learned Single Judge has also referred in this regard to the directions given by the Chairman of the Misra Committee Sri Shailja Kant Misra in his order dated 14.7.2007 to its members and their associates. It would be useful now to refer to the cases cited by the counsel for the parties. 35. The learned Single Judge has also referred in this regard to the directions given by the Chairman of the Misra Committee Sri Shailja Kant Misra in his order dated 14.7.2007 to its members and their associates. It would be useful now to refer to the cases cited by the counsel for the parties. 35. Sri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court : Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others, 1993 (1) SCC 154 paragraph 2; Krishan Yadav and another v. State of Haryana and others, 1994 (4) SCC 165 ; Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and others v. Joseph P. Cherian, 2005 (8) SCC 180 ; Union of India and others v. O. Chakradhar, 2002 (3) SCC 146 ; Biswas Ranjan Sahoo and others v. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and others, 1996 (5) SCC 365 and Pramod Lahudas Meshram v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1996 (10) SCC 749 . We will take up each of these cases in the order in which they have been cited. 36. In Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others, a select list of candidates was cancelled by the Chandigarh Administration and fresh selections were ordered. The Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the order on the ground that no opportunity was given to the members of the selection board. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and held that : (a) the members of the selection board have no personal interest in the matter which may have been affected and as such no opportunity need have been given them; (b) the selected candidates have no indefeasible right to be appointed; (c) the selections were vitiated as they were made on the basis of marks for educational qualification plus interview marks but on investigation it was found that those who were having higher educational qualifications were awarded lesser marks in the interview and vice versa and uniform standards were not applied by the Selection Board. In view of such taint the Supreme Court held that the selections could be cancelled even though corruption charges were not proved. Sri P.P. Rao relied upon this decision in support of his contention that where the selections were vitiated by dishonesty the principle of audi alterem partem is not applicable. In view of such taint the Supreme Court held that the selections could be cancelled even though corruption charges were not proved. Sri P.P. Rao relied upon this decision in support of his contention that where the selections were vitiated by dishonesty the principle of audi alterem partem is not applicable. The decision was considered by the Apex Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2006) 11 SCC 356 . The distinguishing feature in Dilbagh Singh case (supra) is that the Supreme Court in that case had found that the Selection Board did not apply uniform standards. In such a case no segregation was possible on facts. Moreover in the present cases a large number of selected candidates approximately 6000 have been given appointments and their case stands on a better footing than those of mere selectees. In Krishan Yadav case (supra), the selection for 96 posts of Taxation Inspectors was made. Some non-selected candidates challenged the selection. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the records had been destroyed, so that it was not possible to record any finding regarding the infirmities alleged by the non-selected candidates. In the circumstances of the case the Supreme Court directed that CBI investigations be made. The report revealed serious irregularities in the selections. The interview sheets of the Chairman and of some of the members were found to be blank. Some candidates were shown to be present before different Interview Boards showing that the interviews were fake. Relying upon the report of the CBI, it was found by the Supreme Court that the records relating to the examination were not available and that some records were fabricated. In the peculiar circumstances of that case the Supreme Court cancelled the selection and directed for fresh selection from among those who had applied in response to the earlier advertisement. This case was considered in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon case (supra). The distinguishing feature of Krishan Yadav case (supra) is that the appointments were made contrary to the rules and the selection as a whole was vitiated. In that case appointments had been made without medical test and character verification as was found in the CBI investigation. Records of the written examination had been destroyed so the question of segregating the tainted and non tainted selections did not arise. In that case appointments had been made without medical test and character verification as was found in the CBI investigation. Records of the written examination had been destroyed so the question of segregating the tainted and non tainted selections did not arise. In Biswa Ranjan Sahoo case (supra) selection to six posts of Chargemen was set aside by the Administrative Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that it was a case of malpractice in the selection and it was not necessary to give opportunity to the candidates. The distinguishing feature of that case is that the Tribunal itself had given a finding regarding the irregularities. The question of observance of principles of natural justice before the departmental authorities therefore did not arise. In Union of India v. Joseph P. Cherian case (supra), the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of the departmental examination on account of mass scale malpractice in one of the centres and leakage of question papers and its transmission to other centers being not ruled out. In Union of India v. O. Chakradhar (supra) selections for the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist were made. Under the instructions given for the selection, a separate typing test was to be held and the candidates who qualified in the typing test alone were eligible for interview. Instead of adopting this procedure the candidates were subjected to typing test in the course of interview. No separate marks for the typing test were awarded. The rule of eligibility for the interview was therefore breached which vitiated the entire selection. The Apex Court relying upon Krishan Yadav’s case held that where irregularities are on such mass scale and it becomes difficult to separate the cases of those who have been illegally benefited the whole selection is to be quashed. One of the distinguishing features of that case is that it was not possible to apply the principles of segregation on facts. In Pramod Lahudas Meshram v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1996 (10) SCC 749 , the appointment of certain probationers was cancelled. The appointment was found to be vitiated on the admitted fact that no selection or interview was held. It was found that the order of cancellation was not vitiated on account of want opportunity. In Pramod Lahudas Meshram v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1996 (10) SCC 749 , the appointment of certain probationers was cancelled. The appointment was found to be vitiated on the admitted fact that no selection or interview was held. It was found that the order of cancellation was not vitiated on account of want opportunity. In addition to these cases which have been cited by Sri P.P. Rao, Sri Paramjeet Singh Patwaliya relied upon 1994 (5) SCC 696, Preeti Pal Singh v. State of Haryana and others in which the Court on the petition of some non-selected candidates set aside the selection pending certain irregularities. The distinguishing feature of the case is that the selections were set aside by the Court. The question of the departmental authorities applying the principle of natural justice did not arise. 37. The question of segregation of tainted and non-tainted selections was considered by the Apex Court exhaustively in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon case (supra). In that case appointments to PCS (Executive Branch) and PCS (J) were made between 1998 and 2001 on the recommendation of the Punjab Public Service Commission. A Vigilance Bureau report was called for. It submitted a report that large scale irregularities were made in the selection. As a result of the finding, the services of various officers PCS (Executive Branch) as well as of certain officers of PCS (Judicial Branch) were terminated. In the matter of Judicial Officers the decision was taken on the basis of a report submitted by a committee appointed by the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the candidates whose appointments had been cancelled on the ground that there was a large scale manipulation and that most of the candidates who had paid money were awarded higher marks. It was also found those candidates who secured higher marks in the written test were given lower marks in the interview. The Apex Court relying on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCALE 247 held that an appointment made in violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is void. It was also found those candidates who secured higher marks in the written test were given lower marks in the interview. The Apex Court relying on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCALE 247 held that an appointment made in violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is void. Sri Patwaliya who appeared for the appellant drew our attention to the Supreme Court’s holding in Kahlon’s case regarding the satisfaction of the appointing authority about the existence of three foundational facts before arriving at the finding that the appointment is void and terminating the services of employees. They are: Firstly satisfaction in regard to the material collected to arrive at the conclusion that the selection process was tainted. Secondly determining by thorough investigation in a transparent and fair manner that illegalities committed go to the root of the matter which vitiate the selection process. Thirdly, whether the sufficient material collected enabled the State to arrive at the satisfaction that the officers in majority have been found to be part of the fraudulent purpose or the system itself was corrupt. 38. We will now apply the test laid down by the Apex Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon case to examine the validity of the report of the Misra Committee and that of the impugned order of the State Government. It appears that none of the foundational facts has been established. No doubt the Misra Committee has observed that mass scale irregularities were found in the selection process from which the committee could smoothly conclude that corruption was practiced but the Misra Committee has not referred to any specific evidence in proof of corruption. In the absence of any evidence indicated in the report, it is difficult to uphold in a judicial scrutiny the conclusion drawn by the committee that corruption prevailed. The learned Single Judge has given a chart indicating the percentage of irregularities found in the reports regarding different recruitment centres. That chart indicates that the percentage of irregularities found in many of the selection centres where the Committee recommended cancellation of the results is far less than those where the Committee recommended clearance of the selection. The Misra Committee has not adopted uniform standards in recommending clearance of selection or rejection. Some instances demonstrating lack of fairness of the Misra Committee have already been given above. The Misra Committee has not adopted uniform standards in recommending clearance of selection or rejection. Some instances demonstrating lack of fairness of the Misra Committee have already been given above. The single Judge has also found that the working of the Misra Committee was not fair. The existence of one of the foundational facts that the investigation into the irregularities alleged was transparent and fair has also not been established. The conclusion drawn in the report on the basis of the magnitude of the irregularities that corruption prevailed can hardly be sustained. There is no reference in the report to any evidence that any selected candidate had obtained selection by bribe. 39. Learned Single Judge has held that suspicion cannot replace proof. While the alleged large scale irregularities could be the basis for suspicion that corruption had prevailed but such suspicion cannot be treated as proof. The third foundational fact referred to in Kahlon’s case regarding prevalence of corruption has not been established. As regards the foundational fact regarding sufficiency of the material collected for arriving at the conclusion whether the entire selection process was tainted it is necessary to examine another aspect of the matter which is as to whether the entire selection was required to be set aside or whether the tainted and the non-tainted selections could be separated. The report of the Misra Committee is based upon what it has described as large scale irregularities found by it in the selections. I have already referred to the nature of the irregularities found by the Misra Committee in an earlier portion of the order. The said irregularities have also been considered by the learned Single Judge. It appears that irregularities found were of a nature individual to the particular candidates or to a group of candidates. For example, the cases of overwriting and cutting resulting in change of marks in respect of some candidates, use of different handwriting in answer books etc., are irregularities which pertain to particular candidates whose cases could be separated from the rest of the cases where irregularities were not noticed by the Misra Committee. In Kahlon’s case Dalvir Bhandari, J. in support of the judgment agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by S.B. Sinha, J. except on the question of bias attributed to the enquiry committee observed in Paragraph 124 of the judgment as follows : “124. In Kahlon’s case Dalvir Bhandari, J. in support of the judgment agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by S.B. Sinha, J. except on the question of bias attributed to the enquiry committee observed in Paragraph 124 of the judgment as follows : “124. The High Court has not considered the case in the proper perspective. The consequences of en masse cancellation would carry a big stigma particularly on cancellation of the selections which took place because of serious charges of corruption. The question arises whether for the misdeeds of some candidates, honest and good candidates should also suffer on en masse cancellation leading to termination of their services ? Should those honest candidates be compelled to suffer without there being any fault on their part just because the respondents find it difficult to segregate the cases of tainted candidates from the other candidates ? The task may be difficult for the respondents, but in my considered view, in the interest of all concerned and particularly in the interest of honest candidates, the State must undertake this task. The unscrupulous candidates should not be allowed to damage the entire system in such a manner where innocent people also suffer great ignominy and stigma.” 40. In paragraph 126 the conclusion arrived at was : “while following the ratio of the said case, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the order of the respondents cancelling the en mass selections and direct the respondents to examine each case separately on its merits and submit a report to this Court.” 41. The learned Single Judge has stated his conclusion upon the point in para 118 of the judgment in the following words—a conclusion with which I entirely agree : “118. Thus, it cannot be said that the irregularities or discrepancies were of such large proportion where there was no other option except to cancel the entire recruitment itself. Though it may be repetitive, but untainted selection could have been identified if there was a will to do so.” 42. In the circumstances I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that it was not impossible to segregate the tainted from the untainted selections but unfortunately no exercise in that direction was made by the Committee. In the circumstances I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that it was not impossible to segregate the tainted from the untainted selections but unfortunately no exercise in that direction was made by the Committee. The enormity of the exercise is only proportionate to the enormity of the recruitment drive and should not therefore be a factor to deter the exercise. 43. Sri Patwalia pointed out certain irregularities found by the Misra Committee in the selections made by some Recruitment Boards, other than Allahabad. The learned single Judge has given a finding about the percentage of irregularities found by the Misra Committee in respect of other centers too and has found that although the percentage of irregularities found in those centres was less than Deoria, the Misra Committee had recommended cancellation of the selections. The Allahabad case was made the lead case. However, no such irregularities have been pointed out by Mr. Patwalia in the other selections which could vitiate the entire selections. 44. It was then contended by learned counsel for the appellant that no opportunity of hearing need have been granted to the candidates whose selections/appointments were cancelled in view of the fact that it was a case of mass scale irregularities found in the selection. The apex Court itself in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon’s case has distinguished between a proven case of mass copying by candidates in a Board examination and an unproven imputed charge of corruption where the appointment of a civil servant is involved. The apex Court observed : “46. A distinction moreover exists between a proven case of mass cheating for a board examination and an unproven imputed charge of corruption where the appointment of a civil servant is involved.” “50. In those cases also tainted cases were separated from the non-tainted cases. Only, thus, in the event it is found to be an impossible or highly improbable could en masse orders of termination have been issued. “51. Both the State Government as also the High Court in that view of the matter should have made all endeavours to segregate the tainted from the non-tainted candidates.” 45. In paragraph 123 of his judgment Dalvir Bhandari, J. has held that when the basis of termination is a serious allegation of corruption, then it is imperative that the principles of natural justice must be fully complied with. 46. In paragraph 123 of his judgment Dalvir Bhandari, J. has held that when the basis of termination is a serious allegation of corruption, then it is imperative that the principles of natural justice must be fully complied with. 46. The learned Single Judge has on facts observed and it was indeed not disputed before us that no opportunity of hearing was given to the candidates whose selections/appointments have been cancelled. We may now refer to the cases cited by Sri P.P. Rao upon the point whether opportunity of hearing was required to be granted. In Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of M.P., 1996 (11) SCC 599 a dismissal of an employee after a departmental enquiry was challenged on the ground that the copy of the report of the preliminary enquiry was not given. It was held that a preliminary enquiry does not form the foundation of an order of punishment and therefore it was not necessary to supply a copy thereof. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1997) 1 SCC 299 the contention that preliminary enquiry was not properly held was repelled on the ground that the preliminary enquiry was to be followed by a regular enquiry. In the case of Arun Kumar, 2007 (1) SCC 283 it was held that in the preliminary enquiry giving of opportunity of hearing was not necessary as it is followed by a departmental enquiry. The distinction between these cases and the present one is obvious. In the cases cited punishment was not founded upon the report of the preliminary enquiry. In the present case however the report of the Misra Committee has resulted in civil consequences against the writ petitioners in that the State Government has acted upon the said report in cancelling the selections/appointments of the writ petitioners. 47. The following passage from S.A. De Smith’s Judicial Review 6th Edition explains how the concept of hearing is related to the nature of administrative enquiry : “Proximity between investigation and act or decision. The degree of proximity between the investigation in question and an act or decision directly adverse to the interests of the claimant may be important. 47. The following passage from S.A. De Smith’s Judicial Review 6th Edition explains how the concept of hearing is related to the nature of administrative enquiry : “Proximity between investigation and act or decision. The degree of proximity between the investigation in question and an act or decision directly adverse to the interests of the claimant may be important. Thus, a person conducting a preliminary investigation with a view to recommending or deciding whether a formal inquiry or hearing (which may lead to a binding and adverse decision) should take place is not normally under any obligation to comply with the rules of fairness. But such a person may be placed under such an obligation if the investigation is an integral and necessary part of a process which may terminate in action adverse to the interest of a person claiming to be heard before him.” 48. The present enquiry was not a mere administrative enquiry. An administrative enquiry does not give rise to any adverse action founded upon it. The enquiry in the present cases cannot be classified either as a preliminary enquiry or as a regular departmental enquiry. It has two faces. On the one hand it is a fact finding enquiry but on the other hand it has resulted in civil consequences to the writ petitioners in that their selections/appointments have been cancelled. The procedure of affording opportunity required to be observed in a regular enquiry where the enquiry could result in civil consequences was not followed. It is well settled and it is also clear from the decisions above cited by Sri P.P. Rao that a preliminary enquiry is to be followed by a regular departmental enquiry before adverse action is taken. This has not happened in the present case. On the question as to whether opportunity should be granted or not in such cases Sri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioners relied upon the decision in Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University and others, (1998) 8 SCC 194 . That was a case of cancellation of appointment. It was held that opportunity of hearing in such a case is necessary. Another decision cited is that of Shrawan Kumar Jha and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 330. That was a case of cancellation of appointment. It was held that opportunity of hearing in such a case is necessary. Another decision cited is that of Shrawan Kumar Jha and others v. State of Bihar and others, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 330. That was a case of cancellation of appointment and it was held by the apex Court that hearing was a pre requisite. In that case appointments of about 175 assistant teachers were cancelled on the ground that the appointment was made by an incompetent authority and the reservation rules were not followed. In that case although the infirmity in the appointment was based on a fundamental ground common to all the teachers affected, the apex Court held that opportunity was necessary. No doubt the aforesaid two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents relate to a case where cancellation of appointment of a few individuals was in question but the proposition of law has been laid down by the apex Court in no uncertain words. The same principle of law was applied by Dalveer Bhandari, J. in Kahlon’s case in paragraph 123 of the judgment. In the circumstances we are of the view that after segregating the tainted and non-tainted candidates in case the State Government decides to cancel the appointment of those found to be tainted it is incumbent to afford opportunity of hearing to those against whom adverse action is proposed. The learned Single Judge although has not given any specific finding upon the point that the order of the State Government was vitiated on account of want of opportunity but as a fact he has recorded a finding that no opportunity was given and he has also recorded a finding that where civil consequences are to follow the principles of natural justice have to be observed. The learned Single Judge has relied upon the decisions in Dev Dutt v. Union of India and others, 2008 AIR SCW 3486 and in the case of Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 (71) AIC 14. It has been held in those cases that the question to be asked in every case is to determine whether the principles of natural justice have been followed. It has been held in those cases that the question to be asked in every case is to determine whether the principles of natural justice have been followed. From Nag Arjuna Construction Company Limited case the following passage has been quoted in the judgment of the learned single Judge, which we find useful to refer : “Expression ‘civil consequences’ encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.” 49. In this case there is no dispute upon the point that there are two categories of constables affected one: those who had been given appointment letters and had joined and others who were merely selected candidates and had been sent for training during which they were being paid some stipend. The order of cancellation of the selections/appointments has undoubtedly resulted in civil consequences to these persons. Opportunity was therefore required to be given. 50. Sri P.P. Rao and Sri P.S. Patwaliya submitted that a committee headed by the Chief Secretary was constituted by the State Government on 4.10.2007 as a result of the cabinet decision to go into certain questions which we shall refer to presently. The committee was constituted after the decision of the State Government impugned in the present cases. The report has not been referred to by the learned Single Judge in his order. The learned counsel for the appellants have placed reliance upon the report to demonstrate that it was found by the Chief Secretary’s committee that the selection was tainted by corruption. It is common ground between the parties namely counsel for the appellants as well as counsel for the respondents that on the writ petitioners application it was ordered by the learned Single Judge that the report of the Chief Secretary be produced in a sealed cover as the State was claiming privilege but the counsel appearing for the writ petitioners stated that they had downloaded the report of the Chief Secretary from the internet and were not insisting upon a certified copy of the report being given to them but the report as directed was produced, seen by the learned Single Judge and returned. There is however nothing to indicate that in the course of the arguments before the learned Single Judge the State had placed reliance upon any finding in the report. The question which has arisen in these appeals is whether the report of the Chief Secretary is a relevant material for the decision of these cases. Another facet of the question is what was the scope of enquiry to be made by the Chief Secretary and what findings have been given in the said report. The report of the Chief Secretary has been filed along with an affidavit of the Special Secretary Dilip Kumar Gupta. However an affidavit explaining the nature of the enquiry held by the Chief Secretary’s committee has been mentioned in the affidavit of J.N. Chambers. It has been stated that the purpose of the committee was not to justify or nullify action/selection made. The purpose rather was to make the procedure for selection transparent in future and to find out whether the selections have been influenced by high political/administrative levels and, if Yes, to fix responsibility. Our attention has been drawn to para 8 (f) of the affidavit of J.N. Chambers. The relevant portion is quoted below : “That the appointment of Enquiry Committee is a subsequent action, neither aimed nor directed to justify the cancellation of selection of the petitioner nor it has any connection even remotely to the process of cancellation of selection.” 51. The conclusion drawn in the Chief Secretary’s report is stated in the portion of the report on page 218 of the supplementary affidavit. The findings in the Chief Secretary’s report appear to be that the vacancies were artificially created in a planned manner and the then Chief Minister gave his approval and engineered the entire recruitment in a planned manner and that political and administrative interference was clearly visible in the entire recruitment process and clear involvement of Shiv Pal Singh the then Minister of Public Works Department in illegal gratification of money with the cooperation of some other persons and corruption had come to light. It was also prima facie found proved that direct and indirect cooperation in these activities was given by the then Director General of Police Shri Yashpal Singh and Shri Bua Singh and the then Special Secretary to Chief Minister Shri Chandrama Prasad. It was also prima facie found proved that direct and indirect cooperation in these activities was given by the then Director General of Police Shri Yashpal Singh and Shri Bua Singh and the then Special Secretary to Chief Minister Shri Chandrama Prasad. The report ends with the recommendation made in para 4 of the conclusions that in view of the sensibility of the entire matter, the investigation of the matter should be done by the Central Bureau of Investigation. It is clear from the aforesaid conclusions that the finding regarding corruption referred to are only prima facie findings and they have been left for deeper investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. No definite or conclusive finding has therefore been given in the Chief Secretary’s report and on a mere prima facie finding of corruption given ex parte it is difficult to uphold an order setting aside any selection or appointment made. There is however no specific or definite finding that any particular candidate had paid the money nor that any particular officer had accepted illegal gratification. Apart from what has been said above, from the body of the report the learned Standing Counsel referred to the portion that there was “charcha” (a talk) about corruption on the part of Sri S. Bhalla, ADGP. It is well settled that the exercise which the writ Court is required to perform is to examine the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. This has been settled in a catena of cases. The committee of the Chief Secretary was constituted after the orders of the State Government impugned in the writ petition. The Chief Secretary’s report was non-existent at the time when the State Govt. took the impugned decision of cancellation of the selections/appointments. It was not a part of the decision making process as it has come into existence subsequent to the action impugned in the writ petition giving rise to these appeals. Moreover the purpose of the enquiry as explained in the affidavit of J.N. Chambers was not to justify the cancellation of any selection or appointment. In my view in these circumstances any material which was not part of the decision making process cannot be relied upon for sustaining an order impugned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover the report is a mere opinion. In my view in these circumstances any material which was not part of the decision making process cannot be relied upon for sustaining an order impugned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover the report is a mere opinion. Although it is settled law that subsequent facts and events can be taken notice of for moulding relief where the said fact or event affects the rights of the parties but a mere report does not affect any right of the party being only an opinion. It is therefore not a relevant material to be taken note of in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover it is not in dispute that the report was an ex parte one. Further as I have already found the conclusions arrived at in the Chief Secretary’s report are mere prima facie conclusions. In the circumstances I am of the view that the report of the Chief Secretary does not advance the case of the appellants and also cannot be taken into account. In Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and another, AIR 1978 SC 851 it was held that the decision impugned in the writ petition cannot be supplemented by additional reasons in the counter affidavit. In this connection it is just apt to refer to the oft repeated words of Vivian Bose J. in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” 52. Sri P.P. Rao then relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Amit Kumar Shukla v. Union of India, 2008 (5) ADJ 347 in support of his contention that large scale corruption had prevailed in the impugned selections noticing which the Division Bench had directed investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Sri P.P. Rao then relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Amit Kumar Shukla v. Union of India, 2008 (5) ADJ 347 in support of his contention that large scale corruption had prevailed in the impugned selections noticing which the Division Bench had directed investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. All that has been directed by the Division Bench is that the CBI investigation may be made in the matter. No finding has been given by the Court that corruption had prevailed in the selection. It is conceded by the learned Standing Counsel that the matter has been taken to the apex Court and on 15.9.2008 a stay order has been granted by the Supreme Court, the result being that even the CBI investigation cannot be carried on so long as the stay order is continuing. The decision in Amit Kumar Shukla (supra) therefore does not advance the case of the appellants. Sri P.P. Rao also relied upon certain reports of the anti corruption organization about certain irregularities in the selection process and about substitution of certain answer books. The learned Single Judge in para 67 has referred to an affidavit filed by D.K. Gupta, Special Secretary, Home in which it has been stated that in several criminal cases against the officials, the prosecuting agency has sought sanction for criminal prosecution of the Chairman and members of different Recruitment Boards under various sections of the Indian Penal Code read with the Prevention of Corruption Act as sufficient evidence against them was found by the Anti Corruption Organization of the State and has posed a question in the order wondering as to why these officials have not been placed under suspension. 53. Another finding recorded by the learned single judge is that except in the case of recruitment to the wireless wing covered by Report No. 44 no decision of approval was taken by the Director General of Police in respect of the reports. Even regarding Report No. 44 a one line order of acceptance was passed. Indeed the counsel for the appellant did not challenge this finding before us in the course of the argument. It has also been found by the learned Single Judge that in most of the cases the Director General of Police sent the reports to the State Government within a day or two of having received them. Indeed the counsel for the appellant did not challenge this finding before us in the course of the argument. It has also been found by the learned Single Judge that in most of the cases the Director General of Police sent the reports to the State Government within a day or two of having received them. The Director General of Police did not apply mind to the correctness of the report. Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to Paragraph 38 of the affidavit of D.K. Gupta filed in support of the stay application in the special appeal wherein it has been stated that the application of mind by the Director General of Police was not necessary as it was a policy decision and the report was sent to the State Government, which has passed a detailed order. It is, thus, clear that the Director General of Police had merely forwarded the reports in a hasty manner without application of mind. It has also been found by the learned Single Judge that the State Government too acted in haste and that in almost all the cases the reports were accepted within a day or two of their submission before the Chief Minister/State Government. This finding has not been assailed in the memo of appeal. In paragraph 32 of the writ petition of Pawan Kumar Singh it has been stated that the decision was taken by the State Government in a very hasty manner. Learned Standing counsel could not refer to any paragraph in the counter affidavit denying specifically or denying at all the averment that the decision was taken in a hasty manner. The dates given in the chart prepared by the learned Single Judge have not been assailed by the appellant in the memo of appeal. The learned Single Judge in paragraphs 79, 82 and 84 has referred to the various dates on which records were sent to the DGP and State Government and the date of the cancellation order. I am not quoting the chart prepared by the learned Single Judge in extenso but the fact that the decision in many of the reports was taken within a day or two of the submission of the report before the State Government is quite clear from the chart. I am not quoting the chart prepared by the learned Single Judge in extenso but the fact that the decision in many of the reports was taken within a day or two of the submission of the report before the State Government is quite clear from the chart. It therefore appears that the State Government acted in a hasty manner and did not apply its mind and I affirm the findings of the learned single Judge upon this point. 54. Another aspect relating to the non-application of mind at the level of the State Government has been noticed by the learned Single Judge. It appears that the selections made by the Recruitment Board of Sitapur and Gonda were challenged in the writ petition of Harendra Singh reported in 2005 (6) AWC 6161 and the selections were found to be valid and the writ petition was dismissed by the Lucknow Bench. The same selections have been found to be tainted by the Misra Committee and the decision to cancel them has been taken by the State Government by the impugned order. The Lucknow Bench also observed that it had examined the record of 13 other recruitment centers and did not find any invalidity in these selections. The decision in Harendra Singh’s case was relevant. Although the Evidence Act does not apply in respect of departmental inquiries strictu sensu but even if the principles regarding relevancy are borrowed therefrom; the decision is relevant under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a recognition of a fact that the candidates were regularly and validly selected and had a right though not an indefeasible right of appointment but at least of legitimate expectation. The decision was therefore required at least to be considered. Moreover, the said decision is also relevant under the principles of issue estoppel. Upon this point Sri R.N. Singh placed reliance upon Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas and another, [JT 2008(6) SC 440]. In that case the apex Court has considered the difference between principles of res judicata and issue estoppel. 55. Sri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the scope of judicial review against a fact finding in house enquiry is very limited. In that case the apex Court has considered the difference between principles of res judicata and issue estoppel. 55. Sri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the scope of judicial review against a fact finding in house enquiry is very limited. He placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 SC 1721 , Prabhu v. Rama Rao and others; (1972) 4 SCC 618 , Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1991) 2 SCC 716 , Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and others; (1993) 2 SCC 299 , U.P. Financial Corporation v. Gem Cap (India) Private Limited and others; (1999) 5 SCC 762 , Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana and (1999) 8 SCC 90 , R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others. We have already held that undoubtedly the scope of interference by the High Court in a fact finding in house enquiry is very limited and is confined to challenging the decision making process alone vide the State of U.P. v. Jauhari Mal, 2004 (4) SCC 714 . However, as we have already observed above that in this case it was not a mere fact finding enquiry under challenge but an enquiry, which has resulted in the writ petitioners being visited with civil consequences which is not immune from attack and there is nothing laid down in the cases cited by Sri Rao which may preclude interference by this Court in the order of the State Government on the findings recorded by the learned single Judge and affirmed in this appeal. In the case of Rama Rao (supra) cited by Sri Rao itself it was held that the High Court can interfere where departmental authorities have held the proceedings in breach of principles of natural justice or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by taking into account irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion is arbitrary or on similar grounds. 56. Another finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that while in the case of the writ petitioner the enquiry was held post haste and it was also followed by an order cancelling their selections/appointment, but the same speed has not been adopted in the case of officers who were the greater sinners. 56. Another finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that while in the case of the writ petitioner the enquiry was held post haste and it was also followed by an order cancelling their selections/appointment, but the same speed has not been adopted in the case of officers who were the greater sinners. It is pointed out by the Standing Counsel that in the case of officers criminal prosecutions or departmental inquiries are pending. However, it is important to note that in the case of the officers even the orders of suspension were subsequently withdrawn and now the officers are merrily serving. Although the fact that no action has yet been taken against the officers by itself may not be determinative of any particular conclusion but taken in the totality of the other facts and circumstances to which reference has been made above it is an indication of the fact that the State Government has adopted a different attitude in respect of proceedings against the officers. In my opinion action should have been taken for speedily proceeding with the departmental inquiries against them but instead we find that a period of two and half years has elapsed and not a single case has been referred to where some disciplinary action may have been taken against any officer. 57. It is necessary now to take notice of one submission made by Sri Khare, learned counsel for the respondents, that in the present case provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India have not been complied with inasmuch as the order directing enquiry is not expressed to have been passed in the name of the competent authority. He refers to communication dated 11.6.2007 and 12.6.2007 made by the Secretary, Home, State of Uttar Pradesh to the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, to the effect that the investigations as directed be made in accordance with law in respect of the complaints. It is submitted that there is no recital in the order that the directions have been issued in the name of the Governor nor there is any material on the record to demonstrate that any such order was, in fact, passed by the Chief Minister or by the Minister, In-charge of the Department. This point was considered by the learned Single Judge and the argument was repelled. This point was considered by the learned Single Judge and the argument was repelled. It is not disputed that the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh had power to order for an enquiry in a situation where irregularities in the selection process or allegations of fraud and corruption are made. Even assuming that the Director General of Police, may have been labouring under a misconception that the direction to appoint the Enquiry Committee was the result of the directions received by him but as it is not disputed that the Director General of Police himself had the power, the principle that the exercise of power is referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it would be applicable to the case. In this view of the matter if the Director General of Police was satisfied that a case for an enquiry into the complaints regarding mass-scale irregularities in the selection process and prevalence of corruption had been made, it was open to him to direct the enquiry. We, therefore, repel the argument of learned counsel for the respondents. 58. Before parting with the case, we are pained to observe that while the bureaucracy is said to be the steel-frame of the administration and a broad continuity in administration is required to be maintained, we find that in this case with the change of the elected Government, the administration upon which the fate of people hangs in the balance changed colour to the point of making complete somersault in its stand and the very actions which were zealously defended in the previous regime have been brought to severe condemnation shortly after the arrival of the new political bosses. The Sitapur and Gonda selections had been challenged by the non-selected candidates in Harinder Singh’s case. The administration had vigorously defended the selections which were even upheld by the High Court but a different stand has now been taken. A perusal of the report of the Chief Secretary indicates that allegations have now been made by relatively junior officers of the bureaucracy against the previous political bosses and against high officials of the State Government. I am not suggesting that an act vitiated by fraud or other serious irregularity cannot be undone whenever detected but if the fraud or irregularity was known the bureaucracy is not expected to slavishly succumb to pressure. I am not suggesting that an act vitiated by fraud or other serious irregularity cannot be undone whenever detected but if the fraud or irregularity was known the bureaucracy is not expected to slavishly succumb to pressure. In the body of the Chief Secretary’s report, the conduct of the then DGP and of the Special Secretary to the Chief Minister and of certain other officials has been deprecated. The following is an extract from the conclusion No.1 in the Chief Secretary’s Report : “In this way prima facie it is clear that the then Hon’ble Chief Minister meticulously engineered the entire recruitment in a planned systematic manner. It appears that all the Principal Secretaries posted at that time in the Home Department were helpless against the pressures and pulls exerted from the office of the then Chief Minister and thus failed to perform their duty.” 59. I am not expressing any opinion as to whether the conclusions drawn in the report are correct but this picture certainly reflects a very disturbing state of affairs and raises a question whether the administration can again go back upon their present stand should the elected Government again change. However, optimism being the healthier attitude and on the principle that more cannot be read than what is actually said I read the observations as confined to the then high ups in the Government and not as condemnation of the administration generally. The situation that has cropped up in this case is unfortunate. It is one of the duties of the Government in a welfare state to provide job opportunities to the people. On account of lack of jobs reflected by the fact that even at the lowest level hundreds of applications are received against a single post, a situation has arisen where people are forced to do anything in order to get a job, even at the menial and lower rungs. If job opportunities were not scarce this unfortunate muddle in the employment process would not have been created. 60. In the result, I am of the view that an effort should have been made by the concerned authorities to segregate cases of the tainted and non-tainted candidates and that not having been done, I am in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the orders of the State Government cancelling selection/appointments cannot be sustained. 60. In the result, I am of the view that an effort should have been made by the concerned authorities to segregate cases of the tainted and non-tainted candidates and that not having been done, I am in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the orders of the State Government cancelling selection/appointments cannot be sustained. I also agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the action taken by the State Government was a hasty one. In the circumstances, I leave it open to the State Government to now conduct an exercise of getting the tainted candidates from the non-tainted separated. Subject to the aforesaid liberty to the State Government, I dismiss the appeals. Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—With regards to my esteemed brother, so far as operative part of the order is concerned, I fully agree with my senior Brother, but on some points, I will express my own views by a separate judgment. ——— Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—After hearing these special appeals, my esteemed senior brother Hon’ble Mr. Justice Janardan Sahai has been pleased to dictate the judgment and order in the open Court immediately after conclusion of the arguments of the rival parties. With utmost regard, I would like to mention here that while I agree with the conclusions drawn and directions issued in the operative portion of the judgment and order, I am in respectful disagreement with some of the views and reasons recorded by my esteemed brother while dealing with some of the issues. I have my own views to express in the matter. I would like to deal with some points raised during the arguments in a different way. 62. Through these appeals, the State of U.P. has assailed the judgment and order dated 8.12.2008 (reported in 2008 (10) ADJ 321 ), passed by Hon’ble the Single Judge, allowing a number of writ petitions filed by the constables in Civil Police, Provincial Armed Constabulary (P.A.C.) and other personnel of U.P. Police Radio and Wireless Department challenging various orders issued on 11.9.2007, 18.9.2007 and 30.9.2007 by the State Government cancelling their initial appointments. Hon’ble the Single Judge has allowed these petitions quashing the afore-mentioned orders which resulted in termination of the services of candidates who were recruited as constables in police and P.A.C. departments during the year 2005-2006. Hon’ble the Single Judge has allowed these petitions quashing the afore-mentioned orders which resulted in termination of the services of candidates who were recruited as constables in police and P.A.C. departments during the year 2005-2006. Some of the candidates were undergoing training and some were due for enlistment as constables after completion of their training probation period. 63. It is an admitted case of both the parties that the recruitments to the posts of constables in civil police and P.A.C are not governed by statutory rules and hence all the recruitments were to be made as per directions contained in the administrative instructions, executive orders and circulars, etc. issued by the State Government and the police headquarters. The details of circulars have already been given in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. The selection process was held in three stages. At the threshold were the physical measurement and physical ability tests, followed by written test and then the interview by the Selection Board. 100 marks were allotted for physical measurement tests, etc., 50 marks were for written test while interview was of 20 marks. A candidate who secured atleast 50% marks in physical test was to be permitted to take the written examination. The candidates who secured atleast 33% marks in the written test were called for interview, which did not have any maximum qualifying marks. The candidates had passed through the three stages of tests as aforesaid and were selected. They were assigned to different training centres and majority of such selected candidates after successful completion of their training were given appointments in the regular force. Some of them have worked for more than two years. All these recruitments were done by the Government headed by Sri Mulayam Singh Yadav as Chief Minister in the State of U.P. Later on, the new Government headed by Kumari Mayawati as Chief Minister assumed charge on 13.5.2009. 64. It emerges from record that three newly elected Members of the Legislative Assembly, belonging to Bahujan Samaj Party made certain complaints. All these recruitments were done by the Government headed by Sri Mulayam Singh Yadav as Chief Minister in the State of U.P. Later on, the new Government headed by Kumari Mayawati as Chief Minister assumed charge on 13.5.2009. 64. It emerges from record that three newly elected Members of the Legislative Assembly, belonging to Bahujan Samaj Party made certain complaints. Sri Mohammad Irshad Khan, M.L.A. from Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow made a complaint on 14.5.2007 addressed to Hon’ble the Chief Minister alleging that the then Director General of Police Sri V.K. Bhalla in connivance with the then Cabinet Minister Sri Shiv Pal Singh Yadav, real brother of Sri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the then Chief Minister of U.P. had recruited candidates to various posts of constables in civil and wireless departments of police on extraneous and monetary considerations. Two more complaints were made on 15.5.2007 and thereafter on 28.5.2007 by Sri R.P. Jaiswal, M.L.A. from Barhaj, Deoria and Sri Amrendra Shukla, M.L.A. from Ram Nagar, Barabanki respectively. Serious allegations were made in these complaints that the recruitment to the posts of constables in civil police, P.A.C. and Wireless Department of police were made on extraneous and monetary considerations. There were allegations of committing massive illegalities, irregularities, corruption, etc. against senior officers, who were associated with the selection process. Categorical averments were made that most of the eligible candidates were deliberately ignored in the recruitment process, chosen one were recruited. The members of the selection/recruitment boards had not exercised their duties fairly and properly. Serious allegations were made against the members of the Selection Boards. 65. The records produced before the Court further reveals that the Secretariat of the Chief Minister had dealt with these three letters. The Secretary to the Chief Minister Sri Vijai Singh endorsed the complaints to the Principal Secretary (Home) on 7.6.2007. The Secretary (Home), in his turn, referred these complaints on 11.6.2007 to the Director General of Police (D.G.P.) for taking necessary action. The D.G.P. through his order dated 13.6.2007 acting on the instructions issued by the Secretary (Home), Government of U.P. constituted a four-member enquiry committee consisting of Sri Shailja Kant Misra, A.D.G.P. As its head, Sri Javed Akhtar, D.I.G. Police establishment, Sri Vijai Kumar, D.I.G. Allahabad Range, and Sri Avnish Chandra, D.I.G. Bareilly Range, and forwarded the aforesaid three letters of the M.L.As. to the said committee for making an enquiry into the allegations of illegalities, irregularities, corruption, nepotism, procedural illegality, violation of directions and administrative instructions and service rules, etc. The Director General of Police, vide letter dated 29.6.2007 issued a Circular to all the Superintendents of Police and the Commandants P.A.C. appointing authorities for the posts of constables to scrutinize the recruits regarding their heights, physical fitness, educational qualifications and caste certificates. The said appointing authorities were also authorised to take appropriate action against the recruits as per the administrative instructions, rules and regulations. These authorities were asked to extend co-operation to the enquiry committee. This scrutiny exercise was to be completed by 20.7.2007 and a report was to be submitted to the Chairman of the afore-mentioned enquiry committee having its Head Office at Lucknow. 66. Considering the enormity of the enquiry, as the enquiry committee had to scrutinize the process of selection/recruitment etc. held at about 51 centres in U.P., the Chairman of the Committee requested the Director General of Police to strengthen the committee by nominating some more officers to enable it to complete the enquiry within the stipulated period. Considering the request of the Chairman of the enquiry committee, the D.G.P. appointed Sri Sulkhan Singh, Inspector General of Police U.P. vide letter dated 14.6.2007, S/Sri Adish Misra, D.I.G., R.K. Srivastava, S.P. C.B.C.I.D, D.K. Rai, Additional S.P. S.C.O. Lucknow, Sushiri Sadhana Goswami, Additional S.P. and Smt. Pragya Misra, D.S.P. Vide letter dated 30.6.2007 and S/Sri Ram Singh, D.I.G, Sanjay Singhal, Commandant 6th Bn. P.A.C, Brijbhushan, Commandant 8th Bn. P.A.C, Rajiv Krishna, Commandant 35th Bn. P.A.C, R.P. Singh, Commandant 12th Bn P.A.C vide letter dated 31.7.2007. Later Sri Ramit Sharma, Commandant 10th Bn. P.A.C. replaced Sri Sanjay Singhal, Commandant 6th Bn. P.A.C. vide letter dated 3.8.2007. 67. It is also apparent from the record that Sri Shailja Kant Misra, Chairman of the committee, vide letter dated 16.7.2007, had intimated the D.I.G. regarding involvement of Sri Mohammad Javed Akhtar, D.I.G. Meerut in the second recruitment process held for recruiting constables in civil police in district Sitapur on 26.4.2006. He requested for appointment of some other officer for the purposes of enquiry to be held in respect of district Sitapur. Accordingly, the D.G.P. vide letter dated 21.7.2007 excluded Sri Mohammad Javed Akhtar from enquiry committee. He requested for appointment of some other officer for the purposes of enquiry to be held in respect of district Sitapur. Accordingly, the D.G.P. vide letter dated 21.7.2007 excluded Sri Mohammad Javed Akhtar from enquiry committee. These facts have been mentioned in the counter affidavit filed by Sri Shailja Kant Misra in this Court in the writ petitions disposed of by Hon’ble the Single Judge. 68. Attention of the Court was also drawn to the fact that Sri Shailja Kant Misra had no occasion to scrutinize the recommendations submitted by the selection boards in respect of districts falling in eastern zone including district Ballia. The instructions contained in the letter dated 2.7.2006 issued by the Police headquarters were thus followed by Sri Shailja Kant Misra. Moreover, it was canvassed before the Court that the record relating to recruitments held at Police Lines Ballia Centre were returned back through Additional S.P. Ghazipur on 19.9.2006. This exercise was completed much before the instructions of P.A.C. Headquarters contained in letter dated 2.7.2006. 69. It has been submitted before the Court that this duly constituted enquiry committee under the Chairmanship of Sri Shailja Kant Misra had gone into the records of 51 recruitment centres spread over in the State of U.P. Detailed reports were prepared, which were placed before the appropriate authorities. Anomalies and illegalities, procedural and otherwise, were highlighted in the reports. Taking into account these reports, the State Government, vide its order dated 11.9.2007 cancelled the selections made at 14 recruitment centres. Details of these 14 recruitment centres have already been given in the judgment of Hon’ble the Single Judge and the relevant documents have been placed before the Division Bench of this Court. Similarly, by another order issued on 18.9.2007, the State Government had cancelled the selection held at 10 recruitment centres and thereafter by order dated 30.9.2007, the State Government annulled the selection of constables held at 18 recruitment centres including the three recruitment boards concerning the Radio and Wireless Department of police. 70. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that here is a case where the constitution of the Shailja Kant Misra Committee vide order dated 13.6.2007 issued by the D.G.P. and its report is still under fire. The validity of its constitution and the report etc. are under challenge before Hon’ble the Apex Court. 70. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that here is a case where the constitution of the Shailja Kant Misra Committee vide order dated 13.6.2007 issued by the D.G.P. and its report is still under fire. The validity of its constitution and the report etc. are under challenge before Hon’ble the Apex Court. A Division Bench of this Court at Lucknow, comprising Hon’ble A.N.Verma and Hon’ble S.N.Shukla, JJ. in Writ Petition No. 7740 (M/B) of 2007, Brij Bhushan Bakshi and others v. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2009 (1) ADJ 362 (DB)(LB), has quashed the order dated 13.6.2007 issued by the D.G.P., whereby the enquiry committee was constituted and presided over by Sri Shailja Kant Misra. This judgment has been challenged before the Apex Court, by filing a S.L.P. and the Apex Court has been pleased to issue notices to two of the respondents and has further observed that this Court may carry on dealing with these matters in accordance with law. 71. Voluminous records were produced before Hon’ble the Single Judge as per his orders passed on various dates in the order-sheet. Enquiry reports No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 17, 18, 22, 33, 40, 41, 33 and 40 were placed before the Court by the State. Some of the reports, like Chief Secretary’s report dated 15.1.2008 and other documents were also placed. Affidavits of Principal Secretary, Home and Sri Shailja Kant Misra, A.D.G.P. were also filed. Answer-sheets written by the candidates and other material relating to examinations/tests were also produced before this Court. Some of the answer-sheets, result-sheets, etc., mention of which find place in the above reports, were produced by Sri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Advocate, Special Counsel appearing for the State for perusal of the Division Bench. I have seen some of the answer-sheets, result-sheets and other materials put forth before the Court by Sri P.S. Patwalia, Senior Advocate appearing for the State, appellants in the present special appeals. Hon’ble the Single Judge has mainly dealt with the selection process held at Allahabad Centre and thirteen other Centres out of 51 Centres spread all over U.P. 72. The contents of these reports highlighted the irregularities committed in the selection process. Examples of large scale illegalities/irregularities committed in the selection process have been demonstrated in these reports. Hon’ble the Single Judge has mainly dealt with the selection process held at Allahabad Centre and thirteen other Centres out of 51 Centres spread all over U.P. 72. The contents of these reports highlighted the irregularities committed in the selection process. Examples of large scale illegalities/irregularities committed in the selection process have been demonstrated in these reports. These were placed before Hon’ble the Single Judge and the same have again been brought for perusal of the Division Bench. The learned State Counsel has highlighted the relevant contents of these reports for perusal of this Court by placing charts, answer-sheets and result-sheets, which form part of the record of the Court. The examining committees conducted the enquiry in respect of procedure and work of the selection committees in dealing with the physical efficiency test, written examination, interview and tabulation work. The enquiry committee found there were clear cut violation of recruitment instructions at large scale, several irregularities and illegalities such as, marks of physical eligibility test were altered and added by the examiner in the mark sheets/answer sheets. All those answer book of the written examination in which chest number and identification marks were mentioned by the candidate, found to have been checked and declared passed by the selection committees. The evaluation was wrongly done by the examiner and alteration of marks in the answer sheets were found. The hand-writing on the names slip of the answer book and hand-writing in the answer book both are different some answers were written in different hand-writing, in 108 copies of the written examination, the extra marks were given by the examiner without any basis and all those candidates were declared passed. The submission was that if these extra marks are reduced, then the candidate would be declared failed. In several cases, no merit-lists and Broadsheets were prepared by the selection committees. At some recruitment centres, the over-writing on marks made in the answer books were neither signed by the examiner and nor counter-signed by the Chairman of selection committee. There is no signature of the candidate in the mark-sheet of physical eligibility test and some of the candidates declared passed even without appearing in the physical eligibility test. 73. In respect of Gorakhpur Recruitment Centre and other centres, following alarming illegalities/irregularities were found. The selections were tainted. There is no signature of the candidate in the mark-sheet of physical eligibility test and some of the candidates declared passed even without appearing in the physical eligibility test. 73. In respect of Gorakhpur Recruitment Centre and other centres, following alarming illegalities/irregularities were found. The selections were tainted. A Division Bench of this Court which had ordered for a C.B.I. Enquiry has taken note of the following : (i) Several examination sheets were not in the hand-writing of the candidates as has been confirmed by the forensic experts in its report. (ii) Several examination sheets were written by Mr. Sushil Kumar Shukla, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who also happened to be one of the members of the recruitment board. (iii) The investigating agency found that one of the members of the recruitment board Mr. Sushil Kumar Shukla while examining the written examination sheet had himself written answers to facilitate illegal selection of several candidates. The investigating agency has also concluded that Mr. Sushil Kumar Shukla thus acted as part of criminal conspiracy to promote illegal selection. (iv) In several written examination sheets, corrections were made in the given answers by Sri Akhlaq Ahmad, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Sri Sushil Kumar Shukla, Deputy Superintendent of Police and other fellow members of the recruitment board so that the candidates may get undue advantage. This fact again has been corroborated by the hand-writing experts of the forensic lab. (v) The final mark sheet was tampered with and wrong entries were made therein to facilitate selection of several candidates. In all 34 candidates who were not eligible to be selected got selected because the final mark sheet containing the marks for physical examination were deliberately increased as part of a criminal conspiracy. (vi) As per instructions governing the examination, chairman should remain physically present on the site of examination but the investigating agency has detected on the basis of available authentic records that Chairman, namely, Sri B.B. Bakshi was not physically present during the physical test, written examination and also during the interview. A copy of the car diaries of Mr. B.B. Bakshi was enclosed, a perusal whereof would reveal that during the course and the time of examination, he made a visit not only to far distant places in the district but to Lucknow also. A copy of the car diaries of Mr. B.B. Bakshi was enclosed, a perusal whereof would reveal that during the course and the time of examination, he made a visit not only to far distant places in the district but to Lucknow also. (vii) The checking of copies were not carried out at the designated place and forgeries were committed in a well organized manner at the camp office of the Chairman of the recruitment board against the rules and instructions governing the examination. (viii) That in its conclusion the investigating agency has found Mr. B.B. Bakshi, Chairman of the recruitment Board, Mr. Ramesh, Additional Superintendent of Police, Mr. Sushil Kumar Shukla, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Mr. Harinath Yadav, Deputy Superintendent of Police criminally guilty and has sought to launch prosecution against them under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. (ix) The investigating agency has also concluded that the Chairman and the members of the board criminally colluded to ensure the selection of ineligible candidates. 74. A peculiar situation has arisen in this case. Hon’ble the Single Judge, in his judgment impugned in these special appeals, has found fault with the composition of the enquiry committee. Even its act of co-opting some officers to render aid and assistance has not been appreciated. As per learned Single Judge, the principles of natural justice had to be complied with even in holding preliminary enquiry also and in cases when action is taken by the State Government as a policy matter to cancel the whole selection process not casting a stigma on any individual candidate or picking and choosing some particular candidates and letting others to continue in the services. Hon’ble the Single Judge has gone to the extent that pith and substance of the order constituting the Misra committee and the relevant documents is that it had abdicated its powers and neither the report nor its recommendation can be attributed to the Misra committee report. The services of the constables, respondents herein, could not have been terminated on the basis of the reports submitted by such committee. Moreover, the Court had also expressed its dissatisfaction over the act of the Government in not taking a proper action against the erring officers, who were involved in the selection process. The services of the constables, respondents herein, could not have been terminated on the basis of the reports submitted by such committee. Moreover, the Court had also expressed its dissatisfaction over the act of the Government in not taking a proper action against the erring officers, who were involved in the selection process. It is also found that it was a case of non-application of mind and the apex authorities had acted unfairly. 75. Hon’ble the Single Judge has been persuaded by the argument of the petitioner constables, respondents herein that the irregularities or discrepancies found in the various recruitments were only handful and insufficient to identify the candidates, yet neither any effort was made to separate good candidates from the tainted ones, nor it was seen that the alleged irregularities and discrepancies were not so much interwoven that it required cancellation of the entire recruitment. It was also urged that on identical irregularities and discrepancies, some of the recruitments have been declared safe but that standard was not followed in the present case. Much emphasis was given on sparing Saharanpur centre, which is the constituency of Km. Mayawati, the present Chief Minister of U.P. 76. Hon’ble the Single Judge has appreciated the observations made by the Apex Court in Indrapreet Singh Kahlon and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2006) 11 SCC 356 and the ratio laid down in the case of Union of India v. O. Chakradhar, AIR 2002 SC 1119 , reliance on which was also placed by the State, appellants. 77. In paras 95-96 of his judgment, the learned Single Judge has divided the recruitments in two categories. The first category was of those recruitments which were made without following the due procedure prescribed under the rules, such as recruitments which were made without the mandatory advertisement or by overlooking the mandatory eligibility requirement, like knowledge of typing, computer and other qualifications. In other words, the illegality to enable cancellation of entire recruitment, should be one which goes to the root of the recruitment itself and runs through the spine of each selectee and is not peculiar or unique to one or a group of selectees. 78. In other words, the illegality to enable cancellation of entire recruitment, should be one which goes to the root of the recruitment itself and runs through the spine of each selectee and is not peculiar or unique to one or a group of selectees. 78. The other part consists of those recruitments where different irregularities are peculiar or unique to one or a group of selectees but if it is so widespread and interwoven that it is impossible to segregate the tainted from untainted despite a conscious and bona fide effort. According to the Hon’ble Single Judge, the present case does not fall in the first category. The errors and irregularities alleged by the State with regard to over-writing, award of more than prescribed marks, etc. are peculiar and unique to certain selectees or a group of them. Apparently on the allegations made, these recruitments fall in the second category. Therefore, the State is under law to satisfy itself objectively that it was not possible to segregate the tainted from the good on valid and plausible reasons and it has to discharge the further burden and demonstrate before the Court that it was impossible to do so. The burden is so heavy but it has to be discharged. 79. In para 117, the learned Single Judge has produced the chart. Care has been taken, but there may be minor increase or decrease in the number of discrepancies noted. The first entry in the Chart with respect to the report No. 23 has been discussed in this para to show that the majority of the candidates were untainted and their employment could have been saved. In para 118 of the impugned judgment, Hon’ble the Single Judge has expressed, “Thus, it cannot be said that the irregularities or discrepancies were of such large proportion where there was no other option except to cancel the entire recruitment itself. Though it may be repetitive but untainted selection could have been identified if there was a will to do so.” To this extent, I respectfully agree with the observations of Hon’ble Single Judge. 80. Another chart has been dealt with by the Court to come to the conclusion that out of about 22000 candidates selected across the Board, only 40 were detected to have been inducted with less than the minimum prescribed standards of physical measurement. It comes 0.18%. 80. Another chart has been dealt with by the Court to come to the conclusion that out of about 22000 candidates selected across the Board, only 40 were detected to have been inducted with less than the minimum prescribed standards of physical measurement. It comes 0.18%. As per chart, the difference in height, which was noted at some places, was between 0.1 to 0.5 cm less than the minimum prescribed height, i.e. 6%; it was found to be negligible by the Court. During training period, nothing adverse was found against these candidates. 81. Surprisingly, in the concluding para, the Hon’ble Single Judge has found that a deviation from the directions contained in the Circular would not be fatal to the present selection. The various Government Orders cancelling the recruitment by various recruitment board and consequential orders terminating the appointments of the candidates were quashed. This will result in enmass reinstatement of all the candidates in the police force whether tainted or untainted. I respectfully disagree with these sweeping directions. The tainted ones have to be separated from the untainted ones. Innocent candidates deserve reinstatement and not those who had managed to get the job by illegal means. 82. My Senior Brother has taken note of the fact that the young men are facing problem of unemployment. It has now become hard to get a Government Job. To this, I must humbly say that this Court has also to see that the authorities associated with the recruitment process in the Government Departments cannot act arbitrarily and adopt pick and choose methods and recruit from the back door eliminating meritorious candidates. Recruitment Authorities have to carry out the recruitment process in accordance with the Selection Rules, administrative instructions, Government Orders, prescribed procedure and settled principles of law. The correct, just and fair recruitment process is to be carried out is the requirement of the day. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions has laid down guidelines in this regard (Vide State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ). 83. Such actions have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When the right to livelihood is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then the recruitment process which provides livelihood to the citizens should be just and fair. 83. Such actions have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When the right to livelihood is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then the recruitment process which provides livelihood to the citizens should be just and fair. The authorities must adhere to procedure framed and notified by themselves to conduct pre-appointment examinations, recruitment process, selection, interview etc. When the initial entry of an employee in a Government department was made in totally illegal or in blatant disregard to all the established rules and regulations governing such recruitments, such appointment cannot be allowed to continue. In any case, back-door entries for filling up the vacancies have got to be strictly avoided. The beneficiaries of wrongful means or wrongful selections are liable to lose the benefit acquired on the basis of such tainted selection and no equity would lie in their favour, since the rule of law is to prevail and equity and good conscience need to be observed within four corners of the rule of law. (Vide 2007 (59) AIC 226 (SC), State of Jharkhand and others v. Manshu Kumbhkar; 2006 (1) ESC 666 (All), Dinesh Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others and 2007 (8) ADJ 462, Santosh Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P. and others.) 84. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of U.P.-appellant has placed before the Court detailed Charts in respect of the different recruitment centres in which irregularities, illegalities and infirmities in selection process took place at various recruitment centres have been indicated. This document containing charts deals with enquiry reports in respect of various recruitment centres out of 51 Centres. In all the reports by and large the irregularities committed are of similar nature. The details of the irregularities as shown in the 51 enquiry reports are being reproduced below : “ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (1) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. The 12 copies were found in different hand writings 12 2. In 24 copies the candidates mentioned their chest number 14 3. 95 candidates were selected by wrong evaluation 15 4. 9 Scheduled Castes candidates selected by wrong evaluation 16 5. The interviews taken in groups and 7587 candidates were 17 interviewed by the Selection Board within 3-1/2 days. 6. No Broad-sheet and Tabulation prepared 23 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (2) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 95 candidates were selected by wrong evaluation 15 4. 9 Scheduled Castes candidates selected by wrong evaluation 16 5. The interviews taken in groups and 7587 candidates were 17 interviewed by the Selection Board within 3-1/2 days. 6. No Broad-sheet and Tabulation prepared 23 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (2) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 47 cases, in physical aptitude test of Cricket Ball throw, the marks were altered by making over writing. 1 2. In 47 cases, in physical aptitude test by long jump, the 6 marks were altered by making over writing 3. In 18 cases, in physical aptitude test of chinning up, the marks were altered by making over writing. 4. Out of 679 selected candidates, the answer book of 611 10 & 11 selected candidates checked by himself. 5. In 10 cases, excess marks were awarded. 12 6. In 14 cases, the marks were increased by recounted method 7. In 34 cases, the candidates were failed in written examination, but they called for interview and all of them were selected 8. The date was fixed 13.11.2006 for interview but the Selection 29 Board taken interview on 9.11.2006 and the result declared on 11.11.2006 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (3) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 7 Cases, through over writing/cutting, marks altered 6 2. In 25 cases, different hand-writings were used, selected 7 3. In 16 Cases, lesser marks awarded, even though Graduate 19 (4 marks) 4. In 29 Cases, identification mark made, selected. 16-17 5. Marks awarded in Interview, reflects certain trend. 18 6. No Tabulation, Broad-Sheet prepared. Item No. 8.5 23 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (4) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 5 cases by making over writing marks were altered in 3-4 physical eligibility test. 2. In 6 cases marks were altered in written copies 5 3. In 37 cases, through overwriting/cutting marks were 7-8 changed by different person. 4. Marks awarded in interview, the trend would reflect certain 11 design. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (5) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 56 cases the time of ‘Daud Chal’ test not mentioned 5 & 6 2. In 10 cases, the candidates were mentioned their chest 8 & 9 number. 3. In 20 cases, different hand writings found in the answer 9,10 & 11 books. 4. In 107 cases, full marks were awarded without solving the 11 questions 5. In 56 cases the time of ‘Daud Chal’ test not mentioned 5 & 6 2. In 10 cases, the candidates were mentioned their chest 8 & 9 number. 3. In 20 cases, different hand writings found in the answer 9,10 & 11 books. 4. In 107 cases, full marks were awarded without solving the 11 questions 5. The interview taken in groups and 5387 candidates were interviewed by the Selection Board within 4 days. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (6) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. As per instructions dated 2.7.2006 (Annexure-3) final 3 result of selection was required to be declared on 1.9.2006 but the same was declared on 20.8.2006 2. In 2 Cases, identification marks found in the answer book. 6 3. In 16 Cases, of wrongful evaluation. 7 4. In 2 Cases, of difference in hand-writings between over slip 8 and hand writing in answer books. 5. In 19 Cases, difference of hand writing in various answer. 8-9 6. In 1 case, marks increased by over writing. 9 7. Broadsheet and Merit List was not prepared. 29 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (7) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 44 cases, in physical aptitude test the marks were altered 25-26 by making over writing 2. In 2 cases, the answer books found in different hand writings. 26 3. In 17 cases, the excess marks were awarded. 26 4. In 22 cases, the chest numbers were mentioned by the 26-27 candidates. 5. The interview taken in groups and 2495 candidates were 27 interviewed by the Selection Board within 1 day. 6. No Braod-sheet and Tabulation were prepared. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (8) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 7 cases, physical aptitude test, the marks were altered 5-6 by making over writing. 2. In 5 cases, the different events in physical aptitude test, 5-6 the marks were altered by making over writing. 3. In 12 cases, the copies were found in different hand writings. 22 4. In 10 cases, the candidates were mentioned their chest 22 number. 5. In 41 cases, the full marks were awarded without solving the 23 question. 6. The interview taken in groups and 3418 candidates were 23 interviewed by the Selection Board within 5 days. 7. No Broad-sheet and Tabulation were prepared. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (9) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 9 Cases, physical events marks increased 5 2. In 14 Cases, copies checked, identification mentioned 5 3. 6. The interview taken in groups and 3418 candidates were 23 interviewed by the Selection Board within 5 days. 7. No Broad-sheet and Tabulation were prepared. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (9) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 9 Cases, physical events marks increased 5 2. In 14 Cases, copies checked, identification mentioned 5 3. In 108 Cases, marks altered, increased, arbitrary manner. 6-8 4. In preparation of Broad sheet, merit list was not prepared as 22-23 per direction. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (10) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 13 cases, the chest numbers were mentioned by the 14 candidates in their answer books 2. In 23 cases, the answer books were wrongly evaluated 16 3. 106 candidates out of 270 selected candidates were, in 18 interview, provided so much of marks as required to reach the cut of marks for qualifying. 4. The interview taken in groups and 1684 candidates were 10 interviewed by the Selection Board within 2 days ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (11) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 28 Cases, through over writing/cutting, marks altered 2. In 37 Cases, in Cricket Ball throw event, marks given with pencil 3. In 34 Cases, different hand writing. 4. In 12 Cases, marks altered. Item No. 3.2.9 5. In 35 Cases, marks were given in arbitrary manner. Item No. 3.2.12 6. In Interview trend. Item No. 3.3.9 7. In 9 cases, marks were different in Broad-sheet, from actual marks. Item No. 5. 8. In 57 cases, benefits were given in written test. 9. In 53 cases, marks were altered in records. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (12) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. Chest No. D-461 to 480 total 20 cases, wherein the event 6 of Cricket Ball Throw in Mark-sheet had been prepared. Chest No. D-470 was selected. 2. Event of Daud Chal, Chest No. L-421 to L-600 and D-792, 8 total 181 on the Marks-sheet no signature 3. Long Jump, Chest No. A-1 to A-40 marks awarded with 6 Pencil, therefore, awarded by Pen. 4. In Physical Test 38 cases, on Mark-sheet time distances 6, 7& 8 through over writing, marks increased time decreased. 5. Written Exam in 12 cases, over the booklet, through over 9, 10 & 11 writing marks increased 6. 6 Cases, reply to question no.4, wrong reply, marks awarded 9, 10 & 11 7. 13 Cases, Identification mentioned, copy checked and 9, 19 & 11 selected 8. 5. Written Exam in 12 cases, over the booklet, through over 9, 10 & 11 writing marks increased 6. 6 Cases, reply to question no.4, wrong reply, marks awarded 9, 10 & 11 7. 13 Cases, Identification mentioned, copy checked and 9, 19 & 11 selected 8. 26 Cases, not eligible, Selected 45 & 46 9. Interview, instructions not followed, 4 to 18 marks awarded, 12 no date mentioned on the interview mark-sheet 10. 3 Cases, through over writing marks increased/decreased 12 11. Tabulation, Broad Sheet not available, hence violated instructions. Note : Total 4058, O.B.C. Candidates, appeared in interview, whereas only 793 candidates were general. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (13) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 3 Cases, in physical events through cutting/over writing 6 marks awarded 2. In 2 Cases, different hand-writing 7 3. In 3 Cases, marks wrongly awarded, selected. 7 4. In 21 Cases, marks were given in arbitrary manner, in reply to 7 & 8 Question No. 5 (1& 2). 5. In 3 days, 3486 candidates were interviewed 8 6. In interview certain trend reflects in awarding marks 19 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (14) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 124 cases, in physical aptitude test the marks were 25 altered by making over writing. 2 In 27 cases, the excess marks were awarded. 28 3. In 23 cases by making over writing the marks were altered 29 4. No Broad-sheet and Tabulation were prepared ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (15) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 7 Cases, in physical events, even though qualified not 6 permitted to the next event. 2. In 3 Cases, lesser marks awarded, therefore, would not be 7 selected. 3. In total 49 Cases, cutting/over writing made. 8,13,14,15 4. In Interview certain trend reflects in awarding marks. 20 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (16) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 31 Cases, marks were decreased through cutting/over 5 to 7 writing, therefore, could not be selected 2. In 50 Cases, marks were altered through cutting/over writing, 24 to28 table No. 9 3. In 38 Cases, marks were wrongly added, selected Table 29 to 31 No. 10 4. In 43 Cases, marks were awarded in arbitrary manner 31 to 41 5. In 14 Cases, identification and in different hand writing, 33 to 36 copies were checked, selected 6. 2814 Candidates were interviewed in 3-1/2 days 37 7. In 38 Cases, marks were wrongly added, selected Table 29 to 31 No. 10 4. In 43 Cases, marks were awarded in arbitrary manner 31 to 41 5. In 14 Cases, identification and in different hand writing, 33 to 36 copies were checked, selected 6. 2814 Candidates were interviewed in 3-1/2 days 37 7. Prior to the interview marks were fed in computer, of Physical & Written test, details in para 4.1 8. No Broad-sheet prepared, Para 7.1 41 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (17) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 8 Cases, through cutting/over writing marks were altered 5 2. In 3 Cases, marks wrongly awarded, selected 6 3. In Interview certain trend reflects in awarding marks, details 9 are given at page No. 11-17 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (18) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. Only 24 General Category selected out of 450 vacancies 1 2. In 10 Cases, different hand-writing 4 3. In 6 Cases, in same hand writing 5 4. In 5 days, 2440 candidates were interviewed 8 5. In interview certain trend reflects in awarding marks 9 6. Broad-sheet not available 22 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (21) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 5 Cases, Cricket Ball Throw/Long Jump, through cutting/ 5 over writing marks awarded 2. 28 Cases, Dand Baithak, Mark-sheet through point identifica- 6, 2 & 8 tion was made all scored in between 18 to 20 marks. 3. 10 Cases, Identification, Chest No. mentioned 10 4. 5 Cases, through over writing marks increased/decreased 5. 32 Cases, without solving Math awarded full marks. 11 & 12 6. In interview 4 to 20 marks awarded. 3725 candidates were 5 interviewed in 4 days, interview marks given by one member not prepared by Chairman. 7. Broad-sheet not prepared with regard to the candidates appeared in interview. 8. Tabulation were made by computer, secrecy in marks flouted 36 & 37 9. No Broad-sheet without preparation main register how marks 37 awarded, how merit list prepared. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (22) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 32 Cases, in the Mark-sheet of physical eligibility test 4 to 7 cutting and overwriting were found 2. In 200 Cases of selected candidates, only on writing answer 7 to 19 without solving/wrongly the question were allotted full marks 3. In 69 Cases selected candidates, the answer books were 20 to 24 found to have been written in different hand writing 4. In 200 Cases of selected candidates, only on writing answer 7 to 19 without solving/wrongly the question were allotted full marks 3. In 69 Cases selected candidates, the answer books were 20 to 24 found to have been written in different hand writing 4. In 9 Cases of selected candidates marks were increased 24 to 25 5. In 19 Cases, identification marks were made by the 25 to 27 candidates in the answer books and the copies were examined contrary to the instructions by the members 6. In 9 Cases, answer books were not signed on every page 27 by the Committee 7. 83 candidates were wrong benefit of by different type of 51 to 55 irregularities ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (24) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 23 cases in physical event massive irregularities found 5 to 7 2. In 8 cases marks awarded, in arbitrary manner 8 to 9 3. In 50 cases copies were written in different handwriting 10 to 13 4. Broad-sheet not prepared, as per instructions 14 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (26) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 18 cases by making over writing the marks were altered 4 2. In 13 cases, the marks were altered by making over writings 6 3. In 117 cases, the selected candidates were awarded full 9 marks only written by correct answer ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (29) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 25 cases physical event test marks awarded below 4-5 standard 2. In 30 cases physical event test marks awarded above 6-7 standard 3. In 18 cases, physical event cutting/overwriting made 7-8 4. In 5 cases whitener was used 9 5. In 19 cases, difference was found 11 6. In 18 cases, identification mark was mentioned 11-12 7. In 17 cases marks different over the booklet and inside 12 8. In 17 cases marks given, discretionary manner, in reply to 13-15 question 5 (1 & 2) 9. In 32 cases marks awarded, even though wrong reply 15 & 16 10. No broad-sheet prepared. Item No. 3.4 19 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (30) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 29 Cases through over writing/cutting marks were altered 15 & 16 after interview 2. In 38 Cases, lesser marks were awarded in Physical test 4 & 5 3. In 5 Cases, higher marks awarded 5 4. In 37 Cases, marks altered through cutting/over writing in 6 & 7 Physical event. 5. (30) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 29 Cases through over writing/cutting marks were altered 15 & 16 after interview 2. In 38 Cases, lesser marks were awarded in Physical test 4 & 5 3. In 5 Cases, higher marks awarded 5 4. In 37 Cases, marks altered through cutting/over writing in 6 & 7 Physical event. 5. In 13 Cases, identification was mentioned, selected 9 & 10 6. In 10 Cases, marks were given wrongly 10 & 11 7. In 20 Cases, marks were altered inside the Booklet. 11 & 12 8. On 12.6.2006 total 671 and on 14.6.2006, 2034 14 candidates were interviewed. 9. No Broad-sheet prepared. Item No. 6.1 35 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (31) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 12 cases, physical event cutting, overwriting made 6 to 7 2. In 2 cases marks increased in register 7 3. In 3 cases identification mark mentioned 7 4. In 78 cases marks increased wrongly, in written copies 8 to 12 5. In 8 cases marks increased in written examination 12 6. Intentionally decipherable Code used in all 270 cases 12 to 14 and page 34-35 7. 3224 candidates interviewed in 7 days 17 8. No Broad-sheet prepared 39 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (33) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 8 Cases of physical eligibility test marks were illegally 5 & 6 increased in Mark-sheet 2. In 135 Cases of selected candidates, of written test, 6 to 13 marks were wrongly awarded 3. In 5 Cases, selected candidates, the answer books were 13 & 14 found to have been written in different hand writing. 4. In 1 case aggregate of marks was wrongly done 11 5. In Interview, it reflects certain design in awarding marks 32 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (35) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 12 cases by making over writing in physical aptitude test 25 the marks were altered 2. In 5 cases, the signatures were not made by the Examiner 25 3. In 7 cases, the marks were wrongly awarded on the answer 26 books 4. In 10 cases, the excess marks were awarded 26 & 27 5. In 49 cases, the chest numbers were mentioned by the 28 candidates 6. In the total chart of written examination, no signatures were made by any authority 7. The interview taken in groups and 4666 candidates were 28 interviewed by the Selection Board within 5 days. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. In 49 cases, the chest numbers were mentioned by the 28 candidates 6. In the total chart of written examination, no signatures were made by any authority 7. The interview taken in groups and 4666 candidates were 28 interviewed by the Selection Board within 5 days. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (36) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 36 cases, different handwriting, selected 6-7 2. In 23 cases, identification marks mentioned, selected 8 3. Marks awarded in interview, certain trend reflects 9 4. No broad-sheet/tabulation prepared 25-26 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (38) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 41 Cases, Marks increased through over writing 5 to 11 2. 10 Cases. Non appearance in Physical, directly selected 6,8,9&10 3. 9 Cases, different marks in answer sheet at main register 6,8 & 9 4. Chest No. 782 to 1975. Total 1185, Dand Baithak Event examination sheet, no signature 5. Written Examination in glaring example 399 selected 12 candidates, total candidates 305, selected candidates copies were checked by the Chairman namely Sri Akhilesh Malhotra 6. The coding was deliberately made so that the identification of 60 candidate was visible. Chest No. was mentioned in the Code 7. 119 cases, copies were written in different hand writing 8. 75 Cases through over writing/cuttings marks were given 9. 9 Cases, identification mentioned and checked and selected 10. 49 Cases of wrong reply marks were given, selected 11. 172 Cases, wrong reply to questions, marks awarded with discretion 12. In interview the original mark sheet destroyed. It is mentioned 62 & 63 in computer 13. 15 Cases, non-eligible candidates were selected 64 & 65 14. Tabulation and Broad-sheet under prepared 63 & 64 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (39) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 11 Cases, Throw Ball Event, marks increased through cutting 6 2. 5 Candidates, Chining Up, excess marks given 5 3. 581 Cases, Event of Dand Baithak, Mark-sheet not prepared 8 by examiner 4. 13 Cases, Dand Baithak Event, Marks increased (cutting) 8 to 10 5. 22 Cases, Identification marks given-selected 10 & 11 6. 5 Cases, Copies in different hand writing 12 7. 3 Cases, Cutting, over writing was made 13 8. 39 Cases, In Mathematics question wrongly calculated, 13 rightly mentioned only result, full marks awarded 9. 5891 Candidates were interviewed in two days, 2 to 20 15 marks awarded in interview. 10. 22 Cases, Identification marks given-selected 10 & 11 6. 5 Cases, Copies in different hand writing 12 7. 3 Cases, Cutting, over writing was made 13 8. 39 Cases, In Mathematics question wrongly calculated, 13 rightly mentioned only result, full marks awarded 9. 5891 Candidates were interviewed in two days, 2 to 20 15 marks awarded in interview. 10. The marks in interview awarded by one member in his 20, 26 & 23 writing not by Chairman 11. No Broad Sheet prepared 16 12. Written, Physical marks already in computer prior to the 21 interview ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (40) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 28 Cases, through over writing/cutting, marks altered 4-6 2. In 37 Cases, in Cricket Ball throw, marks given with pencil 6-7 3. In 34 Cases, different hand writing 7-9 & 30 4. In 12 Cases, marks altered. Item No. 3.2.9 5. In 35 Cases, marks were given in arbitrary manner. Item No. 3.2.12 6. In Interview trend. Item No. 3.3.9 7. In 9 cases, marks were different in Broad-sheet from actual marks. Item No. 5 8. In 57 cases, benefits were given in written test 36-39 9. In 53 cases, marks were altered in records 39-42 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (41) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 28 Cases, through overwriting/cutting marks altered 4-7 2. In 73 Cases, different hand writings were used, selected 8-13 3. In 55 Cases, wrong reply, marks awarded 13-15 4. In 71 Cases, identification mark made, selected 20-23 5. In 135 Cases, reply to question 5(1) and (2), most arbitrary 23-31 manner marks awarded in between 1 to 2.5 6. In O.B.C. Category, trend in total marks 34-35 7. Total 140 Cases, very detail report submitted where marks 58-63 awarded wrongly 8. 8449 candidates were interviewed in 3 days 75 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (42) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 13 cases physical eligibility test marks were increased 4-5 by cutting and overwriting 2. In 12 answer books of selected candidates discrepancies 5-6 reported 3. In 23 answer books of selected candidates identification 6 marks mentioned 4. In 8 answer books of selected candidates incorrect totalling 6-7 was done 5. In 16 answer books of selected candidates grand total of 7 marks at cover page found different from total of marks awarded to each questions 6. 50 selected candidates awarded full marks for writing answer 7-8 without correct calculation 7. In 8 answer books of selected candidates incorrect totalling 6-7 was done 5. In 16 answer books of selected candidates grand total of 7 marks at cover page found different from total of marks awarded to each questions 6. 50 selected candidates awarded full marks for writing answer 7-8 without correct calculation 7. In interview marks certain trend was found 9 8. Marks tabulated on broad-sheet were different from mark- 10-11 sheet of individual candidate. ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (43) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 11 Cases, marks increased in Physical event 5 & 6 2. 9 Cases, more marks awarded 6 3. 15 Cases, identification mentioned 7 & 8 4. 8 Cases, Written Exam, cutting/over writing 9 & 10 5. 50 Cases, full marks awarded in Math, just writing correct 10 reply 6. 6 Cases, wrong reply marks awarded 11 & 12 7. 5179 Candidates interviewed in 7 days, 2 to 20 marks 13 awarded 8. Interview marks awarded by one member in his writing not 29 by Chairman 9. No Broad-sheet prepared 14 10. Computer used in tabulation date available prior to the 31 interview ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (44) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 40 Cases, by using whitener on the wrong answer, 38-45 thereafter tick on the right answer 2. In 18 Cases different ink were used in O.M.R. Sheets, 45-49 candidates selected 3. No date and C.D. Preserved by the Selection Committee 50 4. The Selection Committee ousted/from written examination 50-51 evaluation and date correction by the Higher Officers, Item No. 9.4 5. In the selection process directly interference by Mr. V.K. 52 Bhalla,the then A.D.G.P. and Mr. K.K. Saxena, the then I.G. and Staff Officer, Mr. Raghvendra Kumar Dwivedi ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (45) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 7 Cases, through over writing/cutting marks altered 5 2. In 22 Cases of physical event, marks altered 5-7 3. In 17 Cases, identification mark made, selected 9 4. In 13 Cases, no averment of written marks 10 5. In 10 Cases, wrongly added marks, selected 10-11 6. In 94 Cases, in arbitrary manner marks awarded, reply to 11-15 question No. 5 (1 & 2) 7. In 5 Cases, marks awarded in arbitrary manner 15 8. In 38 Cases, all O.B.C. Candidates awarded 118 marks, 16-21 adjusted in interview, irrespective of physical and written test 9. In awarding marks in interview, specific trend reflects. In 94 Cases, in arbitrary manner marks awarded, reply to 11-15 question No. 5 (1 & 2) 7. In 5 Cases, marks awarded in arbitrary manner 15 8. In 38 Cases, all O.B.C. Candidates awarded 118 marks, 16-21 adjusted in interview, irrespective of physical and written test 9. In awarding marks in interview, specific trend reflects. Item No. 4.6 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (46) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 117 cases marks awarded in discretionary manner in reply 6-9 to question 5(1) and (2) 2. In 17 cases identification mark mentioned, selected 10 3. In 19 cases through cutting marks altered 10 4. No broad-sheet prepared, Item No. 4.4 14 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (47) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. 12 Cases, in Daud Chal event through overwriting marks 5 altered 2. 4 Cases, Cricket Ball Chinning up marks altered 6, 3, 2 3. 11 Cases, identification was mentioned, checked 7 4. 4 Cases, marks altered subsequently 5. 21 Cases, without solving Maps awarded marks 9 & 10 6. 8 Cases, copies were written in different handwriting 7. 3191 candidates interviewed in 5 days. 15 & 37 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (48) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 5 Cases, in physical event over writing and cutting made 28 2. In 7 Cases, by using whitener on the wrong answer thereafter 28 tick on the right answer 3. In 23 Cases, different ink were used in O.M.R. Sheets, 31-35 candidates selected 4. The Selection Committee ousted from written examination 36-38 up to evaluation by the High Officers. 5. No date and C.D. Preserved by the Selection Committee 40 6. In the selection process directly interference by Mr. V.K. 41-42 Bhalla, the then A.D.G.P. and Mr. K.K. Saxena, the then I.G. and Staff Officer, Mr. Raghvendra Kumar Dwivedi ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (49) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In physical event at 130 places through over writing/cutting/ 6 to 15 whitener marks altered 2. Written Examination more than 253 selected candidates 15 copies were checked by Mr. Susheel Kumar Shukla (Member) out of 400 selected candidates and total 126 anomalies found in it 3. 99 Cases, copies were written in different handwriting 4. 36 Cases, 16 copies were written by one person 5. 48 Cases, through over writing, cutting marks altered 6. 21 Cases, wrong marks awarded 7. Susheel Kumar Shukla (Member) out of 400 selected candidates and total 126 anomalies found in it 3. 99 Cases, copies were written in different handwriting 4. 36 Cases, 16 copies were written by one person 5. 48 Cases, through over writing, cutting marks altered 6. 21 Cases, wrong marks awarded 7. 437 Cases, wrong reply without solving, merely mentioning 16 to 21 the right reply awarded with discretion 8. 37 Cases, identification was mentioned 9. 89 Cases, on Booklet no signature of Class Invigilator 10. 6448 candidates were interviewed, started on 25.8.2006 but 48 & 49 no detail when it ended. 11. No Broad-sheet prepared 49 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (50) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. In 12 Cases, identification mentioned, selected 5 to 6 2. In 26 Cases wrong reply, marks awarded 6-7 3. In 7 Cases, over writing, selected 7-8 4. In 16 Cases, in Maths direct reply, marks awarded, arbitrary 8-9 manner 5. In 4 Cases, aggregate marks on the cover was different than 9 actual marks awarded 6. In 18 Cases, coding was not strictly followed 10 7. 10 cases, different hand writing 11 8. In 19 cases, in different hand writings, reply was changed 11-12 9. In 43 cases, in physical test, marks were different on 15-18 Broad-sheet from Marksheet. Item No. 9.4.5 10. In 29 cases, marks were altered, 9 were illegally selected 38-40 ENQUIRY REPORT NO. (51) Sl. Particulars Page No. 1. The two Selection Committees were constituted against the 18 U.P. Police Radio Adhinasth Sewa Niyamavali 2. The Member of the Selection Committee admitted that they 44 had no information about written examination nor they had been associated 3. No date available instead C.D. Preserved by the Selection 46 Committee 4. In 91 Cases, by using whitener on the wrong answer in the 47-50 first paper, thereafter tick on the right answer 5. In 60 Cases, by using whitener on the wrong answer, second 51-52 paper, thereafter tick on the right answer 6. The Selection Committee ousted from written examination, 59 evaluation and date correction by the Higher Officers. Item No.10.10 7. In the selection process directly interference by Mr. V.K. 56 Bhalla, the then A.D.G.P. and Mr. K.K. Saxena, the then I.G. and Staff Officer, Mr. Raghvendra Kumar Dwivedi 85. The Selection Committee ousted from written examination, 59 evaluation and date correction by the Higher Officers. Item No.10.10 7. In the selection process directly interference by Mr. V.K. 56 Bhalla, the then A.D.G.P. and Mr. K.K. Saxena, the then I.G. and Staff Officer, Mr. Raghvendra Kumar Dwivedi 85. Learned Standing Counsel pointed out that a bare perusal of the above mentioned details, which also find place on record, makes it clear in no uncertain terms that various irregularities and illegalities have been committed during the selection process. Before the Court instances of violation of the recruitment procedure, which was committed by the Chairmans and members of the various Selection Boards during the selection process etc. have also been pointed by the learned Standing Counsel. These materials have now been brought to the notice of the Court. The answer sheets, result sheets, Handwriting Expert’s report and other documents have also been placed before the Court for its consideration. This Court cannot ignore these materials altogether from consideration. 86. At most of the recruitment centres, Broadsheets were not prepared. In the absence of Broadsheets, it can be inferred that the Selection Boards did not award the marks of physical test, written test and interview separately, but after completion of the selection, the persons who were to be selected or chosen were given marks according to whims and fancies of the recruiting officers. 87. In my opinion, there is substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. Even if the reports submitted by Shailja Kant Misra Committee taken as invalid and illegal, this Court cannot exclude from consideration the irregularities and illegalities committed during the selection process and it cannot shut its eyes ignoring the materials put-forth by the appellants before the Court. The law is also well settled that the Court is entitled to take notice of the subsequent events, which have bearing on the case (Vide (1975) 1 SCC 770 , Paragraphs 3 to 5, Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders). 88. My view finds support from the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 348 , Puran Mal v. Director of Inspection where in Paragraphs 25 and 26, the Apex Court has held as follows : “25. 88. My view finds support from the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 348 , Puran Mal v. Director of Inspection where in Paragraphs 25 and 26, the Apex Court has held as follows : “25. So far as the India is concerned, its law of evidence is modelled on the rules of evidence which prevailed in English Law and Courts in India and in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. In Barindra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor, (1910) ILR 37, Cal 467, the learned Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins says at page 500 : Mr. Das has attacked the searches and has urged that, even if there was jurisdiction to direct the issue of search warrants, as I hold there was, still the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code have been completely disregarded. On this assumption, he has contended that the evidence discovered by the searches is not admissible, but to this view I cannot accede. For, without in any way countenancing disregard of the provisions prescribed by the Code, I hold that what would otherwise be relevant does not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As Jimutavahana with his shrewd common sense observes.— “a fact cannot be altered by 100 texts,” and as his commentator quaintly remarks: “If a Brahmana be slain, the precept ‘slay not a Brahmana’ does not annul the murder.’ But the absence of the precautions designed by the legislature lends support to the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully scrutinized.” 89. In Emperor v. Allahabad Khan, (1913) ILR 35 All 358 the Superintendent of Police and a Sub-Inspector searched the house of a person suspected of being in illicit possession of excisable articles and such articles were found in the house searched. It was held that the conviction of the owner of the house under Section 63 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, was not rendered invalid by the fact that no warrant had been issued for the search, although it was presumably the intention of the legislature that in a case under Section 63, where it was necessary to search a house, a search warrant should be obtained beforehand. In Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 AC 197 where the Privy Council had to consider the English law of Evidence in its application to Eastern Africa, their Lordships propounded the rule thus : “The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matter in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how it was obtained.” Some American cases were also cited before the Privy Council. Their Lordships observed at p. 204 thus : “Certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America were also cited in argument. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to examine them in detail. Suffice it to say that there appears to be considerable difference of opinion among the judges both in the State and Federal Courts as to whether or not the rejection of evidence obtained by illegal means depends on certain articles in the American Constitution. At any rate, in Olmstead v. United States, (1828) 277 U.S. 438, the majority of the Supreme Court were clearly of opinion that the common law did not reject relevant evidence on that ground.” In Kuruma’s case, Kuruma was searched by two Police Officers who were not authorized under the law to carry out a search and, in the search, some ammunition was found in the unlawful possession of Kuruma. The question was whether the evidence with regard to the finding of the ammunition on the person of Kuruma could be shut out on the ground that the evidence had been obtained by an unlawful search. It was held it could not be so shut out because the finding of ammunition was a relevant piece of evidence on a charge for unlawful possession. In a later case before the Privy Council in Herman King v. The Queen, (1969) AC 304 which came on appeal from a Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the law as laid down in Kuruma’s case was applied although the Jamaican Constitution guaranteed the constitutional right against search and seizure in the following provision of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962, Sch. 2, Section 19 : “(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises. 2, Section 19 : “(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises. (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required.....for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime.....” In other words, search and seizure for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime reasonably enforced was not inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee against search and seizure. It was held in that case that the search of the appellant by a Police Officer was not justified by the warrant nor was it open to the Officer to search the person of the appellant without taking him before a Justice of the Peace. Nevertheless it was held that the Court had a discretion to admit the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and the constitutional protection against search of person or property without consent did not take away the discretion of the Court. Following 1955 AC 197 the Court held that it was open to the Court not to admit the evidence against the accused if the Court was of the view that the evidence had been obtained by conduct of which the prosecution ought not to take advantage. But that was not a rule of evidence but a rule of prudence and fair play. It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. 26. In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of the provisions of Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the Income tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no Writ of Prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted. It must be, therefore, held that the High Court was right in dismissing the two writ petitions. It must be, therefore, held that the High Court was right in dismissing the two writ petitions. The appeals must also fail and are dismissed with costs.” 90. Similar views have been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Pratap Singh and others v. Director, Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others, (1985) 3 SCC 72 vide Paragraphs 15 and 16, the same are being reproduced below : “Assuming that it is obligatory upon the officer proceeding to take search or directing a search to record in writing the grounds of his belief and also to specify in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which the search is to be made, is mandatory and that non-recording of his reasons would result in the search being condemned as illegal, what consequence it would have on the seizure of the document during such illegal search. The view taken by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. case ( AIR 1976 Cal 178 ) that once the authorization for carrying out the search is found to be illegal on account of the absence of recording of reasons in the formation of a reasonable belief, the officer who has seized during such search must return the documents seized as a result of the illegal search is against the weight of judicial opinion on the subject and does not commend to us. In fact this decision should not detain us at all because virtually for all practical purposes, it can be said to have been overruled by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection, (1974) 2 SCR 704 : (1974) 1 SCC 345 : 1974 SCC (Tax) 114. This Court held that “Courts in India and even in the England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure.” If, therefore, the view of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court were to be accepted meaning thereby that if the search is shown to be illegal, anything seized during such illegal search will have to be returned to the persons from whose premises the same was seized, it would tantamount to saying that evidence collected during illegal search must be excluded on that ground alone. This was in terms negatived by the Constitution Bench. It has been often held that the legality in the method, manner or initiation of a search does not necessarily mean that anything seized during the search has to be returned. After all in the course of a search, things or documents are required to be seized and such things and documents when seized may furnish evidence. Illegality of the search does not vitiate the evidence collected during such illegal search. The only requirement is that the Court or the authority before which such material or evidence seized during the search shown to be illegal, is placed has to be cautious and circumspect in dealing with such evidence or material. This is too well-established to necessitate its substantiation by a precedent. However, one can profitably refer to Radhakishna v. State of U.P., 1963 Supp SCR 408, 411: AIR 1963 SC 822 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 809) wherein the Court held that assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. It may be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding seizure, but no other consequence ensues. (See State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni, (1980) 4 SCC 669 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 98. 16. In this behalf, the appellant further contended that if the search was genuine or bona fide for carrying out the purposes of the Act, it is surprising that when the matter was before the High Court the Enforcement Directorate submitted that it does not wish to take any further action in respect of the material seized during the search. There is no warrant for the assertion that every search must result in seizure of incriminating material. Such an approach would be a sad commentary on human ingenuity. There can be cases in which search may fail or a reasonable explanation in respect of the documents may be forthcoming. There is no warrant for the assertion that every search must result in seizure of incriminating material. Such an approach would be a sad commentary on human ingenuity. There can be cases in which search may fail or a reasonable explanation in respect of the documents may be forthcoming. In ITO v. M/s Seth Brothers, (1970) SCR 601: (1969) 2 SCC 324 , it was in terms held that “from amongst the documents seized during the search, if some are found not to be useful for or relevant to be proceeding, that by itself will not vitiate the search, nor can an inference be made that the power was initially exercised mala fide.” The Court in Pooran Mal case held that if the books of account and other documents collected during the search were afterwards found to be not relevant that by itself does not make the search and seizure illegal. In this case, however, as the documents and other materials have been sealed under the warrant of authorization issued under Section 132-A of the Income Tax Act, the Enforcement Directorate may legitimately close the proceedings. We cannot move backward and conclude that if no further proceedings are taken, at the inception the search was mala fide or for reasons irrelevant or extraneous to the exercise of power. The contention, therefore, must be rejected. Having examined all the limbs of the submission, we find no merit in the contention that the issuance of search warrant was illegal or the search was illegal and invalid.” 91. Applying above principles of law in the present case also, even if this Court is persuaded to hold that the appointment of Shailja Kant Misra Committee was invalid and improper and the same was constituted with oblique motive and for irrelevant considerations, the materials, that is, some of the answer sheets, result sheets and the documents relating to the selection process brought before the Court cannot be overlooked, excluded from consideration. The documents produced before the Court itself demonstrate that irregularities and illegalities were committed in making selections. The persons who have been selected by adopting illegal means must be weeded out. 92. In addition to the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report, I have also perused the record and the copy of the Chief Secretary’s report submitted to the State Government on 15th January, 2008. This report was placed before the Cabinet on 4.2.2008. The persons who have been selected by adopting illegal means must be weeded out. 92. In addition to the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report, I have also perused the record and the copy of the Chief Secretary’s report submitted to the State Government on 15th January, 2008. This report was placed before the Cabinet on 4.2.2008. The Cabinet took a decision to refer the matter for further investigation through the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). In pursuance of the decision of the Cabinet, Principal Secretary, Home, Uttar Pradesh vide a letter dated 4.2.2008 referred the matter to the Government of India with the request to get the matter enquired into by the CBI. Can this Court overlook the Cabinet’s decision to hold a C.B.I. Enquiry into the conduct of concerned authorities. The scene was not clean. The smoke only comes when there exists fire. 93. The Chief Secretary’s report and other materials have been produced before the Court as directed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 5.2.2008. This report also finds mentioned in the order sheet of the Court. This high level Committee was comprised of Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh as its Chairman, Director General of Police, U.P., and Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow as its Members. This high level Committee headed by the Chief Secretary has concluded as follows : “CONCLUSION After the examination of all the above said facts and perusal of concerned documents, the following facts came to light very clearly : 1. The total vacancies of 18,894 posts shown in the civil police for recruitment were actually not available. Instead, firstly the announcement of promotion was made by the then Hon’ble Chief Minister from time to time and after each announcement in a meticulously planned manner posts abolished/kept in abeyance in the previous years were re-created/revived thus creating the vacancies while according to the letter No.-110(115)2007, dated 6-11-2007 of Director General of Police, in the year 2004 there were already 3269 constables working in excess of the sanctioned posts of constable, thus in effect there was no vacancy. The objections repeatedly raised by the Finance Department against the re-creation/revival of abolished posts and clubbing vacancies of future years in the current year and reflecting them as expected vacancies, of such a large number of posts of civil police were ignored and the then Hon’ble Chief Minister approved the proposal of re-creation/revival of posts again and again. In this way prima facie it is clear that the then Hon’ble Chief Minister meticulously engineered the entire recruitment in a planned systematic manner. It appears that all the Principal Secretaries posted at that time in the Home Department were helpless against the pressures and pulls exerted from the office of the then Chief Minister and thus failed to perform their duty. 2. The political and administrative pressure were clearly visible in the entire recruitment process. The clear involvement of Shri Shivpal Singh Yadav, the then Minister of Public Works Department, in illegal gratification of money with the cooperation of some other persons and corruption have come to light. It is prima facie proved that direct and indirect cooperation in these activities were given by the then Director General of Police Shri Yashpal Singh and Shri Bua Singh and the then Special Secretary to Chief Minister Shri Chandrama Prasad. 3. The facts of corruption which have come in light in the recruitment of Police Radio Wing also includes the complaint of sexual exploitation of some of female candidates. These facts should be included in the detailed investigation. 4. Keeping in view the sensibility of the entire matter, the investigation of the matter should be done by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Sd/-15-1.2008 Sd/-15-1.2008 Sd/-15-1-2008 (Vijay Shanker Pandey) (Vikram Singh) (Prashant Kumar Mishra) Member/Convener Member Chairman High Level Enquiry High Level Enquiry High Level Enquiry Committee Committee, Committee, Commissioner, Director General of Chief Secretary, Lucknow Division, Police, Uttar Pradesh Government of Uttar Lucknow Lucknow Pradesh” 94. I have also taken note of the fact that a Division Bench of this Court, vide a judgment reported in 2008(5) ADJ 347 , Amit Kumar Shukla and others v. Union of India and others has directed the Union of India and the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate the matter relating to the recruitment of Police Constables. The Union of India were directed to order for holding a CBI enquiry into the matter as requested by the State Government vide order dated 4th February, 2008. The Union of India were directed to order for holding a CBI enquiry into the matter as requested by the State Government vide order dated 4th February, 2008. This Court has been informed that the operation of this order has been stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and the matter is still pending disposal before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 95. I have taken note of the fact of a conclusion recorded by a Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice in its judgment rendered on 21.11.2007 in Special Appeal No. 1573 of 2007, Arvind Kumar Sonker v. State of U.P. and others (along with nine other connected Appeals). The findings recorded in the conclusion of the said judgment recorded by the Division Bench of this Court are being quoted below : “4. Mr. Khare, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the appellants made various submissions including that an opportunity was required to be provided to the Constables concerned under the relevant rules although they were probationers. He also submitted that they were all examined on different occasions during the period of their training and the period of probation and no physical deficiency as such was found. He further submitted that basically the action is being taken because of change of Government and that large number of persons who were recruited during the course of earlier Government are now being removed since complaints have been allegedly received from few M.L.As. He drew our attention to the particular order issued by the Director General of Police dated 13th June, 2007 and another order issued on 29th June, 2007 constituting a committee to look into the complaints against the irregular recruitments. 5. As far as the grievance of Mr. Khare that all these cancellations are in view of the complaints of some M.L.As. and that those should not have been entertained, we are not inclined to accept that submission. If representatives of people make grievance and point out that there are certain irregularities in the matter of employment under the Government, it is the duty of the authority concerned to examine those complaints and if there is any substance, those complaints have to be followed. 6. In the instant case, all that has been done is that a committee has been appointed and thereafter appropriate decisions have been taken.” 96. 6. In the instant case, all that has been done is that a committee has been appointed and thereafter appropriate decisions have been taken.” 96. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that enquiries have already been initiated against the erring Officers including those of Indian Police Service, Provincial Police Service and Police Department by the State Government, charge-sheets have been issued and Departmental enquiries are proceeding. Besides it, the Anti Corruption Department of the State Government has also initiated criminal enquiries against those corrupt officers. Admittedly, criminal proceedings have also been initiated against this set of officers, sanction for initiation of such criminal proceedings as per relevant service rules have also been sought from the State Government. This Court has been informed that the interim orders have been passed by a Division Bench of this Court staying arrest of these officers. 97. In view of these developments, it cannot be said that no action, administrative or otherwise, has not been taken against the erring officers whereas from the records it is amply clear that criminal as well as administrative proceedings have been initiated against the erring officials. These facts appears to have been excluded from consideration in the impugned judgment. 98. As per the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State of U.P. these matters are being processed expeditiously by the State Government. 99. Much stress has been laid by Sarvasri R.N. Singh and Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocates appearing for the respondents, that the learned Single Judge has rightly found fault with the constitution and composition of the Enquiry Committee headed by Sri Shailja Kant Misra. Both the learned Senior Counsel have reiterated their submission put-forth before the learned Single Judge and placed before the Court various citations which were taken note of and discussed by the learned Single Judge and by my respected Senior Brother. 100. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, on the other hand has also made detailed submissions defending the constitution of the Enquiry Committee, its exercise and submission of its report. 101. At the outset, I may record that I respectfully disagree with the views of my esteemed Senior Brother regarding status of the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report. 101. At the outset, I may record that I respectfully disagree with the views of my esteemed Senior Brother regarding status of the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report. After going through the materials on record, appreciating the chronology of events and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the contesting parties, I am of the firm opinion that the investigation/enquiry which was conducted by Shailja Kant Misra and his associates was “preliminary in nature”. It was merely a fact finding enquiry initiated at the instance of the State Government by the Director General of Police, who under the law was required to take appropriate action in respect of the complaints received from the people’s representatives, that is, three Members of the Legislative Assembly. It was merely an enquiry to ascertain the relevant facts to enable the Head of the Department, that is, the Director General of Police and the State Government in arriving at a decision on objective consideration whether to retain such Constables, whose selection is found tainted, in service or to cancel the entire selection held at 51 recruitment centres in Uttar Pradesh. It was not a case where any formal full-fledged detailed departmental enquiry as per the C.C.A. Rules or other Statutory Service Rules had been conducted. The said Committee had to submit its report within a stipulated period to the Director General of Police for its further transmission to the State Government at whose level the decision was to be taken in the matter. This enquiry has been dissected by the learned Single Judge as if it was a statutory enquiry or holding of such an enquiry was enjoined by any statutory rules or procedure, which must have been followed. It is common in Government Departments that on receiving complaints against an employee, the appropriate authority orders for holding an investigation and a preliminary fact finding enquiry. Such enquiry is instituted by deputing some responsible officer of the department to ascertain facts and place the enquiry report before the competent authority. On the basis of such preliminary fact finding report, appropriate action, including that of holding a departmental enquiry or a decision for holding a full-fledged enquiry may be taken. This may result in dismissal or removal of the concerned employee or he may be exonerated. On the basis of such preliminary fact finding report, appropriate action, including that of holding a departmental enquiry or a decision for holding a full-fledged enquiry may be taken. This may result in dismissal or removal of the concerned employee or he may be exonerated. What is to be judicially scrutinised by this Court has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its three decisions, that is, Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 11 SCC 599 ; Narain Dattaraya Ramteerthankha v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 299 and Kendriya Vidalaya Sangathan v. Arun Kumar Madhav Rao Sinddaye, (2007) 1 SCC 283 . What has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in aforesaid three judgments is that the High Court must not treat such preliminary or fact finding enquiries as regular disciplinary proceedings. The strict principles of law, while adjudicating upon a formal regular enquiry or a departmental trial, cannot be applied in such cases of fact finding enquiries and even the principles of natural justice cannot be stretched that far. 102. In the context of the present case, it would be relevant to quote a passage from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 1976 (2) S.L.R. 248, Sarin, H.C. v. Union of India wherein the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “23. In the entire background of this, we find a passage occurring at page 803 in the judgment of Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls in the case of R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department ex party Mughal (3) quite appropriate to be quoted. The passage runs thus : “The rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences.” 103. The preliminary enquiry report is only to decide and assess whether it would be necessary for the appropriate authority to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent officer or against an employee against whom some complaint had been made by citizens or representatives of people. The preliminary enquiry report is only to decide and assess whether it would be necessary for the appropriate authority to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent officer or against an employee against whom some complaint had been made by citizens or representatives of people. After going through the materials brought on record and the pleadings of the parties, I am of the opinion that even if Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report is excluded from consideration, there is sufficient evidence and materials to come to the conclusion that the large scale irregularities and illegalities were committed in holding selection for recruitment of Constables in the Police Department of Uttar Pradesh. 104. The learned Single Judge has also dealt with the question of delegation of power, the view which has been supported by my learned Senior Brother, without appreciating the fact that in the present case the entire enquiry conducted is not a statutory one, rather a preliminary fact finding enquiry which was initiated at the instance of the State Government on receiving complaints from three Members of the Legislative Assembly, the allegations made therein have to be enquired into. Thus, the question of delegation of power and its application by the delegatee did not arise. This legal theory has been stretched too far. It is not applicable in the present set of circumstances. It is noteworthy that the decision to cancel the selection/recruitment was not taken by the Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee or the Committee constituted by him. In the present case, the State Government had taken the decision of cancellation of appointments which it had taken on the aid and advice and after appreciating the report of the Enquiry Committee. 105. It has also been submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. that the enquiry conducted by Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee was only a fact finding enquiry ordered by the State Government. This Administrative Committee was constituted with the purpose of finding out illegalities and irregularities reported to have been committed by the various Selection Boards in the selection process. 106. From a perusal of the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, I have found that the learned Single Judge had not recorded any finding that the selection process was entirely free from irregularities and illegalities and was fairly conducted (as has not been pointed out in the enquiry reports of the Committee). 106. From a perusal of the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, I have found that the learned Single Judge had not recorded any finding that the selection process was entirely free from irregularities and illegalities and was fairly conducted (as has not been pointed out in the enquiry reports of the Committee). Without recording any such finding and declaring the whole process of selection fair, clean and untainted, reinstatement of all the recruited Constables in selection process ought not to have been ordered ignoring the adverse materials brought on record. There was also no finding that the Enquiry Committee had not collected any material with regard to the irregularities and illegalities committed in the selection process. The record, however, reveals that 42 cancellation orders were passed after considering various enquiry reports by the State Government. The learned Single Judge appears to have taken note of only 13-14 instances and without considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case proceeded to hold that it was a case of non-application of mind. In fact, as per the record, selections of Constables in the Police Department were held at 51 different recruitment centres and the selection process relating to 42 recruitment centres were cancelled by the State Government taking into consideration the large scale irregularities and illegalities and violation of the selection procedure prescribed by various instructions and administrative directions. In the absence of recording any finding that the selections of Constables were fair and proper and in fact no irregularities and illegalities were committed by the different Selection Boards, the writ petition could not have wholly been allowed. This would result in reinstatement of every candidate, tainted or untainted, and of those who had purchased the employment, used unfair and illegal means in obtaining the same alongwith others who had come with clean hands and got selected on their own merits. The exercise of segregation of the tainted from untainted candidates has to be carried out as per the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indrapreet Singh Kahlon’s case (supra). 107. The exercise of segregation of the tainted from untainted candidates has to be carried out as per the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indrapreet Singh Kahlon’s case (supra). 107. As far as finding recorded in some of the paragraphs of the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge that even though the State Government had complete records in its hand, but it had never tried to draw a distinction between good ones and bad ones and tainted candidates should have been taken out is concerned, I fully agree with this view taken by the learned Single Judge and that of my esteemed Senior Brother, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Janardan Sahai that due to misdeeds of unscrupulous candidates innocent and honest candidates should not suffer and as such this exercise of segregation of tainted candidates from untainted ones is of utmost necessary so that innocent and honest youths coming from rural and poor background cannot be thrown out of employment in such hard days due to misdeeds of some dishonest persons. 108. As per record, in the present case where no formal regular departmental enquiry as per Service Rules or C.C.A. Rules, 1999 has been initiated against any of the officers, Constables inasmuch as there was no enquiry entrusted to a Statutory Administrative Tribunal specially created in U.P. to hold an enquiry under the provisions of the U.P. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and Rules framed thereunder. In Uttar Pradesh, if a formal enquiry is to be conducted against a Government servant by an Administrative Tribunal, it has to follow the provisions as contained in Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and the Rules framed thereunder. It was also not a case of holding vigilance enquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department, which can be treated as a fact finding enquiry by the Vigilance Department (as has been held in various pronouncements of this Court as well as by the Apex Court while dealing with the matters relating to the cases where an order of compulsory retirement passed on the basis of vigilance reports were under challenge). What has emerged from the record and pleadings of the parties that the Director General of Police, U.P., vide order dated 13.6.2007 has constituted a Committee to conduct “a preliminary fact finding enquiry”. What has emerged from the record and pleadings of the parties that the Director General of Police, U.P., vide order dated 13.6.2007 has constituted a Committee to conduct “a preliminary fact finding enquiry”. The necessity of holding “a preliminary fact finding enquiry” had arisen on account of written complaints made to the State Government/Hon’ble Chief Minister by the three sitting Members of Legislative Assembly relating to the irregularities, illegalities, corruption and nepotism in the selection of Constables in the Police Department. 109. Here is a case where the Chief Minister had to take some action on the complaints of three Members of the Legislative Assembly. The Secretary to the Chief Minister has referred the matter to the Principal Secretary, Home for taking appropriate action on the complaints made by the three Members of the Legislative Assembly. The Principal Secretary, Home, Government of U.P., in his turn had informed the Director General of Police, U.P., who is the head of the Police Department as per the provisions contained in the Police Act, to enquire into the allegations indicated in the complaints, that is, in the letters of the Members of the Legislative Assembly and submit a report accordingly. In this way, the administrative machinery was put in motion to process the complaints of the Members of the Legislative Assembly and submit a report to the State Government. 110. The Apex Court recently in the judgment reported in JT 2007(11) SC, 540, Mohd Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others and a Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice in a Special Appeal No. 1573 of 2007, decided on 21.11.2007 have expressed views that if the representatives of the people make a grievance and point out that there are certain irregularities in the matter of employment under the Government, or an officer of the Government is not acting properly or is not discharging his duties properly, it is the duty of the concerned authority to examine these complaints and if there is any substances then those complaints have to be followed up. 111. Similarly in the case in hand, what else could have been done. 111. Similarly in the case in hand, what else could have been done. Here is a case where on the complaints made by the three Members of the Legislative Assembly to the Government, the Secretary to the Chief Minister has forwarded the complaints to the Principal Secretary, Home, who was the concerned authority, who in his turn has forwarded the same to the Director General of Police, U.P., who is the head of the Police Department, against whose officers very serious allegations were made in the complaint. The Director General of Police has appointed an Enquiry Committee appointing a Senior Officer Sri Shailja Kant Misra, who was also not a stranger to the Police Department, but was a senior I.P.S. Officer holding the rank of Additional Director General of Police. 112. To me it appears that nothing wrong was done in ordering for an enquiry by the Director General of Police. The Director General of Police, U.P., was, thus, well within his power to appoint a Senior Officer to hold “a preliminary fact finding enquiry” into the allegations made by the three Members of the Legislative Assembly, who are representatives of the people. The legal principles, delegation of power, competence of the authority, application of principles of natural justice, technicalities cannot be imported in this simple situation, reasonable and honest one with ordinary prudence could have been ordered for holding an enquiry. 113. As far as the judicial scrutiny of the orders/instructions issued by the Chief Minister’s Secretariat and its follow-up action by the Home Secretary and the Director General of Police are concerned, the U.P. Rules of Business, 1975 have been placed before the Court. Rules 8, 10, various Schedules and Items and U.P. Authentications (Order and the Instruments) Rules, 1975 empowered officers of the Secretariat, that is, the Principal Secretaries, Special Secretaries, Joint Secretaries etc. to issue administrative directions and conduct their day to day business. In the present case, all the notings and orders were signed by the Secretaries to the Government and were according to Rules of Business. Thus, there is substance in the submission advanced by the learned Standing Counsel that the present cases relates to “a case of administrative importance” and, thus, falls under Item No.7 of the Second Schedule contained in Rule 8 of the U.P. Rules of Business, 1975. Thus, there is substance in the submission advanced by the learned Standing Counsel that the present cases relates to “a case of administrative importance” and, thus, falls under Item No.7 of the Second Schedule contained in Rule 8 of the U.P. Rules of Business, 1975. As per record of the Secretariat brought before this Court, I am fully satisfied that the decision arrived at to set up “a preliminary fact finding enquiry" in the present case was in accordance with the U.P. Rules of Business, 1975. Thus, the Enquiry Committee to investigate the complaints of the Members of the Legislative Assembly made to the Chief Minister was, thus, rightly constituted. Admittedly, final decision was to be taken by the State Government not by the Director General of Police or by Sri Shailja Kant Misra, Additional Director General of Police, who was merely asked to hold “a preliminary enquiry” and submit a report to the Director General of Police and also to the State Government and as such the argument of Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel, appears to be misconceived and accordingly deserves to be repelled and has been rightly repelled by my Senior Brother. 114. The cases reported in 1997(2) SCC 1 , Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar (Paragraph-3); JT 2007(11) SC 540, Mohd Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others and Special Appeal No. 1573 of 2007 (Arvind Kumar Sonkar v. State of U.P. and others), decided on 21.11.2007 squarely cover this issue. 115. The object of the constitution of Enquiry Committee was to find out irregularities, illegalities and the violations of administrative instructions spelling out the requirement procedure. The administrative instructions were flouted by the Chairmans and the members of the selection boards during the process of selection. The Enquiry Committee, so constituted, considering the enormity of the task, voluminous of the record may take aid and assistance of other officers of the same department as well. I do not find any illegality in Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee in taking assistance of some of his colleagues of the same department for the purpose of smooth functioning of the committee. The Enquiry Committee, so constituted, could exercise implied ancillary and incidental powers including that of co-opting officers nominated by the Director General of Police to assist the Committee in its enquiry taking into account the enormity of the large scale recruitment. The Enquiry Committee, so constituted, could exercise implied ancillary and incidental powers including that of co-opting officers nominated by the Director General of Police to assist the Committee in its enquiry taking into account the enormity of the large scale recruitment. In my view, the Enquiry Committee has done nothing wrong in taking assistance of other officers for the purpose of smooth functioning of the Committee. My view finds support from the judgments reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , M.S. Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (Para-89). 116. The report of the Enquiry Committee was later on approved/ratified by the Director General of Police, Head of the Department, who was directed by the State Government to hold investigation into the allegations and submit a report to the State Government after enquiring into the complaints made by the Members of the Legislative Assembly. In my opinion there is nothing wrong in approving the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry committee as the ratification relates to previous events. The enquiry was, in fact, ordered by the Government and the Director General of Police had to take a final decision on the same. My view finds force from the judgments of the Apex Court reported in (1970) 2 SCC 386 , Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh (Paragraphs-8, 9, 10 and 11); (2001) 8 SCC 179 , Punjab University v. V.N. Tripathi and (2003) 4 SCC 239 , High Court of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh and others. 117. As far as the argument of Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, relating to the principle of ‘delegatus non-protest delegate’ is concerned, it applies to judicial and statutory powers and not to administrative power, which can always be sub-delegated. Once I am of the view that Shailja Kant Misra Committee was constituted to conduct “a preliminary fact finding enquiry” not a formal regular enquiry in accordance with some statutory rules, this Committee could be provided assistance of other officers and could also exercise all ancillary and incidental powers in discharge of its duties. The action of the Committee is covered by the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Pradut Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 and Shni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346 . 118. The action of the Committee is covered by the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Pradut Kumar Bose v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 and Shni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, (1994) 5 SCC 346 . 118. As far as inference of bias against Shailja Kant Misra, Chairman of the Enquiry Committee and Javed Akhtar, Member of the Enquiry Committee, is concerned, the same are not correct and are liable to be rejected. In the present case, the Director General of Police, U.P., had appointed the Additional Director General of Police to hold a preliminary enquiry. From the record brought before the Court, it does not appear that Shailja Kant Misra had any personal interest in the matter and as such there was no conflict between his personal interest and his duties as Chairman of the Committee. As far as the recruitment process held at Ballia is concerned, when he was Zonal Inspector General there, it is noteworthy that the Committee had recommended action against the recruitments held at Ballia. In the present case, the selections were cancelled by the State Government nor by the Director General of Police or by Shailja Kant Misra, Additional Director General of Police. Since the allegation of conflict between the personal interest and the duties as an officer is absent, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the bias had prevailed in his mind or it was a case of malice in law. 119. Learned counsel for respondents have failed to point anything that there was any personal interest of Shailja Kant Misra and Sri Javed Akhtar in the selections held. Moreover, there was no conflict of interest in duty. In an administrative set up at times it happens that an enquiry is to be made into the complaints received against any decision or order because that decision or order was taken during the course of discharge of official duty or function without any personal interest and as such the findings given in the decision or the order may not be treated as malice in law. Here in the present case, the Members of Legislative Assembly against whom aspersions have been made have not been impleaded as party to the proceedings whether at Lucknow or before the Court which has disposed of the writ petition. Here in the present case, the Members of Legislative Assembly against whom aspersions have been made have not been impleaded as party to the proceedings whether at Lucknow or before the Court which has disposed of the writ petition. Findings against the Members of the Legislative Assembly, who had made complaints regarding irregularities and illegalities in the selection process have been made in their absence and without hearing them. 120. In fact, it appears that neither the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2008(5) ADJ 347 (DB), Amit Kumar Shukla and others v. Union of India and others ordering for a C.B.I. Enquiry into the matter nor the report of the high level Committee headed by the Chief Secretary have been placed before the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court. Had the above facts been placed before the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court, the Division Bench could have taken a different view in the matter. 121. It is noteworthy that Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee itself found that the selections made in eastern U.P. Centres including Ballia and Gorakhpur etc. were also vitiated on account of irregularities and illegalities committed by the Chairmans and the Members of the Selection Boards and there was an element of possible corruption and, thus, it had recommended for registration of criminal cases against the erring officials. Thus, there is force in the arguments of learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State that this action of Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee shows his objectivity. 122. As far as Javed Akhtar is concerned, it was brought on record that he was Chairman of the second Selection Board for making selection on the basis of the advertisement issued in April, 2006. Thus, he was not associated with the first selection made at Sitapur on the basis of advertisement issued in 2005. Because of this reason, the Director General of Police issued specific direction that so far as the second selection at Sitapur is concerned, Javed Akhtar will not be associated with the enquiry and the remaining members may scrutinise the records of the recruitment centre of Sitapur. This is a material fact which has been noted by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph-35 of the judgment. This is a material fact which has been noted by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph-35 of the judgment. Thus, there was no reason to draw a wrong inference and in either case there is no likelihood of bias on his part as he was excluded from the Committee by the Director General of Police himself to scrutinise the said centre. 123. In the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1950 , referred by the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 7740 (M/B) of 200, Brij Bhushan Bakshi v. State of U.P. and others, A.K. Kraipak, an officer, who was on the Selection Board, himself was a candidate for selection and, thus, the selection was held to be vitiated on the ground that there was a conflict between officer’s personal interest and his duties as he was a judge of his own cause. The principles laid down in A.K. Kraipak’s case and other cases as have been referred by the Division Bench in its judgment do not apply to the facts of the instant case. In fact the present case is squarely covered by the judgments cited by Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants reported in AIR 1957 Pat 732 , Sarju Prasad Singh v. South Bihar Regional Transport Authority Patna and others; AIR 1961 SC 82 , J.Y. Kondala Rao v. APSRTC, AIR 1973 SC 974 , T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu; (1976) 3 SCC 585 , Dr. G. Sarana v. Lucknow University; (1980) 3 SCC 304 , Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal; (1981) Supp 2 SCC 703, State of M.P. v. Ganekar Motghare; AIR 1985 Bom 436 , M/s. Lakshmi Motor Service v. RTA, Goa; (1988) Supp SCC 651, Secretary to Government, Transport Department, Madras v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and another and (1992) Supp 2 SCC 92, State of U.P. v. R.K. Bhargava. 124. Much emphasis has been laid by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case. Several judgments have been cited in support of such submissions. 125. 124. Much emphasis has been laid by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that the principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case. Several judgments have been cited in support of such submissions. 125. I am of the view that law does not require observance of principles of natural justice in a preliminary enquiry held for the purposes of collection of facts for the satisfaction of the Government so as to enable it to decide the further course of action. Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee had submitted its report to the Director General of Police, who further submitted it to the State Government. The State Government taking into consideration the findings recorded in the enquiry report had taken a decision to cancel all the disputed selections which were made during the years 2005-06. The ultimate decision in the present case was taken by the State Government not by Sri Shailja Kant Misra, who was only assigned with the work to make an enquiry into the allegations of corrupt practices adopted by the various Selection Boards. Thus, his role was limited only to submit a report after investigation and enquiry. 126. The enquiry was held to find out whether the entire selection process was fair, transparent and was held in accordance with law and instructions regulating the selection process were followed. On the enquiry being conducted, it was found that there was large scale and pervasive irregularities and illegalities and as such the Government had decided as a policy matter to cancel the entire selection process. In such a situation it was not necessary to issue individual notices since the entire selection was found to be tainted and all the selectees were ousted and as such the individual notice was not required. The learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on the judgments reported in AIR 1970 SC 1269 , Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra and others, AIR 1992 SC 952 , Karnataka Public Services Commission v. B.M. Vijay Shankar, AIR 1994 SC 2166 , Krishana Yadav v. State of U.P. and others; AIR 2001 SC 2196 , Union of India v. Tarun Kumar Singh and others; 2002 AIR SC 1119, Union of India v. O. Chakradhar; (2005) 6 SCC 149 , State of A.P. v. V.T. Sury Chandra Rao and AIR 2006 SC 2571 , Inderpreet Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and others. 127. 127. A perusal of these judgments reveal that in cases where entire selection was found to be vitiated/tainted and was cancelled, in such cases it was not necessary to give individual notices. The Enquiry Committee, in the present case, was not enquiring conduct of the individual candidates selected, but it was focused on the purity of the entire selection process and the conduct of the officers involved in the selection process and whether these officers had sincerely and honestly discharged their duties and the selection was held in compliance with the instructions issued in respect of the process of recruitment in the Police Department. While holding these enquiries, the officers manning various Selection Boards were offered opportunity to explain their conduct. No stigma of any kind was attached to the selected candidates while cancelling the entire selection by the Government. 128. In cases where majority of examinees had adopted unfair means, the whole examination could be cancelled is the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. O. Chakradhar (supra). In Paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of this case, the Apex Court has in no uncertain terms has clearly laid down that if the mischief played is so widespread and all pervasive effecting the result, so as to make it difficult to pick out the persons who have been unlawfully benefited or wrongly deprived of their selection in such cases it will be neither possible nor necessary to issue individual show cause notice to each selectee. In the said case it was held by the Apex Court that the entire selection was vitiated even in respect of those who had already been appointed and had been working for substantial period of time (as in the present case). 129. However, in the present case, this Court is of the view that the State Government may itself make endeavour to scrutinise all the selected candidates, weed out the tainted ones and permit the untainted ones to continue in the employment. It is, therefore, expected from the Government that in furtherance of these directions, it may provide opportunity of hearing to the persons, who, as a result of the scrutiny are found unfit, ineligible and unsuitable for appointment whose further retention in the service is liable to be rejected and as such they may be given opportunity of hearing at this stage. 130. 130. Further, the Apex Court has held in the cases of Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 11 SCC 599 ; Narayan Dattaraya Ramteerthakha v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 299 and Kendriya Vidalaya Sangathan v. Arun Kumar Mahdav Rao Sinddhaye, (2007) 1 SCC 283 that law does not require observance of principles of natural justice in a preliminary enquiry held for the purposes of collection of facts for the purposes of satisfaction of the Government so as to able to decide future course of action. 131. There is substance in the arguments of Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, that in cases where selection is found to be vitiated due to dishonesty on the part of the Members of the Selection Board, the principle of “audi alteram partem” is not attracted. Thus the ratio laid down in the following judgments of the Apex Court are relevant for the purposes of this case also where the Enquiry Committee had recorded finding against the Officers who were connected with the selection process. In this case also, Shailja Kant Committee’s report, Chief Secretary’s report, Anti Corruption Department’s report and the Cabinet’s decision everything is against the officers, who were associated with the selection process. There are catena of judgments reported in (1993) 1 SCC 154 , Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others; (1994) 4 SCC 165 , Krishana Yadav and another v. State of Haryana and others; (1996) 5 SCC 365 , Biswa Ranjan Sahoo v. Sushanta Kumar Dinda; (2005) 8 SCC 180 , Union of India v. Joseph P. Cherian and (1996) 10 SCC 749 , Pramod Babudas Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, which deal with such situations. 132. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has further submitted that assuming that some of the officers who had participated in the enquiry in order to assist the Enquiry Committee under the Chairmanship of Shailja Kant Misra were not formally appointed by the Director General of Police as members, it would not invalidate the enquiry report, the materials collected or the findings recorded therein in the light of the “de facto doctrine” as held by the Apex Court in the case of Gokaraju Rangraju v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCC 132 . 133. 133. In the present case, the enquiry report has been accepted by the Director General of Police and the State Government. At no stage it was returned back. It means approval and ratification of the findings given in the enquiry report by superior administrative authority, which is permissible under the law. Since I am of the opinion that Shailja Kant Misra’s Committee was constituted for the purposes of investigation, fact finding preliminary enquiry, the report had to be submitted to the State Government which had set the administrative machinery in motion on receipt of the complaints from three Members of the Legislative Assembly. The State Government, in fact, has taken action on the complaints of the three Members of the Legislative Assembly after collecting facts through its administrative agency. The State Government has taken a collective decision after receiving the report from the Director General of Police, the Enquiry Committee appointed by him including the reports received after scrutiny of records relating to the selections held at various centres (51 in numbers) in Uttar Pradesh. 134. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel, has further brought to the notice of this Court two decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Dr. Amarjeet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 503 and B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others, (1983) 4 SCC 582 to draw the attention of the Court that the Hon’ble Single Judge had failed to appreciate that the recruitments made by violating the administrative instructions and binding guidelines can be held to be arbitrary as well as violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India and as such the cancellation of selection could have been upheld by the Hon’ble Single Judge. 135. Considering the submissions of Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and having noticed the fact that the prescribed procedure was not followed in the selection process, I am of the view that when the prescribed procedure has not been followed, the decision of the Government to cancel the entire selection cannot be branded as illegal. However, an effort could have been made to segregate the tainted candidates from the untainted and innocent ones. 136. However, an effort could have been made to segregate the tainted candidates from the untainted and innocent ones. 136. I find sufficient force in the argument of Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel, that the scope of judicial review, when there is an in-house fact finding enquiry report, is extremely limited. In the present case, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court, while deciding Writ Petition No. 7740 (M/B) of 2007, Brij Bhushan Bakshi and others v. State of U.P. and others has not noticed the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), Narayan Dattaraya Ramteerthakha v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and other cases on the point which have been referred in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment. The observations made by two Division Benches of this Court at Allahabad referred in the foregoing Paras cannot be ignored by me. The spirit of these two orders was that State must have taken positive action in this matter not to freeze the matter. I cannot subscribe to the views expressed by my other fellow Judges. The wrong has to be undone. 137. It appears that these cases have not been placed either before the learned Single Judge or before the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court, though both the Courts have dealt with the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report as if a statutory enquiry or a formal regular departmental enquiry has been conducted. It was not a case of holding a statutory enquiry under some Statutory Rules. It was not a case of holding an enquiry by Administrative Tribunals as per the scheme of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and the Rules framed thereunder. 138. While judicially scrutinising the matter, the Court has to see these elements. How the administrative machinery was set in motion. Certainly on receiving the complaints of the three Members of the Legislative Assembly, it was expected from the Chief Minister’s Secretariat or the State Government to hold an enquiry. 138. While judicially scrutinising the matter, the Court has to see these elements. How the administrative machinery was set in motion. Certainly on receiving the complaints of the three Members of the Legislative Assembly, it was expected from the Chief Minister’s Secretariat or the State Government to hold an enquiry. The Manual of the Government Order, Enquiries under Lok Ayukt’s Act, Vigilance Commission, Anti Corruption Department of the Government and other Agencies provide a written procedure that on receipt of a complaint against an officer or public servant, a preliminary enquiry has to be held and after receiving the enquiry report and scrutinising the same, a formal statutory regular enquiry can be ordered whereas in the present case, the situation is altogether different. My view is supported by the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ; Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 ; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and others, (1991) 2 SCC 716 ; U.P. Financial Corporation v. GEM CAP India Pvt. Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 299 ; Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (1999) 1 SCC 759 ; Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 ; R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others, (1999) 8 SCC 90 ; K. Vinod Kumar v. S. Palanisami, (2003) 10 SCC 681 ; Government of A.P. and others v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 and Harpal Singh Chauhan and others v. State of U.P., (1993) 3 SCC 552 wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Court cannot substitute its own opinion to that of the Government, based on a detailed enquiry report. The decision making process did not have any infirmity, except that the Government ought to have cancelled the appointments, recruitments of the tainted ones and not of all the candidates. 139. Reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Lucknow Bench of this Court in Harendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2005) 6 AWC 6161(L.B.) to impress upon the Court that the selections held in Sitapur and Gonda districts were legal and valid. 139. Reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Lucknow Bench of this Court in Harendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2005) 6 AWC 6161(L.B.) to impress upon the Court that the selections held in Sitapur and Gonda districts were legal and valid. The finding of the Enquiry Committee, which enquired the matter in the year 2007, revealed that the selection process was vitiated. Thus, the reasons assigned in Harendra Singh’s case (supra) by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the pleadings placed before the Court cannot hold good for judging the action taken by the State Government on the basis of the enquiry reports submitted later to it. Harendra Singh’s case (supra) cannot be cited as a legal precedent as it is not a declaration of law. Thus, it is respectfully observed that there is no declaration of law in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of this Court which may apply to the present case. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of this Court was rendered in different set of facts and circumstances and taking into consideration the pleadings which were made at that point of time. It is well settled that an earlier decision rendered in different factual backgrounds may not be binding when more startling and glaring facts came to light in a subsequent case and as such the matter can be reviewed. The State can always approach this Court to give a fresh look on an earlier decision. The ratio in the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of Col.(Retd) B.J. Akkara v. Govt. of India and others, (2006) 11 SCC 709 ; Union of India v. A.S. Gangoli and others, (2007) 6 SCC 196 and Niyaz Mohd. and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1994) 6 SCC 332 support this view. 140. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has placed before the Court the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 ; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 ; United India Insurance Co. 140. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has placed before the Court the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 ; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 ; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and A.P. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 to substantiate his argument that after discovery of a fraud in the selection process, the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Harendra Singh’s case has lost its efficacy. With great respect, I may record that the above cited cases were not brought before the Bench at Lucknow nor the Bench has appreciated the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. However, the matter is now pending disposal in the Hon’ble Apex Court and no conclusions can be drawn in this judgment. 141. I am also of the opinion that after discovery of fraud and serious irregularities and illegalities in the selection process, the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Harendra Singh’s case (supra) has no application in view of the judgments of the Apex Court relied upon by Sri P.P. Rao. 142. As far as allegations of malafide against the superior officers of Police Department, very Senior Secretaries to the Government and Constitutional functionaries are concerned, the respondents have failed to substantiate their allegations by placing materials on record. Moreover, the officers and the constitutional functionaries were not impleaded as parties to the writ petitions. In view of this fact, this Court cannot enquire into these allegations in their absence. (Vide State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 222; All India State Bank Officers Federation and others v. Union of India and others, (1997) 9 SCC 151 ; Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 ; Girlas Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 7 SCC 53 and Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 8 SCC 418 . 143. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 ; Girlas Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 7 SCC 53 and Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 8 SCC 418 . 143. Sri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has made elaborate submissions and persuaded the Court to hold the judgment of the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 7740 (M/B) of 2007, Brij Bhushan Bakhshi v. State of U.P. and others as per incurium as it did not notice the above mentioned binding decisions of the Apex Court which have been cited in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment. According to him two courses are open to this Division Bench either to declare that the said judgment of the Lucknow Bench of this Court is per incurium and decide the case on merits applying the law declared by the Apex Court or refer this case to a larger Bench of this Court. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Deepak and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1982 and Shardulbhai Lakhmanbhai Pancholi and another v. State of Gujarat, (1990) Cr.L.J. 1275. 144. I have already expressed my views in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment dealing with the case laws cited before the Court on this issue. I have been informed that the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of this Court has already been assailed by the State of U.P. by filing a Special Leave Petition in which notices have already been issued and the matter is pending disposal before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The matter is sub judice in the Hon’ble Apex Court. In view of this, I and My Brother refrain ourselves from making any such endeavour to go into the above-noted issue and declare the such judgment as per incurium or refer the case to a larger Bench of this Court. The matter is sub judice in the Hon’ble Apex Court. In view of this, I and My Brother refrain ourselves from making any such endeavour to go into the above-noted issue and declare the such judgment as per incurium or refer the case to a larger Bench of this Court. I have dealt with the matter independently excluding the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report and I have taken into consideration the other unchallenged materials placed before the Court like the complaints, the Chief Secretary’s report, the decision of the Cabinet and the action of the Anti Corruption Department initiating criminal proceedings against the erring officers who were associated with the selection process and have now been charged for committing irregularities, illegalities and corruption in making the appointments. Substantial materials have been placed before the Court on the basis of which the cases can be disposed of independently on merits even excluding from consideration Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report. It is not a case where every thing was found to be in order. Several irregularities and illegalities have been found in the selection process. After all the recruitment process for appointments in the Government departments have to be tested on the touchstones of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 145. I have also found, as has been held by the learned Single Judge, that there are two categories of selected candidates, one set is of tainted candidates, percentage of which has been given in the chart relating to some centres and the other set of candidates is of untainted candidates who are innocent and cannot be thrown out of employment due to misdeeds of others who had obtained employment using illegal and unfair means. Here I may cite a Phrase that “Sadhya Ki Prapti Key Liye Sadhan Ka Pavitra Hona Avashyak Hai” (To Achieve a Goal, It is necessary that the means to achieve the Goal are pure). 146. Here in the present case, the scrutiny of record and appreciation of the materials demonstrates that the substantial number of candidates were tainted ones. Here I may cite a Phrase that “Sadhya Ki Prapti Key Liye Sadhan Ka Pavitra Hona Avashyak Hai” (To Achieve a Goal, It is necessary that the means to achieve the Goal are pure). 146. Here in the present case, the scrutiny of record and appreciation of the materials demonstrates that the substantial number of candidates were tainted ones. The details of the irregularities and illegalities committed during the selection process have already been pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment which have also been noticed by the other Division Benches of this Court while dealing with such matters at Allahabad (Vide 2008 (5) ADJ 347 (DB), Amit Kumar Shukla and others v. State of U.P. and others) whereby a C.B.I. Enquiry was ordered by the Division Bench of this Court. The Court cannot close its eyes to these irregularities and illegalities committed during the selection depriving of the opportunity to the thousands of honest candidates who may not have been selected due to corrupt practices adopted by the tainted candidates in connivance with the members of the Selection Boards. 147. I have taken notice of the startling conclusions in the Shailja Kant Misra Committee’s report and made the assessment of the situation as has been put-forth before the Court through the pleadings and the records which have been placed before the Court and in furtherance of its own orders the Court has seen the reports of the Enquiry Committees and the Chief Secretary’s report. The records were also produced before the learned Single Judge in pursuance of various orders passed by the learned Single Judge from time to time. The materials which have been placed in the Appeal like Chief Secretary’s report and the Enquiry Committee’s report were also placed before the learned Single Judge and opportunity was afforded to the respondents to confront the allegations. To me, it appears that the respondents have not been able to clear the allegation relating to irregularities and illegalities committed during the selection process. 148. The Court has also taken notice of the fact that a large number of candidates have already put in few years of services and some candidates are undergoing training, who were being paid stipend during the training and as per Training record they were found fit for retention in the Police Department and they were expecting regular appointments/postings after successful completion of their training. There are also some candidates who were merely awaiting formal orders to undergo training, thus, in such circumstances applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2006) 11 SCC 356 that the State Government and the High Court must make a serious endeavour to segregate untainted candidates from tainted ones. Although in the present case, the task may be certainly difficult one, but it cannot be an impossible task. Thus, while following the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon (supra), it would be appropriate to direct that the State Government to constitute Scrutiny Committees to examine case of each candidate separately on its merit at each centre. If the selection of a candidate after the scrutiny is found untainted and if he has been selected in accordance with the instructions after following the prescribed procedure, administrative circulars, administrative directions and fulfils all the eligibility conditions, his case shall be put in the untainted category and he shall be allowed to continue in the services or the training, as the case may be. After scrutiny, the candidates who are found to be tainted ones, they shall be weeded out by declaring their selection invalid. In such cases oportunity of hearing may be afforded to the candidate as per observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon’s case (supra), reliance upon which has been placed by both of us. This Bench is of the view that the liberty may be gien to the State Government to segregate tainted ones from the untainted ones and only then appropriate action be taken. 149. For the discussions and observations made hereinabove, though I agree with the conclusions of my respected Senior Brother to dismiss the Special Appeals, but I respectfully differ on the above indicated findings recorded by my respected Senior Brother. Accordingly, I have recorded my own views in this judgment alongwith the directions to segregate tainted candidates from untainted ones applying the principles of the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon’s case (supra). 150. The Special Appeals are dismissed with above observations. ————