Judgment D.A. Mehta, J.—This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was heard at length yesterday i.e. 9th November, 2009 and at the end of the day was part-heard. Today, in the forenoon after the admission Boards were over learned Advocate for the respondent prayed for time by making a request that the matter may be passed over and kept in the second session after recess as the clerk of the learned Advocate for the respondent had not brought the file to the Court room. Accordingly the request was granted. After the entire final hearing board was called out once learned Advocate for respondent has not turned up to continue his submissions when the matter has been called out once again. Hence the Court has proceeded to dictate the judgment, considering the fact that the petition is of 1999. 2. The petitioner, a co-operative Bank has preferred this petition challenging the order dated 22/05/1995 made by the Board of Nominees rejecting the suit filed by the petitioner - Bank, and the subsequent orders made by Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal (the Tribunal) in Appeal No. 191 of 1995 on 30/08/1997 and in Review Application No. 10 of 1997 on 04/08/1999 confirming the order made by Board of Nominees in the backdrop of following facts and circumstances of the case. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that on 09/02/1983 a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was advanced as a loan to one concern known as Padmavati Chaniya Center as per terms of contract between the parties. One Shri Nanjibhai Dungarbhai Mistri (since deceased) stood surety for the said loan. On 10/06/1984 a notice was issued by the petitioner to deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai Mistri as well as the principal borrower for recovery of the outstanding amount. Deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai did not reply to the notice and did not dispute the liability as per the petitioner. It is stated that Shri Nanjibhai Dungarbhai expired on 02/03/1986. On 22/05/1986 the petitioner filed a suit before the Board of Nominees being Arbitration Suit No. 1414 of 1986. It appears that there was no appearance on behalf of either the principal borrower or deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai and accordingly on 05/01/1987 the Board of Nominees made an ex-parte award and decree against the said two persons. 4. On 22/05/1986 the petitioner filed a suit before the Board of Nominees being Arbitration Suit No. 1414 of 1986. It appears that there was no appearance on behalf of either the principal borrower or deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai and accordingly on 05/01/1987 the Board of Nominees made an ex-parte award and decree against the said two persons. 4. Respondents herein, who are the legal heirs and representatives of deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai carried the matter by way of appeal before the Tribunal. The said appeal bearing No. 2595 of 1993 was disposed of by partly allowing the appeal insofar as respondents are concerned by setting aside the award against deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai on the ground that the suit had been filed against a deceased person. However the Tribunal confirmed the award made against the principal borrower. The petitioner was permitted to join respondents herein as necessary parties in the suit and hence Board of Nominees decided the matter afresh after respondents had been impleaded as defendants. Award came to be made on 22/05/1995 by the Board of Nominees by dismissing the suit against the respondents. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal before Tribunal which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 30/08/1997. Review Application filed by the petitioner was also rejected on 04/08/1999 by the Tribunal. 5. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has assailed the orders made by the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal on the short ground that both the authorities have failed to appreciate that under provisions of Section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (the Act) a dispute has to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee by any of the parties referred to in the provisions and hence it is not the date of the transaction between the parties which is material but the date of the dispute when a reference is made. Elaborating on the submission it was contended that the legal issue which is required to be decided is limited to the aspect as to on what date a person, against whom proceedings are initiated, should be a member for being governed by provisions of Section 96 of the Act: whether on the date of the transaction, as held by the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal; or whether on the date of dispute when the proceedings are initiated by one or the other party. In support of the submissions made reliance has been placed on Bombay High Court judgment in the case of Dinkar Wasudeo Joshi vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay-Poona, reported in AIR 1946 Bombay 346. It was submitted that the judgment rendered under Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 deals with the term ‘dispute’ as appearing in Section 54 of the said Act and considering that Section 96 of the Act uses similar language and employs the same term the judgment of Bombay High Court would squarely cover the case of the petitioner. That in the said case it was held by Bombay High Court that the word ‘dispute’ could not be altogether divorced from the connotation of a claim or demand or a question at issue and could not be said to be the same thing as a cause of action or mere incurring of a liability. In other words, according to learned Advocate it is at the point of time when the creditor raises a dispute by resorting to initiate proceedings that the case would be governed by the provisions of the Act. 5.1. Inviting attention to facts of the case it was submitted that the evidence on record unequivocally shows that certificate of membership dated 20/05/1986 was placed on record of the authorities indicating membership of the deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai while the suit had been filed only on 22/05/1986, and therefore it was apparent that deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai was a member prior to institution of the suit, or at least on the date of the suit. That both the authorities had erred in law in considering the relevant date to be the date of transaction, viz., the date when the loan was disbursed. Learned Advocate for the petitioner therefore submitted that the impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside and the relief prayed for by the petitioner be granted, viz., an award be made for claim of Rs. 9007.60 Paise with running interest @ 20 % plus penal interest @ 2 % against the respondents. 6. On behalf of respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 learned Advocate submitted that there was no pleading by the plaintiff in relation to the aforesaid issue and therefore the plaintiff - petitioner cannot be heard on this count at this belated stage in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. On behalf of respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 learned Advocate submitted that there was no pleading by the plaintiff in relation to the aforesaid issue and therefore the plaintiff - petitioner cannot be heard on this count at this belated stage in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that respondents had been able to establish that the loan in question, which was advanced on 09/02/1983, had been repaid on 09/03/1983, and on the said date fresh loan of Rs. 5,000/- had been advanced for which there was no continuing surety by deceased - Nanjibhai Dunagarbhai. That the authorities had concurrently found that this was a single loan transaction and in the circumstances, in absence of any continuing liability no action could have been initiated against deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai who stood surety only in relation to said single transaction. Referring to the findings recorded by Board of Nominees and the Tribunal that there was no evidence that deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai was a surety on the date of transaction, it was submitted that no interference was warranted and the petition was required to be rejected. Learned Advocate also read extensively from the deposition of an employee of the Bank recorded by the Board of Nominees in the suit to emphasize the lack of evidence as regards membership of deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai. It was therefore contended that petition be rejected considering that there was no case made out either in relation to lack of jurisdiction or a case of jurisdiction not being rightly exercised. 7. Section 96 of the Act which appears in Chapter-IX of the Act relates to Disputes. Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Act in simplest form provides that any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society shall be referred in the prescribed form by any of the parties to the dispute, if the parties satisfy the description set out in any one of the Clauses (a) to (e) as appearing in the said Section. Hence for determining whether a person is entitled to make a reference there should be existence of a dispute, such a dispute must be between the parties described in the provision, and any of the enumerated party could seek reference by applying in the prescribed form. Hence for determining whether a person is entitled to make a reference there should be existence of a dispute, such a dispute must be between the parties described in the provision, and any of the enumerated party could seek reference by applying in the prescribed form. In the present case it is not in dispute that the petitioner is a society who answers the description of the entity as mentioned in Section 96 of the Act. The only question which then remains to be answered is whether deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai answers the description of being a member of the petitioner - society, and if yes, what would be the relevant date for being such a member. The stand of the respondent, which has been accepted by the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal, is that the relevant date for this purpose, viz., for being a member, would be the date of transaction. On the other hand the case of the petitioner is that it is the date of dispute which is material for the purpose of deciding whether the parties are governed by provisions of Section 96 of the Act. 8. It is necessary to record that the submissions made on merits would have no bearing because as can be seen from the order made by Board of Nominees after framing five issues it is recorded that issue No. 1 is answered in the negative while it was not necessary to answer issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4, while in relation to issue No. 5 the answer is as per the order. Issue No. 1 was whether the suit relates to a dispute under Section 96 of the Act. Holding that the suit is not in relation to a dispute under Section 96 of the Act the Board of Nominees has categorically recorded in paragraph No. 3 of the judgment that as the Board of Nominees does not have jurisdiction to hear and conduct the suit against the respondents it is not necessary to record any other finding in relation to other issues. This order has been upheld by the Tribunal. 9. This order has been upheld by the Tribunal. 9. In the aforesaid circumstances various submissions made on merits of the controversy, viz., whether the respondents, having stepped into shoes of deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai, are liable to make payment or not need not be dealt with in absence of any findings either by the Board of Nominees or the Tribunal. 10. As noted herein before provisions of Section 96 of the Act can be invoked by any of the specified parties by making a reference to the Registrar in the prescribed form in relation to a dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society and therefore in the first place a dispute has to arise. The dispute has to be between parties. It is not possible to accept the stand of the respondents that on the date a loan transaction is entered into between a creditor and a borrower, which is guaranteed by a surety, a dispute has arisen. The reason is not far to seek. If the principal borrower discharges the liability within the stipulated period, as originally contracted or within the extended period, no dispute would arise between the parties and the date of transaction would have no relevance. Similarly, in a given case where the principal borrower is discharged from his liability by the creditor either by squaring off of the account on receipt of a lesser amount, or in a case where the creditor arrives at a conclusion that raising a dispute would not yield any result considering the sum involved (which may be petty), or due to the financial position of the borrower, or due to the borrower and surety not being traceable or alive, there would be no dispute and no occasion to invoke provisions of Section 96 of the Act. In such an eventuality also the date of transaction would have no relevance. 11. Then, only because in a given case the creditor decides to initiate proceedings for recovery of the outstanding amount it cannot be stated that the date of transaction becomes relevant for invoking provisions of Section 96 of the Act. In such an eventuality also the date of transaction would have no relevance. 11. Then, only because in a given case the creditor decides to initiate proceedings for recovery of the outstanding amount it cannot be stated that the date of transaction becomes relevant for invoking provisions of Section 96 of the Act. It is only when a claim is made by the creditor and the defaulting borrower either denies his liability or, even while accepting the liability refuses to pay, or while accepting the liability does not agree to pay the entire amount, can one say that a dispute between the parties has arisen. The dispute is in relation to the amount claimed and not paid. The amount may be the entire amount or may be part amount. There could be a dispute as to the entire amount or there could be a dispute as to the part amount. For example, a borrower may dispute the rate of interest or liability to pay penal interest. Hence it becomes apparent that the concept of dispute as appearing in Section 96 of the Act would not be relatable to the date of transaction but would a date subsequent to the point of time when the transaction is entered into. The last such point being the date on which a suit is preferred, viz., when remedy under provisions of the Act is availed of. Merely because the dispute is relatable to the transaction that does not mean that for the purpose of resorting to a legal remedy under Section 96 of the Act the date of transaction is the relevant date. 12. The plain language of Section 96 of the Act cannot be ignored. A Court is not empowered or entitled to either add or substitute words in a statute, unless and until a plain construction of a provision results in absurdity. That is not the situation in this case. 13. The term dispute in common parlance means to question the correctness or validity of a statement. A disagreement, a quarrel between the parties. Between a creditor and a debtor (in whatever capacity, a borrower or a guarantor) where the parties do not agree on the amount to be repaid / repayable it can be termed to be a dispute. 14. The term dispute in common parlance means to question the correctness or validity of a statement. A disagreement, a quarrel between the parties. Between a creditor and a debtor (in whatever capacity, a borrower or a guarantor) where the parties do not agree on the amount to be repaid / repayable it can be termed to be a dispute. 14. Hence both the Tribunal and the Board of Nominees have erred in coming to the conclusion that deceased - Nanjibhai Dungarbhai is not shown to be a member on the date of transaction because that is not the relevant date for the reasons recorded herein before. None of the authorities have recorded as to what is the date of dispute, which in a given case, like the present petitioner, would be the date on which a resolution is passed to initiate appropriate action in accordance with law for effecting recovery, and that too after a claim is made and the claim is denied by the other side, by either disputing the claim or not discharging the liability. As held by Bombay High Court in the case of Dinkar Wasudeo Joshi (Supra). “It does not seem to us possible to hold that the dispute which was referred to the Assistant Registrar arose at any time earlier than the resolution of the society. It cannot be said that before that resolution was passed, the society intended to take any action in the matter of the declaration.” 15. In the circumstances the impugned orders made by the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal cannot be sustained as they suffer from a legal infirmity based on a premise which is patently incorrect in law. The Board of Nominees having held that it had no jurisdiction to conduct the suit and the said order having been upheld by the Tribunal it is necessary that the impugned orders are quashed and set aside and the suit restored to file of the Board of Nominees for deciding afresh in accordance with law. 16. Accordingly the order made by Board of Nominees on 22/05/1995, the orders made by the Tribunal on 30/08/1997 and 04/08/1999 are hereby quashed and set aside and Arbitration Suit No. 1414 of 1986 stands restored to file of the Board of Nominees to be decided afresh in accordance with law after considering the respective stands of the parties. 17. 16. Accordingly the order made by Board of Nominees on 22/05/1995, the orders made by the Tribunal on 30/08/1997 and 04/08/1999 are hereby quashed and set aside and Arbitration Suit No. 1414 of 1986 stands restored to file of the Board of Nominees to be decided afresh in accordance with law after considering the respective stands of the parties. 17. The petition is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. 18. Considering the fact that the suit is of year 1986 the Court earnestly hopes that the Board of Nominees shall expedite the hearing and disposal thereof.