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2009 DIGILAW 721 (CAL)

Bhusan Kumar Das v. Sanjay Kumar Dutta

2009-09-09

TAPAN KUMAR DUTT

body2009
Judgment :- (1). Heard the Learned Advocates for the respective parties in the two appeals which were heard together. (2). S.A. No. 626 of 2008 arises out of the judgement and decree dated 8th July, 2008 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Hooghly in Title Appeal No. 140 of 2007 which was also heard analogously with Title Appeal No. 141 of 2007 affirming the judgement and decree dated 29th June, 2007 passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Additional Court, Chandernagore, Hooghly in Title Suit No. 72 of 1997 which was also heard analogously with Title Suit No. 103 of 1996. (3). S.A. No. 627 of 2008 arises out of the judgement and decree dated 8th July, 2008 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Hooghly affirming the judgement and decree dated 29th June, 2007 passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Additional Court, Chandernagore, Hooghly in Title Suit No. 103 of 1996 which was also heard analogously with Title Suit No. 72 of 1997. (4). The facts of the case, very briefly, are as follows :-The appellant Bhusan Kumar Das filed Title Suit No. 180 of 1994 against one Smt. Tapati Rakshit which was renumbered as Title Suit No. 72 of 1997 and such suit shall hereinafter be described as the first suit. The Title Suit No. 9 of 1995 which was re-numbered as Title Suit No. 103 of 1996 was filed by the said Tapati Rakshit against the said Bhusan Kumar Das. This suit shall be hereinafter be referred to as the second suit. In the first suit Bhusan prayed for a decree for declaration that he is a premises tenant in the suit premises under the said Tapati Rakshit and that he is not a licensee in the suit premises and that he has got every right to possess the suit premises and to run his business therein until he is evicted by any decree of eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He also prayed for an order of permanent injunction restraining the said Tapati Rakshit from disturbing his peaceful possession in the suit premises and the smooth running of the business. He also prayed for an order of permanent injunction restraining the said Tapati Rakshit from disturbing his peaceful possession in the suit premises and the smooth running of the business. The case of the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das in the said suit was inter alia to the effect that the suit premises previously belonged to one Subodh Kumar Rakshit who died leaving his sons, daughters and wife and that Tapati Rakshit is a daughter of the said Subodh Kumar Rakshit; that the said Subodh Kumar Rakshit had let out the suit premises to one Tilak Das who used to run a business in the name and style of Sree Hanuman Stores; that the said Tilak Das died on 3.3.1984 leaving behind his wife and sons which included one Shree Mahesh Prasad Das; that subsequently by a mutual arrangement among such heirs Mahesh Prasad Das only was authorised to look after the business and to become the sole tenant of the suit premises; accordingly, Mahesh Prasad Das alone used to run the business and paid rent in his own name and the name of the business was changed to Sree Ram Stores; on the death of Subodh Kumar Rakshit his heirs through Urmila Rakshit (mother of Tapati Rakshit) used to collect rent from the said Mahesh Prasad Das; that Mahesh Prasad Das found it difficult to run the business and made an arrangement with the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das to run the business in the suit premises for which Mahesh Prasad Das demanded and realised huge amount from the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das and a condition was imposed that all liabilities will be shouldered by the said Bhusan Kumar Das. According to the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das, in January, 1986 a negotiation was held in presence of Urmila Rakshit and her sons and daughters when the said Mahesh Prasad Das and the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das were also present and all the persons accepted that the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das shall be treated to be the tenant but Urmila Rakshit imposed the conditions that even though rent would be paid by the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das but the receipts would be granted in the name of Mahesh Prasad Das and that an agreement dated 8.1.1986 was entered into by the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das and the said Mahesh Prasad Das and since then the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das is running the said business in the name and style of Sree Ram Stores. It was the further case of the appellant i.e. Bhusan Kumar Das that in March, 1993 the properties inherited by the said Tapati Rakshit and other heirs and legal representatives of late Subodh Kumar Rakshit were partitioned and the said premises was allotted to Tapati Rakshit who used to realize rent from the appellant Subodh Kumar Das by granting receipt in the name of Mahesh Prasad Das. It was the further case of the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das that on several occasions he requested the said Tapati Rakshit to grant receipts in his name instead of Mahesh Prasad Das who declared that he had no objection if rent receipt is issued in the name of Bhusan Kumar Das in respect of the suit premises and in such context the defendant, her mother and brothers obtained many signatures of Mahesh Prasad Das on blank papers / blank stamp papers on assurance that such papers/documents of tenancy would prepared later on but on several pleas the matter was delayed and ultimately the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das received a notice on 22.8.1994 sent by the learned Advocate of Tapati Rakshit in which the said Bhusan Kumar Das was described as a licensee and he was asked to quit and vacate the suit premises. Hence the said first suit was filed by the said Bhusan Kumar Das. (5). The said Tapati Rakshit filed the second suit against the said Bhusan Kumar Das praying for decree of eviction of the said Bhusan Kumar Das from the suit premises and for mesne profits. Hence the said first suit was filed by the said Bhusan Kumar Das. (5). The said Tapati Rakshit filed the second suit against the said Bhusan Kumar Das praying for decree of eviction of the said Bhusan Kumar Das from the suit premises and for mesne profits. The case of the said Tapati Rakshit in the plaint was that the suit premises along with other properties belonged to her father late Subodh Kumar Rakshit and on her fathers death her mother, her brothers and her sister and herself inherited the properties of late Subodh Kumar Rakshit including the suit premises and subsequently there was a deed of partition dated 26.3.1993 whereby the said Tapati Rakshit was allotted the suit premises and other properties and the said Tapati Rakshit became the exclusive owner of such properties. According to the said Tapati Rakshit, the suit property was let out to Shree Mahesh Prasad Das who became a tenant under the said Tapati Rakshit and ultimately the said Mahesh Prasad Das had surrendered the tenancy and delivered possession of the suit property in favour of the said Tapati Rakshit; the said Bhusan Kumar Das was an employee of the said Mahesh Prasad Das and after surrender of the suit property by the said Mahesh Prasad Das, the said Bhusan Kumar Das disclosed that he had purchased some business articles from the said Mahesh Prasad Das and that he required some time for removal of such articles and thus he prayed for granting license and/or permission from the said Tapati Rakshit, and accordingly, such license was granted to the said Bhusan Kumar Das for a short period to occupy the suit property and the said Bhusan Kumar Das also promised to deliver possession of the suit property within a short period of time and that since the said Bhusan Kumar Das was only causing delay in delivering back the suit property to the said Tapati Rakshit on some pretext or the other, the said Tapati Rakshit revoked the said license by an Advocates letter in the year 1994; that the said Bhusan Kumar Das received the said notice but instead of delivering the possession of the suit premises to the said Tapati Rakshit, filed the said first suit claiming a tenancy right in the suit premises. Hence, the said second suit was filed by the said Tapati Rakshit. (6). Hence, the said second suit was filed by the said Tapati Rakshit. (6). Both the suits were contested by the respective defendants by filing written statement and the case of the defendant in the first suit is similar to the case of the plaintiff in the second suit and the case of the plaintiff in the first suit is similar to the case of the defendant in the second suit. It appears from the materials on record that by virtue of the transfer of suit property the respondent Sanjay Kumar Dutta stepped into the shoes of Smt. Tapati Rakshit and he was brought on record in the two suits. (7). The two suits were heard analogously and by a common judgement dated 29th June, 2007 the first suit was dismissed and the second suit was decreed on contest and the respondent Sanjay Kumar Dutta was granted a decree of eviction of the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das from the suit premises and the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das was directed to quit and vacate the suit premises within 30 days of the date of the judgement and deliver khas possession of the suit premises to the said Sanjay Kumar Dutta failing which liberty was given to the Sanjay Kumar Dutta to file execution case for execution of the decree. (8). That challenging such judgement and decrees dated 29th June, 2007 the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das preferred Title Appeal No. 140 of 2007 and Title Appeal No. 141 of 2007 which were also heard analogously by the Learned Lower Appellate Court and by a common judgement dated 8th July, 2008 dismissed both the appeals. (9). Challenging the judgement and decrees dated 8th July, 2008 passed in both the aforesaid appeals being Title Appeal No. 140 of 2007 and Title Appeal No. 141 of 2007 the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das has filed the present two Second Appeals being S.A. No. 626 of 2008 and S.A. Mo. 627 of 2008. (10). (9). Challenging the judgement and decrees dated 8th July, 2008 passed in both the aforesaid appeals being Title Appeal No. 140 of 2007 and Title Appeal No. 141 of 2007 the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das has filed the present two Second Appeals being S.A. No. 626 of 2008 and S.A. Mo. 627 of 2008. (10). It appears from records that the present Second Appeals were admitted on the following two grounds :- (a) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in holding that there existed no relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the parties by totally misreading Exhibit 9 admittedly executed by Tapati in favour of the appellant ; (b) Whether the learned Courts below committed substantial error of law in holding that even after execution of Exhibit 9, there is necessity of further showing payment of rent by grant of rent receipt by overlooking the fact that in Exhibit 9 itself, creation of tenancy in favour of the appellant has been admitted and thus, so long that tenancy is not terminated in accordance with law, the relationship between the landlord and the tenant continues; (11). It appears from the judgement of the learned trial Court that the learned trial Court found that admittedly Mahesh Prosad Das was the previous tenant. It further appears from a written agreement allegedly executed by Tapati Rakshit on 2.5.1994 and marked as Ext. 9, that Bhusan Kumar Das took possession of the suit premises from the previous tenant and proposed to possess the suit property on rent. The learned trial Court observed that such document is a controversial one and even though it was marked as Ext. 9, the respondent (Sanjoy Kumar Dutta) filed an application for expunging the said document but the said application was rejected by order dated 29.8.2005. That challenging such order the respondent filed a revisional application in this Court being CO. No. 3413 of 2005 and this Court had directed the learned trial Court to consider the relevancy and evidentiary value of the said document. It further appears from a perusal of the judgement of the learned trial Court that the said document Ext. That challenging such order the respondent filed a revisional application in this Court being CO. No. 3413 of 2005 and this Court had directed the learned trial Court to consider the relevancy and evidentiary value of the said document. It further appears from a perusal of the judgement of the learned trial Court that the said document Ext. 9 was not mentioned even in the plaint filed by the present appellant nor it was mentioned by the present appellant in the written statement filed in the suit brought by the said Tapati Rakshit and as such the appellant filed an application for amendment of the plaint in the first suit but the said application was rejected by the learned trial Court by an order dated 17.5.2005 and the appellant filed a Civil Revisional Application being CO. No. 2097 of 2005 in this Court which was rejected by this Court. The learned trial Court found that there is practically very little evidentiary value of Ext. 9. The learned trial Court, however, found that if for a moment all the contents of Ext. 9 are taken to be correct, it gives a devastating blow to the appellants case because the document states that the date of induction was 1st May, 1994 as against the claim of the appellant that the tenancy commenced since 1986. The learned trial Court found that having regard to the contradictory statements, the learned trial Court totally disbelieves the allegation of induction of the appellant. The learned trial Court further found that the appellant failed to prove his claim of tenancy and failed to prove the allegation of induction as a tenant and the appellant also failed to prove the alleged tenancy by not being able to produce any rent receipt in his favour. The learned trial Court found that the appellant was a licensee and not a tenant. The learned trial Court found that the first suit should be dismissed and the second suit should be decreed and, accordingly, it granted a decree of eviction of the appellant from the suit premises in favour of the respondent. (12). The Learned Appellate Court affirmed the judgement and decrees of the learned trial Court by holding inter alia that the appellant failed to prove any document to show that he paid rent during the period from 1986 to 1994. (12). The Learned Appellate Court affirmed the judgement and decrees of the learned trial Court by holding inter alia that the appellant failed to prove any document to show that he paid rent during the period from 1986 to 1994. The Learned Appellate Court also found that the title of Tapati Rakshit as well as the present respondent has neither been denied nor it can be denied. With regard to Ext. 9 the Learned Lower Appellate Court observed that the said document does not explain as to what happened during the period 1986 to 1994. (13). The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Bhusan Kumar Das relied upon Ext. 9 in support of his submission that a tenancy was created in favour of the appellant and in view of the acceptance of the Ext. 9 the question of payment of rent or non-payment of rent becomes immaterial and mere non-payment of rent cannot obliterate the tenancy. The said learned senior Counsel submitted that since there is an admission in a document, in this case Ext. 9, unless there is a proper explanation regarding such admission, such admission becomes conclusive. His further submission was that it will appear from the agreement that the previous tenant (Mahesh Prasad Das) surrendered the tenancy in favour of Tapati Rakshit and thereafter the tenancy agreement between the said Tapati Rakshit and the appellant was executed. (14). The learned senior Counsel for the appellant cited a decision reported at 38 Cal WN 861 (Nanilal Das v. Nutbehari Das and Ors.) in support of his submission that even though the burden of proving a fact may be on a certain party, an admission of such fact is the best evidence against the party making it and that there shall be a presumption that such admission is true unless it is shown that it is untrue or it was made under certain circumstances which do not make it binding. (15). The said learned Counsel cited another decision reported in AIR 1960 SC 100 (Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors.) and relied upon with the observation of the Honble Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the said reports to the effect that an admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. (16). (16). The said learned Counsel also relied upon a decision reported at AIR 1981 SC 2085 (Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import) and referred to paragraph 17 of the said reports wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that an admission, unless explained, furnishes the best evidence. According to the said learned senior Counsel, Ext. 9 was not explained either by the said Tapati Rakshit or by the respondent. (17). The learned senior Counsel for the appellant cited a decision reported at AIR 1965 SC 610 (Mrs. M. N. Clubwala and Anr. v. Fida Hussain Saheb and Ors.) in support of his submission that to find out whether an agreement is an agreement of tenancy or merely a licence the Court should take into consideration the intention of the parties and such intention has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. His submission was that the Ext. 9 proves that a tenancy agreement was created in between the appellant and the said Tapati Rakshit and the case of the appellant is based on the said Ext. 9. (18). The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that the allegation regarding Ext. 9 was not pleaded either in the plaint of the first suit or in the written statement of the second suit and the appellant tried to amend his pleadings in the two suits but on both the occasions the appellants application for amendment of his pleadings were rejected by the learned trial Court. Two Civil Revision cases were filed by the appellant being C.O. No. 2097 of 2005 and C.O. No. 4505 of 2006. The said learned senior Counsel relied upon the order dated 30th June, 2005 passed by an Honble Single Judge of this Court in C.O. No. 2097 of 2005. The said C.O. No. 2097 of 2005 was filed against an order of the learned trial Court whereby the appellants application for amendment of his written statement in the second suit was rejected. His Lordship on perusal of the application for amendment of the written statement and the original written statement, was pleased to observe that it appears that the allegations are concocted for the purpose of filing the application for amendment of the written statement of Bhusan Kumar Das. His Lordship on perusal of the application for amendment of the written statement and the original written statement, was pleased to observe that it appears that the allegations are concocted for the purpose of filing the application for amendment of the written statement of Bhusan Kumar Das. His Lordship was further pleased to observe that the said Bhusan Kumar Das never whispered about the existence of any document acknowledging his tenancy by the erstwhile landlady and in the written statement also the said Bhusan Kumar Das never alleged about the existence of any such document and the application for amendment of the written statement was filed to drag the suit. His Lordship was pleased to dismiss the revisional application. In CO. No. 4505 of 2006 this Court by order dated 23.04.2007 took note of the earlier order dated 30.06.2005 and observed that subsequent to the filing of the document the appellant herein again wanted to amend his pleadings but this time his plaint in the first suit but the aim for amendment of pleadings remained the same. The learned trial Court dismissed the application for amendment of the plaint of the appellant and against such order passed by the learned trial Court the said C.O. No. 4505 of 2006 was filed by the appellant. This Court by the said order dated 23.04.2007 also dismissed the said C.O. No, 4505 of 2006. Thus upto this Court the appellants applications for amendment of his pleadings stood rejected. The learned senior Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the document being Ext. 9 was marked as on Exhibit in spite of objection being raised on behalf of the respondent. (19). The learned senior Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the respondent had filed an application for expunging the said Ext. 9 but the said application was dismissed by an order dated 29.08.2005 passed by the learned trial Court. That challenging such order dated 29.08.2005 the respondent filed a Civil Revision case in this Court being C.O. No. 3413 of 2005 and an Honble Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 07.04.2006 was pleased to observe that when a document is admitted in evidence, it does not mean that the contents thereof are sacrosanct, particularly, when such document was admitted with objection. His Lordship was pleased to dispose of the revisional application with the direction on the learned trial Judge to consider the relevance and the evidentiary value of the said alleged agreement being Ext. 9 at the time of final hearing of the suit. The learned senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that both the learned Courts below found that Ext. 9 did not have any foundation in the pleadings of the appellant and since there were no pleadings with regard to Ext. 9, the said Ext. 9 cannot be relied upon, particularly, when the efforts on the part of the appellant to amend his pleadings were unsuccessful upto this Court. (20). The said learned senior Counsel for the respondent further submitted that an application was made by the respondent for appointment of an expert to verify the signatures of Tapati Rakshit purportedly appearing on the said Ext. 9 which is a fraudulent document. The learned trial Court by order dated 01.07.2006 dismissed the said application of the respondent on the ground that the said Ext. 9 is not supported by any pleadings and as such it is meaningless and cannot be considered as an evidence. The learned trial Court also observed that a document, even if, inadvertently exhibited in evidence, does not prove the fact stated in such document when it is not supported by pleadings of the party concerned who presents such document. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that there is no justification to refer the matter to any expert for verification of the signatures of the said Tapati Rakshit since such exercise would only result in wastage of time. (21). According to the said learned senior Counsel, Ext. 9 cannot be said to be an admitted document in the aforesaid circumstances. His further submission was that if such document (Ext. 9) cannot be treated as an admitted document the arguments made by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant fails. (22). The learned senior Counsel for the respondent cited a decision reported at AIR 1980 SC 1109 (Nirod Baran Banerjee v. Dy. Commissioner of Hazaribagh) and referred to paragraph 6 of the said reports wherein it has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings. (23). Commissioner of Hazaribagh) and referred to paragraph 6 of the said reports wherein it has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings. (23). He referred to another judgement reported at AIR 1996 SC 112 [Abubakar Abdul Inamdar (dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. Harun Abdul Inamdar and Ors.] and referred to paragraph 5 of the said reports wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe inter alia that no amount of proof can substitute pleadings which are the foundation of the claim of a litigating party. The learned senior Counsel for the respondent also submitted that the observations made by the learned trial Court in the aforesaid order dated 01.07.2006 have not been challenged by the appellant in the present appeal. According to the said learned senior Counsel, the appellant cannot rely upon Ext. 9. (24). He cited a decision reported at AIR 1960 SC 941 in support of his contention that since the appellant has not challenged such observations of the trial Court in the trial Courts order dated 1.7.2006, in spite of having opportunity to challenge such observations, the appellant cannot at this stage in the second appeal take exception to the said observations of the learned trial Court. According to the said learned senior Counsel for the respondent, the reported cases cited by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case since there was no admission on the part of the respondent and/or the said Tapati Rakshit with regard to Ext. 9. (25). The learned senior Counsel for the respondent cited a decision reported at AIR 1970 SC 1 (Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat) and referred to paragraph 6 and 8 of the said reports. Paragraph 6 and 8 of the said reports are quoted below :- "6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Paragraph 6 and 8 of the said reports are quoted below :- "6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a Superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in those of Superior Courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. 8. Even on the assumption that the order of the appellate Court had not merged in the order of the single judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the Subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions." (26). It will appear from the said reports that the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe to the effect that if a revisional application is filed before the High Court, the High Court, being a Superior Court, can interfere for the purposes of rectifying the error of the Court below and the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Section 115, C.P.C. is a part of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. The said learned senior Counsel submitted that since on earlier occasions this Court had affirmed the order of rejection of the appellants applications for amendment of his pleadings, this Court, in second appeal, cannot pass an order which may have an adverse effect on the earlier orders passed by this Court in the revisional jurisdiction. (27). The learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the reported decisions AIR 1960 SC 100 and AIR 1981 SC 2085 cited by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case since the said cases did not involve the question as to what would be the evidentiary value of the document which does not have its foundation in the pleadings. He further submitted that in the instant case there is no admission on the part of the respondent and/or the said Tapati Rakshit with regard to Ext. -9 and as such the said reported decisions cannot be of any assistance to the appellant. It is true that admission, unless explained, furnishes the best evidence but such principle cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case where there has been no admission at all on the part of the respondent and/or the said Tapati Rakshit with regard to the Ext. 9. (28). The learned senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that since Tapati Rakshit was not examined adverse inference should be drawn against the respondent and this Court should also take into consideration the fact that there is no finding to the effect that Ext. 9 has not been signed by Tapati Rakshit. The said learned senior Counsel further submitted that even if the appellants effort to amend his pleadings failed it does not matter since Ext. 9 is a only piece of evidence and as such it need not be pleaded. He also submitted that the rejection of the appellants application for amendment of pleadings for introducing Ext. 9 cannot prevent this Court in second appeal to reconsider the matter. (29). He cited the judgement reported at (2000)1 SCC 434 (Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through LRs. 9 is a only piece of evidence and as such it need not be pleaded. He also submitted that the rejection of the appellants application for amendment of pleadings for introducing Ext. 9 cannot prevent this Court in second appeal to reconsider the matter. (29). He cited the judgement reported at (2000)1 SCC 434 (Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (Dead) By LRs.) and referred to paragraph 21 of the said reports where from it appears that the Honble Supreme Court had observed that the plaintiffs plea (in the said reported case) against the admissibility of certain Exhibits in the trial Court was rejected by the said Court and a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. was filed by the plaintiff in the High Court but the High Court dismissed the revisional case since that there was no case decided within the meaning of the words "case decided" in Section 115, C.P.C. The plaintiff in the said reported case questioned the admissibility of the said Exhibits in the first appeal. In such circumstances, the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that it was permissible for the said plaintiff to raise the said question in the first appeal in view of Section 105, C.P.C. (30). The learned senior Counsel for the appellant also referred to paragraph 16 of the decision reported at AIR 1960 SC 941 (Satyadhyan Ghosal and Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Anr.) where from it appears that the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. The said learned senior Counsel also referred to Section 105, C.P.C. (31). Having heard the learned senior Counsels for the respective parties and having considered their respective submissions and the facts of the case and also the materials on record this Court is of the view that the appellant has placed his entire case upon Ext. 9. From the order of admission of this appeal it will also appear that the present appeal was admitted on the basis of the existence of Ext. 9 on records. 9. From the order of admission of this appeal it will also appear that the present appeal was admitted on the basis of the existence of Ext. 9 on records. The decisions cited by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant on the point of admission are based on the fact that there has to be a valid admission on record and that such admission can be taken into consideration in accordance with law. (32). Some of the decisions cited by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant on the point of admission are based on the fact that there were valid admissions on record but in the instant case Ext. 9 cannot be said to be an admitted document. It will appear from the facts of the present case that the respondent had applied for the appointment of an expert for verification of the signatures of Tapati Rakshit purportedly appearing on the document being Ext. 9. The learned trial Court dismissed such application on the ground that such Ext. 9 cannot be treated as an evidence. The learned trial Court also observed that if any document is inadvertently exhibited in evidence it does not prove the facts stated in such document when it is not supported by the pleadings of the party concerned who presents such document. In such circumstances, the learned trial Court held that there was no justification to refer the matter to any expert for verification of signatures of the said Tapati Rakshit. In such circumstances it cannot be said that Ext. 9 was admitted by the respondent. It will also appear from the facts and circumstances of the present case that an Honble Single Judge of this Court by order dated 30th June, 2005 passed in C.O. No. 2097 of 2005 was pleased to observe that it appeared that the allegations made by the appellant were concocted for the purpose of filing the application for amendment of written statement in the second suit and the application for amendment of the written statement was filed to drag the suit. It will also appear from the facts and circumstances of the present case that in C.O. No. 3413 of 2005 an Honble Single Judge of this Court by order dated 7.4.2006 was also pleased to observe that when a document was admitted in evidence, it does not mean that the contents of such document are sacrocant, particularly, when such document is admitted with objection. Ext. 9 was marked as an exhibit in spite of objection being raised on behalf of the respondent. The facts and circumstances of the present case, thus, shows that Ext. 9 was not at all an admitted document and the contents of Ext. 9 was also not proved in accordance with law. An Honble Single of this Court in the said order dated 7.4.2006 (passed in C.O. No. 3413 of 2005) was also pleased to direct that the learned Trial Judge shall consider the relevance and evidentiary value of such alleged agreement being Ext. 9 at the time of final hearing of the suit. The findings of the learned Courts below in this regard have been against the appellant. The Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 1109 , as indicated earlier, has been pleased to observe that it is well settled that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings. Apart from the fact that Ext. 9 does not have any foundation in the pleadings, this Court on two occasions affirmed the Trial Courts order that the appellant cannot be permitted to amend his pleadings for the purpose of introducing Ext. 9 in the pleadings. In such circumstances, Ext. 9 cannot be looked into. Since Ext. 9 cannot be looked into the argument made by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant that adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that Tapati Rakshit was not examined as a witness in the context of Ext. 9 becomes an argument without any substance. His other submission that it is important to note that there Is no finding on record that Ext. 9 had not been signed by Tapati Rakshit also cannot stand. The respondent made an application for verification of the signatures of Tapati Rakshit on the document being Ext. 9 since it was the respondents case that the said Ext. His other submission that it is important to note that there Is no finding on record that Ext. 9 had not been signed by Tapati Rakshit also cannot stand. The respondent made an application for verification of the signatures of Tapati Rakshit on the document being Ext. 9 since it was the respondents case that the said Ext. 9 is a fraudulent document but such application was rejected on the grounds that the said Ext. 9 is meaningless and cannot be considered as an evidence. Thus it is immaterial that there is no finding that the said Ext. 9 has not been signed by Tapati Rakshit. The argument made by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant that it is immaterial that the appellant could not amend his pleadings since Ext. 9 is only a piece of evidence and it need not be pleaded also cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The orders passed by the two revisional Courts, as indicated earlier, do not allow the appellant to make such submissions. Ext. 9 cannot be relied upon by the appellant as it has no foundation in the pleadings. This Court cannot reconsider the matter which has already been agitated by the appellant in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court earlier. The decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 , as already indicated above, has to be borne in mind. The decision reported at (2000)1 SCC 434 cannot be of any assistance to the appellant since in that case the application under Section 115, C.P.C. was dismissed by the High Court as it was found that it was not a "case decided" as contemplated under Section 115, C.P.C. (33). Thus, this Court finds that the appellant cannot rely upon Ext. 9 as it cannot be looked into since it has no foundation in the pleadings. The appellants efforts to amend his pleadings have stood rejected upto this Court on earlier occasions. (34). In view of the discussions made above, this Court does not find any merit in the instant appeals which are, accordingly, dismissed. The judgement and decrees passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court are affirmed. (35). There shall, however, be no order as to costs.